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This thesis provides an analysis of communism in Britain between 1927 
and 1932. In these years, the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) 
embarked upon a'new period' of political struggle around the concept of 
class against class. The increasingly draconian measures of the Labour 
Party and trade union bureaucracy between 1924 and 1927 significantly 
restricted the scope of communist influence within the mainstream labour 
movement. As such, the CPGB 
- 
in accordance with the Communist 
International 
- 
attempted to establish an 'independent leadership' of the 
working class. 
The decline in Communist Party membership that accompanied the'New 
Line'has led historians to associate an apparent collapse in CPGB 
influence with the political perspective of class against class. Similarly, the 
CPGB's initial resistance to the line has been interpreted as evidence of the 
Party's willing subservience to Moscow. In this thesis, such a portrayal of 
communist motive and experience will be challenged. Instead, a more 
multifaceted approach will endeavour to show that: i) the 'left turn' of 
1927- 28 complemented attitudes evident in Britain since at least 1926; ii) 
the simultaneous collapse in CPGB influence related primarily to the 
structural changes afflicting Britain (and the British labour movement) 
between the wars; iii) the period was a difficult but not completely 
disastrous time for the Party. Rather, the years should be seen as a 
transitional period, in which the focus of communist activity moved out of 
the workplace and onto the streets. Thus, the Party's successful 
mobilisation of the unemployed, and the development of an idiosyncratic 
communist culture, were 'positive' factors. And finally; iv) that the 
political line pursued by the CPGB was more flexible and changeable than 
IV 
has hitherto been recognised. The Party continually modified its political 
strategy and objectives throughout the Third Period. Moreover, the 
'sectarian excesses' that characterised class against class were due in part 
to the will of the Party rank and file. Many in the Party embraced the 
exclusivity of the New Line, and were responsible for interpreting the 
policy'on the ground. ' 
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Introduction 
The Communist Party of Great Britain 
in the Third Period 
In an essay devoted to the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) and 
the recently opened communist archive, Kevin Morgan suggested that "if 
the British Party's history is worth writing at all, it is because it often 
exercised a political and cultural influence out of all proportion to its 
size. "' This thesis however, while endorsing the essence of Morgan's 
assertion, is an attempt to understand the CPGB in a period generally 
regarded to be amongst the most calamitous in the Party's history. Between 
1927 and 1932, Communist Party membership dwindled, its leadership 
fractured, and many of the links the CPGB had tirelessly established with 
the wider labour movement were curtailed. Non-Party allies, such as the 
miners' leader A. J. Cook, were denounced as social fascists; joint 
initiatives established with the trade unions and the Labour left were 
discontinued; and the CPGB found itself increasingly estranged from both 
the work environment, and the working class that the Party endeavoured to 
represent. 
And yet, although many of the channels through which the Party had 
carved out a political influence were obstructed during these years, the 
CPGB remained a significant presence in other important spheres. The 
Party had become the undisputed leader of the unemployed by the early 
1930s, leading national Hunger Marches and helping thousands of workers 
negotiate the trauma of unemployment at a local level. Also 'on the 
ground', the CPGB organised social and political events such as football 
IK. Morgan, 'The CPGB and the Comintern Archives. 'In Socialist HistoEy Autumn 1993, 
P19. 
leagues, campaigns for free school meals, local news sheets and aid for 
striking workers. Similarly, the CP developed a rich educational and 
cultural environment. Party schools were established; workers' theatre and 
film groups developed across the country; and numerous social events 
were organised to raise money for various communist initiatives. As such, 
this thesis will examine the nature of Communist Party influence and 
support between 1927 and 1932, based upon the premise that: i) 
'understanding the lulls in Party influence are as important to the study of 
communism in Britain as the various peaks; and ii) that the late 1920s and 
early 30s were a difficult but not wholly disastrous time for the CPGB- 
The prevailing view of communist activity in this period is an 
overwhelmingly negative one. Historians both sympathetic and hostile to 
the Party generally agree that the CPGB suffered during these years; and 
both locate the blame for the Party's apparent decline in the class against 
class policy pursued by the CP from 1928. Such a policy 
- 
which sought 
to reveal the 'treacherous' role of social democracy while simultaneously 
establishing an 'independent' communist leadership of the working class 
- 
is seen to be inapplicable to the 'objective conditions' prevalent in Britain 
in the 1920-30s. Furthermore, the policy's proximity to Stalin's 
consolidation of power within the Soviet Union has further tainted the 
period as one of growing 'Stalinisation' and communist uniformity. 
Commentators have therefore, either dismissed the period as an anomaly 
in the CPGB's development and ignored the wider implications of the New 
Line (as the policy was alternatively called); or stressed the prominent role 
played by the Comintern in the implementation of the policy so as to 
highlight the CPGB's subservience to Moscow/Stalin. The British 
Communist Party was brow beaten into submission, the argument goes, 
and suffered as a consequence. 
2 
Henry Pelling's account of the Third Period, written in the midst of the 
Cold War, encapsulates such a 'traditional' view. "By 1928" writes Pelling, 
the CPGB's "slavish submission to Moscow" led to the "barren class 
against class policy" being forced upon the compliant British Party. 
'Alienation' from 'any general influence whatsoever' followed as a 
consequence. 2 Similarly damning accounts of the period emerge from 
Trotskyist writers. Robert Black's outlandish Stalinism in Britain for 
example, relentlessly attributes every move of the CPGB to Stalinist 
manoeuvring. Hugo Dewar meanwhile, focuses on Party explanations and 
'excuses' for the New Line. Class against class he concludes, was a 
'misreading' of the "entire political situation in the most blockheaded 
manner possible. "3 A more balanced Trotskyist critique comes from Brian 
Pearce, but here too marginalised political point scoring overrides 
objective analysiS. 4 
Both Pelling and the various Trotskyist historians fail to place the 
experience of the CPGB beyond the parameters of the Party's relationship 
to Moscow and the Communist International. Inconsistencies in CPGB 
policy are highlighted with an apparent disregard to wider considerations. 
Such accounts fail to acknowledge the indigenous factors that facilitated a 
'left turn' in communist thinking. In particular, they fail to place the 
experience of the CPGB within the context of the wider British labour 
movement. As such, the 'traditional' argument is overwhelmingly 
determinist and one sided; Stalin moulded communist policy, the CPGB 
2H. Pelling, The British Communist Paqy- A Historical Profile (London, 1959), ppS4-72. 
For a more recent, but similarly prejudiced account, see F. Beckett, The Enemy Within: 
The Rise and Fall of the British Communist Pa! V (London, 1995), pp36-37 and pp44-47. 
Beckett describes the "fatility" of the New Line with barely disguised glee. 
3R. Black, Stalinism in Britain (London, 1970). H. Dewar, Communist Politics in Britain: 
The CPGB from its Origins to the Second World War (London, 1976), pp88-102. 
4M. Woodhouse and B. Pearce, Essgys on the HistoEy of Communism in Britain (London, 
1975). 
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did as it was told, and the Party became alienated from the British working 
class. This thesis will contest such a viewpoint in an attempt to place the 
experiences of the CPGB within a broader paradigm. The Party's fortunes 
will be discussed in relation to the social, political and economic climate 
of the time, wherein the changing economic structure of the UK, and 
developments within the British labour movement, were fundamental to 
the Party's evolution. 
Those historians more sympathetic to the activities of the CPGB are also 
generally dismissive of the class against class years. The Third Period is 
reduced to a homogenous block, and although the Party's adoption of the 
New Line is rightly considered to have a rationale beyond Stalinist power 
politics, the argument remains essentially focused on the implementation 
(or failure) of the Party line. "The New Line" says Noreen Branson in the 
third volume of the Communist Party's history, "was a disaster. " Emphasis 
is thus placed on the Party's falling membership and the divisions inside 
the CP leadership. 5 Similarly, Willie Thompson's account of the Third 
Period is one of "total and bitter isolation. " After conceding that the 
relationship between the CPGB and the Labour Party and trade unions 
further deteriorated following the General Strike, Thompson maintains that 
the line ran "wholly against the grain of British realities. " As such, the line 
of the CPGB again becomes the predominant cause of the Party's loss of 
influence, and while Thompson also refers to the Party's successful 
mobilisation of the unemployed, no attempt is made to reconcile these two 
seemingly contradictory trends. 6 
5N. Branson, History of the Communist PaM of Great Britain (London, 1985), pp 17-5 1. 
6W. Thompson, The Good Old Cause: British Communism 1920-1991 (London, 1992), 
pp44-50. 
4 
Thompson further suggests that the adoption of the New Line led the 
CPGB "to abandon a position from which it could never subsequently 
recover. "7 Yet such a view neglects the evolutionary nature of history, and 
ignores the continually changing nature of communist 
- 
labour-socialist 
relations and socio-economic development. Moreover, it presupposes that 
a fixed 'position' was altered through communist realignment. As will be 
demonstrated throughout this thesis, the policies of the Third Period were 
actually under constant review, and the sectarianism that undoubtedly did 
characterise communist activity between 1928 and 1931 was regularly 
attacked by the Comintern and British Party leaders. By treating the New 
Line as a constant and solid entity, the various attempts made by the 
CPGB to adapt the line to the 'objective situation' in UK are overlooked. 
In their 1975 essay Trade Unions and Revolution: The Industrial Politics 
of the Early British Communist-PaLty, James Hinton and Richard Hyman 
have gone some way towards locating the fortunes and experiences of the 
CPGB within a fluid historical context. While noting that the revolutionary 
zeal of the New Line was incongruous, Hinton and Hyman place the 
(mis)fortunes of the Party within the "profoundly unfavourable conditions" 
of the depression years, outlining the changing nature of the Labour Party 
and the trade unions, and the immobilising effect of economic depression 
and unemployment on a revolutionary proletarian movement. 8 Even so, the 
essay's focus on political practice negates a detailed analysis of the Third 
Period, and concentrates primarily on the theoretical 'correctness' of Party 
policy. 9 
71bid. 
8See D. Geary, European Labour Politics from 1900 to the Depression (London, 199 1), 
pp6l-66. 
9J. Hinton and R. Hyman, Trade Unions and Revolution: The Industrial Politics of thg 
Early British Communist Pagy (London, 1975). 
5 
More detailed studies of the CPGB and the Minority Movement (MM), by 
L. J. Macfarlane and Roderick Martin respectively, clearly demonstrate 
various nuances in the British Party's approach to the New Line. However, 
both fall short of an adequate analysis. 10 Macfarlane ends his account in 
1929, thus arbitrarily discarding the New Line's continual evolution and 
the CPGB's numerous political and theoretical realignments. We are left 
hanging, with the CPGB in mid-crisis. And while Macfarlane details 
possible British motives for a political 'left turn' (the expulsion of 
communists from the Labour Party and the trade unions, communist anger 
and analysis in the wake of the General Strike, declining Anglo-Soviet 
relations) he fails to apply them to either the perspective of the CPGB, or 
the 'space' in which the Party attempted to function. II Martin meanwhile, 
outlines the failings of the New Line in relation to communist trade union 
activity. Again, the decline in communist influence is attributed almost 
solely to the line of the CPGB, and subsequently little or no attention is 
placed upon the general decline in trade union activity between 1927 and 
1930; structural changes in the British economy; and divergent communist 
- 
labour-socialist relations prior to the introduction of class against class 
in 1928. 
Such an exclusive focus on the Party line (and the dismissal of a six to 
seven year period as either'good', 'bad', a 'success' or 'disastee) is clearly 
inadequate, and historians in the 1980s and 90s have sought to offer a 
more complex appraisal of Communist Party history. As Eric Hobsbawm 
and Perry Anderson have both suggested, a satisfactory appraisal of any 
10L. J. Macfarlane, The British Communist Pa[jy: Its Origin and Development until 1929 
(London, 1966). R. Martin, Communism and the British Trade Unions, 1924-1933 
(Oxford, 1969). 
1 IMacfarlane also ignores the cultural side of CPGB activity, and 'traditionally' remains 
fixed on the 'line' of the Party. He concludes: '... the adoption of the New Line was the 
main factor which accelerated the rate of decline after 1928. ' ibid, p286. 
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Communist Party necessitates a multifarious approach. 12 The Party's 
relationship to the Comintern must be reconciled against the particular 
environment within which the Party operated. The basis of CP support and 
the nature of the Party must be explained. Finally, the 'success' of the CP 
must be measured against more than just electoral and industrial policy. 
The communist experience was a total one, and its ideology cut across 
social, political and cultural bounds. 13 
More recently, historians have tended to concentrate upon certain areas of 
communist activity (or key figures within the movement) as opposed to the 
specific nature of the Party line. Subsequently, the diversity of communist 
experience in the late 1920s and early 1930s is revealed, and assumptions 
inherent in the 'traditional' view of the class against class years are 
undermined. Stuart Maclntyre's study of the Marxist tradition in Britain for 
example, clearly demonstrates that the divisions between communists and 
labour-socialists explicit during the Third Period, were evident well before 
the Party's adoption of the New Line. 14 MacIntyre, along with Alan 
Campbell and Hywel Francis, has also presented valuable research into the 
diverse experiences of the British communist movement. By looking at 
specific communities (mainly in Wales and Scotland) these historians 
show that the influence and import of the CPGB was closely connected to 
indigenous factors 
- 
local traditions or economic environment. 15 
12E. Hobsbawm, 'Problems of Communist History. ' In Revolutionaries (London, 1973), 
pp3 
-10. P. Anderson, 'Communist Party History! In R. Samuel, People's Histojy and 
Socialist Theoly (London, 198 1), pp 145-156. 
DSee K. Morgan, Against Fascism and War: Ruptures and Continuities in British 
Communist Politics 1935-41 Manchester 1989. Morgan offers this work as a contribution 
to Anderson's sisyphean task. 
14S. Macintyre, A Proletarian Science: Marxism in Britain. 1917-1933 (Cambridge, 
1980). 
15S. Macintyre, Little Moscows: Communism and Working Class Militangy in Inter War 
aritain (London, 1980). H. Francis and D. Smith, The Fed: A HistojY of the South Wales 
Miners in the Twentieth Centuly (London, 1980). H. Francis, Miners Against Fascism 
London, 1984). 'The Communist Party in the Scots Coal Fields in the Inter-War Period. 
'In Andrews, Fishman, Morgan (Eds. ) Opening the Books: EssUs on the Cultural Histoly 
Raphael Samuel's, Stephen Jones' and Alun Howkin's varied studies of 
Communist Party culture have also given a new significance to CP activity 
in the late 1920s, early 30s. Workers'theatre groups, football, netball, 
rambling and cycling clubs, film societies and even Esperanto circles, 
were developed by the Party in these years to the benefit of many beyond 
the CPGB itself. 16 Similarly, Richard Croucher's history of the National 
Unemployed Workers' Committee Movement (NUWCM), has 
demonstrated clearly what previous commentators have noted but never 
really explored; the Party's successful mobilisation of a national 
unemployed movement. 17 Finally, the work of Kevin Morgan, Nina 
Fishman, John Callaghan and Sue Bruley 
- 
though concentrating on 
broader topics 
- 
has also revealed the various adjustments in communist 
and CPGB perspective that occurred throughout the Third Period. Bruley's 
research into the Party's attitude towards women, Fishman's account of the 
Party's industrial policy, and Morgan and Callaghan's definitive 
biographies of Harry Pollitt and Rajani Palme Dutt, all demonstrate how 
the Party attempted to adapt itself within the framework of the New Line. 
Focuses changed, initiatives were born, and general failures were mixed 
with limited success. 18 
of the British Communist PpIly (London, 1995). Also'The Social History of Political 
Conflict in the Scots Coal Fields 1910-1939. 'In A. Campbell, N. Fishman, D. Howell, 
Miners. Unions and Politics, 1910-47 (Aldershot, 1996). 
16R. Samuel, E. MacColl, S. Cosgrave, Theatres of the Left: Workers'Theatre Movement 
in Britain and America 1880-1935 (London, 1984). R. Samuel, 'The Lost World of 
British Communism., In New Left Review November/December 1985, March-April 
1986, September-October 1987. S. G. Jones, Workers at Play: A Social and Economic 
HistoKy of Leisure (London, 1986). 'Sport, Politics and the Labour Movement: The 
British Workers'Sports Federation, 1923-35. 'In British Journal of Sports Histojy Vol.. 2 
No. 2 1985. A. Howkins, "Class Against Class: The Political Culture of the Communist 
Party of Great Britain, 1930-35. 'In F. Goldsmith (Ed. ), Class Culture and Social Change 
(Sussex, 1980), pp208-239. 
17R. Croucher, We Refuse to Starve in Silence: A Histojy of the National Unemployed 
Workers'Movement (London, 1987). 
18The attention paid to women's issues in the early 1930s was a clear example of the 
Party acting upon a1esson leamt'during the Third Period. S. Bruley, Leninism, Stalimsm 
and the Women's Movement in Britain 
. 
1920-1939 (New York, 1986). 'Women and 
8 
Understandably however, the general opinion of the New Line period 
remains incredulous. Kevin Morgan has argued that "but for Soviet 
subventions, [the CPGB] would virtually have collapsed. " While Nina 
Fishman has suggested that it took the political guile of Party leaders such 
as Harry Pollitt and Johnny Campbell to halt the CPGB's drift towards 
ultra-7left obscurity. Hywel Francis too, in his study of the Welsh mining 
communities, has described the policy as "industrial suicide. " 19 Only Mike 
Squires and Alun Howkins have attempted to portray the Third Period in a 
positive light. Squires refers to the increase in Party membership from 
193 1, while Howkins points to the burgeoning Party culture of the early 
1930s. Both arguments are instructive, but somewhat misleading. Squires' 
concentration on membership figures ignores any possible disparity 
between numbers and influence, and Howkin's study (situated within a 
collection of essays on class culture) is not broad enough to constitute a 
comprehensive 'line' on the Third Period. 20 
Within this thesis therefore, a fresh analysis of the CPGB in the Third 
Period will be offered. This will consider the fortunes and experiences of 
the British communist movement beyond the parameters of the Party line. 
While the disputes over policy and the Party's relationship with the 
Communist International are imperative to an understanding of communist 
activity (and will be discussed in detail within this thesis), the wealth of 
Communism: A Case Study of the Lancashire Weavers in the Depression. ' In Andrews, 
Fishman, Morgan (Ed. ), Opening the Books op. cit. K. Morgan, 'The CPGB'op. cit. Also 
Hagy Pollitt (Manchester, 1993). N. Fishman, The British Communist Pam and the 
Trade Unions, 1933-45 (Aldershot, 1995). J. Callaghan, Rajani Palme Dutt: A Study in 
British Stalinism (London, 1993). 
19K. Morgan, 'The CPGB'op. cit. p 19. N. Fishman, The British Communist Party op. cit. 
pp3l-43. H. Francis, Miners Against Fascism op. cit. p47. 
20M. Squires, Saklatvala: A Political BioUaphy (London, 1990). pp208-223. 'CPGB 
Membership During the Class Against Class Years. ' In Socialist History Winter 1993. A. 
Howkins, "Class Against Class' op. cit. 
9 
evidence unveiled by the communist archive, and the spaces opened up by 
recent research, necessitate a broader, more multifaceted analysis. The 
years between 1927 and 1932 were ones in which the focus and 
composition of the CPGB changed dramatically. The antagonisms that had 
long divided communists and labour-socialists (or social democrats) 
became entrenched in the mid-late 1920s, while the federal, liberal nature 
of British socialism was replaced by the hegemonic dominance of the 
Labour Party and TUC. The changing economic structure of the UK 
shattered the traditional bases of radical socialist (later communist) 
support. The miners, engineers, and shipbuilders, who formed the 
backbone of British militancy, were displaced through economic 
depression and unemployment. Communists were expelled from the 
Labour Party and, following the General Strike, silenced in the unions. As 
such, the focus of the Party's struggle moved from the workshop to the 
street and the dole queue. 
Such an approach will not endeavour to turn history on its head. The 
difficulties and traumas experienced by the CPGB, and detailed in 
previous studies, were very real ones. The memoirs and testimonies of 
communists involved with the Party during the Third Period are full of 
frustration and disappointment. Harry Pollitt, for example, who became 
General Secretary of the CPGB in 1929, and its de facto leader in 1930, 
would later recall the period of his promotion thus: 
We had 3,500 dues paying members, no daily paper, and disagreements on policy that 
required two Party congresses to sort out 
... 
I think the Party congress in Leeds in November 1929 was the most difficult congress I have ever attended. I made a political 
report that was received in stoney silence. 21 
1 H. Pollitt, Twen! y Years Fight for Socialism (CPGB pamphlet, 1949). p2. 
10 
Party members such as Ernie Benson and William Paynter describe 'dark 
days' of unemployment and poverty, 22 CP election candidates recall 
humiliating defeats and returned deposits, 23 and veterans of numerous 
industrial struggles remember fighting for an 'independent leadership' in a 
tone of anger and futility. 24 ldris Cox, a champion of the New Line who 
rose through the Party apparatus during the Third Period, belatedly 
regretted the "amazing [amount ofl time, heat, and imagination 
... 
expanded 
on secondary tactical issues. "25 And even Rajani Palme Dutt, who 
remained uncompromisingly loyal to the CP throughout his life, later 
conceded that 'class against class' was a "potentially misleading slogan, " 
and that the period's formulation of 'social fascism' led to "harmftil" 
repercussions. 26 
Consequently, this study will endeavour to place the Third Period in 
perspective; to suggest that the policy pursued by the CPGB in the wake of 
the General Strike was in many ways a palpable response to contemporary 
events and attitudes. This was certainly true within broader Comintern 
circles, where dissatisfaction with the more moderate policies of 1924-26 
was widespread. 27 With regard to the CPGB, the attitudes expressed 
during the class against class years were neither 'alien' to the Party, nor 
were they uniformly imposed from 'outside'. Moreover, in line with the 
22E. Benson, To Struggle is to Live: A Working Class Autobiography (Newcastle, 1980), 
ppl7-19. W. Paynter, My Generation (London, 1972), pp82-108. 
23H. Pollitt, Serving My Time (London, 1940), pp 265-283. J. T. Murphy, New Horizons 
(London, 194 1), pp291-294. H. Crawftird, Autobiographical Transcrip (undated). 
Communist Archive. 
24M. McCarthy, Generation in Revolt (London, 1953), pp 151-153. A. Homer, 
Incorrigible Rebel (London, 1960), pp 103-111. 
251. Cox, Personal and Political Recollections (undated). Communist Archive. 
26R. P. Dutt, The Internationale (London, 1964), pp209-10. 
27This was abundantly clear in Germany. See E. D. Weitz, Creating German Communism 
(Princeton, 1997). 
II 
perspective of the late Eddie Frow, the period was a mixture of positive 
and negative results. 28 
In chapter one, the foundations of British Communist Party support are 
examined in relation to the structural changes affecting Britain in the inter- 
war period. During the years under review, communist influence and the 
focus of communist agitation were forced out of the workshop and onto 
the street, as changes in the British (and world) economy affected both 
industry and society. This is explored further in chapter two, where the 
ramifications of the General Strike will be discussed in conjunction with 
the emergence of a more 'leftist' communist perspective. From late 1926 
through 1927, the theoretical basis of Communist International policy (as 
outlined by Nikolai Bukharin) hardened, while Communist Party criticism 
of the trade union and Labour Party bureaucracy intensified in response to 
the perceived betrayal of May 1926. Concurrently, both the Labour Party 
and the trade unions extended measures restricting communist influence 
within the broader labour movement, compounding variances inherent in 
the communist 
- 
labour-socialist dialectic. Essentially, the retreat of the 
British labour movement evident since 1920-21 was accentuated in the 
years following the General Strike as the militant wing of the movement 
succumbed to the more moderate, conciliatory majority. 
The implementation and principal effects of the New Line are outlined in 
chapters three and four. Although the decision to radically alter the 
political direction of the CPGB emerged within the Executive Committee 
of the Communist International (ECCI), the New Line introduced in 
February 1928 was relatively limited. It is argued that the New Line must 
28K. Morgan, 'Engineering Struggles: Eddie Frow. 'In M. Herbert and E. Taplin, Born 
with a Book in his Hand: A Tribute to Eddie Frow 1906-1997 Manchester 1998. p 12. 
12 
be seen as evolutionary. That is, its scope widened and contracted in 
accordance with national and international events, and as a consequence of 
power struggles within the communist movement. Crucially, the leftist 
perspective that characterised CPGB politics throughout 1929 was 
persistently to the left of the Comintern, and it took pressure from both the 
ECCI and sections of the British leadership to realign the CPGB with the 
International line. 
Also within chapter four, as well as in chapters five and seven, the 
practical application of the New Line is detailed. The achievements and 
work of the CPGB are equated with the material conditions in which the 
Party operated. In such instances as the Yorkshire and Lancashire textile 
disputes, communists attempted to rally support in areas where the CP had 
little local support. Conversely, in areas where the Party did have deep- 
rooted support, industrial action was limited by unemployment and union 
recalcitrance. Moreover, as the trade unions sought to limit communist 
influence, the capability of Party members to influence events was 
similarly restricted. This was compounded not only by the CPGB's 
unrealistic attempts to establish an independent communist leadership, but 
also by Party members' unemployment and subsequent separation from the 
workplace. As such, the organisational rigour many communists had 
applied to industrial politics, was now applied to the struggles of the 
unemployed. Thus, when and where conditions favoured communist 
agitation 
- 
during the heightened political atmosphere of late 1931 for 
example 
- 
the Party was able to act effectively (through the NUWM) and 
gain support. 
The period between 1927 and 1932 should be seen as transitional one for 
the CPGB, during which the Party was forced to adapt itself to the 
13 
changing nature of inter-war Britain, to widen the scope of its activity, and 
to create a political totality distinct from that of the mainstream labour 
movement. The genesis of such a development is discussed in chapters 
five and seven, wherein the Party's various attempts to realign itself with 
the British working class are examined. 
Correspondingly, the emergence of a distinctly communist culture, is 
explored in chapter six. The Party's decision to act independently of the 
organised labour movement instigated a number of cultural initiatives. An 
idiosyncratic Party social life subsequently emerged, and was chronicled 
in the pages of the Daily Worker. Moreover, through numerous study 
groups and Party schools, the CPGB expanded upon a tradition of 
proletarian education indicative of the early British labour movement. 
The history of the CPGB and the New Line is complex and varied, and this 
thesis is an attempt to chronicle the multiple experiences of the Party in the 
Third Period. So far as is possible, the historical framework outlined by 
Anderson and Hobsbawm has been adhered to, although to fulfil such an 
extensive criteria would need a considerably larger body of work. As Nina 
Fishman noted in 1995, "British historians have failed to revise their 
standard accounts [of the New Line] to take account of recent research 
which shows the Comintern's flexible interpretation of its own line. Not 
only have they ignored evidence of the Comintern's pragmatism, they have 
also not considered the published accounts of the CPGB's own particular 
political trajectory. 1129 It is hoped that this work will go some way towards 
correcting such an incongruity. 30 
29N. Fishman, The British Communist PgM op. cit. p36. 
30This thesis is primarily focused on the CPGB's activity within Britain itself. 
Subsequently, the Party's work in relation to the British colonies is neglected in the 
interest of time and space. 
14 
Chapter One 
A Party in Transition 
1926-1932 
Traditional portrayals of the CPGB in the Third Period have concentrated 
primarily on the collapse in Communist Party membership and the 
simultaneous withering of communist influence that afflicted the CP in the 
late twenties. I But while the Party did diminish in both number and 
influence during the years of class against class, to attribute such a 
'disaster' to the political line of the CPGB is to ignore the economic, social, 
and political realities that ensnared the British labour movement in the late 
1920s-30s. It is the purpose of this chapter, to approach the experience of 
the CPGB from a broader perspective. 
Foremost, the traditional correlation between Communist Party influence 
and Party membership is highly problematic. Kevin Morgan has correctly 
raised this concern in relation to Mike Squires' attempt to give a more 
positive reading to the New Line years, but such an observation should 
also be applied to the overtly negative interpretations of the period. 2 The 
origins of the growing divide between the CPGB and the reformist labour 
movement began prior to the introduction of the New Line. The hostile 
I See introduction for the views of various historians. 
2K. Morgan, 'The CPGB' op. cit. pp 19-20. M. Squires, Saklatvala op. cit. pp208-223. 
Also M. Squires, 'The CPGB and Class Against Class. 'In Socialist Histojy Winter 1993. 
pp4-13. Squires rightly points out that the Party was firmly aligned to the policy of class 
against class when CP membership began to increase in 193 1. However, he neglects the 
fact that the Party remained sufficiently concerned about its 'isolation from the masses' to 
overhaul the Party apparatus in 1932; to restrain the more extreme concepts of the New 
Line from 1930 through to 1932; and to recognise the severe lack of communist influence 
in the factories and trade unions. It was not until the CPGB overhauled the Party 
apparatus in 1932 that the Party was able to consolidate its membership and broaden its 
influence. From that time, the Party managed to balance the notion of an independent lead 
with a broadly based united front policy that focused on the 'grass roots' concerns of the 
workers, while the social-economic conditions of the mid-30s became more conducive to 
working class agitation. 
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policy of the Labour Party and the TUC, coupled with the mass exodus of 
Party members recruited during and immediately following the General 
Strike, significantly influenced the CPGB's (and the Comintern's) change 
of approach. As such, those membership figures generally used by 
historians to demonstrate Communist Party decline have been applied in 
an arbitrary manner. Both the low of November 1930 (2,555) and the high 
of late 1926 (10,730)3 were statistical extremes. 4 
Indeed the extent to which the rank and file membership of the Communist 
Party were influenced by the specifics of the Party line must be 
questioned. While the 'hardcore' of the CPGB were dedicated militants 
with at least a basic understanding of Marxist ideas, those who joined the 
Party in the midst of an industrial struggle, or in the sway of a dazzling 
oratory display by Tom Mann or Shapurji Saklatvala, did so for quite 
different reasons. And although the Party's emphasis on political training 
was undoubtedly an attempt to facilitate a revolutionary class 
consciousness, the majority of those who passed quickly through the ranks 
of the CPGB, did so on the basis of the Party's relationship to their own 
circumstances. Hence, the miners of the 1926 lock-out and the 
unemployed of the 1930s means test demonstrations. 
It is clear therefore, that any history of the CPGB must encompass more 
than just the political line of the Party at any given time. Of equal, if not 
more importance to the development and fortunes of the Communist Party, 
3The membership actually reached 11,127 in December 1926 (Pgly Census January- 
February, 1927. Klugmann Papers), but historians usually refer to the figure of 10,730 
given at the 1926 Party Congress. 
417or the question of why the CPGB generally failed to appeal to the mass of the British 
people see D. Geary European Labour Protest 1848-1939 (London, 1981), and European 
Labour Politics from 1900 to the Depression op. cit. See also R. McKibbon, The Ideolog 
of Class (Oxford, 1990). 
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was the social, economic and political climate in which it functioned. 
Between 1926 and 1932, the British economy was in the midst of 
substantial structural problems. The old export reliant industries of coal, 
textiles, steel, and shipbuilding were in decline, unemployment was 
increasing, and those communities centred around Britain's staple 
industries were falling deep into depression. Significantly, it was in just 
those communities that the CPGB had a basis of support, and the 
disintegration of those localities greatly affected the Party's traditional 
sphere of influence. 
Furthermore, the structural problems confronting sections of the economy 
in the twenties and thirties affected other working class organisations. 
Trade union membership (and therefore influence) also declined, and the 
growing homogeneity of the Labour Party as a parliamentary force 
overshadowed the numerous guilds, co-operatives, and associations that 
had once characterised British socialism. Militant workers (both 
communist and non-communist) subsequently became marginalised in the 
wake of May 1926. Hounded from trade union and Labour Party branches, 
victimised by their employers, militant workers were forced through 
circumstance to focus their activity away from the shopfloor and onto the 
plight of the unemployed. 5 
It is within such a climate of social and economic dislocation therefore, 
that the difficulties experienced by the CPGB in Third Period must be 
assessed. 
SThis was clearly evident in South Wales where militant miners were blacklisted and 
condemned to unemployment. See W. Paynter, My Generatio op. cit. pp82-108, for a 
personal account. See also H. Francis and D. Smith, The Fed op. cit. pp98-107. 
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The Communist Party of Great Britain: Foundations of Support 
In February 1927, the CPGB registered a membership of 7,909 spread 
across 219 local Party branches. 6 The membership was predominantly 
male (there were 1,122 female members), and predominantly working 
class, with the majority of the Party consisting of mine workers recruited 
in the wake of the General Strike and miners' lock-out of 1926.7 Of these, 
5,823 communists were also members of a trade union, the majority of 
whom (3,753) were in the MFGB. The communist presence in other 
unions was less substantial, with relatively little representation in the AEU 
(219), the NUR (168) and the TGWU (152). Even so, the Party was able to 
exert an influence that belied its small number through the National 
Minority Movement, which claimed to represent 956,000 workers in 1926, 
and through the acquisition of official positions within the various union 
branches and trades councils. 8 As well as Arthur Homer and Harry Pollitt's 
annual appearance at the TUC, 9 numerous lesser known Party members 
held official positions within the union apparatus. 10 The CPGB also had 
1,455 members in the Labour Party and 690 trades council delegates in 
February 1927, and the dedicated militancy of CP members again enabled 
communists to hold prominent positions within the Labour Party branches. 
6Unless otherwise stated, the figures given in this chapter come from various 
organisational reports included among the James Klugmann Papers in the Communist 
Party archive, Manchester. 
71n the wake of the General Strike and miners lock-out of 1926, the ranks of the CPGB 
swelled considerably, rising from 4,398 in June 1925 to a peak of 11,127 in December 
1926. 
8The MM had an actual membership of 3,460 in December 1926, although the 228 
organisations/groups affiliated to the movement claimed to represent some 219,000 
workers. 910 members were miners, 950 were transport workers, 640 were metalworkers, 
and 210 were in the building trade. See Harry Pollitt's Report of Minorijy Movement 31 
December 1926. Klugmann Papers. At the MM conference of August 1926,802 
delegates attended and claimed to represent 956,000 workers. 
9Horner was on the MFGB Executive Committee in 1926-28 
IOTwo such examples were Thomas Cavanagh and Seth Segar. Cavanagh was President 
of Pendleton 2nd and Salford 5th AEU, and delegate to the Manchester and Salford 
trades council. Segar was a member of the Nelson Weavers' Executive Committee. 
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ldris Cox for example, was the vice chairman of the Maestag Labour Party 
at this time. II 
Although a minority in the Party, women such as Rose Smith, Kay 
Beauchamp, Lily Webb, Isabel Brown, Bessie Dickinson, Beth Turner, 
Kath Duncan, and Helen Crawfurd, emerged as leading figures within the 
CPGB. The Party was committed, in theory, to sexual equality and female 
emancipation, with a functioning Women's Department headed by Rose 
Smith, and a periodical entitled The Working Woman. 12 A Women's 
Conference in February 1928, organised by the Party in preparation for 
International Women's Day, was attended by 152 delegates from numerous 
working class organisations. 13 The subsequent demonstration, on 6 March, 
was a great success. Three hundred women travelled from Wales, 
Lancashire, Durham and Yorkshire to join their London comrades. 
Communist slogans decorated the procession, and Beth Turner, Majorie 
Pollitt, Kath Duncan, A. J. Cook and J. R. Campbell addressed the 
contingent in Trafalgar Square to cries of 'Make Way For The Women! ' 
and demands for equal pay. 14 
However, the CP was not the progressive organisation such a synopsis 
suggests. The'woman question'was seen as largely peripheral to the 
broader class struggle, and several local Parties failed to establish a 
I 11. Cox, Personal and Political Recollections Unpublished Autobiography. Communist 
Archive. 
12S. Bruley, Leninism Stalinism op. cit. p 134. The Working Woman was initially called 
The Woman Worker in 1926. The former existed from 1927 until March 1929. 
Circulation dropped in relation to Party membership and its disappearance in 1929 was 
due to financial reasons. 
13Women's Delegate Conference 4 February 1928. Johnson-Pollard Collection. The 
Party first became involved with International Women's Day in 1926. 
14The March of the Women (London, 1928). 
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functioning women's section in the 1920s. 15 Moreover, where sections had 
developed, they were often ill-supported by the male comrades, while the 
addition of yet more work to the already substantial load of job, family, 
and Party responsibilities, meant efforts were limited. 16 Florence Mahon, 
in a letter of December 1927 for example, regreted that her hospital work 
necessitated her resignation from the local Women's Committee. Similarly, 
Edith Brandwood reported that her position as a'live-in' domestic worker 
severely restricted her activity in the Tooting Women's group. Brandwood 
also complained of her male comrades' lack of support, while suggesting 
that many women in the Party were only members because their husbands 
were. "The women who could be active won't; and the women who would 
be active can't, " she concluded. 17 
The role of female Party members varied from locality to locality. In areas 
such as South Wales and Scotland, the exclusively male world of mining 
and political debate cast a long shadow over the pit villages. Women 
appeared to function primarily in a militant but supportive role, not 
participating in political decision making, but figuring prominently in the 
struggles undertaken by their men-folk. In the textile towns of Yorkshire 
and Lancashire however, where women made up the majority of the 
workforce, the respective sexual roles were more even. 18 Women not only 
15See Women's Department Material. Johnson-Pollard Collection. In November 1927, 
the Women's Department issued a memorandum to all London Local Party Committees (LPQ requesting information concerning'work amongst women'. Several LPCs had no 
Women's sections however, while those Locals that had established such a department 
generally reported difficulties and inactivity. 
161bid. Kay Beauchamp was made ill by her heavy workload in 1927. However, 
Beauchamp did successfully co-ordinate a North London Committee of Communist 
Women through which papers such as the St Pancras Women's Worker and the Islington 
Women's Worker developed. 
17171orence Mahon to Comrade Williams 3 December 1927. Edith Brandwood to the 
Secreta! 3ý of the Women's Department 2 September 1927. Both in the Johnson-Pollard 
Collection. 
18See S. Bruley, Leninism, Stalinism op. cit. for an excellent overview of women and the 
CPGB. 
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participated at the forefront of the struggle, but also took the lead in a 
number of instances. Margaret McCarthy was the secretary of the Burnley 
NUWM by 1930 for instance, while Isabel Brown headed the Shipley 
Central Strike Committee in the same year. 19 In London too, Kay 
Beauchamp, Phyllis Neal and Ethel Maddox were all notable CP 
organisers in the late 1920s. 
The role of the female proletariat and the growing prominence of women 
in industry were characteristics of the Third Period to which the CPGB 
. 
and the Comintern were slow to adapt. Clara Zetkin had criticised 
Bukharin's failure to acknowledge the revolutionary potential of women in 
the workplace in an article for The Communist International in August 
1928, and Beth Turner, in The Communist Review, had earlier detailed the 
effects of rationalisation on the female workforce. 20 Although the 
Women's Department encouraged women's study circles and even issued 
speakers notes on the plight of the female textile workers, it was not until 
1930 
- 
following the advent of numerous female-dominated strikes 
- 
that 
the CPGB attempted to effectively adapt itself to such a crucial feature of 
the period. 21 
Support for the CPGB in the 1920s was mainly concentrated in those areas 
affected by Britain's industrial decline, and was most deeply rooted in the 
mining towns and villages of South Wales, and the mill towns, shipyards 
and coal fields of Scotland. However, this should not necessarily suggest a 
link between the economic downturn of the time and communist support. 
As is well documented, the Party lost support in the years of 'the 
19M. McCarthy, Generation in Revolt op. cit. p IS I- 
20The Communist International August 1928. Beth Turner, Communist Review 
November 1927. 
21Women's Department Materials. Johnson-Pollard Collection. 
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depression'. Those areas in Wales and Scotland where the CPGB claimed 
an influence, generally had a tradition of militancy that stretched back to 
before the First World War. As such, communist influence was most able 
to manifest itself in comparatively new communities of two to three 
generations. These communities tended to be quite distinct, with locally 
controlled institutions (co-ops, guilds, unions, workmen's clubs), and a 
workforce based upon a single or concentrated industry. Work, leisure and 
home life were tightly connected, and an often non-conformist tradition 
was complemented by a studious literacy that fuelled an indigenous class 
consciousness. Labour Colleges were prevalent in both South Wales and 
Scotland, and the bookish habits of these working class militants was one 
inherited by the fledgling CPGB. 22 
The South Wales District Party numbered 1,500 in September 1926 and 
although the official membership figure of 2,300 given the following year 
was exaggerated, the Party was nevertheless able to mobilise significant 
support throughout the Welsh mining region. As Stuart Macintyre and 
Hywel Francis have demonstrated, the CPGB was a dominant political 
force in Welsh villages such as Mardy, where the Party became a 
congenital part of such villages' local identity. 23 These close-knit pit 
villages threw up a number of renown militants (not all of them 
communist) such as Arthur Homer, Noah Ablett and S. O. Davies, while 
22S. MacIntyre, A Proletarian Science op. cit. Little Moscow's op. cit. Both offer an 
overview of such areas. MacIntyre's analysis offers a paradigm within which militancy, 
not necessarily of a communist nature, was able to develop. 
231bid. Also H. Francis and D. Smith, The Fed op. cit. Idris Cox has pointed out that 
several localities in the Welsh coal fields were worthy of the'Little Moscow' tag. See 1. 
Cox, 'Communist Strongholds in Inter War Britainin Marxism Todgy June 1970. Hywel 
Francis has also warned against focusing too much on Mardy. The workforce was'mobile 
and variegated', and much of the Mardy workforce came from Ferndale, Blaenilechau 
and Tylorstown. (H. Francis and D. Smith, The Fed op. cit. p 160. ) 
22 
the international flavour of the Welsh mining industry allowed radical 
syndicalist ideas to coalesce with more traditionally British reformiSM. 24 
Similarly in Scotland, the militant reputation of localities such as the Vale 
of Levan and Lumphirmans led to their being christened 'Little Moscow's' 
in the 1920s. The CPGB had significant support throughout the industrial 
belt of Scotland, and even when the Scottish district membership fell from 
1,792 in December 1926 to just 346 in November 1930, communists such 
as Harry McShane, Abe and Alex Moffat, Willie Gallacher and Hugh 
McIntyre, were able to mobilise considerable support for the NUWM, the 
UMS, and local and national election campaigns. 
In both Wales and Scotland, communists emerged within, and were an 
accepted part of, an already militant locality. Communists were measured 
by their work rather than their particular ideology, and were supported for 
so long as the Party remained within the framework of the indigenous 
social labour movement. However, a sense of oppressed nationhood also 
facilitated political militancy in these regions, not only from Scottish and 
Welsh nationals, but also from the large Irish contingent that had settled in 
these industrial centres. As Alan Campbell has demonstrated, Scottish 
politics were often bitter and fragmented, and religious sectarianism 
hampered communist influence. 25 In Lanarkshire, certain villages were 
known by their religious denomination, and local militancy was even 
expressed in the procurement of explosives for the IRA. 26 It is significant 
241talian, Spanish, and West Indian workers were all prevalent in the Welsh coal fields. 
After initial hostility, the relationship between the Spanish and Welsh workers was later 
symbolised by the Welsh International Brigades who fought in the Spanish Civil War. 
See H. Francis Miners Against Fascism op. cit. 
25A. Campbell, 'The Social History of Political Conflict in the Scots Coal Fields. ' op. cit. 
Bob Stewart, in his memoirs, Breaking the Fetters (London, 1967), p 102, also refers to 
the political individualism of many Scottish militants. 
26A. Campbell, 'The Social History of Political Conflict in the Scots Coal Fields. 'op. cit. 
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therefore, that in Fife, where such religious disputes were less prevalent, 
the CPGB found more consistent support. 
Such religious sectarianism was also an obstacle to Communist Party 
progress in both the Liverpool and Manchester districts. In Liverpool and 
certain Lancashire textile towns such as Accrington, the predominance of 
Protestant-Catholic divisions eclipsed those class antagonisms that the 
CPGB sought to focus on. (Significantly, the Labour Party also found 
progress difficult in these areas. )27 The Liverpool CP was subsequently 
among the weakest of the Party's various district sections, with a 
membership ofjust 385 in February 1927. By December 1930, this had 
fallen to 58, and although dedicated local communists such as Leo 
McGree worked tirelessly to develop the District Party, Liverpool 
remained particularly unresponsive to communist agitation. 
The Manchester District, which included the cotton towns of Lancashire, 
was also relatively weak. The working class communities of Lancashire 
were very different to those in Wales and Scotland, with the relatively 
paternal liberalism of the mill owners and the fragmented nature of textile 
labour organisations obstructing potential communist influence. The 
textile industry was characterised by a number of small associations 
detached from, and even hostile to, broader union organisation. Moreover, 
the CPGB's programme was generally inapplicable to the predominantly 
female labour force, whose domestic 'responsibilities' further restricted 
political activity. Although such a picture may well have been undermined 
somewhat by 1930, as the industry fell into serious decline and the Party 
27For Liverpool see P. J. Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism: A Political and Social 
History of Liverpool 1868-1939 (Liverpool, 1981). For an insight into Lancashire see 
Margaret McCarthy's autobiography Generation in Revolt op. cit. ppl2-18. 
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increasingly focused attention on the revolutionary role of women in 
industry, such engrained differentials made communist influence difficult 
to attain. 
In Manchester itself, the Party nurtured a number of eminent working class 
activists 
- 
Eddie FroW, 28 Hymie Lee, Jimmy Miller and Ernie Woolley 
among them 
- 
and through the NUWM the Party was able to mobilise 
thousands of unemployed workers in the early thirties. 29 Even so, the 
District membership had numbered only 756 at the peak of the CPGB's 
popularity in December 1926, and despite the Party's steady growth from 
1930, those pockets of communist support scattered across Lancashire 
remained isolated, as the Party secretariat complained in 1932.30 
While the CPGB often remained on the periphery of the political struggle 
in the North West, the Party and the Minority Movement were able 
sporadically to mobilise support among the miners of the North East. 
During the lock out of 1926, mine workers flocked into the CPGB. The 
District Party was temporarily the largest section of the British CP in 
December 1926 with 2,600 members, while the militant programme of the 
MM was endorsed by over 30 lodges of the Durham Miners' Association 
in 1927.31 However, support for communist initiative was often transient, 
and the North East was a classic example of working class acceptance of 
28Eddie Frow moved to Man6hester in 1929 after working with Leo McGree in the 
Liverpool CP. 
2917or an overview of communism in Manchester in the early 1920s see R. and E. Frow, 
The Communist PaM in Manchester 1920-26 (Manchester, 1979). 
30The Manchester District membership stood at just 218 in May 1930, but through the 
efforts of comrades such as those listed above, and the intensified political climate 
engendered by the unemployed and textile struggles of 1929-33, the Party membership 
reached 689 in 1932. For criticism, see Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist 
Pgqy of Great Britain 25 June 1932. Communist Archive. 
3 IR. Martin, Communism and the British Trade Unions op. cit. p5 S. See also W. R. 
Garside, The Durham Miners 1919-1960 (London, 197 1), pp240-242. 
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communists, but rejection of communism. The huge gains of 1926 were 
quickly lost for example (the District Party membership had fallen to just 
109 by mid 1930), and while the MM was still able to rally support around 
specific disputes such as that at the Dawdon colliery in 1929, the CPGB 
had little effect on the solid Labour Party support in the area. 32 Even the 
'Little Moscow' of Chopwell was more militant than communist. Despite 
its Marx Terrace and the prominent role local communists played in the 
General Strike, the Chopwell Party branch numbered just four in 193 3.33 
The two District Party organisations established in Yorkshire were also 
characterised by a fluctuating membership. The Sheffield District, which 
by 1927 included the mining areas of the Midlands, had 554 members in 
February of that year, and was comprised primarily of miners and 
engineers from Sheffield, Mansfield, Nottingham and Rotherham. The 
militant shop stewards movement of the First World War had given the 
CPGB a certain basis of support in the region, but the less radical tradition 
of the Midland miners meant communist influence was relatively diffuse. 
After an increase in membership during the General Strike (the District CP 
grew from 247 in June 1925 to 1,200 in September 1926) the Party 
suffered severe losses throughout 1927.34 Even so, there remained a 
communist presence in the local trade councils, on which Party members 
such as Dan Mahoney and Billy Lees were able to gain limited political 
victories. 35 
320nly 2.4 per cent of the electorate in Seaham, Durham voted for Harry Pollitt in his 
General Election battle with Ramsay MacDonald in 1929. See also K. Newton, The 
Sociology of British Communism (London, 1969). 
33S. MacIntyre, 'Red Strongholds Between the Wars. 'In Marxism Today March 1979. 
34Sheffield Statement on Membership 1926-1930. WCML. 
35See R. Stevens, Trades Councils in the East Midlands, 1929-195 1: Politics and Trade 
Unionism in a7raditionally Moderate Area. Ph. D thesis, Nottingham University, 1995. 
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The other Yorkshire District Party, based in Bradford, was briefly 
amalgamated into the surrounding Districts in 1927, but the advent of the 
Yorkshire woollen dispute necessitated the re-establishment of the District 
Party Committee in 1929. Despite the bitter struggle conducted by the 
woollen workers however, the Party membership never grew to more than 
300. As in Lancashire, the organisational structure of the woollen unions 
and the predominantly unorganised female labour force, were unconducive 
to Communist Party advancement. With no established roots in either the 
industry or the district, the CPGB remained on the periphery of the 
indigenous political culture. 
The same was true in Birmingham, where the lack of a homogenous 
working class community hampered the development of a collective 
political consciousness. Local industry was relatively varied, and 
Birmingham was dominated by new industries that were not so affected by 
Britain's economic decline. Even in the midst of the General Strike the 
local Party amounted to only 326 members, and throughout the Third 
Period Birmingham remained among the smallest and least effective of 
CPGB sections. 
Finally, the CPGB had solid bases of support in London, with a 
membership of 1,105 in February 1927. In the East End the Party boasted 
sizeable support amongst the Jewish community centred around the textile 
industry. The Party's internationalism, and the CPGB's active approach to 
politics appealed to those marginalised by wider British society, and the 
distinct location of the textile industry and its workers enabled an acute 
27 
sense of class identity to develop. 36 As Sharon Gewirtz has noted, 
"communism provided an answer to both kinds of oppression, class and 
ethnic 
... 
If racism was a tool of the ruling class employed to divide the 
working class, then the defeat of capitalism would mean the disappearance 
of anti-Semitism along with wage slavery. 1137 
Communist Party support in London was focused less on specific 
industries than in Wales or Scotland however. The CPGB did dominate the 
London Trades Council in the mid 1920s, but the basis of communist work 
in the capital was often concentrated around local political or community 
issues. As such, the Party's composition was relatively disparate with 
railwaymen, engineers, clerics, teachers and transport workers all included 
among its varied membership. Communists even enjoyed limited electoral 
success in areas such as Bethnal Green, Battersea and Hackney, with 
Shapurji Saklatvala's election as the MY for North Battersea in 1924 being 
the most obvious example. 38 Even so, communist influence developed 
primarily in those London communities where a radical local tradition had 
already been established. This is clearly demonstrated by Mike Squires 
with regard to Battersea, where communists were incorporated into a 
radical tradition that stemmed from the 1880s. In addition, while local 
communists accumulated considerable power within the borough, the 
actual number of CPGB members remained small. Here again, communists 
were embraced as local militants, but such support did not necessarily 
transform itself into an acceptance of Marxism-LeniniSM. 39 
36For an insightful account of communism and Jewish life in the East End, see J. Jacobs, 
Out of the Ghetto. My Youth in the East End: Communism and Fascism 1913-1939 
(London, 1978). 
37S. Gewirtz, 'Anti-Fascist Activity in Manchester's Jewish Community in the 30s. 'In 
Manchester Region HistoEy Revie Spring/Summer 1990. p20. 
38For Saklatvala see M. Squires, Saklatvala op. cit. Also S. Saklatvala, The Fifth 
Commandment: Biography of Shgpuji Saklatyal (Salford, 1991). 
39M. Squires, Saklatvala op. cit. pp65-72. 
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Throughout Britain therefore, the CPGB's ability to develop a significant 
influence among the working class varied markedly. In areas where a 
distinct working class identity had developed, communists who emerged 
within the existing social and political structures of the local community 
were able to mobilise significant support. Where the Party, or Party 
members, appeared as anisolated political sect with strange links with 
Russia'- as Margaret McCarthy remembered the fledgling CPGB in 
Lancashire 
- 
communist influence was generally minimal. 40 Subsequently, 
for a locality to embrace communist, as distinct from militant, activity, the 
ability of individual Communist Party members to interact and relate with 
the indigenous working class community was imperative. Support for the 
CPG13 was linked to the wider traditions of the British labour movement; 
to its federal nature that allowed trade union, ILP, Labour Party and 
Communist Party members to coalesce as representatives of the working 
class. This explains the loyalty felt for Arthur Homer within Mardy in 
South Wales. Homer's commitment to the pit and village arguably 
legitimised the CPGB in the minds of his contemporaries to a greater 
extent than his specific political ideology. 
In the following section therefore, the decline in CPGB support will be 
examined within the broad framework of the British socio-political climate 
of the time. 
A Party in Decline 
As the 1920s turned into the 1930s, the British Communist Party found 
itself in disarray. A report on the Party's position in October 1930, drafted 
40M. McCarthy, Generation in Revolt op. cit. p7l. 
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by Robin Page Arnot, acutely outlined the CPGB's plight. "In area after 
area, " he noted, "the Party is isolated from the masses, is miserably weak 
and cannot be said to have won the leadership [of the working class]. " 
There were areas where propaganda was never heard, Page Arnot 
complained, where Party work was conducted only amongst small circles 
of workers, and where united front initiatives amounted to little more than 
a series of "paper campaigns. " In Tyneside for instance, he found no MM, 
no YCL, no Friends of Soviet Russia, no Meerut Prisoners campaign, no 
Workers' Film Society or book shop, and no worker correspondents for the 
Daily Worker. 41 
Other Party members compiled similarly distressing reports. The ultra- 
leftist interpretation of the New Line 
- 
most acutely expressed in 
Tyneside, Birmingham and parts of Scotland 
- 
appeared to have reduced 
those sections of the Party to minuscule sectarian rumps. In Newcastle, 
there were reportedly only five active Party members by 193 1, and the 
subsequent failure to develop a 'united front' policy beyond the ranks of 
the CPGB itself (the Workers' Charter Committee in Newcastle included 
just one non-communist member) had isolated the District Party to the 
brink of extinction. 42 The inter Party purge of the 'right danger' further 
diminished the CPGB. Details referring to expulsions and suspected 
deviations peppered the organisational reports of several DPCs, leading to 
41R. Page Arnot, Position of the Pq! jy October 1930. Dutt Suitcase WCML. Such a 
synopsis was verified by William Spence, who visited the District in 193 1. Spence 
described Tyneside as "the worst district in the whole country. " The leadership was 
preoccupied with rooting out the 'right danger', and its sectarian approach was reported to 
have led to "disintegration and apathetic indifference throughout the membership. " 
Report of the Tyneside District Congress 15 March 193 1. General Report of the Party 
Organisation in the Tyneside District 22 January 193 1. Klugmann Papers. 
42Gencral Report of the Pgjy Organisation in the lyneside District 22 January 193 1. 
Klugmann Papers. See also David Springliall's report to the CC. Minutes of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Paqy of Great Britain 16-17 January 1932. Communist 
Archive. 
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the displacement or censure of many experienced Party cadreS. 43 
Subsequently, both Margaret McCarthy and Harry McShane wrote later of 
the ramshackle character of the Scottish DPC in the early 
1930S. 44 
What such disarray amounted to in terms of actual membership varied 
from region to region. Nationally, the Party membership fell to 5,556 in 
April 1928,3,200 in December 1929,2,800 in May 1930 and 2,555 in 
November 1930.45 Locally, those areas that had traditionally formed the 
backbone of the Party's support declined dramatically in the late 1920s. 
The South Wales membership had fallen from 1,147 in February 1927 to 
just 264 by November 1930. In the same period, the Scottish Party 
membership fell from 1,306 to 356, the Tyneside Party from 1,969 to 148, 
and the Manchester Party from 766 to 244. Only in London did the CPGB 
remain slightly more stable, with 1,105 members in 1927 compared to 916 
in 1930.46 
More important than the drop in membership figures however, was the 
dwindling influence of the Party among the working class. The number of 
43For examples, see Report on the Scottish District PaIty 18 July 1930. WCML. Report 
of the Sheffield District PaM Committee 3 January 193 1. Report on the Tyneside District 
13 August 193 1. Klugmann Papers. 
44H. McShane, No Mean Fighter (London, 1978). pp 166-67. McShane recalls the 
Scottish organiser Davie Campbell referring to Marx's Communist Manifesto as an 
abridged edition of the text. While working in the Party book shop, Campbell 
subsequently recommended customers Ryzanoffs commentary instead! M. McCarthy, 
Generation in Revolt op. cit. ppl59-160. McCarthy described the Party as 'disorganised 
and chaotic. ' For an official report of the "disenchantment" in the Scottish Party, see 
Report of the Scottish District Pagy Committee July 1930. WCML and Klugmann 
Papers. 
45The various figures are taken from numerous Party census and organisational reports. 
For 1928, see Materials for Organisational Report April 1928. Klugmann Papers. For 
1929 and 1930 see Report on PLM Organisation November 1930. Klugmann Papers. 
These include reports on the various districts. Similar reports can also be seen at the 
WCML. 
461bid. Other District Party membership losses in the same period were: Sheffield, 554 to 
205; Liverpool, 385 to 126; Birmingham, 245 to 78. The Bradford District was dissolved 
in late 1926, but its membership numbered 250 in September 1926 and had fallen to 155 
by November 1930. 
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factory groups established by Party members had fallen from 149 in 
February 1927 to just 39 by November 1930, while the percentage of Party 
members actually in work declined sharply. Where the vast majority of the 
Party had been employed in 1926, only 39 per cent of the Communist 
Party membership were in the workshops, pits and mills by 1932.47 Such a 
transformation of the Party's structural basis also affected the CP's 
standing within other labour organisations. Not only had the expulsion of a 
number of communists from both the Labour Party and trades councils 
severed a crucial link between the CPGB and the working clasS, 48 but the 
percentage of communist trade union members fell from 90 per cent of 
those eligible in October 1926, to just 65 per cent in November 193 1.49 
Moreover, the once influential Minority Movement had all but 
disintegrated by 1930-31 as members broke their ties with the movement 
to avoid expulsion from their union, or were forced into unemployment 
through recession or victimisation. By the early 1930s, the CPGB's 
Organisation Bureau diagnosed that a "lack of political confidence 
... 
due 
to pessimism" had descended over the Party, and the vanguard of the 
working class had become largely a Party of the unemployed. 50 
The traditional explanations for such an apparent decline in Communist 
Party support have focused primarily on the class against class policy then 
47Report of the Twelfth Congress of the Communist Pa! jy of Great Britain. Klugmann 
Papers. The report was given by Idris Cox, who headed the Organisational Bureau at the 
time. 
48The London DPC reported that those members who had chosen to remain in the Labour 
Party rather than leave for the CPGB had "ceased to maintain contact with the Party. " 
Recruitment and Loss in London 9 July 1930. WCML. 
49 19 October 1926. Report on Par! y Organisation November 
193 1. Both Klugmann Papers. 
50Covering Letter to the Report on Organisation 4 July 1930. Klugmarm Papers. William 
Spence reported that 70 to 80 per cent of the Tyneside District Party membership were 
unemployed by 193 1 (Tyneside District Report 13 August 193 1. Klugmarm Papers). In 
Wales, Enoch Collins found himself to be the only employed member of the South Wales 
DPC in the early 1930s. (H. Francis, Miners Against Fascism op. cit. p60. ) 
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endorsed by the CPGB. The Party's attempt to develop an independent 
leadership of the working class isolated the Party, it is argued, and it is true 
that the sectarianism engendered by the New Line contributed to the 
Party's problems. In areas with a "strong tradition of working within the 
trade unions, "51 such as South Wales, many workers deserted the Party 
once the question of 'new unions, ' and the 'social-fascism' of their union 
comrades, became a feature of communist propaganda. 52 Similarly, the 
ferocious, all encompassing attacks the Party made on the Labour Party 
undoubtedly alienated a number of workers and potential allies. However, 
the circumstances leading to the CPGB's loss of influence cannot be 
reduced to the political line of the Party; a closer examination of the 
underlying causes reveal far more diverse reasons. 
Significantly, the CPGB's drop in membership and influence coincided 
with similar developments in the broader labour movement. Trade union 
membership had been falling since the early 1920s, dropping from 
8,434,000 in 1920 to 4,392,000 in 1933. Moreover, the number of actual 
trade unions had fallen to 1,081 in 1932, compared to 1,176 in 1925.53 As 
Chris Wrigley has demonstrated, the drop in overall membership was 
further compounded by a reduction in union density after 1926, as the 
number of organised workers in traditionally unionised industries 
decreased. The percentage of Yorkshire miners belonging to a union for 
example, fell from 82.5 per cent in 1925 to just 63 per cent in 1927.54 This 
51 Harry Pollitt, Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PaM of Great 
Britain 15-16 April 1930. Klugmann Papers. 
52Several Welsh Party members also left following the transfer of Arthur Homer to the 
RILU in early 1930. Homer was regarded as (and indeed was) a grudging and critical 
adherent to the New Line. 
53C. j. Wrigley, 'The Trade Unions Between the Wars. 'In C. J. Wrigley (Ed. ), A Histo 
of British Industrial Relations Volume 11.1914-1939 (Brighton, 1987). p72. K. Laybourn, 
A History of British Trade Unionism (London, 1992). 
54C. j. Wrigley, 'The Trade Unions' op. cit. pp72-1 11. 
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undoubtedly affected the CPGB, as sections of the labour movement in 
which communists had previously been able to exert a degree of influence 
began to contract. Thus the SWMF lost nearly half of its membership 
between 1927 and 1929, falling from 136,250 to 74,446.55 
The consequence of such a development was a decrease in both trade 
union power and influence. The number of days lost to stoppages declined 
rapidly, particularly in the three years that followed the General Strike, 
and those disputes that did occur were almost uniformly of a defensive 
nature. 56 Union leaders sought only to limit, rather than oppose, the effects 
of rationalisation. In addition, a 'new spirit' of union-employer relations 
was encapsulated in the Mond-Turner talks of 1928. Many workers, 
demoralised by the General Strike, fearful of unemployment, and 
increasingly aware of the impotent position of the unions, turned away 
from extra-parliamentary action, and looked to the Labour Party for a way 
out of their economic and social impasse. 
For a Party that prospered in times of heightened political and/or industrial 
tension, the decline in industrial action, and the disheartened character of 
the labour movement, significantly restricted the Party's potential sphere of 
influence. Workers in the 1920s tended to join the Party in the midst of 'the 
struggle'. On a national scale, this was evident during the General Strike 
and the political-economic crisis of late 193 1, amidst which thousands 
55H. Francis and D. Smith, The Fed op. cit. p97. By 1928 the Federation's membership 
had fallen to 59,858. 
56 In 1927 and 1928, the days lost through industrial action amounted to 1,174,000 and 
1,3 88,000 respectively. In the years prior to the General Strike 7,925,000 (1925), 
8,424,000 (1924) and 10,675,000 (1923) days were lost. The increase in 1929, to 
8,287,000 was due primarily to the outbreak of the Lancashire textile dispute in the latter 
half of the year. Ministly of Labour Gazette December 1929. See also, K. Laybourn, A 
Histojy of British Trade Unionism op. cit. p142. 
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flocked into the CPGB. 57 The localised, defensive, and sporadic nature of 
industrial action between 1927 and 1931 therefore, tended to obstruct the 
CPGB's attempts either to influence those disputes that did occur, or to 
develop a mass Party in their wake. 
The changing economic conditions that Britain experienced in the inter- 
war period were central to the labour movements' diminishing authority. 
Technological modernisation and the subsequent rationalisation of 
industry; the emergence of new industries based upon domestic retail, 
electrical engineering and chemical production; and Britain's declining 
share of the export market, were all fundamental to this. Subsequently, 
those areas reliant on the old staple industries became increasing 
dilapidated. Unemployment rose as employers modified or shut down less 
efficient units of production, the psychological effects ofjob loss and/or 
insecurity sapped the spirit from previously resolute communities, and the 
search for work led to the literal dislocation of numerous working class 
localities. 58 Meanwhile, union representation amongst the new industries 
developed only slowly. The union tradition was not inherent in such 
industries, and the workforce was geographically diffuse, less skilled, and 
included a number of women and juveniles; factors unconducive to union 
organisation. 59 As a result, the traditional basis on which the labour 
57Even during the barren years of 1929-30, when the Party was able to exert only a 
limited influence on the workers' defensive struggles against rationalisation, local Party 
membership generally increased during a relevant dispute (though not to the extent the 
Party would have wished). During the Dawdon colliery strike in 1929 for example, a 
Dawdon CP branch was established and the District membership rose briefly from 130 to 
220. See W. Gallacher's Report of the Tyneside District Party Congress in Minutes of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Pany of Great Britain 26-27 October 1929. 
Klugmann Papers. Even in Bradford, where the Party lacked a basis of support within the 
woollen industry, the Party membership rose from just 58 in December 1929, to 300 in 
May 1930 as a consequence of Party activity in the woollen dispute of March-June 1930. 
58The unemployed were not in a position to take strike action. And with unemployment 
rising, those in work were in a weaker bargaining position. 
59See D. Geary, European Labour Protest 1848-1939 op. cit. Also S. Maclntyre, A 
Proletarian Science op. cit. p14. 
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movement (and the CPGB) had typically gained support, fell into 
disrepair. 
The South Wales coal fields for example, were decimated by the industrial 
decline of the inter-war period. Between 1921 and 1936,241 mines closed 
down and a workforce that had numbered 271,161 in 1920 fell to 126,233 
in the same period. 60 Similarly in Scotland, the mines of the West-Central 
region employedjust 38,585 workers by 1932, compared to 66,986 in 
1925.61 In the textile regions of Lancashire, Yorkshire and Scotland, a 
declining export market combined with rationalisation, mechanical 
innovation and more intensive working practices (the'more looms 
system'), forced thousands into unemployment. Between 1912 and 1938 
the amount of cloth produced in Britain fell from 8,000 million square 
yards to just 3,000 million, and the number of cotton workers dropped 
from 621,000 to 288,000.62 
For the CPGB, such fundamental shifts in Britain's structural composition 
were inherently linked to the Party's loss of influence between 1927 and 
193 1. Migration, unemployment, or victimisation became the expected lot 
of the dedicated communiSt. 63 Ann Kane has recalled how her father, Jock, 
a Scottish miner, was both laid off and evicted in response to his activities 
during the General Strike. The whole family'walked down to England' in 
60H. Francis and D. Smith, The Fed op. cit. pp32-35. 
61A. Campbell, 'The Social History of Political Conflict in the Scots Coal Fields 19 10- 
1939. 'In A. Campbell, N. Fishman, D. Howell, Miners, Unions and Politics, 1910-47 op. 
cit. 
62E. Hobsbawm, IndustKy and Empýire London 1968. p207. 
6317or a list of the dictated terms enforced by the pit owners following the lock-out of 
1926, see H. Francis and D. Smith, The Fed op. cit. pp505-507. In Ogmore and Gilfach, 
no member of the Communist Party was re-employed for example. 
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search of work only to find that their reputation preceded them. Even those 
who offered accommodation to the Kanes were threatened with the sack. 64 
Whole towns fell to ruin in the wake of such economic decline. Most 
famously, Jarrow became known as 'the town that was murdered' 
following the collapse of its shipyard industry. Similarly, Welsh mining 
villages "from the Rhondda to the Rhymney valleys" succumbed to 
crippling unemployment and poverty. 65 As one contemporary observed, 
"[the] South Wales coal field was ravaged by pit closures 
... 
pits at the 
northern ends of the valley and the shallow pits throughout the coal field 
were closed, with the result that mining villages and areas, later to be 
designated 'distressed areas', became derelict. "66 Miners, including 
communists such as Dai Lloyd Davis, were forced to transport themselves 
to London or the coal fields of South Yorkshire and the Midlands to find 
employment. Communist support was thus dispersed and diluted across the 
country. By 1927, the effects of unemployment and victimisation were 
such that Arthur Homer's Mardy Lodge 
-a traditional bastion of 
communist support 
- 
comprised just 377 employed and 1,366 unemployed 
members. By 1929, the Lodge had virtually disintegrated with only 25 
working miners and 325 members attempting to procure work. 67 
Even in areas less affected by the rigours of Britain's economic 
dislocation, communists found little respite. The Sheffield DPC for 
example, reported that several of the local Party's 'best comrades' had been 
641n P. Cohen, Children of the Revolution. Communist Childhood in Cold War Britain 
(London, 1997), p 141. 
65Sce E. Wilkinson, The Town That Was Murdered (London, 1939). For Wales, see H. 
Francis and D. Smith, The Fed op. cit., and A. Hutt, The Condition of the Working Class 
in Britain (London, 1933). 
66W. Paynter, My Generation op. cit. pp42-43. 
67H. Francis and D. Smith, The Fed op. cit. p 164. 
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"starved out of their homes, " and had either'left town, 'and even the 
county, as a consequence. 68 Those militants who decided to stay in their 
particular localities, generally chose either unemployment or a period of 
political inactivity. The Sheffield Party again reported how certain 
comrades had decided to "lie low" in order to gain employment, 69 while 
the Scottish DPC similarly noted "wholesale victimisation and emigration" 
as the primary cause of the District Party's shrinking membership. 70 
The CPGB's decline in the late 1920s must also be placed within the 
context of the British labour movement's continual transformation. In 
particular, the homogenisation of the Labour Party negated the pluralist 
traditions of the movement, and the entwining party, union, and 
association memberships of the late 19th, early 20th century had became 
ever more tenuous by the mid 1920s. Following the First World War, the 
Labour Party developed a political programme and constitution 
increasingly distinct from the party's broader, federal roots. Subsequently, 
the ties that had bound the Labour Party and the trade unions loosened 
throughout the inter-war period, and the disparities that existed between 
the party and the ILP, and between the constitutional and the radical, 
similarly widened as the twenties drew on. 71 
As for the CPGB, the Party's revolutionary objectives, its theoretical 
orthodoxy, its internationalism, and its deference to the Soviet Union, all 
stood apart from the gradualist, ethical socialism of the Labour Party. 
While the broader labour movement of trade unions, co-operatives, Fabian 
68For Wales, see H. Francis and D. Smith, The Fed op cit. pp74-107. For Sheffield, see 
Sheffield Statement on Membership 1926-1930 23 July 1930. WCML. 
69ibid. 
70Report of the Sgottish District PAM July 1930. WCML. The Party estimated that 90 
members had left because of victimisation. 
71 See R. McKibbon, The Evolution of the Labour Pagy 1910-1924 (Oxford, 1974). 
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and Clarion Clubs remained fin-nly within the liberal framework that had 
both spawned and shaped their development, the 'Bolshevisation' of the 
CPGB soon severed what incipient ties the Party had with such a 
tradition. 72 In many ways, the antagonisms of the class against class years 
were merely an extension of the differences that had hampered communist 
- 
labour-socialist relations since the Communist Party's birth. 
As such, divisions were evident long before the CPGB's adoption of the 
New Line. At a national level, the refusal of Communist Party affiliation, 
and the denial of individual membership to communists, revealed the 
Labour Party National Executive's perception of Labour as a party 
ftindamentally at odds with the CPGB. Conversely, the CPGB's rejection 
of reformism, and the Party's intention to manipulate parliamentary 
democracy in an effort to mobilise anti parliamentary activity, was 
obviously antithetical to the constitutional Labour Party. Indeed, the 
CPGB's fundamental opposition to the Labour Party was an inherent part 
of the Party's political perspective. The debate over whether the CPGB 
should utilise parliament through Labour affiliation had preoccupied the 
Party's unity conferences of 1920, and it took the intervention of Lenin to 
stop the fledgling CPGB from dismissing parliamentary action 
altogether. 73 
In those areas where communists were an accepted part of the indigenous 
political make-up, differences between moderate Labour Party members 
72S. Maclntyre's A Proletarian Science op. cit., remains the definitive account of the 
divergence of British Marxism and labour socialism. 
73For varying interpretations of the Party's initial debate over parliament see W. Kendall, 
The Revolutiongy Movement in Britain 1900-21 (London, 1969). J. Hinton's review and 
reply to Kendall is published in the Bulletin of the Sociejy for the Study of Labour 
Histo Spring 1929. pp42-49. J. Klugmann, Histoly of the Communist PaLty of Gre 
Britain, Volume One (London, 1968). L. J. Macfarlane, The British Communist Pa! jy op. 
cit. 
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and more militant working class activists were also apparent prior to 1928. 
The Rhondda Urban District Council for example, was characterised by 
"continual wrangling between the cautious majority and left-wingerS. "74 
Stuart Maclntyre has thus concluded that "the consequent polarisation of 
Labour ranks in Mardy clarified a division within industrial and political 
opinion which had been apparent throughout the 1920s. "75 
Across the myriad sections of the labour movement, disparities with the 
CPGB were manifest in the early 1920s. In 1922, the CPGB broke with the 
Plebs League over the question of Marxist teaching, while the Party's 
relationship with the Central Labour College became increasingly strained. 
The Party's revolutionary, monotheistic version of Marxism (-Leninism) 
created evident friction, and Party criticism of college practice and method 
led eventually to the expulsion of communist students between 1926 and 
1928.76 The Party similarly seceded from the Socialist Sunday Schools in 
1922-24, and the ability of Communist Party members to attain prominent 
positions on the executive committees of various organisations led to 
further ruptures in the British Workers' Sports Federation (BWSF) and the 
League Against ImperialiSM. 77 
74S. MacIntyre, Little Moscow's op. cit. p34- 
751bid. p35. 
76S. MacIntyre, A Proletarian Science op. cit. pp80-85. Those trade unions that sponsored 
the Labour College also severed their links in the late 1920s. The reason was as much 
financial as political, although the College's reputation for schooling militant critics of 
trade union reformism must have made the decision of the NUR and SWMF more 
palatable. 
77Minutes of the National Committee of the British Workers' Sports Federation 16 
October 1927. Conference of the National Committee of the British Workers' Sports 
Federation 8 January 1928. Communist Archive. The First Annual Conference of the 
BWSF, held on 28-29 April 1928, debated the Labour Party and the TUC's decision to 
veto the BWSF. See also, R. Samuel, 'Staying Power: The Lost World of British 
Communism, Part Two. 'In New Left Review March-April 1986. pp63-113 
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Even in the world of working class theatre, Raphael Samuel has 
demonstrated how the "rise and extension of the Workers' Theatre 
Movement was closely associated with, and anticipated, the'leffturn" of 
the CPGB. 78 Debate over the content and direction of the WTM in the 
wake of the General Strike reflected the Party's growing divergence from 
the theatre groups that had preceded it. And although the various working 
class theatre groups affiliated to the WTM had emerged out of broader 
labour movement initiatives, the CP's hegemony over the ideological 
direction and physical make-up of the movement soon severed any links 
the ILP, Labour Party or the Central Labour College wished to have with 
the WTM. 
Finally, while trade union strength was compromised by the politico- 
economic climate of the 1920s, the period did see the emergence of a more 
powerful trade union apparatus. 79 The growth in union membership 
between 19 10 and 1920, the amalgamations that forged the TGWU and 
NUGWU, and the extended need for collective bargaining on a national 
scale, all prompted a more centralised union administration. As a result, 
the character of the TUC changed dramatically in the wake of the First 
World War. The formation of a General Council in 1921, the appointment 
of a full time Secretary in 1923, and the adoption of a mediatory role 
between union and government, all served to consummate the primacy of 
the central bureaucracy. 
Ironically it was the militants who had led the appeal for a more 
centralised union movement who suffered as a consequence. The TUC and 
78R. Samuel, 'Theatre and Socialism in Britain 1880-1935. 'In R. Samuel, E. MacColl 
and S. Cosgrove, Theatres of the Left op. cit. 
79j. Hinton and R. Hyman, Trade Unions and Revolution op, cit. pp 18-22. 
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the various trade union leaderships had consolidated their position within a 
clearly defined remit. While a central administration could potentially 
offer a militant leadership to a labour movement on the offensive, in the 
adverse conditions of the 1920s, the opposite proved to be the case. The 
abject failure of the General Strike tipped the balance of power decisively 
in favour of the moderate wing of the trade union movement, and the 
increasingly powerful administration was utilised to marginalise its more 
militant sections, and to expel the revolutionaries. 
As the CPGB's links to the wider British labour movement were severed 
and the industrial-geographical foundations of its support disintegrated, 
the Party inevitably suffered. The Communist Party was caught in a time 
of transition, and any history of the Party in the Third Period must 
necessarily correlate this structural crisis with the Party's ability to 
confront the changes that surrounded it. 
Conclusions 
The structural changes that affected Britain during the inter-war years, as 
'new' industries began slowly to displace the 'old' export reliant industries 
of coal, textiles and shipbuilding, altered fundamentally the traditional 
basis of the British labour movement. Rationalisation and unemployment 
came to characterise the old industrial heartlands of Britain, and areas 
where the labour movement had traditionally amassed support fell into 
dramatic decline. 80 The depression of 1929-33 merely exacerbated the 
already evident structural decay, and for both the CPGB and the wider 
labour movement, the effect of such dislocation was immense. 
8OFor the effects of such a decline see A. Hutt, The Condition of the Working Class in 
Britain op. cit. 
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The apparent isolation of the CPGB between 1927 and 1932 must be 
understood in relation to developments within both the labour movement 
and the social, political, and economic framework of Britain in the 1920- 
30s. While the non-revolutionary climate of the period marginalised a 
Party calling for revolutionary change, and the policy undertaken by the 
Party did initially accentuate problems already confronting the CPGB, the 
New Line in itself did not incite the Party's discernible decline. 81 Nor too 
did it prevent the Party from expanding its membership base within the 
same (Third) period. 
As such, traditional interpretations of the Third Period ignore the 
achievements of the CPGB between 1927 and 1932. First, the Party's 
divorce frorn'the wider labour movement enabled the CPGB to develop a 
rich Party culture distinct from the liberal traditions of British labour (see 
chapter six). Similarly, the depiction of a Party'isolated' from the working 
class undermines the considerable success of the NUWCM. From the 
above analysis, it is apparent that those areas in which the Party. had 
traditionally obtained significant support were the same areas most 
affected by the dislocation of British industry in the 1920s. Second, such 
areas (in particular South Wales and Scotland) saw the emergence of 
powerful and active unemployed movements. As Hywel Francis has 
recognised, "erstwhile 
... 
militants redirected their energies into the 
National Unemployed Workers' Movement, which became the archetypal 
extra-parliamentary movement in the South Wales valleys. "82 Indeed, the 
81 See J. Hinton And R. Hyman, Trade Unions and Revolution op. cit. for an analysis of 
Communist Party strategy. Hinton and Hyman persuasively argue that a CPGB policy 
attempting to develop a mass Party was fundamentally flawed. The Party programme 
should, it is argued, have centred around consolidating the bases of support the Party had 
already established. 
82H, Francis, Miners Against Fascism op. cit. pp5l-52. For a contemporary accounts that 
correspond to such a statement see W. Paymer, My Generation op. cit. pp82-108. And M. 
McCarthy, Generation in Revolt op. cit. pp 150-153. 
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Party's involvement with the unemployed arguably widened the scope for 
CPGB-worker contact, as evidenced by the increasingly large local and 
national demonstrations held between 1929 and 1933, and the thriving 
turn-over of Party membership in the early thirties. Third, the impact of 
the CPGB often disguised its relatively small number. As well as the 
NUWM, the formation of the UMS occurred as the Scottish membership 
plummeted, while in London some 113 communists held official trade 
union positions in November 1931.83 Conversely, the increase in Party 
membership that coincided with the economic crisis of 1931 did little to 
enhance the Party's ability to influence events. 
The years between 1927 and 1932 therefore, saw the CPGB pass through a 
period wherein the foundations of the Party's support disintegrated and the 
focus of communist agitation passed out of the workshops and into the 
dole queue. The period necessitated that the Party adapt itself to structural 
changes evident in British industry, and (despite the revolutionary rhetoric 
of the Comintem) to the defensive nature of the working class struggle. In 
doing so, the Party would reap genuine successes in the early 1930s, and 
the Party's work amongst women, the unemployed, and against the fascist 
threat, all facilitated a broader basis of potential CPGB support. Amidst 
the turmoil of 1927-1930 however, the prospects of such a revival seemed 
to hang precariously in the balance. 
830rganisational Report of the London District Parjy Committee December 193 1. 
Klugmann Papers. 603 members of the London CP were also members of a trade union. 
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Chapter Two 




For the Communist Party of Great Britain, the General Strike of May 1926 
was both an inspirational and enraging experience. The Party had entered 
the strike in defiant mood, calling for trade union solidarity, the formation 
of Councils of Action, Workers' Defence Corps, and a united front of 
every "political, industrial, co-operative and unemployed organisation. ", 
Although too small to play a decisive role in the nationwide dispute, in 
areas where the CPGB had a basis of support 
- 
mining villages in South 
Wales and the North East, industrial centres in Scotland 
- 
the Party was 
able to exert an influence that belied its relatively small membership. 2 In 
the South Wales village of Mardy for example, the CP dominated miners 
lodge effectively became the'executive power of the village. '3 The 
subsequent collapse of the strike was a profound disappointment to the 
CPGB, and it is the intention of this chapter to outline a noticeable 
radicalisation in the Communist Party's perspective from mid-l 926. 
The manner of the General Strike's defeat confirmed the Party's generally 
low opinion of the existing ('reformist') leadership of the TUC and Labour 
Party. Although communist expectations had been raised by the relatively 
lQuoted in J. Klugmann, Histoly of the Communist PaM of Great Britain Volume Two: 
The General Strike 1925-1926 (London, 1969). p 115. 
2 The CPGB membership stood at 6,000 immediately prior to the General Strike. 
Additionally, at the'Special Conference'of the Minority Movement held in March 1926, 
883 delegates attended from 636 trade unions and trades councils, claiming to represent 
956,000 workers. Harry Pollitt, 'Report of the Minorijy Movement. Klugmann Papers. 
3H. Francis and D. Smith, The Fed op. cit. ppl63-64. This was also the case in some 
Scottish villages. See A. Campbell, ' The Social History of the Political Conflict in the 
Scots Coal Fields 1910-39. ' In A. Campbell, N. Fishman, D. Howell, Miners, Unions and 
Politics. 1910-47 op. cit. Similarly in the North East, the Party had a forcible influence 
during the strike. See A. Mason, The General Strike in the North East (Hull, 1970), and 
R. Page Amot, The Miners Years of Struggle (London, 1953). 
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'left! agenda of the Scarborough TUC in 1925,4 the General Council's 
willingness to'give in'to Government pressure appeared to underline the 
futility of Party attempts to revolutionise the British labour movement 
through the existing apparatus. Indeed the Party slogan of 'All Power To 
The General Council'rang particularly hollow in such circumstances. 
Moreover, the enthusiasm and solidarity shown by the workers suggested 
to many in the Party that the working class, in contrast to their leaders, 
were 'turning to the left'; towards the CPGB. 
Concurrently however, the accusations and condemnations levelled by 
communists against the official labour leadership were reciprocated. 
Indeed, it can be argued that the increasingly autonomous position 
undertaken by the Communist Party in the late 1920s was provoked as 
much through necessity as design. Those links adjoining the CPGB to the 
wider the labour movement were systematically broken by the various 
trade union bureaucracies, the TUC General Council and the Labour Party 
Executive throughout the 1920s. Although hostility towards communist 
agitation was hardly a new development, in the months following the 
General Strike, it took on an increasingly official and effective quality. 
This chapter will detail the CPGB's response to such an offensive. 
In accordance with the British Party's more militant perspective, the 
theoretical basis of international communist policy similarly hardened in 
late 1926. At the Seventh Plenum of the ECCI in November of that year, 
Nikolai Bukharin (who headed the CI from 1926 to 1929) outlined the 
4This was due to the seemingly left bias of the General Council, which included such 
men as A. A. Purcell and A. J. Cook. Additionally, the militant character of AJ. Swales' 
opening speech; the endorsement of resolutions moved by the Minority Movement; and 
the ratification of the Anglo-Russian Committee, all appeared to justify the Party policy 
of'united front from above. ' 
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emergence of a'new period'of struggle. A'First Period'of revolutionary 
crisis was seen to have emerged in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution 
of 1917, and continued up until the failed KPD putsch of 1923. This was 
followed by a'Second Period' of 'relative capitalist stabilisation' from 
1924, while a 'Third Period' of 'capitalist crisis' was officially sanctioned at 
the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International in 1928. 
However, it would be erroneous and historically naive to accept such 
distinct cut-off dates. Comintern policy was continually 'fine tuned', and 
while historical continuity seemed to compliment the teleological 
approach of the ECCI, it was evident that the 'new periods' of struggle 
unfolded, rather than appeared (as it were) overnight. As such, November 
1926 saw the beginning of a revision of Comintern policy, a revision that 
would gain momentum and substance throughout 1927 in response to 
events across the world. This chapter will outline this development, while 
demonstrating the differences and similarities between the 'left turn' in the 
CPGB and the'left turn' in the Communist International. 
Finally, in order to analyse clearly the Communist Party's response to the 
events of 1926, it is necessary to bear in mind the importance the 
Comintern and the Soviet Government (and indeed the CPGB) placed on 
the Anglo-Russian Trade Union Unity Committee. The Committee, 
established in 1925, promised "co-operation between the British TUC 
General Council and the All Russian Trade Union Council in every way 
that may be considered from time to time advisable for the purposes of 
promoting international unity. "5 For the Soviets, the agreement brought the 
Russian trade unions closer to the IFTU (International Federation of Trade 
Unions), while for the Comintern, it provided an important point of contact 
5See J. Klugmann, Histojy of the Communist PaM of Great Britain op. cit., pp 16-21 for 
details of the committee. 
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between Soviet and British workers. Such manoeuvrings were very much 
part of the O's attempts during theSecond Period'to establish links with 
the wider international labour movement. By working in harmony with the 
'reformist' trade unions, the Comintern. hoped to disseminate communist 
influence amongst the workers, while simultaneously 'revolutionising'the 
unions for the struggles that 'inevitably' lay ahead. 
The Need for Change? 
i) Lessons of the General Strike 
On the 15 May 1926, the foremost theoretician in the CPGB, Rajani Palme 
Dutt, described the General Strike as a "prelude to a new era. " The "old 
conditions can no longer continue" he wrote, "and the British working 
class have entered into a new era, the era of mass struggle, which can only 
culminate in open revolutionary struggle. " For Dutt, the strike had acutely 
undermined the 'reformist' leadership of the labour movement, and "the 
trappings of parliament, democracy, trade union legalism and economism 
[had] been tom aside. " Within two days of the strike's collapse, Dutt was 
calling for a new approach to a new situation, to "direct political 
revolutionary" struggle under the auspices of the Communist party. 6 
Dutt was writing from Brussels (where he resided, ostensibly, on the 
grounds of ill-health), 7 but back in Britain, the acting leadership of the 
CPGB headed by Bob Stewart, took a similar line. 8 The calling off of the 
61bid. 
7Dutt did have health problems, but his residence in Brussels also enabled him to have 
closer contact with the West European Bureau of the Comintern. 
8The 'acting leadership' was due to the imprisonment of twelve leading communists 
immediately prior to the Strike. Albert Inkpin (Secretary), William Gallacher, Harry 
Pollitt, Wal Harmington and William Rust had all been sentenced to twelve months in 
November 1925 under the Incitement to Mutiny Act. Arthur MacManus, Tom Bell, Jack 
Murphy, Johnny Campbell, Robin Page Arnot, Tom Wintringham. and Ernie Cant, each 
received six months. This political trial was motivated, in part, by the mounting tension 
of the pre strike days. 
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General Strike was condemned by the Party as "the greatest crime that has 
ever been committed, not only against the miners, but against the working 
class of Great Britain and the whole world. " Like Dutt, the Party laid the 
blame squarely at the feet of the General Council, and also like Dutt, the 
Party included the "so-called left wing" of A. A. Purcell and George Hicks 
in its criticism. 9 Peter Kerrigan, a member of the Party Executive in 1927, 
recalled later that many communists felt a "tremendous sense of betrayal, 
not only by the TUC leadership but also by the lefts on the General 
Council, " at the end of the strike. "The effect on myself and on others was 
to turn against them, and this made it easier for the tendency to be against 
the whole 'official movement'... it helped make stronger sectarian 
tendencies among communists. "10 
For those such as Dutt 
- 
whom Harry Pollitt would later call "sectarian 
through and through" II- the untrustworthiness of the 'so-called left' was a 
central lesson of the General Strike. 12 As Bolsheviks, the Party knew its 
support of the General Council and the Labour Party was equivalent to the 
'rope supporting the hanging man', and the excuse to come out openly 
against those who uttered'Ieft phraseswhile maintaining a commitment to 
reformist politics was embraced by many throughout the communist 
movement. Internationally, this was evident in the'Theses on the General 
Strike' adopted by the ECCI, which declared "the exposure of the left wing 
9Stand by the Miners! An Appeal by the Communist PaM Of Great Britain 13 March, 
1926. Printed in full in J. Klugmann, Histoly of the Communist Pa! jy of Great Britain 
op. cit. pp210-212. 
I OQuoted from an interview with Peter Kerrigan in R. A. Leeson, Strike: A Live Histoly 
1887-1971 (London, 1973). pp 114-116. 
1 )Quoted in K. Morgan, Har! y Pollitt op. cit. p76. 
12Dutt felt that the General Strike was the furthest the 'Reformist leadership' could go 
without "breaking through those shackles and entering on the direct revolutionary path. " 
'The British Election and the New Labour Government'. Sent to the CI 26 June 1929 
(Dutt Papers, BL). See also, 'Problems of the New poliev in Britailf. Sent to the Cl 6 July 
1928 (Dutt Papers, BL). For a similar opinion, see G. Hardy, Those Stormy Years. 
Memoirs ofthe Fight for Freedom on Five Continents (London, 1956). p 188. 
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as people who capitulated, " to be a primary task of the CPGB. It was the 
'left', insisted the ECCI, who were "mainly responsible for the defeat. " 13 
Although the CP briefly 'toned down' its rhetoric in an attempt to realign 
the collapse of the strike with the Party's continued encouragement of 
Anglo-Russian relations, 14 the more instinctive 'mood' within the CPGB 
prevailed, and it did so for a number of reasons. First, the experience of the 
strike itself, with its disappointing climax and the continued sufferance of 
the miners, facilitated communist hostility. As the miners continued their 
struggle, the Party's anger towards those who claimed to represent the 
working class yet appeared indifferent to the suffering of the mine workers 
and their families undoubtedly intensified. Moreover, the CPGB's call for 
an embargo against coal imports was rejected repeatedly by the official 
leaders of the labour movement. Even the ILP, within which there was 
rank and file support forjoint action with the CP, excluded any possibility 
of such a campaign. Understandably therefore, communists perceived 
themselves to be fighting alone in support of the miners. 15 
Second, the Party's attitude towards the General Council was compounded 
by the criticism many in the TUC aimed at the CPGB, and the cries of 
'never again'that resonated throughout the labour movement. C. T. Cramp 
of the National Union of Railwaymen (NUR) for example, blamed not the 
General Council for the events in May, but "our people who for years 
made it impossible for the General Council to resist the General Strike. " 16 
13Communist Review July 1926. 
14See Workers'Weekly 4 June 1926. 'Why the Strike Failed'; a statement by the Central 
Committee of the CPGB, 29-31 May 1926. Such an attitude was clearly evident at the 
Third Conference of the Minority Movement in August. 
15For a lucid account of such a response to the lock-out, see M. McCarthy, Generation in 
Revolt op. cit. pp80-84. 
16Quoted in N. Fishman, The British Communist Party and the Trade Unions op. cit. p30. 
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Furthermore, many union leaders and members who had once been 
tolerant of the CPGB and communist led Minority Movement, turned 
against their former allies. Andrew Conley, the secretary of the Tailor and 
Garments Workers' Union, who prior to the General Strike had 
sympathised with the aims and intentions of the movement, admitted his 
fear that unless trades councils were forbidden from affiliating to the MM, 
the 'Minority' could become the'Majority'. 17 By 1927 he was of the 
opinion that: 
It may be that the Minority Movement served a useful purpose in the early days, but with 
my reading of the papers from week to week I am convinced that the vilification of our 
movement that we see there is doing our movement a lot of harm, and if Pollitt and his 
friends want to play the part of team men they should get back into the movement and 
work against the common enemy instead of splitting our forces. 18 
Subsequently, at the 1926 Trades Union Congress, the General Council 
informed its members that, "affiliation to the National Minority 
Movement, in the opinion of the Council, was not consistent with the 
policy of the Congress and the General Council, and that the Council could 
not, therefore, approve of affiliation with the National Minority 
Movement. "19 
Third, the solid support shown by the workers during the General Strike, 
and the dogged commitment of the miners in the months that followed, 
appeared to contrast significantly with the General Council's apparent 
haste to end the dispute. Fundamental to the attitude of the CPGB (and the 
Cl) was the belief that while the labour leaders were retreating to the right, 
the workers had been radicalised by the General Strike; their morale 
17N. Branson, Histo! y of the Communist PaLty of Great Britain op. cit. p12. 
18R. Martin, Communism And The British Trade Unions op. cit. p79. Quoted from the 
TUC Report of 1927. 
19J. Klugmann, History of the Communist Pagy of Great Britain op. cit. p273. 
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boosted and their resolve enhanced. 20 Even when it became clear that the 
experience of the General Strike had led more generally to 
"disillusionment with both the TUC leadership and with direct action, "21 
sections of the Party remained convinced of the workers' intensified 
militancy. Although the number of days lost to stoppages fell from 7, 
950,000 in 1925 to 1,170,000 in 1927 (excluding the extraordinary 1926 
figure of 162,230,000), 22 the apparent dichotomy between perceived 
working class radicalisation and the decline in industrial action was 
explained by Dutt as being due to 'the initiative laying with the 
bourgeoisie. ' The workers' subjection to defeat and victimisation served 
only to augment class differences, argued Dutt. 23 
Fourth, the instinctive reaction of the CPGB was encouraged by both the 
ECCI and the Soviet Government. Although the CI was not, in mid 1926, 
committed to an overhaul of International policy, the attitude of the 
Comintern following the General Strike became increasingly critical. 
Similarly, the Russian All Union Central Council of Trade Unions 
condemned unreservedly the'surrendee of the General Council, as 
Tomsky's telegram to the 1926 TUC demonstrated. 24 Although this did not 
lead to a Soviet withdrawal from the Anglo-Russian Committee, the 
Soviet attitude towards the British trade unions noticeably hardened. 
20For an example, see J. T. Murphy, The Political Meaning of the General Strike (London, 
1926). ppl34-36. "The working class has emerged from the General Strike with its 
morale undamaged, though bitterly resenting the collapse of its leaders. "
21C. j. Wrigley, 'Trade Unionism Between the Wars' op. cit. p99. My emphasis. 
22See Minisjjy of Labour Gazette for the relevant years. In 1928 the number of days lost 
fell to 1,390,000. 
23 Reference to'Problems of the New Policy in Britain', an article sent to the Cl in July 
1928 (Dutt Papers, BL); although Dutt wrote several articles making this point. For 
another example see Inpreco I March 1928. 
24See L. J. Macfarlane, The British Communist Party op. cit. p168. 
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In his autobiography New Horizons, Jack Murphy gives an entertaining, if 
slightly self important, account of Moscow's position. Murphy, the British 
representative on the ECCI, met with a Russian delegation that included 
Stalin and Bukharin to discuss the situation. He suggested that too harsh a 
tone of criticism was "calculated to rupture the Anglo-Russian Trade 
Union Unity Committee, thereby strengthening the position of the [British] 
Government which was aiming to break off relations with Russia. " Stalin, 
who according to Murphy admitted the committee's collapse was probable, 
"quietly proceeded to analyse our points of criticism and give the reasons 
for the Russian decision to deal so sharply with the British trade union 
leaders. " Stalin felt the CPGB approached the question with "too formal a 
viewpoint" and suggested that "sometimes it was necessary to break with 
formalities, especially when they had ceased to have any real value to the 
working class. 1125 Such a response was consistent with the view outlined by 
Bukharin at the Fifteenth Conference of the Soviet Communist Party. The 
existence of formal relations between the British and Soviet unions 
insisted Bukharin, was less important than the relationship between the 
workers; which Bukharin believed to be tightening. Even so, like Stalin, 
Bukharin favoured the maintenance of the Anglo-Russian committee. 26 
Such factors demonstrate the importance the Communist Party plated on 
the events of May 1926. Not only had the General Strike revealed the'true 
face' of the reformist labour leadership, but the working class had shown it 
could be effectively mobilised. At the Eighth Congress of the CPGB, held 
in Battersea on 16-17 August 1926, the Party declared that the "General 
Strike and the mining lock-out have awakened the class consciousness of 
25J. T. Murphy, New Horizons op. cit. pp226-230. 
261OLecorr 4 November 1926. See also L. T. Lah, O. V. Naumov, 0. V. Khlevniuk, 
Stalin's Letters to Molotov (New Haven, 1995). pp 106-107. 
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the rank and file workers who are moving to the left. " The 'class co- 
operation'of the General Council and the'left wing phrase mongers'was 
condemned, and although the Party maintained its belief that the trade 
union apparatus could still be 'won over', it nevertheless affirmed "that the 
class struggle in Britain has entered into a new phase in which the efforts 
of the working class to defend itself must bring the working class 
movement into ever sharper conflict with the capitalist class, forcing it to 
realise that the only way to complete victory is the destruction of the 
capitalist state and its replacement by a workers' state based on the mass 
organisations of the workers. 1127 
ii) The International 
While the CPGB instinctively 'turned leffin the wake of the General 
Strike, the Communist International began a more theoretical realignment 
in late 1926. At the Seventh Plenum of the ECCI, Bukharin outlined three 
phases of post-war development, the third of which was one of ever 
sharper class struggle stemming from the "internal contradictions of the 
process of... [capitalist] stabilisation 
... 
coming out in ever sharper form. " 
Significantly, a principal characteristic of such a development was the 
radicalisation of the working class. 28 
The basis for such an observation was detailed at the Fifteenth Conference 
of the Soviet Communist Party in October 1926, where Bukharin noted 
that while certain capitalist countries were expanding, others like Britain, 
were in obvious decline. He reasoned this with a "differentiated" analysis, 
whereby the world was divided into six 'types' wherein the 'revolutionary 
27The Eig-hth Congess of the Communist Pagy of Great Britain: 
_Reports 
Theses and 
Resolutions (London, 1926). 
281npreco 20 December 1926. 
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situation' differed in each. This acknowledged a perceived swing to the left 
by workers in certain countries, while recognising also the (temporary) 
continuation of 'capitalist stabilisation' in others. Such an equilibrium was 
however, Bukharin suggested dialectically, characterised by 'internal 
contradictions' that actually intensified class antagonisms and thus 
engendered conditions ripe for Communist Parties to exploit. "We may 
come to the conclusion" Bukharin reasoned, "that capitalism is now 
approaching the conclusion of its period of reconstruction. 1129 
The determinants for Bukharin's theory came from a number of sources. 
As N. N. Kozlov and E. D. Weitz have demonstrated, the development of 
capitalism in Germany was central to Bukharin's perspective. 30 Although 
Germany was advancing technologically, economic relations in the 
Weimar Republic were deteriorating by the mid-twenties. Subsequently, 
sections of the KPD began, in the words of L Peterson, "to demand a more 
aggressive strike strategy against employers 
... 
and the repressive reaction 
of the labour union leaders to the growth in support for the communist 
opposition convinced many KPD leaders that it should adopt a policy of 
leading grassroots economic movements 
... 
even if this meant 
confiontation with the labour unions. "31 
Weitz has also demonstrated that divisions in the German labour 
movement intensified throughout the Weimar period. "The SPID's leading 
291nprecorr 4 November 1926. 
30N. N. Kozlov and E. D. Weitz, ' Reflections on the Origins of the'Third Period': 
Bukharin, the Comintern, and the Political Economy of Weimar Germany. 'In Journal of 
Contemporary HistoKy July 1989. 
31 L. Peterson, 'From Social Democracy to Communism: Recent Contributions to the 
History of the German Workers' Movement, 1914-1945. 'In International Labour and 
Working Class Histojy No. 20 198 1. Also quoted in K. McDermott and J. Agnew, The 
Comintern: A Histojy of the International Communism from Lenin to Stalin (London, 
1996). p72. 
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role in the Weimar system 
... 
meant that the police forces with which the 
communists came into conflict were often under the command of social 
democrats, making coalitions even with other labour parties almost 
unthinkable. The intense communist hostility toward social democracy had 
its origins therefore 
... 
in the hard experience of physical conflict in 
politicised spaces. "32 The influence of the KPD within the Comintern was 
substantial and Bukharin's analysis of the 'international situation' was 
effectively a theoretical balancing act that acknowledged such pressure, 
whilst maintaining his own belief that the period of capitalist stabilisation 
was not universally resolved. 
Events in Britain similarly influenced Bukharin's perspective. The General 
Strike motivated the ECCI dialectician to declare that: 
Our international policy, in view of the specific international situation, which has 
enriched us with the experiences of the English strike and the great transformations in the 
English proletariat, must now pass on to the next stage of progress 
... 
[The English 
working class] can no longer be retarded in its revolutionary development now that the 
chief basis between the English bourgeoisie and the working class has disappeared. 
English capitalism, more than any other capitalism, is confronted with its imminent 
collapse. 33 
It was in Britain for instance, that Bukharin saw "more than in any other 
country in Europe 
... 
a direct revolutionary situation developing. "34 The 
British workers, once "the most conservative force in the European labour 
movement, " were now the "vanguard of the European working class. "35 In 
such a situation the CPGB was called upon to expose 'ruthlessly' the 
reformism of the trade union and Labour Party leadership, while 
intensifying its agitation inside the trade unions. The emphasis of the 
32E. D Weitz, Creating German Communism op. cit. p 187. 
331npreco 4 November 1926. 
341npreco 3 December 1926. 
351bid. 
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CPGB's 'united front! work was thus switched from 'above' to 'below'; a 
strategy that was evident also with regard to the Anglo-Russian Trade 
Union Unity Committee. 
As noted above, the Committee remained an integral part of both Soviet 
and Comintern policy. However, the General Strike revealed the 
limitations of "mutual aid between the two countries. " Not only was the 
Soviet offer of monetary aid refused by the General Council during the 
miners lock-out, but the severe criticism of the TUC leadership unleashed 
by Mikhail Tomsky (President of the Soviet Trade Unions) and members 
of the CPGB following the strike's demise, soured the relationship 
permanently. Thus, the Soviet position shifted so as to "remain in the 
Anglo-Soviet [sic] Committee, for the sake of contact with the masses of 
the British workers, without restricting in any way our right to criticise any 
action by the General Council. "36 
Due to British imperial interests, the CPGB was also closely connected to 
the revolutionary possibilities emerging in the East during the 1920S. 37 
Events in China had forced the ECCI to reassess its political strategy, as 
the communist alliance with the Kuomingtang became increasingly 
entangled. While Chiang Kai Shek welcomed CI support, he 
simultaneously ensured that communist influence within China was 
severely limited. 38 Consequently, while the Comintern remained 
committed to the united front, there was (non-Trotskyist) pressure from 
36Coded Telegram from Molotov to Stalin I June 1926. In L. T Lih, ON. Naumov, and ON. Khlevniuk, Stalin's Letters to Molotov op. cit. pp 106-7. Stalin agreed. (p 109. ) 
37The Party mounted a dedicated'Hands off China! campaign in the following months 
and much of its associated literature tackled the issue of imperialism. 
381n May 1926, Chiang ordered the expulsion of communists from all senior positions. 
57 
sections of both the Chinese CP, and Voitinsky within the ECCI, for a 
loosening of the alliance with Chiang. 39 
Finally, the gradualist nature of Soviet policy in the USSR, most obviously 
the NEP, was coming in for criticism by 1926, and Bukharin accordingly 
outlined a turn in policy towards increased production, new enterprise, and 
technological advancement. Although Bukharin's policy was in no way as 
extreme as that advocated by Russian left wingers such as Preobrazensky 
(or indeed Trotsky), the move towards a more centrally planned, pro- 
industrial economy did mark a subtle 'left turn' in Bukharin's outlook, and 
can in part be attributed to the pressure for a more radical policy gaining 
eminence within the Soviet Union. 40 
Thus, within the CPGB and wider sections of the international communist 
movement, the strategic and theoretical basis of communist policy was 
coming into question. While this did not lead inevitably to an overhaul of 
Comintern practice, the sharper condemnation of labour-socialists and 
social democrats; the increasingly tenuous nature of the 'united front from 
above'; and the innate desire within a revolutionary movement for 
revolutionary policy (most obviously expressed within the KPD), all 
served to push the Comintern to the left. The events of the following year 
could only augment such a development. 
The Left Turn Consolidated 
39 M. Weiner, 'Comintern in East Asia, 1919-39. ' In K. McDennott and J. Agnew, The 
Comintern op. cit. ppl58-190. See also R. Thornton, The Comintern and the Chines 
Communist Pqr! y 1928-1931 (Washington, 1969). 
40For further details, see E. H. Carr and R. W. Davies, Foundations of a Planned 
Economy, 1926-1929 2 vols. (Great Britain, 1969). Also, R. W. Davies, The Socialis 
Offensive 1929-1930: The Collectivisation of Soviet Agriculture (London, 1980). pp4- 40. 
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Although, as Keith Laybourn has argued, the General Strike should not be 
seen as a'watershed' in industrial relations, 41 the aftermath of May 1926 
certainly exacerbated differences already existent within the British labour 
movement. This section will examine how the more radical perspective of 
the CPGB and Cl was affirmed by British and international events 
throughout 1927. 
For the CPGB, the harder line adopted at the Eight Party Congress was 
justified by a perceived polarisation in the British labour movement. On 
the one hand, the Party claimed to discern a notable radicalisation of the 
working class, including the 'left rank and file' inside the Labour Party and 
trade union movement. On the other, however, the Party detailed an 
offensive against the workers, carried out under the auspices of the 
capitalist state in conjunction with the Labour Party and TUC bureaucracy. 
The Party portrayed the militancy of the working class in a number ways; 
the solid support given to the General Strike, the emergence of an 
organised Left Wing Movement inside the Labour Party, the expansion of 
the Minority Movement, and the numerical growth of the CP itself. Linked 
to this was the Party's expectation that the events of May 1926 and the 
revelation of the 'true character' of the reformist leaders, would allow the 
workers to recognise the Communist Party as the only true representative 
of the working class. 
There was some credence to the Party's outlook. Party membership had 
grown to 11,127 by December 1926,42 with substantial increases in South 
Wales, Scotland, Sheffield and Tyneside. Furthermore, the 'treachery' of 
the labour leaders had pushed several thousand workers, particularly 
41K. Laybourn, A Histo! y of British Trade Unionism op. cit. pp 139-143. 42Pagy Membership Figures June 1925-September 1927. Klugmarm Papers. 
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miners, into the CPGB. Margaret McCarthy, Will Paynter, Freda Utley, 
Reg Groves, and Tom Thomas have all detailed how the General Strike 
and miners' lock-out convinced them to join the CPGB. 43 Thomas, writing 
in 1977, recalled how he "left [the Labour Party] because of the way the 
General Strike had been betrayed. I could not continue under the 
MacDonald leadership 
... 
so I joined the... Communist Party, and 
remained in it for several years. "44 While the majority of new recruits 
proved to be more transient members than Thomas (who developed the 
Workers'Theatre Movement), the increase in membership undoubtedly 
enthused and encouraged the CPGB. 
The extension of left wing activity inside the Labour Party also bolstered 
communist expectations. Left Wing groups had been forming within the 
Labour Party since 1924, primarily in response to the perceived right wing 
policy of the leadership, but also in opposition to action taken against 
communist Labour members. The Labour Executive had taken various 
measures to restrict communist activity within the party, ranging from the 
rejection of Communist Party affiliation and a block on communist 
members acting as national or local representatives of the Labour Party, to 
the denial of individual membership. The General Strike encouraged the 
continued organisation of the Left Wing, and in September 1926 the first 
conference of the National Left Wing Movement (NLWM) was held in 
London. 
43W. Paynter in My Generation op. cit. pp33-34. M. McCarthy in Generation in Revolt 
op. cit. pp66-69. F. Utley, Lost Illusion (London, 1949). pp I 1- 12. R. Groves, The 
Balham Group (London, 1974). pp 15-16. 
44T. Thomas, 'A Propertyless Theatre for a Propertyless Class' In HistoEy Workshop 
Journal No. 4 1977. Reprinted in R. Samuel, E. MacColl, S. Cosgrove, BLeatresof the 
Left op. cit. p79. 
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The very existence of the NLWM seemed to bear out the CPs vision of a 
polarised labour movement, and with communists filling the NLWM 
leadership and a CP sponsored newspaper acting as its mouthpiece 
(SundU Worker), 45 the Party was intrinsically linked to its development. 
The Second Annual Conference in September 1927 was attended by 54 
local Labour Parties representing 150,000 members, 46 and with 90 Left 
Wing groups across the country, R. W. Robson could justifiably inform the 
Party leadership that "the active rank and file in the Labour Party are more 
closely connected with communists" as a result of Left Wing activity. 47 As 
The Communist boasted in 1927; "from being a movement mainly 
confined to London, the Left Wing, has 
... 
developed into a powerful 
national force, which is causing the right wing Labour bureaucracy more 
and more anxiety and alarm. "48 
As for the National Minority Movement, the number of workers the 
movement claimed to represent rose from 200,000 in 1924 to 956,000 in 
1926, although individual membership amounted to just 3,460.49 The 
Fourth Minority Movement Conference in 1927 saw a further increase in 
the number of delegates from the metal and transport industries, and the 
mounting concern the TUC gave to the MM's existence throughout 1926- 
29 was a compliment to the relatively tiny CPGB. Moreover, as Roderick 
Martin has demonstrated, the antagonism that existed between the MM 
and the mainstream trade union movement widened in the months 
45The headquarters of the NLWM was Gray's Inn Road, London, home of the CP 
initiated Sunday Worker. 
4613etween the Fifth and Sixth Congress 1924-1928 CPGB 1928. 
47Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Parjy of Great Britain 14-15 May 
1927. Klugmann Papers. 
48The Communist August 1927. Cited in M. Woodhouse and B. Pearce, Essays op. cit. 
pl8l. 
49Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist P= of Great Britain 31 December 
1926. Klugmann Papers. 
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following the General Strike, with the MM exuding "new vigour" in its 
work, concertedly organising factional activity and mobilising the militant 
opposition at the annual TUC. 50 
This 'new vigour'was first evidenced at the Third Annual Conference of 
the MM in August 1926. Although condemnation of the TUC General 
Council was deliberately restrained at the conference so as not to threaten 
the Anglo-Russian Committee, the organisational structure of the MM 
was overhauled, and more radical political objectives were unveiled in 
accordance with the increasingly militant perspective emanating from CP 
headquarters in King Street. George Hardy of the MM Executive 
Committee declared that "the Minority Movement is entering a new phase 
in its work. " Where previously the MM had organised itself as an 
ideologically broad militant movement that campaigned for a radical trade 
union policy within the official trade union organisation, the August 
conference transformed the movement into a more co-ordinated pressure 
group, aiming to gain political control of the trade union apparatus. A new 
leadership was elected, with Harry Pollitt as Secretary. The movement's 
structure was further centralised. And the conference resolved to form MM 
factions in every possible area of the trade union structure with the 
intention of gaining "control of the existing unions, to transform them into 
real class war organisations. "51 
Such developments were due, in part, to the on-going process of 
'Bolshevisation' then underway throughout the Comintern, and the 
reorganisation of the MM augmented the CPGB's growing separation from 
SOR. Martin, Communism and the British Trade Unions op. cit. p82-83. 51 Report of the Third Annual Conference of the National Minorily Movement August 
1926. 
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the mainstream labour movement. In the context of the General Strike 
however, the 'new phase' of the MM also necessitated more radical 
objectives. No longer would the MM merely advocate a militant trade 
union policy, it would systematically endeavour to apply such a policy by 
securing actual control of the leadership. Essentially, the MM had become 
an organisation within an organisation. Furthermore, the 'conciliatory' 
attitude shown towards the trade union leadership by the MM in the wake 
the General Strike was soon rectified. In November 1926, The Worker 
renounced the MM's concern that criticism of the trade union leadership 
would damage the miners' struggle. Instead, "merciless criticism and 
exposure of the manoeuvres of the new consolidated trade union 
bureaucracy" was to become "one of the foremost tasks in the struggle for 
revolutionising the British trade union movement. 1152 
From such a perspective, the CPGB was able to detect a protracted 
militancy within the labour movement through which an "organised 
revolutionary opposition movement, centred around the political 
leadership of the Communist Party" could develop. 53 The masses were 
seen to be moving, in Andrew Rothstein's words, from "political passivity 
to political activity. "54 Even the communist led National Unemployed 
Workers' Committee Movement (NUWCM), which had been in decline 
since the successful campaigns of the early twenties, appeared to be 
regrouping. 55 
52The Worker 19 November 1926. 
53Labour Monthly February 1927. This comment was in particular relation to the 
NLWM. 
54Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PgM of Great Britain 14-15 May 
1927. Klugmann Papers 
55See R. Croucher, We Refuse to Starve in Silence op. cit. p87. 
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The plight of the miners and the appearance of the Blanesburgh Report 
gave a definite point of focus to the NUWCM in 1927. A widespread 
campaign against the report (which included the hated 'not genuinely 
seeking work! clause) was launched in the face of TUC opposition. And a 
N_LJWCM sponsored march from South Wales to London, in recognition of 
the out of work miners, was supported by thousands of unemployed 
workers. The latter culminated in a huge demonstration in Trafalgar 
Square on 20 November 1927, and small but hard-fought concessions were 
secured. 56 However, Labour Party and trade union acceptance of the 
Blanesburgh Report (and the subsequent Unemployment Bill), once again 
revealed the growing breach between the CPGB and the wider labour 
movement. The contrasting attitudes (and response) to the report merely 
underlined the apparent 'treachery' of the official labour leadership in the 
minds of communist supporters, 57 and it was indicative of such mounting 
tension that the Joint Advisory Committee (JAC) of the TUC and the 
NUWCM was dissolved in mid 1927. 
While the CPGB perceived the workers and sections of the militant left to 
have radicalised in the wake the General Strike, the representatives of the 
official labour movement were simultaneously seen to be moving to the 
right. The'reformist! leadership was committed to crushing "the 
revolutionary Marxist nucleus" that existed within the labour movement 
Dutt later wrote, echoing R. W. Robson's report to the PB in May 1927.59 
56W. Hannington, Unemployed Struggles 1919-1936 (London, 1977, reprint). pp 154- 
168. 
57See Hannington's pamphlet, The Meaning of the Blanesburgh Repo (London, 1927). 
And, Workers' Life 6 May 1927. 
58Labour Monthly September 1928. Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of Great Britain 14-15 May 1927. Klugmarm Papers. Robson outlined a 
poMsation within the Labour Movement where a'sharpening class struggle'was evident 
between the workers and the bureaucracy. Robson also noted the latter's 'offensive' 
against the CP. 
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But the basis for such reasoning related to far more than the 'betrayal' of 
May 1926, and was supported by a series of measures undertaken to limit 
or indeed 'crush' communist influence within the labour movement. 
Following the TUC's denunciation of militant action in 1926, numerous 
measures were taken by the various trade union bureaucracies to restrict 
the influence of communists inside the union apparatus. The NUGMW 
declared membership of the MM or CPGB to be 'inconsistent' with 'loyal 
attachment' to the union, and a number of its members who had attended 
an MM meeting against the orders of the union executive were later 
disqualified. By 1927, the union insisted that no communist or member of 
the Minority Movement could hold an official position within the 
NUGMW, and C. J. Moody (a communist member of the union leadership) 
was suspended along with several other militant trade unionists. 
The AEU meanwhile, blocked the payment of affiliation fees to the 
Minority Movement, and warned local branches against sending delegates 
to MM conferences. Similarly, the Boilermakers' Union voted to deny 
communists the right to act as union delegates. Elsewhere, the NUR and 
the TGWU sought to block correspondence between the MM and local 
union branches; the Painters' Union ruled affiliation to the MM out of 
bounds; and both the Printers and the Shop Assistants' union denied CP or 
MM members the right to stand for official union positions. Even the 
MFGB, arguably the most militant trade union, condemned the activities 
of the communists and the MM at its Annual Conference in 1928. 
Where the MM continued to wield an influence, as in the National Union 
of Boot and Shoe Operatives, extraordinary measures were granted to the 
union executive to arrest communist infiltration. Minority Movement 
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members were debarred from holding official positions within the union, 
local branches were forced to sign a declaration denying affiliation to 
communist organisations, and the leader of the Leather Workers MM, 
G. W. Chandler, was expelled. 59 
Communist influence within the trades councils was also targeted. In 
February 1927, the TUC withdrew recognition of those trades councils 
affiliated to (or associated with) the MM. This struck a major blow against 
a significant area of communist influence. The London Trades Council for 
example, had included five members of the MM on its Executive of twelve 
in 1926.60 
Such measures have been listed in a number of studies of the CPGB, yet 
their relevance to the Party's adoption of a more militant perspective has 
not been adequately acknowledged. 61 The CPGB regarded the manoeuvres 
of the various union bureaucracies to be symptomatic of the growing'class 
struggle', and the scope of the 'offensive' formed a fundamental basis of the 
new Party line in 1928. With the Party's access to the various unions and 
trades councils severely restricted, the CP was forced to assume a more 
independent position prior to the adoption of the New Line. 
59Edward Pountney of the National Amalgamated Union of Shop Assistants, 
Warehousemen and Clerks suffered a similar fate. See E. Pountney, Autobiographical 
Transcript. Communist Archive, and E. Pountney, Unpublished Minority Movement 
Pamphlet. Communist Archive. Also, Verbatim Report of an Interview Between Mr. S. 
Purkis and the Executive Committee of the RCA (Railway Clerks Association 3 March 
1929. Pollard-Johnson Collection. 
60j. Vaughan, R. Pountney, F. Smith, T. Quelch and W. Hannington. The CP had also 
been responsible for the establishment of a National Federation of Trades Councils in 
1923. 
61 See R. Martin, Communism and the British Trade Unions op. cit. pp93- 10 1. N. 
Branson, Histoly of the Communist Pa! V of Great Britain op. cit. pp I l- 15. L. J. 
Macfarlane, The British Communist Pa op. cit. pp243-46. 
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In effect, the trade union leadership sought to exclude all communist and 
associated groupings from the official labour movement. And when the 
measures undertaken by the General Council are considered next to the 
TUC's withdrawal from the Anglo-Russian Committee in September 
1927, the offensive against the MM/CP (and communism generally) can 
be regarded as an efficacious one. Add to this the advent of 'industrial 
peace' and the Mond-Turner talks held by TUC and employers 
representatives in January 1928, and it becomes clear that the 'new spirit'62 
within the hierarchy of the labour movement fermented the 'intensifying 
class struggle' determined by the CPGB. 
This was similarly reflected at the 1926 Labour Party Conference, which 
exuded an overall tone of conciliation and moderation. 63 Not only was the 
General Strike dismissed as an unrealistic industrial weapon, but the 
disaffiliation of local Labour Parties and trades councils linked to the 
CPGB 
- 
outlined a year earlier in Liverpool 
- 
was re-emphasised. 
Although these measures were criticised by communists and left wingers 
such as Joseph Southall and Frank Jackson, their challenge was defeated 
easily, and by 1929,27 local branches had been disaffiliated from the 
Labour Party. Meanwhile, those Labour locals that wished to avoid 
disaffiliation were forced to sever their ties with both the NLWM and the 
CPGB. Communists who were individual members of the Labour Party 
were also targeted, and although the CP maintained a presence at the 
Labour Party Conference in 1928, the measures taken in Birmingham that 
year 
-a loyalty clause that outlawed the election of communist trade union 
delegates, and the debarring of Labour members from sharing a platform 
62K. Laybourn, A Histoly of Trade Unionism op. cit. p 143. 
63See J. Klugmann, Histoly of the Communist Pagy of Great Britain op. cit. p279, for 
details of Robert Williams' presidential address. 
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with the CP and NLWM 
- 
effectively sealed off the last communist in- 
roads into the Labour Party. 64 
It was not just within the labour movement that the CPGB perceived there 
to be an offensive against the working class however. The Party could also 
point to Government action to justify its claims of an 'intensifying class 
struggle. ' The state had traditionally regarded the CPGB with disdain, and 
the General Strike served only to reinforce such an attitude. As Richard 
Thurlow has recently suggested, the British state's view of communism 
was approached very much in terms of law and order, with little or no 
understanding of the political, social, economic context within which the 
Party operated. 65 Subsequently, the General Strike was perceived as a 
militant challenge to the status quo, resulting in mounting pressure for 
direct action against the left in all its guises. In relation to the CPGB, 
whose links to Moscow had been a constant source of consternation for the 
secret services, Sir William Joynson-Hicks saw the strike as a Comintern 
plot to capture the TUC General Council, with the unemployed emerging 
as a fledgling Red Army. Although such amazing leaps of the imagination 
were not consistent throughout the state apparatus, the disruption caused 
by the General Strike meant the Government set out immediately to ensure 
that such a situation could never occur again. 66 
In June, the Lord Chancellor laid out various restrictive measures designed 
to limit the power of the labour movement, including the compulsory 
auditing of trade union accounts, the amendment of the 1906 Trades 
64For a comprehensive overview, see N. Branson, Histoly of the Communist Pam of 
Great Britain op. cit. pp4-1 1. 
65R. Thurlow, The Secret State. British Internal Securijy in the Twentieth Centu! y (Great 
Britain, 1995). p 145. 
661bid. 
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Disputes Act, and the request for legal notice to be given before strikes 
were undertaken. The Coal Mines Bill soon followed, suspending the 
seven-hour day. And in April 1927, the Trade Union Act outlawed the 
policy of General Strike. The Act included numerous provisions that 
infringed trade union practice. These included limiting the rights of 
picketing, debarring civil service unions from affiliating to the TUC, and 
transforming the payment of the trade union levy by substituting 
'contacting in' for'contracting out'. For Palme Dutt, the Bill was the second 
'signpost to the new era' (the other being the General Strike), and in 
conjunction with the TUC's talk of 'industrial peace' it constituted the 





and transforming henceforth the social situation in Britain into 
increasingly open conflict between the capitalist dictatorship and working 
class revolution. 1167 
Such a 'smashing attack' had been preceded by more 'grass roots' action. 
Prior to the General Strike, the CP leadership had been arrested and 
gaoled, and throughout May 1926 and the succeeding months, communists 
were conspicuous targets for victimisation. Local Party branches were 
raided, and one historian has estimated that over a thousand communists 
were arrested in and around the period of the General Strike, often in 
connection with the seemingly minor charge of producing or distributing 
militant strike bulletins. 68 As noted in chapter one, communists and 
militant workers were also victimised in the workplace, as employers lost 
no time in ridding themselves of'difficulf workers. "To become known as 
67Labour Monthly May 1927. The language used by Dutt was particularly interesting 
given that he was writing at the beginning of the period that preached'social fascism. '
"The leaders of international fascism fare] striking from the seat of power of decaying 
British capitalism, " he wrote. 
68A. J. Davies, To Build a New Jerusalem. The British Labour Pg!! Y from Keir Hardie to 
Tony Blai (London, 1996). p157. 
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'Red' on the average job" recalled Douglas Hyde in his autobiography, 
"meant that, at the first opportunity, you would be dismissed. "69 And 
although numbers are impossible to gather, various memoirs and historical 
studies illustrate acutely the arbitrary measures inflicted against militant 
members of the working class in the wake of the General Strike. 70 
On an international scale, the communist perspective was augmented by 
the deterioration of Anglo-Soviet relations. On 12 May 1927, the British 
Government raided the offices of ARCOS, the Russian trade delegation in 
London; and the subsequent espionage charges made by the Baldwin 
administration led to the severing of diplomatic relations. 71 
Simultaneously, the Soviet embassy in Peking was raided, while British 
troops were dispatched to Shanghai 
- 
on the pretence of protecting British 
property 
- 
in order to halt the advancing Nationalist offensive. For the 
Soviet Union, such measures were the prelude to war, and throughout the 
Third Period the threat of 'imperialist aggression' featured prominently in 
the pronouncements of the CPGB and the Comintern. 72 
The Trade Union Act, the 'social democratic' discipline of the Labour 
Party, the TUC offensive against communists and the Minority Movement, 
the rationalisation of industry, and the collapse of Anglo-Soviet relations, 
69D. Hyde, I Believed (London, 1950). p24- 
70For examples see, A. Campbell, 'The Communist Party in the Scots Coal Fields in the 
Inter-War Period' op. cit. Campbell quotes David Proudfoot, a leading Communist in 
Fife, as saying in 1927 that, "others were failing to put in an appearance at the Party 
meetings because of the bright and handy idea that membership of the Party is the reason 
for them not being employed. " See also C. J. Wrigley, '1926, Social Costs of the Mining 
Dispute', in Histoly Today November 1984. pp5-1 0. 
71Dutt referred to the raid as "lawless bandit outrage" and linked it to the perceived 
offensive against the working class in Britain. Labour Monthly June 1927. 
72See Workers'Life 3 June 1929. Labour Monthly and The Communist June 1927. Also 
articles such as T. Bell, 'The Communist Parties and the War Danger' in The Communist 
July 1927. C. Dutt, 'War Preparations and the TUC' in Labour Monthly September 1927. 
W. Gallacher, 'Facing the War Makers' in Labour Monthly August 1929. And A. 
Rothstein's 'Preparing War on Soviet Russiain Labour Monthly September 1929. 
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were all regarded by the CPGB as evidence of sharpening class struggle. 
The question that soon divided the British Communist Party however, was 
how should the CPGB respond? 
A New Policy? 
The severance of British-Sovict relations and tile ever worsening debacle 
in China, where Chiang Kai Slick's continued repression of the CU 
culminated in the Shanghai massacre of communists in April 1927, have 
traditionally been presented as tile cause of the left tuni within the 
Comintern. 73 In reality however, such events augmented a move to tile left 
already apparent from late 1926, and in many ways justified the rationale 
behind it. The transition from theory to practice engendered by Bukharin's 
speech to the ECCI Plenum in November 1926 was however, a anornalous 
one. Contrasting interpretations as to the extent and meaning of the 
encroaching Third Period clearly obstructed the development of a cogent 
Comintern policy, and the practical modifications that initially 
complimented Bukharin's theoretical innovations were confused and 
uncertain. 
In Germany, where enthusiasm for a stronger line towards social 
democracy was perhaps most intense, the KPD immediately complimented 
the ECCI's hardened rhetoric. At the Eleventh Congress of the German 
Communist Party in January 1927, Ernst Thtilmann announced that the left 
within the SPD had become an "obstacle to the leflward development of 
the social democratic workers, " and went on to stress the "necessity of 
73For example see E. 1 1. Carr and R. W. Davies, Foundations of P lllinncd Economy op. 
cit. pp56-57. Also 1. Dcutschcr, 
_Stalin (revised edition) op. cit. pp383-406 and It. Martin, Communism and the British Trade Union op. cit. pp102-105. 
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fighting the 'left' leaders as the main enemy within the SPD. "74 Although 
the final congress resolution differentiated between the left SPD members 
and tile party leadership, tile majority of the KPD supported Thalmann's 
hard-line position. 75 And yet, the KPD was not certain enough of the ECCI 
position to initiate a distinct break from the existent Party policy. 
In France too, Jules Humbert Droz, a close comrade of Bukharin and tile 
ECCI's representative on tile French Communist Party, took steps to adapt 
PCF policy to Comintem ideology. Both Zinoviev and Bukharin had 
castigated the PCF for its 'right tendencies' at the Sixth Plenum of tile 
Communist International in early 1926,76 and Humbert Droz consequently 
encouraged the French CP to sever its electoral alliance with the'Bloc des 
Gouche. ' In premonition of the divisive conflict that later tormented the 
CPGB, the policy 
- 
named'class against class'- was tile centre of a 
protracted and heated debate within the PCF. Although the majority of the 
French Party leadership resisted Humbert Droz's initiative, the new line 
was endorsed by an ECCI commission that included Bukharin in March 
1927.77 While convinced of the need to overhaul tile policy of the PCF 
however, the fact that the debate endured through to November suggests 
that the ECCI remained uncertain as to the extent of its 'new line. ' 
The debate surrounding the PCF revealed that controversies over the 
development of communist policy were evident early in 1927. Moreover, 
it is apparent hat discussions within the higher echelons of the 
74B. Fov%-kcs, Communism in Gumany under the Wcimar Rqpublic (London, 1984). 
p142. 
75K. Mcdermott and J. Agnew. 'l-be Comijit op. cit., pp7l-72. 
76T. Draper. 'Me Strange Case of the Comintcm-' In Survey Surnincr 1972. pp9l-137. 
Bukharin said, "the central danger in France is the right danger. " 
771bid. Also, E. Mortimcr, -nic Rise of the French Conlullnist Party 1920-1947 (London, 
1984). pp 131-138. 
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International had also stretched beyond electoral tactics and political 
theory. In a letter to the Italian leader Togliatti, Humbert Droz revealed 
that pressure for a more radical 'left turn' was mounting. In particular 
Losovsky, who headed the Red International of Labour Unions (RILU), 
was reputedly battling with the ECCI over the possibility of establishing 
communist led 'Red' trade unions. 78 
The Eighth Plenum of the ECCI, held between the 13 and 30 May 1927, 
offered a glimpse of future political realignments. Again however, there 
was scant evidence of any forthcoming practical amendments to existing 
Comintern policy. Certainly the primary focus of the Plenum was centred 
upon the non-Party left, and the "exposure" of such "lackeys of the 
reactionary bureaucracy" (who the Comintern labelled "our greatest 
enemy") was listed as a'most urgent'task of the Communist 
International. 79 In addition, concepts that would become central to the 
Third Period, such as the 'sharpening class struggle, ' the 'rapprochement' of 
social democracy and the capitalist class, and the 'fascist methods' of 
capitalist rule, were all inclusive in the Plenum resolutions. 80 However, a 
distinct 'new line' with which to approach the 'new period' was noticeably 
absent. Subsequently, the CPGB continued to apply a policy that mingled 
militant rhetoric with a limited practical agenda, thus revealing a number 
of differing opinions within the CPGB, as well as disparities between the 
Party and the Cl. 
78T. Draper, 'The Strange Case of the Comintern' op. cit. p 131. 
791npreco 23 June 1927. 'Resolution on the Tasks of the CPGB. ' The reference noted 
above related to the ILP. Inpreco 18 August 1927. 
80'Resolution of the Eighth Plenum of the ECCI on the Situation in Great Britain. ' In The 
Ninth Congress of the Communist PA! jy of Great Britain (London, 1927). 
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The first open disagreement occurred in October 1926, in the form of an 
article written for the Communist International by Robin Page Amot and 
Jack Murphy. 81 The article, pointedly endorsed by the ECCI, brought 
attention to Nacillations to the right in the ranks of the British Communist 
Party or rather in its leadership. " These included the failure to criticise 
adequately the role of the 'sham left' during and after the General Strike; 
undue concern over the severity of Tomsky's criticism of the TUC General 
Council; 82 the failure to expose the'right errors'of A. J Cook; and the 
portrayal of the Bournemouth TUC as a'step backwards'. "The British 
Communist Party has spoken a language much less clear than the Russian 
trade unions" wrote Murphy and Page Arnot, "in particular [the CPGB] 
adopted a mild attitude towards the "lefts" of the Purcell type, although 
these "left" leaders had moved to the right, to an alliance with Thomas. " 
The MM conference was held up as an example of these 'right 
vacillations', and Murphy and Page Arnot insisted that the Bournemouth 
TUC represented a "step forward" in terms of the militancy shown by the 
working class rank and file. 83 
The sharper tone that emerged from Murphy, Page Amot and the ECCI 
echoed that of Palme Dutt, who in the 1920S was the most acute 
'Comintern reader' in the CPGB. Dutt was married to the Finnish 
revolutionary Salme Murrik whose contacts, particularly with Otto 
Kuusinen, led her to the heart of the ECCI's 'inner sanctum. ' As Kevin 
81 Murphy was the British secretariat's representative on the ECCI, and Page Arnot was a 
member of the Cl's Agit Prop section in Moscow. 
82The Comintern's influence can be seen here due to the fact that Murphy had been one 
of those opposed to such criticisms 
- 
as evidenced by his conversation with Stalin 
described above. 
83The Communist International 15 October 1926. The CPGB's reply was published in 
The Communist International 30 October 1926. The Executive denied it had neglected 
criticism of Cook, and sought to compromise between the varying interpretations of the 
TUC. The matter of the Russian trade unions was accepted however, although the CC 
pointed out that Murphy shared in this 'error. '
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Morgan has shown, Salme played a hidden but significant role in the 
CPGB, 84 and although Dutt's influence on the 'average' CP member should 
not be exaggerated, his unique location and his contact with the'inner 
sanctum' of the ECCI, enabled him to offer a reliable guide to the varying 
currents of the Comintern. 85 
Dutt had struck a typically militant tone immediately following the 
General Strike, even going so far as to "question 
... 
whether the apparatus 
of the [trade union] movement is fitted for such a general struggle. t'86 
Although his analysis was tempered by the line of the EM, Dutt 
consistently adopted a position that pre-empted CPGB's analysis of the 
emergent Third Period throughout 1927. In both the Labour Monthly 
(which he edited) and The Communist International, Dutt relentlessly 
outlined the 'treachery' of the TUC, the militancy of the working class, and 
the ever closer correlation of the labour bureaucracy, the employers and 
the state. 87 In January 1927, Dutt insisted that the trade union leadership 
could only be transformed from "outside" the existing apparatus, 88 while 
his Socialism and the Living Wage, published in mid 1927, stated; "a 
reformist leadership and party has no longer any basis, and can only 
maintain itself for a while by acting more and more openly as the decoy 
agent of the capitalist class in the tasks of repression and stabilisation on 
the backs of the workers. "89 Such reasoning, while generally accepted 
within the CP, did not lead necessarily to a political consensus however. 
84K. Morgan, Hagy Pollitt op. cit. pp 33-38. 
85See also, J. Callaghan, Raiani Palme Dutt op. cit. 
86R. P. Dutt in The. Communist International June 1926. 
87For a typical example see Labour Monthly May 1927. 
88Labour Montbly January 1927. 
89R. P. Dutt, Socialism and the Living Wag London 1927. 
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In 1927, the Party Executive was concerned primarily with its response to 
the repressive measures taken against the CPGB by the Labour Party and 
TUC. Without a clear lead from the ECCI however, the Party often found 
itself at odds with the logic of Dutt and the Comintern. In response to the 
TUC's threat to withdraw its recognition of trades councils affiliated or 
associated with the MM for example, the majority of the British P13 voted 
to accept "under protest" the TUC decision, and to instead concentrate on 
trade union branches and individual membership. 90 To resist the decision, 
the CPGB argued, would further "isolate" those trades councils linked to 
the Party. 91 
The ensuing debate however, revealed both the ambiguity of the ECCI's 
position in 1927, and the leftward trajectory of Comintern policy. Harry 
Pollitt had been the only British leader to oppose the line recommended by 
the British Political Bureau (PB), but in doing so he received support from 
the ECCI and its British representative, Jack Murphy. Murphy was 
provoked into "[wiring] a protest"92 to the Party leadership, and although a 
subsequent ECCI Presidium failed to construct a clear alternative to the 
CPGB line, it resolved that the Party should "conduct with greater energy" 
a campaign to "expose the disgraceful ultimatum of the General 
Council. "93 Thus, the ECCI insisted that the CPGB oppose the General 
Council's ultimatum, and campaign against the TUC, but was unable to 
formulate a cohesive political strategy. The fact that Pertrovsky, the ECCI 
90Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pa! jy of Great Britain 22 March 
1927. Letter from Inkpin to Bukharin 30 March 1927. Klugmann Papers. Letter to all 
Trades Councils 31 March 1927. Tanner Papers. 
91 Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pa! ly of Great Britain 2-3 April 
1927. Klugmann Papers. 
92j. T. Murphy, New Horizons op. cit. p233. Pollitt was also supported by Gallacher. See 
Letter from H. Pollitt to J. T. Mu! phy 31 March 1927. Klugmann Papers. 
931npreco 14 June 1927. 
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representative in Britain, argued in favour of the CPGB's initial decision, 
can only have exacerbated the confusion. 
The Labour Party's intention to expel those local parties associated with 
the NLWM raised similar questions for the CPGB. Again, the central issue 
from a communist perspective, was whether an offensive policy would 
"isolate" those Labour Parties linked to the CPGB. As such, the Party 
maintained a variable policy of not recommending that the disaffiliated 
branches return to Labour, while simultaneously struggling against 
disaffiliation where it was threatened but had not yet occurred; a decision 
that reflected the importance the Party placed on the Left Wing groups in 
1927. The main critic of the Party's policy was William Gallacher, who 
felt such a strategy contradicted the line taken towards the disaffiliated 
trades councils. "How far can we carry on a defensive struggle against the 
trade union bureaucracy, " he asked, "whilst 
... 
endeavouring to maintain an 
offensive action against the Labour Party leadership? "94 
Gallacher feared that the CPGB's strategy would lead to a split with the 
Labour Party, and he communicated this concern to Bukharin in February 
1927.95 Even so, it was Gallacher who suggested that the "success" of the 
Labour Party's disaffiliation campaign necessitated a "modification of our 
poliCy, "96 and although the line of the CPGB fell somewhat short of the 
policy then under discussion in the PCF, the Party's decision to support 
Left Wing candidates against official Labour representatives marked a 
noticeable 'left turn' in the Party's strategy. Moreover, the disagreements 
94Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PaM of Great Britain 2-3 April 
1927. Gallacher later charged the leadership of "wobbling" between ultra-leftism and 
ultra-rightism. Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Great 
Britain 14-15 May 1927. Klugmann Papers. 
95Letter from Gallacher to Bukharin 19 February 1927. Klugmarm Papers. 
961, etter from Gallacher to the Political Bureau April 1927. Klugmann Papers. 
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that would characterise the introduction of the New Line in 1928, 
particularly with regard to the 'mood' of the masses, were also emerging in 
1927. 
This was clearly evident in the leadership discussion on the Trade Union 
Bill. The debate centred around the proposed slogan in favour of a General 
Strike adopted by just five votes to four at a meeting of the Political 
Bureau in March. 97 Although it was accepted that the working class were 
moving to the left, a minority on the P13 believed the workers were not yet 
ready to embrace such a slogan. For the majority of the Party leadership 
however, the workers, betrayed by the events of May 1926, were indeed 
ready, and such a slogan was expected to rally support against the Bill. 98 
The debate was a heated one, so much so that the Party secretary Albert 
Inkpin, complained to Bukharin that "the atmosphere in the PB during the 
last two weeks has been very tense" and Gallacher, who once again found 
himself in the minority, was so unhappy that he went'back to Glasgow. '99 
In the Executive meeting called to conclude the matter, the slogan was 
adopted by fourteen votes to six. 
Ultimately, the CPGB's call for a second General Strike found little 
support outside of Party circles (although the Scottish TUC rejected the 
policy by just nineteen votes). However, the decision to agitate for such a 
policy clearly revealed the militancy of a significant section of the Party in 
97Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PaM of Great Britain 6 April 1927. 
Klugmann Papers. Rothstein, Campbell, Brown, Rust and Inkpin were in favour of the 
slogan. Gallacher, Stewart, Bell and Robson were against. Interestingly, Campbell, 
Rothstein, Brown and Inkpin were to be amongst the chief targets in the hunt for the 
'right danger'in 1928-29, and yet all three show a greater belief in the radicalisation of 
the working class in 1927. 
"Such a belief was exemplified by Pollitt a week later when he said the rank and file 
would be able to force the TUC into calling a General Strike. Minutes of the Central 
Committee of the Communist PaM of Great Britain 12 April 1927. Klugmann Papers. 
"Letter from Inkpin to Bukharin 29 April 1927. Kluginann Papers. 
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1927.100 But how intense did the CPGB believe the "sharpening class 
struggle" to be? While the Comintern's estimation of the "growing 
momentum of the masses to the left" 10 1 was accepted by the CP, it was not 
seen to be occurring 'evenly' in Britain. As R. W. Robson outlined at the 
Special Executive meeting in May 1927, the "drift to the left" in a British 
context, was characterised by workers "swinging" from the Conservative 
and Liberal Party to Labour; while within the Labour Party itself, a 
simultaneous class struggle was emerging between the bureaucracy and 
the rank and file. 102 Such a synopsis led the Party to struggle actively to 
maintain its links with the Labour Party, while also seeking to consolidate 
communist influence within the disaffiliated Labour locals. The workers 
were perceived to be getting closer to communism, the class struggle was 
becoming more acute, and the Party had sharpened its line towards the 
labour movement leadership accordingly; but the CPGB still remained 
committed to working within the existing Labour Party apparatus. And it 
was such an approach that the ECCI sou ght to challenge in October 1927. 
Conclusions 
Although the CPGB perceived the General Strike to be a potentially 
revolutionary opportunity, the events of May 1926 were, in reality, a final 
flurry of militancy from a labour movement forced onto the defensive. 
Subsequently, the dramatic fall in the instances of industrial protest that 
proceeded the miners' lock out allowed the CPGB little opportunity to 
either witness, or work amongst, the'radicalised working masses. ' 
10()Report of the Ninth Congress of the CPGB op. cit. Also in L. J. Macfarlane, The 
British Communist PaE! y op. cit. p 182. It should be noted that even those on the Party 
Executive who voted against the slogan did so because it was inappropriate at that time, 
rather than because it was inappropriate per se. 
1011nprcco 14 June 1927. 
102Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Parly of Great Britain 14-15 
May 1927. Klugmann Papers. 
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Although the Party's vehement support of the miners earned it the respect 
of the heroic men and women who carried their struggle on into November 
1926, the CPGB's main concern throughout 1927 was the 'offensive' 
launched against Party members by the Labour Party and trade union 
bureaucracy; a change of emphasis indicative of the Party's growing 
separation from the 'official' labour movement. 
The CP did make some gains within the industrial sphere however. In 
Scotland, the militant tradition among the Scottish mineworkers 
engendered notable communist success. Support for the Party and the 
Minority Movement in Fife had developed as a consequence of communist 
involvement in the Miners Reform Union, set up in 1923 in opposition to 
the conservative Fife, Kinross and Clackmannan Miners' Association 
(FKCMA). When the two unions merged in early 1927, the extent of 
communist support (further enhanced by the CP's work during the miners' 
lock out) was revealed. Communist candidates dominated the elections of 
the amalgamated Fife Union, and David Proudfoot and John McArthur 
were both elected onto the Executive of the National Union of Scottish 
Mineworkers (NUSM). The Yorkshire woollen dispute in late 1927 
similarly bolstered communist expectations. The MM's campaign in favour 
of industrial action rallied considerable support, and the employers' 
temporary retraction of proposed wage cuts was interpreted as a victory by 
the CP. 103 
On wider issues, and in areas where the Communist Party lacked a firm or 
even incipient basis of support, the Party proved less successful. Its call for 
a General Strike in response to the Trade Union Bill was given little 
103Workers' Life 2 and 9 December 1927. See also L. J. Macfarlane, The British 
Communist PLM op. cit. pp 188. 
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credence by the wider labour movement, or indeed by those workers still 
recovering from the struggle of the previous year. Subsequently, 
campaigns based around such slogans as 'Hands Off China' failed to 
mobilise support beyond the circles of the CP and the ILP left, despite the 
concerted efforts of the Party rank and file. 
While the CPGB claimed to discern evidence of working class 
radicalisation therefore, the substa ntial decline in industrial action in 1927 
and the mood of conciliation and anti-militancy that dominated the TUC, 
placed the Party in a difficult position. The CP was being simultaneously 
squeezed out of the labour movement at a time when class antagonisms 
were deemed to be 'sharpening, ' and Party influence was seen to be 
spreading. The experience of the General Strike had reinforced the Party's 
belief in the revolutionary potential of the British working class; but 
conversely, the official labour leadership was moving closer to the 
employers and the capitalist state. From such a perspective, the 
'independent leadership' that the CPGB attempted to forge in the Third 
Period can be regarded as a cogent response to events as perceived by the 
Communist Party. And while it is possible to criticise the Party's 
estimation of the 'existing situation, ' it is essential to recognise that much 
of the logic that lay behind the Party's 'left turn' was based on events 
unfolding within Britain itself. 
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Chapter Three 




On I October 1927, the Political Secretariat of the Executive Committee 
of the Communist International made a decision that radically affected the 
CPGB. In conjunction with the Conservative Government, the ECCI 
declared, the Labour Party and trade union leadership were "concentrating 
[their] fire" on the British Communist Party. This was due to the 
realisation that the CPGB was "the only Party" willing and able to defend 
"the interests of the British workers 
... 
and the oppressed colonial and 
semi-colonial peoples. " Simultaneously (or dialectically), the CPG13 had 
forged a "growing influence among the workers, " and would subsequently 
"head the forthcoming struggles not only against the ruling classes, but 
also against their lackeys. " As such, it was necessary for the CPGB to 
"struggle against the bourgeois leadership of the Labour Party, against 
parliamentary cretinism in all its forms, and 
... 
take the necessary 
preparations for participating in the next general election as an 
independent Party with its own platform and candidates 
... 
against 
candidates of the LP. "I 
This chapter will endeavour to outline the Party's response to the ECCI 
decision, and to place the 'left turn' of October 1927 within the theoretical 
context of the New Line adopted at the Sixth World Congress of the 
Communist International in August 1928. As has been discussed in the 
preceding chapters, the CPGB's separation from the mainstream labour 
movement had been accentuated in the wake of the General Strike, and the 
I Wire to the Ninth Congress for the Political Secretariat of the CPGB, Decided on I October 1927. Copy translated by James Klugmann. Klugmann Papers. 
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decision to stand openly against the Labour Party was arguably a logical 
development of this widening breach. And yet, the ECCI memorandum 
bitterly split the British Party leadership. The change in policy, which was 
enforced at the Ninth ECCI Plenum in February 1928, led to both a change 
in Party policy and authority. Party stalwarts such as Johnny Campbell, 
Tom Bell, Albert Inkpin and Andrew Rothstein, suddenly found 
themselves in opposition to the line of the International, while Harry 
Pollitt, Palme Dutt and (eventually) William Rust became the erstwhile 
ambassadors of the Comintern line. Such an alignment was never fixed - 
Pollitt would soon find himself opposed to the New Line approach to trade 
unionism 
- 
but the emergence of right, left and centre blocs (however 
amorphous or intangible) seriously affected the CPGB. 
The emanation of the New Line has been comprehensively discussed by 
numerous historians, but with little attention to the nuances of policy and 
perspective. Crucially, the policy adopted in February 1928 differed 
greatly from the line pursued by the Party in 1929, or 1930, or 1932. 
Initially, the'left turn'appeared to relate only to electoral policy and 
theoretical formulations. However, by approaching the New Line in the 
knowledge of the excesses that later emerged, the traditional explanation 
of the Third Period as a Stalinist manoeuvre or Moscow dictate, overly 
predetermine the intentions and objectives of both the CPGB and the 
Comintern. Central to this thesis therefore, is the evolutionary nature of 
communist policy in the Third Period, and this chapter will subsequently 
concentrate on the disparities of the initial 'left turn', and the varied 
interpretations of that policy within the CPGB. 
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Emergence and Implementation 
Quite clearly, the decision to revise the political objectives of the CPGB 
was initiated within the higher echelons of the Communist International. In 
September-October 1927, Bukharin issued a series oVinformation letters' 
to the various Comintern sections in which he emphasised the primary 
need to 'uninasle the "treacherous and malicious role of social 
democracy. "2 The memorandum to the CPGB sent on I October further 
recommended the adoption of Communist Party candidates to stand in 
opposition to the Labour Party at the proximate general election. 3 Finally, 
at the end of October, the ECCI Presidium issued a further letter to 
'relevant sections' of the Comintern, recommending that the "intensified 
struggle against reformism" be based upon a "united front [that] must, in 
the overwhelming majority of cases, be constructed from below. "4 
The British Party leaders knew very little about the proposed policy 
changes. William Gallacher informed the CPGB's Central Committee that 
although "discussions on the British question had been going on since 
August, " the meeting that he, Albert Inkpin and Jack Murphy had held 
with Bukharin in September, had been vague and inconclusive. "We did 
get to know that there was actually some sort of possibility of a change 
taking place in Britain, or a strengthening of the line against the Labour 
Party leadership" Gallacher revealed, but "no serious discussion" on the 
nature of such 'changes' had occurred. The meeting had even endorsed the 
draft resolutions of the Ninth Party Congress that maintained the Party 
2Quoted in K. McDermott and J. Agnew, The Comintern op. cit. p74. 
3The memorandum was intended to facilitate a discussion on Party policy at the Ninth 
Congress of the CPGB. For reasons that remain unclear however, it failed to arrive in 
time. 
4Letter from the Presidium to the CCs of the CPs 31 October 193 1. Translated copy by 
James Klugmann. Klugmarm Papers. 
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slogan in favour of a Labour Government. In November, Gallacher once 
again visited Moscow to find that the "British question [had been] very 
seriously and thoroughly discussed 
... 
and certain conclusions reached. " 
Subsequently, at various meetings with ECCI representatives and the 
Anglo-American secretariat, Gallacher debated resolutions that appeared 
to "[come] from nowhere" and were "thrown at us quite unexpectedly. "5 
As for Jack Murphy, the CPGB's representative in Moscow insisted that 
"only very scrappy conversations took place" prior to the October 
Presidium, and "no meeting of the secretariat" had discussed the 
modification of CPGB policy. Murphy's only inkling of a possible change 
of line came from a discussion with Bukharin, Piatnitsky and Kuusinen 
undertaken shortly before his return to Britain in late 1927. The possibility 
of "sharpening the struggle and challenging the leaders of the Labour 
Party" was raised, but "so far as a full review and political analysis of the 
situation [was] concerned, nothing of the sort took place. "6 Harry Pollitt it 
seems, had a more informative meeting with certain ECCI luminaries 
(Stalin and Bukharin among them) during a visit to Moscow in October 
1927. "The interview took the form of putting up the question for a change 
of line, " Pollitt informed the CC. "At the time I resisted 
... 
and got a 
hammering from one fellow which lasted eight hours. "7 But this occurred 
after the ECCI had issued its first October memorandum. Pollitt, along 
5Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pajjy of Great Britain 17-18 
March 1928. Klugmann Papers. Murphy and Robin Page Arnot were also in Moscow at 
this time, representing the British Party in the Comintern. They were both involved in 
these discussions. 
61bid. 
7Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pg! jy of Great Britain 7-9 January 
1928. Klugmann Papers. 
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with Palme Dutt, was quick to get behind the change of line, but neither of 
them referred to the matter (publicly of privately) prior to October 1927.8 
The initial directives of the ECCI were limited and based upon a number 
of fragmentary conceptions. In terms of actual policy, the ECCI 
recommended that Communist Party candidates stand openly against 
representatives of the Labour Party; and that the CPGB expose social 
democratic 'flirtations' with the USSR as a'manoeuvre'to weaken the 
revolutionary movement. The rationale for such a decision was based upon 
the conception that "the situation has completely changed in comparison 
with the time when Lenin advocated voting for the Labour Party and 
pushing it into power. " MacDonald had already headed a Labour 
Government the ECCI reasoned, and thereby 'demonstrated his polices'to 
the workers. Thus, with the working class 'swinging to the left', and the 
Labour Party and trade union leadership turning to the right, 9 the CPGB 
was instructed to "come forward decisively as the only Party of the 
working class and more boldly criticise reformism. " 10 
Perhaps understandably, the CPGB leadership found the ECCI 
memorandums "decidedly vague 
... 
[and] altogether too cryptic and 
ambiguous. " IIA reply rebuking the ECCI's estimation of 'the objective 
situation in Britain'was subsequently dispatched by the Political Bureau, 
and a meeting between CPGB and ECCI representatives was arranged for 
the 15 December. In the opinion of the British leadership, the ECCI had 
overestimated both the significance of the first Labour Government and 
8The correspondence between Palme Dutt and Harry Pollitt is housed at the Museum of 
Labour History in Manchester. Dutt's papers are also kept at the Working Class Museum 
Library and the British Library. 
917he ECCI even countenanced the possibility of a Lib-Lab pact. 
IOLetter from the Presidium to the CCs of the CPs 31 October 1927. Klugmann papers. 
II Letter from the Political Bureau to the ECCI 23 November 1927. Klugmann Papers. 
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the militancy of the working class. The majority of workers remained 
committed to the Labour Party the PB reasoned, and a change of policy 
would only generate "hostility" towards the Communist Party. As such, the 
December meeting was designed to clarify the theoretical basis of the 
Comintern line, and to raise issues for discussion within the CPGB. 
In effect however, the meeting placed the formulations of the ECCI more 
firmly on the CPGB's agenda. The Party slogan in favour of a Labour 
Government was deemed inappropriate given the existing Labour Party 
leadership's attitude towards the USSR, China, and the working class. The 
necessity of CPGB election candidates fighting on a platform that exposed 
the Labour and trade union leaders was recognised, and the slogan of a 
Revolutionary Workers' Government was provisionally raised. Although a 
united front with local Labour Party branches was still encouraged, the 
commission resolved that only in 'exceptional cases' should votes be given 
in support of the Labour Party. 12 While such a policy remained decidedly 
inconclusive, it was, by December 1927, the central issue on the CPGB 
agenda. 
Although the ECCI provided the impetus for a change in Communist Party 
policy, this should not exaggerate the extent to which the New Line was 
enforced upon, or alien to, the CPGB. 13 Nor should it give credence to the 
argument that the Third Period was engineered by Stalin to facilitate his 
rise to power. 14 The policies that came to constitute the New Line of the 
12Notes on the Small Commission of the Presidium 15 December 1927. Klugmann 
Papers. 
13The influence of the Soviet Union was central to the perspective of the Comintern 
however. The analysis 
- 
and method of analysis 
- 
that predetermined communist policy 
was very much a Russian product. 
14 Such an argument has long been discredited. For an overview of the historical 
discussion, see K. McDermott and J. Agnew, The Comintern op. cit. pp8l-119. 
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Communist International and the CPGB, emerged from very real 
determinants, both British and international. And while the Third Period 
became the arena for the dramatic struggles within the Soviet Union, the 
'left turn' of the Comintern was well underway prior to the Stalin- 
Bukharin rift of 1928-29. Thus, while theoutside' influence on the CPGB 
was clearly evident, the actual adoption of the New Line by the Party must 
necessarily be placed in perspective. 
First, as outlined in the previous chapter, many of the concepts that 
constituted the New Line were already engrained within the doctrine of the 
International by 1927. In relation to Britain for example, the 'sharpening 
class struggle; ' the 'left lackey' role of the ILP; the 'rapprochement' of the 
Labour Party-trade union bureaucracy and the capitalist class; theTascist 
methods'of the Baldwin Government; and the 'deceptions' of the'left'trade 
union leaders, were all underlined at the Eight ECCI Plenum in May. 15 
Moreover, these conceptions were accepted, endorsed and propagated by 
the CPGB. The Ninth Party Congress resolutions were peppered with 
references to the 'intensifying class struggle' and the need to sharpen the 
fight against reformism. 16 As such, the discussion was initiated from 
outside because, in the words of Harry Pollitt, "we damped it down at 
home. "17 
15'Resolution of the Eighth Plenum of the ECCI on the Situation in Great Britain. 'In The 
Ninth Congress of the Communist Pagy of Great Britain op. cit. 
16ibid. While Gallacher and Inkpin did not discuss the overhaul of CPGB policy with 
Bukharin in September 1927, "five points" were nevertheless agreed upon. These 
included the intensifying class struggle, the radicalisation of the working class and the 
need to sharpen the offensive against reformism. Minutes of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Pga of Great Britain 17-18 March 1928. Klugmann Papers 
17Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pam of Great Britain 7-9 January 
1928. Klugmarm Papers. 
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Second, the changes recommend by the ECCI were not antithetical to the 
CPGB. At its formation, the Party had been sharply divided over the 
question of the CP's relationship to the Labour Party. Many communists, 
including Harry Pollitt and William Gallacher, had only grudgingly 
accepted the parliamentary policy initially pursued by the CPGB, and 
hostility towards theTallacy of reformism'was central to the communist 
perspective. Moreover, the Party had debated a similar change of line in 
the wake of the first Labour Government and in response to the restrictions 
imposed upon communists at the 1925 Labour conference. In a letter to the 
Party Executive Committee, Saklatvala had urged the CP to "adopt 
merciless measures to fight the Labour Party. " The CPGB should "set 
itself up as the only avowed anti-capitalist party" Saklatvala argued, and in 
a premonition of the New Line debates of 1928, insisted that the trade 
unions withhold their political subscriptions. 18 Helen Crawfurd also 
revealed that a section of the Party had discussed similar matters with 
Mikhail Borodin "some years ago. " 19 Subsequently, although the ECCI 
memorandum came as something of a surprise to the CPGB leadership, the 
recommendation of a policy independent of the Labour Party soon found 
widespread support within the Party. 
Finally, the initial changes in CPGB policy recommended by the ECCI 
were limited in scope and flexible in character. In line with the left turn 
already discussed vis a vis the French Communist Party, the October 
memorandums to the CPGB dealt exclusively with electoral strategy. The 
finer detail, or wider scope, of the New Line remained undetermined. 
18M. Squires, Saklatyala op. cit. pp52-55. Saklatvala's letter is included amongst the 
Documents Selected from those Obtained on the Arrest of the Communist Leaders on the 
14 and 31 October. 1925. HMSO. 
19Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PiIM of Great Britain 7-9 January 
1928. Klugmann Papers. 
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Thus, when ECCI representatives met with Inkpin, Gallacher and other 
British communists in December, Bukharin made it clear that the 
Comintern's recommendations "should not be taken as an instruction, but 
as suggestions for the consideration of the British comrades. 1120 
Even so, the 'considerations' of the CPGB were determined by the 
theoretical framework established by the ECCL As such, the Party 
maladroitly formulated a policy applicable to both the Comintern and 
Great Britain, and in the process came close to tearing itself apart. 
Definitions: What Was the New Line? 
The left turn initiated by the ECCI in late 1927 was open to a variety of 
interpretations. While such notions as the 'intensifying class struggle, 'the 
treachery of social democracy' and the 'radicalisation of the working class' 
were endorsed throughout the International, the problem of relating 
revolutionary practice to revolutionary theory remained. How far had the 
class struggle intensified? How radicalised had the workers become? Such 
fundamental questions formed the basis of the debate over the New Line, 
and the subsequent attempts made by the ECCI to formulate an exact 
solution divided communists in every Comintern section. 
Within the CPGB, the varying opinions of the Party leadership were 
represented in three theses, and discussed at the Ninth ECCI Plenum in 
February 1928. The'majority thesis'- so called because it was endorsed 
by sixteen of the 23 Party le aders present at the CC meeting of 7-9 January 
- 
extended the concerns raised by the PB in November. Drafted by Johnny 
Campbell and Andrew Rothstein, the 'majority' represented those such as 
201bid. 
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Arthur Homer, Ernest Brown, and Tommy Jackson, who felt the Party was 
in danger of "mistaking our subjective notions for the revolutionary 
feelings of the proletariat. f'21 
The'majority thesiswas based largely upon Lenin's Left Wing 
Communism, and sought to argue that the'objective conditions'that had 
shaped CPGB policy in 1920-21 had not changed sufficiently to warrant 
an overhaul of the Party line in 1928. First, Campbell and Rothstein 
insisted that the Labour Party remained a "federal body of trade unions and 
affiliated political parties. " Subsequently, despite "its social democratic 
programme, its 'completely putrefied leadership, ' and the attempts of its 
leaders to impose social democratic discipline, [the Labour Party was] not 
yet a social democratic party in the accepted meaning of the term. " The 
trade unions still had a'numerical predominance' within the Labour Party, 
and from such a basis communists could enter and influence Labour as 
delegates to committees and conferences, and as parliamentary candidates. 
Thus, the CPGB should continue to apply for affiliation, the'majority' 
argued, in the belief that as the labour movement strengthened, the 
'bureaucracy' would be less able to stifle communist influence. 22 
Campbell and Rothstein endeavoured to explain the radicalisation of the 
working class within a British context. Rather than turning en masse to the 
CPGB, the militancy of the working class was instead demonstrated by an 
211bid. The quote is from Jackson. Rothstein himself felt the policy of standing CP 
candidates against the Labour Party was "childish. " Other notable comments came from 
Wal Hannington, Tom Bell and Peter Kerrigan. Hannington feared that by openly 
opposing Labour, "we retreat and leave the right wing completely in charge of the 
machine. " Bell raised concerns about the ECCI "doing the thinking. " And Kerrigan 
predicted that the Party would "lose influence" if it followed the ECCI line. 
227hesis of the Central Committee of the CPGB. 'In Communist Policy in Great Britain. 
The Report of the British Commission of the Ninth Plenum of the Comintem (London, 
1928). pp132-152. 
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increase in Labour Party support. The Labour Party was subsequently 
"tom between the class aspirations of the masses and the bourgeois 
policies of its leaders"; and while communist agitation within the Labour 
Party was "becoming more difficult, " it had also proven effective. 23 
Communists led "all forms of working class protest within the Labour 
Party, " the thesis claimed, and to stand openly against Labour would 
"impede" the CPGB's growing influence on the working class. Thus, the 
radicalisation of the masses was endorsed within the 'majority' thesis, but 
to a limited degree. 
The'majority' also argued that British capitalism remained 'relatively 
stable. 'No colonial uprising threatened the empire, the labour movement 
was characterised by reformism and a declining organised workforce, and 
no tnational crisis' (a Leninist prerequisite for revolution) affected 'both the 
exploited and the exploiters. '24 While the thesis accepted that the tempo of 
revolutionary struggle was once again in the ascendance, it was deemed to 
have "not yet reached the pitch attained in 1920. "25 Indeed, themajority' 
portrayed the period as one of "depression, " in which the labour movement 
was "on the defensive; " a position that contrasted not only with Stalin's 
talk of 'revolutionary upsurge, 'but also with a number of the CPGB's own 
assertions of 1926-27.26 
The ECCI's suggestion that the Labour Government of 1924 had 
demonstrated its policies and thus alienated the British working class, was 
similarly challenged by the'majority. ' "The experience of the Labour 
231bid. 
24See IN. Lenin, Left Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder (Little Lenin Library 
edition 1934, originally published 1920). pp59-7 1. 
25'Thesis of the Central Committee of the CPGB. ' op. cit. 
261bid. 
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Government exposed to a number of the most active members the true 
character of the leaders, [but] the experience of the Labour Government 
was too short and incomplete to convince the mass of the workers that the 
communists were right. " Even the General Strike, Campbell and Rothstein 
argued, had only revealed the true character of the Labour bureaucracy to 
those workers affected by and'accessible to'CP propaganda. While the 
political consciousness of the working class was rising, revolutionary 
consciousness remained elusive. 27 
The basic task of the Communist Party therefore, remained unchanged; to 
"push the Snowden-Henderson Government into office in order to help the 
workers 
... 
convince themselves of the worthlessness of reformism. " 
Although the 'majority' accepted the primacy of the united front from 
below and the necessity of an independent Party line, CPGB parliamentary 
candidates were only recommended to stand in specific instances. Thus, in 
areas already contested by the CPGB; double member constituencies 
where only one Labour candidate would stand; localities where the Labour 
Party branch had been disaffiliated; and heavily working class areas where 
a Labour-CP split would not allow a Tory victory; the Party was to adopt 
an independent programme and contest the seat. Elsewhere, the Party was 
to maintain its 'critical support' of the Labour Party. 28 
As such, the 'majority' thesis favoured the continuation of the existing 
Party line. The radicalisation of the working class and the'sharpening' 
class struggle were endorsed by Campbell and Rothstein, but were placed 
within a specifically British context. While the workers were turning to the 




the CP Executive to be conducive to a communist offensive. This revealed 
a retreat from the more militant attitude of 1926-27 (that had led to the 
General Strike slogan against the Trade Union Bill) and suggested that the 
expectations generated by the miners' struggle of 1926 had given way to a 
more sober prognosis. 29 
However, there was a sizeable minority within the Party leadership who 
endorsed the ECCI's recommendations. At the Executive meeting in 
January, Helen Crawfurd, Shapurji Saklatvala, Percy Glading, William 
Allen and William Joss, all upheld the adoption of a more independent 
communist line. Moreover, those Party leaders connected to the Comintern 
apparatus 
- 
Page Amot and Jack Murphy 
- 
similarly favoured a 
realignment in Communist Party strategy; though in differing ways. 30 
Finally, and most formidably, Harry Pollitt and Palme Dutt seized quickly 
upon the ECCI's initiative. Indeed, Pollitt and Dutt sought to widen the 
debate beyond the immediate issue of election tactics. Pollitt raised the 
question of the NLWM for example, while the theoretical formulations of 
Palme Dutt quickly went beyond the tentative synopsis issued by the 
Comintern in October. Dutt's connections with the ECCI enabled him to 
keep one step ahead of the debate within the CPGB, and he was 
subsequently able to develop a line far more in tune with the prevailing 
'mood' of the International. 
29Among the supporters for the thesis however, were those such as William Rust who 
emphasised the need to sharpen the Party line against the Labour Party. Minutes of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Pagy of Great Britain 7-9 January 1928. 
Klugmann Papers. 
, 301bid. Crawfurd suggested that "if we oppose some of the traitors like MacDonald and 
Thomas, the workers would have a better idea where we stand. " Joss meanwhile, asked; 
"must we tell the working class to vote for candidates we know will betray us? " 
Interestingly, Campbell also referred to an attitude of "IeVs fight the bastards" within the 
Party. 
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It was Dutt and Pollitt therefore, who drafted an alternative thesis to that of 
the Party 'majority. ' At the end of 1927 the two men met in Brussels to 
establish what Dutt soon referred to as'our line', 31 and Pollitt was 
subsequently able to offer a detailed critique of the 'majority' thesis at the 
January Executive. 32 Pollitt further articulated the 'minority' position in a 
document dated 24 January 1928. "We must revise our present policy in 
relation to the Labour Party as a whole" he urged. Labour had become the 
"third capitalist party, " while the consolidation of the "MacDonald- 
Henderson hegemony" and the simultaneous capitalist offensive against 
the working class, constituted a "complete change" in the 'objective 
situation' compared to 1920. Accordingly, Pollitt recommended that the 
Party denounce its policy of affiliation to the Labour Party; support only 
those Labour candidates who agree to work with the CPGB; and stand 
communist candidates against prominent Labour leaders. Furthermore, 
Pollitt endorsed the liquidation of the NLWM, so as to encourage the 
Labour left to join the CP, and suggested that the Party campaign for a 
proportion of the political levy to be "used for the electoral work of the 
local Communist Party. "33 
Pollitt. sent the 'minority' statement to Palme Dutt, who added theoretical 
bite to the thesis and made subtle alterations to the proposals. Dutt inserted 
quotes from Bukharin to substantiate the 'minority' line, 34 emphasised 
31Quoted in K. Morgan, HaM Polli op. cit. p62. 
32Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PgM of Great Britain 7-9 January 
1928. Klugmann Papers. Pollitt referred to the Labour Party as the "third bourgeois 
Party", recommended the liquidation of the NLWM, and renounced the Party's affiliation 
policy; all of which went way beyond the initial ECCI brief and those issues raised by 
Campbell and Rothstein. 
3313ocument Sianed by Ha! 2y Polli 24 January 1928. Klugmarm Papers. 
3413y doing so Dutt revealed the central role Bukharin played in the formation of class 
against class. Bukharin had insisted that "the situation is now quite different" and 
underlined the fact that the Labour Party had already been in power. Inpreco 29 
December 1927. 
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inconsistencies in the 'majority' thesis, and demonstrated those aspects of 
the'new phase'that necessitated a change in Communist Party 
perspective. 35 These included the experience of the Labour Government 
and the General Strike, the'leftward advance of the working class', the 
consolidation of the reformist leadership, the programme of industrial 
peace, and the "increasing transformation of the Labour Party on to a 
limited, opportunist basis with discipline and exclusions. "36 Crucially 
however, Dutt tempered Pollitt's initial line. 
The last stage of the Labour Party's transformation 
- 
the exclusion of 
communists as trade union delegates 
- 
had not yet occurred, and Dutt 
subsequently emphasised the need to 'utilise' such an important channel of 
propaganda. Similarly, although Dutt maintained that the Party's affiliation 
campaign was "finished", he also recommended a final application as a 
means to propagate the CPGB's independent line. As for the NLWM, 
although Dutt acknowledged the "tendency" of the Left Wing Movement 
to appear as an independent political force, and thus serve as "a barrier" to 
Communist Party growth, he refuted Pollitt's call for liquidation. There 
was "still room 
... 
for an organised opposition movement within the 
Labour Party" he insisted. 37 
35The apparent dichotomy between the perceived radicalisation of the workers following 
the General Strike and the decline in industrial action in 1927 (excluding the extra- 
ordinary General Strike year, the number of days lost to stoppages fell from 7,950,000 
in 1925 to 1,170,000 in 1927) was initially explained by Dutt as being due to 'the 
initiative laying with the bourgeoisie. ' The workers' subjection to conditions of defeat and 
victimisation served only to augment class differences, argued Dutt. 'Problems of the 
New Policy in Britain. ' Article sent to the C1 in July 1928 (Dutt Papers, BL). See also 
Inpreco I March 1928. 
36'Altemative Proposals to the Thesis of the Central Committee. ' In Communist Policy in 
Great Britain op. cit. pp 153-165. 
371bid. 
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Finally, Dutt conceded that the intricacies of the Party's election tactics, 
particularly with regard to constituencies where no communist candidate 
was presented, needed "further discussion", although he proposed urging 
the workers not to vote. As such, the 'minority' thesis offered a far more 
radical analysis of the 'objective situation', while maintaining a cautious, 
open ended political strategy. This suggests that the ECCI did not have a 
fixed position on the policy of class against class in late 1927/early 1928, 
and Dutt refrained from presenting too unyielding a line to the 
International. 38 Even so, Dutt was confident enough to detail the'New 
Phase of the Labour Party' in Labour MonLhly prior to the ECCI Plenum, a 
breach of Party discipline for which he was censured by the CP Political 
Bureau. 39 
A final position was taken by Jack Murphy, who endorsed the basic 
theoretical prerequisites for the New Line, but reached rather different 
solutions. Murphy called for the Party to drop its policy of affiliation while 
recommending simultaneously the formation of a national anti-capitalist 
party of disaffiliated Labour Parties and Left Wing groups. However, 
Murphy's proposition received no support within either the CPGB or the 
Comintem, and he soon aligned himself with the 'minority' canip. 40 
The theses were presented to a British Commission at the Ninth ECCI 
Plenum held between 9 and 25 February 1928. After preliminary 
discussions with Bukharin, Campbell concluded that although the Party's 
"estimation on the situation in Britain did not differ to any considerable 
381bid. 
39Labour Monthly February 1928. Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist 
Pa! jy f Great Britain 17 February 1928. Klugmann Papers. Pollitt supported the censure. 
Dutt's article was described as a "thinly veiled attack on the Party. " 
40'Our Party: Its Election Tactics and its Relations to the Labour Party. ' In Communis 
Policy in Great Britain op. cit. ppl66-174. 
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extent" from that of the Cl, the Party had nevertheless drawn very 
different 'practical conclusions. '41 In tandem with the 'minority' thesis, the 
scope of the commission went well beyond the Party's electoral strategy. 
The theoretical aspect of the line predominated the discussion, and 
amongst the various ECCI representatives who spoke at the commission, a 
more cohesive, cogent position was expressed. 42 Subsequently, the 
'majority' thesis was widely criticised, and while the 'minority' position 
(presented by Robin Page Arnot) was not endorsed completely, the 
theoretical line on which Pollitt and Dutt had based their argument was 
validated. 43 
The'British question' was considered within a far more international 
context than outlined in the 'majority' thesis, with particular reference to 
Britain's colonies. 44 The transformation of the Labour Party into the 'third 
party of the bourgeoisie' was acknowledged by a number of speakers, 
while the radicalisation of the working class and the accentuation of class 
antagonism was similarly reiterated. As Bukharin made clear, the ECCI 
regarded "the [British] government, the Liberal Party, the trade union 
bureaucrats, and the bureaucracy of the Labour Party [as] one hostile camp 
against the proletariat and particularly its class conscious sections and 
primarily the communists and the Minority Movement. "45 
41 Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PaM of Great Britain 17-19 
March 1928. Klugmann Papers. 
42See Communist Policy in Great Britain op cit. for a report of the proceedings. Among 
the several leading communists who took part in the debate were Togliatti, Roy, Varga, 
Losovsky, Remmele, Braun and Bukharin. 
43For example, there were wide differences over the question of when, or if, the Party 
should recommend the workers to vote Labour. See ibid, pp33-36. 
441bid. p36. The Czech communist Smeral for example, recommended that instead of 
voting Labour, workers should be called upon to write'self determination for India, 
including separatism! ' on their ballot papers. 
451bid. pp46-57. 
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The resolutions of the Ninth Plenum therefore, endorsed a theoretical 
paradigm that related closely to the 'minority thesis'. "Class struggles of 
increasing acuteness accompanied by an increasingly close alliance. 
between the reformist leaders and the bourgeoisie" were deemed to 
characterise the British labour movement. The rising crisis in British 
capitalism had engendered a change in the "intellectual outlook" of the 
'reformist labour leadership. ' Consequently, the Labour Party and the trade 
unions were in the process of becoming an auxiliary apparatus of the 
bourgeoisie, and were thus brought into conflict with an increasingly 
radicalised working class. 46 
In terms of actual policy, the commission was arguably less radical. The 
initial ECCI recommendation 
- 
that communist representatives stand 
against the Labour Party at any forthcoming election 
- 
was accepted by 
the CPGB, as was the slogan for a Revolutionary Workers' Government. 
And the Party was instructed to "adopt clearer tactics of opposition to the 
Labour Party and the trade union leadership. " However, the CPGB was to 
also maintain its affiliation campaign, and the importance of communist 
agitation within the Labour Party was repeatedly underlined. Similarly, the 
more problematic aspects of the new approach to the Labour Party were 
noticeably fudged by the commission. The tactical question of how the 
workers should vote in constituencies where no Party member was 
standing remained undecided, and neither the role of the NLWM, nor the 
question of the political levy, were referred to in the resolutions. 47 
As such, the line introduced in February 1928 combined a hardening of 
communist perspective with a relatively limited political 'left turn'. But 
461bid. 'Resolution of the Ninth Plenum of the ECCI on the British Question. ' pp 191-195. 471bid. 
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while the line fell short of both Dutt and Pollitt's recommendations, it did 
indicate a decisive shift in both the electoral policy, and the political 
conceptions, of the CPGB. The discussions of the Ninth Plenum further 
revealed the embryonic nature of the New Line; and while the theoretical 
basis of the Third Period was coming into ever sharper focus, the practical 
responses warranted by an 'upsurge in revolutionary struggle' were 
evidently still under review. Moreover, the transferral of the New Line to 
wider spheres of communist activity, particularly industrial politics, was 
conspicuously absent from the commission's report. Thus the New Line 
should be regarded as an amorphous, unfolding development, and the 
policy of class against class the beginning of a strategic and theoretical 
overhaul that evolved throughout the Third Period. 
Problems of Application: How the Line was Transformed 
The transformation of the New Line from its rather limited beginnings in 
1927-28 to the all encompassing policy of the Tenth ECCI Plenum of 
1929, was directed by four interlinking factors. First, by the attempt to 
apply coherently the logic of the ECCI's formulations (sharper class 
conflict, social democratic treachery) to the practical work of the 
Communist Party. Second, the referral of those formulations to all aspects 
of Party theory and activity. Third, the varied interpretations of the 'new 
period' and the necessity (in accordance with the principles of democratic 
centralism) to develop an exclusive, 'correct' policy. And Fourth, the 
absorption of the New Line into the emergent struggle between Bukharin 
and Stalin inside the Soviet Communist Party. In the following section, the 
initial attempts of the CPGB to apply the line of the Ninth Plenum will be 
discussed, along with the tensions growing inside the Comintern and the 
CPSU. 
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The resolutions of the Ninth Plenum were accepted by the overwhelming 
majority of the CPGB. In the leadership, only Tommy Jackson criticised 
the logic of the New Line, claiming to see neither the economic crisis nor 
the radicalised workers that justified the left turn. For others, such as Sam 
Elsbury, the line was a "God send. "48 Indeed, it soon became clear that the 
main criticism of the New Line within the Party was that it did not go far 
enough. Thus, while Dutt described the resolutions as "a landmark in the 
history of British communism, " Aitkin Ferguson complained that the 
resolution failed to establish a "complete break" with the old poliCy. 49 
In the District and Local Party branches, the resolutions were 
"enthusiastically" received. The PB recorded the unanimous acceptance of 
the resolutions in Manchester and Birmingham, and clear majorities in 
South Wales (44 to one), Liverpool (3 1 to one), Sheffield (15 to two) and 
Tyneside (48 to one). 50 But once again, there was evidence that many local 
members of the Party wished to take the independent lead of the CPG13 
further. In London for example, the District Party Committee only 
narrowly defeated a resolution calling for an end to the CP's attempts to 
affiliate to the Labour Party. 51 
Subsequently, even before the Sixth World Congress of the Comintem in 
July-August, and in spite of both Party and ECCI endorsement, an 
48Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pa! V of Great Britain 17-18 
March 1928. Klugmarm Papers. Arthur Homer did admit later that I am still not 
convinced of the New Line despite many attempts to persuade me. " Minutes of the 
Central Committee of the Communist PaM of Great Britain 28-30 April 1928. 
Klugmarm Papers. 
49For Dutt, see Inpreco I March 1928. For Ferguson, ibid. 
5OMinutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pa! V of Great Britain 27 March 
1928. Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PgM pf Great Britain 17-18 
March 1928. Klugmann Papers. 
5IMinutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pam of Great Britain 3 April 1928. 
Klugmann Papers. 
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inclination to pull the Party beyond its established guidelines was clearly 
evident within the CPGB. And in relation to the specific issues of the New 
Line, numerous questions continued to plague the leadership. As the 
London DPC suggested, "the affiliation policy is inconsistent because on 
the one hand we are demonstrating the need for the independent role of the 
Communist Party as the leaders of the struggle against reformism, and, on 
the other hand, we are fighting for our inclusion in the social democratic 
Labour Party. "52 Jack Murphy in particular (along with Harry Pollitt, 
Helen Crawfurd and William Allan) raised similar objections, and when 
the issue was voted upon in July, the Executive was split exactly down the 
middle, with nine for and nine against the maintenance of the poliCy. 53 
The Party was also divided over the question of how to vote in areas where 
the Communist Party was unrepresented. In the two by-elections that 
immediately followed the Ninth Plenum, the Party recommended a Labour 
vote in Hanley, and abstention in Linlithgow (following the withdrawal of 
the CP candidate). Such an obvious inconsistency was immediately 
condemned by Dutt, who insisted the Party develop a clear line. But prior 
to the World Congress, and despite numerous formulations and variations, 
the Party remained unable to construct a cohesive policy that did not, in 
the last instance, result in abstention. 54 
52Statement on the Policy of Affiliation to the Labour PajjY by the London District Paqy 
Committee 30 June 1928. Klugmarm Papers. 
53Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PaM of Great Britain 30 June-2 
July 1928. Klugmann Papers. Interestingly William Rust and Walter Tapsell, both of 
whom emerged as champions of the more militant New Line from September 1928, 
voted for the maintenance of the affiliation policy. 
54Letter from R. P. Dutt to the CPGB 17 April 1928. Klugmarm Papers. Minutes of the 
Central Committee of the Communist PgM of Great Britain 30 June-2 July 1928. 
Klugmarm Papers. Five Executive members voted for abstention, twelve against, while 
Gallacher abstained! 
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Less contentious were the issues of the political levy and the NLWM. The 
Ninth Plenum's recommendation that the Party campaign for local control 
of the levy was endorsed by the CPGB, and only Murphy seriously 
challenged the preservation of the payment in the meantime. 55 Similarly, 
only Sam Elsbury voted against the maintenance of the NLWM. 56 
However, while the Party continued to recognise the Left Wing Movement 
as a 'bridge' organisation linking the CPGB with the Labour left, the 
'danger' of its transformation into an organisation distinct from the CPGB 
was an increasingly tendered argument. As well as Elsbury and Harry 
Pollitt, both the London and Tyneside DPCs had questioned the necessity 
of the NLWM by April 1928, and subsequently, an agit-prop 
memorandum was issued by the Organisation Bureau to quell talk of 
liquidation. 57 
While the Party leadership remained unsure about the connotations of the 
Ninth Plenum, the formulations of the New Line were increasingly applied 
beyond their initial limits. The gathering of the RILU in March 1928 for 
example, offered an opportunity for the 'independent' line of the CPGB to 
be related to the industrial sphere. Left wing militants in the ECCI such as 
Losovsky, had long been agitating for a more militant, oppositional trade 
union policy, and although the resolutions of the Fourth RILU conference 
offered little in the way of a1eft tum, 'the speeches and committees that 
55Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pagy of Great Britain 30 June-2 
July 1928. Klugmann Papers. Wal Hannington had initially suggested that in unions 
where members were denied "their political rights" they should refuse to pay the levy. 
Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PLM of Great Britain 17-19 March 
1928. Klugmann Papers. 
56Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PaE! y of Great Britain 30 June-2 
July 1928. Klugmann Papers. Murphy, this time with support from Arthur Homer, again 
suggested the transformation of the NLWM into a separate party, but to little effect. 57Workers'Life 23 March and 6 April 1928. Memorandum on the Left Wing Movement 
30 May 1928. Klugmann Papers. 
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accompanied the proceedings were distinctly radical. 58 Arthur Homer 
reported that "the tendency to treat all reformist unions as having actually 
become units of capitalist production" was prevalent at the congress, and 
correctly predicted that the CPGB would soon "have to fight against 
... 
[the] setting up of independent unions. "59 
Such a militant position had not been considered by either the CPGB or 
the MM prior to the RILU congress, although Dutt had placed the strategy 
of the MM clearly within the framework of the ECCI's'new phase'by 
January 1928. The 'capitulation' of the trade union bureaucracy was 
complete, Dutt insisted, and the MM represented the "sole opposition" to 
the reformist leadership. The 'pseudo-leftism' of A. A. Purcell and George 
Hicks had been revealed, and "new methods" were required to win over 
the 'mass of workers. ' But the focus of the Minority Movement remained 
within the existing trade union movement. The slogan of 'All Power To 
The General Council'was maintained and the objective of the MM 
remained to "win over the trade unions" in the struggle for a Revolutionary 
Workers' Government. 60 The notion of independent 'red' trade unions 
remained off the immediate agenda, and the harder rhetoric essentially 
endorsed the increasingly critical line of the MM from August 1926. 
Although the CPGB leadership had been slow to adopt the 
recommendations of the EM therefore, once the basis of the New Line 
had been revealed to the wider sections of the Party, it was the limitations 
of the policy that prompted and extended the debate. Pressure from the 
58 Report of the Fourth Congless of the RILU (London, 1928). 
59minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pa! jy of Great Britain 28-30 April 
1929. Klugmann Papers. 
60 The Situation in Britain and the Tasks of the Trade Union Movement January 1928. 
Jack Tanner Collection. J. Callaghan, Raiani Palme Dutt op. cit. p 116. 
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Party Districts compounded the uncertainties and inconstancies that 
characterised the Ninth Plenum resolutions. And as the Party sought to 
formulate a coherent policy that applied the theoretical conceptions of the 
'new phase' to the practical work of the CP, the 'left turn' gained in 
momentum. 
Within the International, the significance and the objectives of the 'new 
period' were also under discussion. Moreover, the debates within the 
Comintem became entwined with the struggle for power inside the Soviet 
Union. As such, the battle between Bukharin and Stalin over the future 
direction of the USSR undoubtedly shaped the direction of the New Line 
and the formulation of the Third Period. That said, the eventual victory of 
Stalin should not lead necessarily to the conclusion that the New Line was 
either forged as a tool in the ensuing struggle, or that it reflected a purely 
'Stalinist' view. Rather, the debates within the Comintern were utilised to 
inflect the divisions evident within the CPSU. The policies of the Third 
Period were very much in the Bolshevik tradition; relating to the growing 
breach between communism and social democracy evident since the 
outbreak of the First World War. 
Although the policies pursued by Bukharin within both the Soviet Union 
and the Communist International were coming under mounting criticism 
by late 1927, the onset of the New Line and the formulations of the Third 
Period were established before Stalin broke ranks with his former ally. 
When Stalin talked of "the crisis of capitalism and the preparation of its 
doom grow[ing] as a result of stabilisation, " he did so in essentially 
Bukharinist terms. 61 Even when, at the Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU in 
6lQuoted in T. Draper, 'The Strange Case of the Comintem. ' In Survey op. cit. ppl03- 104. 
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December 1927, Stalin declared thatEurope has entered a new 
revolutionary period', it remained within the context of "increasingly 
decayed" capitalist stabilisation. More indicative of the forthcoming 
struggles were Losovsky's accusation that Bukharin ignored the 'right 
danger' emerging within the Comintem, and the critical analysis of 
Bukharin's portrayal of western capitalism offered by Shatskin and 
Lominadze, both of whom were associated with Stalin. 62 
As Stephen Cohen has argued convincingly, the issues that would 
decisively divide the Soviet Politburo 
- 
collectivisation, investment policy, 
the tempo of industrial growth 
- 
were 'taking shape' in late 1927, but do 
not seem to have become 'sharp and systematic' until late January or 
February 1928.63 Similarly, divergent opinions were evident within the 
Comintern, and it would be incredulous to presume the ECCI formulated a 
coherent policy without varying ideas and perspectives coming into the 
debate. It was the interlocking of the various disputes within the Soviet 
Union and the Comintern that affected decisively the political evolution of 
the Third Period and prompted the New Line to go beyond its initial 
parameters. 
It was not until the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern however, that 
the divisions within the CI became openly apparent. On a number of 
issues, the prevailing ECCI perspective. came in for severe criticism, and 
while a coherent alternative political line was not proposed at the congress, 
dissatisfaction and a desire for more radical action was clearly evident in a 
number of speeches, and in the closed congress commissions. The main 
points of debate centred around the theoretical definition of the Third 
62See S. Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution (Oxford, 1980). p267. 
631bid. p263-267 
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Period; the extent and pattern of capitalist crisis, the role of the non- 
communist left in such a period, and the main threats to communist 
advancement. 
While Bukharin saw the Third Period as one in which the contradictions of 
capitalism would inevitably lead to revolutionary upheaval, he saw such a 
development as a gradual one, in which the revolutionary 'spark' would 
come from external factors and imperialist war. For Bukharin, capitalism 
was in the process of decay. However, a more radical interpretation was 
also palpable at the congress; one which portrayed capitalism as teetering 
on the brink of immanent collapse. As a consequence of intensified class 
antagonism and capitalist degeneration it was reasoned, the 'new period' 
would be one of revolution and war, in which the forces of social 
democracy (including the British Labour Party and trade unions) would 
openly support the interests of capital against the revolutionary aspirations 
of the working class. From such a position, the social democratic left and 
the communist right became the 'most dangerous enemies of communism', 
and although such a line of reasoning was not wholly contrary to Bukharin 
(who agreed that the right represented the main danger, acknowledged the 
'openly fascist role' of social democracy, and favoured an offensive against 
the 'sham left') 64 it greatly simplified and/or exaggerated his original 
synopsis. 
The sources of the adversity to Bukharin's position were varied, and had 
been existent for some time. Those on the left of the ECCI had always 
pushed for a more revolutionary strategy, as Humbert Droz's reference to 
the 'struggle against Losovsky' revealed. Meanwhile members and sections 
641npreco 6 June, 1928. 
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of the Young Communist League had continually agitated for more radical 
action. For example, the young Italian, Longo, had consistently been a 
thorn in the side of the pC165 in a way similar to the agitation conducted by 
associations such as the RAPP in the USSR. 66 The crucial factor in 1928 
however, was that such radical perspectives received encouragement from 
important sections of the communist hierarchy, as those gathered around 
Stalin sought to mobilise opposition to the prevailing orthodoxy. Slogans 
such as that equating social democracy with social fascism were reapplied 
by the KPD for instance'67 and the basis of Bukharin's theory of capitalist 
stabilisation came under critical discussion within the Soviet press. 68 
A section of the German leadership had also been agitating to take action 
against, and to broaden the definition of, the 'right danger' within its own 
ranks since at least early 1928. At the Ninth Plenum, a meeting between 
Russian and German delegates had ruled that "tolerance toward the 
representatives of the right deviation" was erroneous. 69 And the 
organisational measures demanded by the KPD would soon be effectively 
applied. 
While criticism of Bukharin's position was apparent in several speeches to 
the World Congress (including those given by Jack Murphy and Robin 
Page Amot) it was behind the scenes, in the breaks and the closed 
65See T. Draper, 'The Strange Case of the Comintern! op. cit. J. B. Urban, Moscow and 
the Italian-Communist PaM. From Togliatti to Berlingue (London, 1986). pp43-44. 
66Russian Association of Proletarian Writers, previously the VAPP. 
67For the origins of the term social fascism see T. Draper, 'The Strange Case of the 
Comintern' op. cit. pp 119-137. The term was first officially re-used in June 1928 by Josef 
Lenz, the Chairman of the German Party Programming Commission. Social fascism was 
used to denote situations where the bourgeois state was 'aided and abetted' by social 
democrats to block the advance of the working class. This became increasingly important 
at a time of imminent revolution. 
68See S. Cohen, Bukharin op. cit. p292. 
69j. B. Urban Moscow and the Italian Communist Party op. cit. p67. 
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commissions, that the real agitation was accomplished. As B. Gitlow of 
the CPUSA later recounted, "there were two congresses going on at the 
Sixth World Congress. One was the official congress over which Bukharin 
presided 
... 
Then there was the corridor congress called together by 
Stalin. 1170 It was in the corridors that policies were canvassed, and 
criticisms of Bukharin's line circulated. Jack Murphy for example, recalled 
the "rush of leading members to the committee room" as "rumour got 
going that Stalin and Bucharin [sic] differed. "71 Moreover, Johnny 
Campbell was to complain later that several British delegates returned 
from Moscow with a "new union complex" as a result of militant agitation 
in the closed commissions. 72 Therefore, while the final resolutions of the 
congress would remain close to Bukharin's initial perspective, 
discrepancies within the ECCI were simultaneously revealed. The result 
was a struggle for hegemony that would preoccupy the Comintern for the 
following twelve months. 
What effect did the disagreements within the communist hierarchy have on 
the congress? In terms of actual policy, the importance lay in the 
implications of the numerous amendments Bukharin made to the congress 
reports and resolutions. The most obvious example was in relation to the 
'right danger, which Bukharin agreed was the "chief danger" of the Third 
Period. The fact that his own political perspective was associated with 
such a deviation, and the ambiguity of its meaning was accompanied by 
calls for the "tightening of internal discipline", meant the clause took on 
serious connotations. Additionally, Bukharin was forced to make 
70QUoted in E. H. Carr, Foundations of a Planned Economy 1926-1929 Vol 11 op. cit. 
p74. 
71J. T. Murphy, New Horizons op. cit. pp282-283. 
72j. R. Campbell'The Mining Situation in Great Britain. A. J. Cook: A Policy' undated. Klugmann Papers. 
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theoretical concessions. While the more extreme concept of social fascism 
was not accepted by the ECCI for example, reference to social 
democracy's "tendency" towards fascism was included in Bukharin's 
congress report. 73 
Such modifications, combined with the criticism Bukharin received from 
both congress speeches and corridor conversations, represented the 
beginning of the New Line's extension beyond its relatively moderate 
origins. The militant mood evident at the World Congress gained credence 
and support from September 1928, and became linked to debates raging 
within the Soviet Union. In such a way, the demands to extend the policy 
of class against class evident within the CPGB prior to the World 
Congress were encouraged. As such, the return of the British delegates in 
September 1928 heralded the onset of the most traumatic year in the 
CPGB's brief history. 
Conclusions 
The politics of the Third Period should not be regarded as a set entity. The 
basis of the New Line extended gradually throughout 1928, and following 
the Sixth World Congress, evolved far beyond the policies adopted by the 
CPGB at the Ninth ECCI Plenum. Subsequently, the framework for the 
Third Period remained relatively flexible and open to interpretation; a 
development that facilitated the conflicts over policy that afflicted all 
sections of the Comintern between 1928 and 1930, while also enabling the 
ECCI to reinterpret continually its position in accordance with its political 
perspective. 
731npreco 4 September 1928. 
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Crucially, pressure to adopt a more militant International policy was 
evident prior to the World Congress, and came from beyond the 
parameters of Stalin's organisational coterie. The left turn undertaken by 
the ECCI in 1928 was based upon theoretical formulations established. 
from at least 1926, and reflected a widespread desire within the 
international communist movement. As the CPGB discovered, the policy 
of class against class was embraced by a sizeable section of the movement, 
while in Parties such as the KPD, the New Line complimented "the basic 
orientation of the [German communist] activist. "74 Furthermore, the power 
struggle that tore through the Soviet Communist Party and the Comintern 
utilised the debates surrounding the New Line. The Third Period thus 
became the arena for Stalin's consolidation of power, as opposed to its 
expression. 
Finally, the CPGB leadership's initial resistance to the policy of class 
against class should not be interpreted as indicative of the mood within the 
Party as a whole. A considerable and powerful minority of the leadership 
favoured the New Line, and were supported by several of the Party 
Districts. Moreover, although the majority of the CPGB Executive initially 
opposed the Comintern's recommendations, communists such as Campbell 
and Rothstein nevertheless endorsed the general thrust of Bukbarin's 
theoretical analysis. Where the British Party disagreed with the Comintern, 
its leaders would not refrain from registering their opposition. For 
example, CPGB delegation voted against the ECCI resolution on 
colonialism at the Sixth World Congress. 75 
74E. Hobsbawrn, 'Confronting Defeat: The German Communist Party. ' In Revolutionaries 
op. cit. p49. 
75The resolution, 'The Revolutionary Movement in Colonial and Semi Colonial 
Countries', was drafted by Kuusinen. Kuusinen criticised the line of R. P. Dutt and M. N. 
Roy, in particular Dutt's belief that British imperial policy included the industrialisation 
of colonies. After a long debate, all but four of the British delegation remained opposed 
III 
Following the congress however, the formulations of New Line would 
stretch beyond Bukharin's more subtle analysis. Charges of social fascism, 
predictions of capitalist disintegration, and the'right deviation' 
predominated communist rhetoric and activity; and for the CPGB the 
ensuing sixteen months brought the Party to brink of collapse. It is to the 
effects of such turmoil that this study now turns. 
the ECCI line, and voted against the thesis. For a detailed discussion, see L. J. Macfarlane, 
The British Communist PM op. cit. pp204-210. 
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Chapter Four 




Within a year of the Comintern Sixth World Congress, the British 
Communist Party was racked by internal conflict and political confusion. 
The ECCI offensive against the 'right danger' plunged the CPGB into a 
period of communist civil war, resulting in two national congresses and an 
overhaul of the Party leadership. The focus of the Comintern centred upon 
theoretical orthodoxy, and for a Party not known for its dialectical 
proficiency, the debates on communist practice that dominated 1928-29 
threatened to undermine the very existence of the CPGB. 1 
The Party's antipathy to theoretical debate was clearly demonstrated by 
Arthur Homer at a meeting of the Central Committee in September 1928. 
Exasperated by his comrades' protracted attempts to interpret the ECCI 
line, Homer resolved to "ask the Party congress whether or not the average 
[worker] in this country is of the opinion that only those who sit at a table 
and write theses which nobody reads and which are always critical because 
they can never be tested, are fit comrades to be in the leadership of the 
Party. "2 In a period where such theses were the measure of communist 
ardour however, the Party was forced to devote much of its time to just the 
kind of discussion that Homer detested. And while this suited those such 
as Palme Dutt, who appeared to live for contentious debate, it alienated the 
CP from the workers it endeavoured to represent. As the London District 
secretary R. W. Robson reported in 1930, the "year of great internal 
I See S. Macintyre, A Prol, 
-tarian Science op. cit. for an excellent overview of Marxism in 
Britain; and particularly the CPGB's contribution. 
2Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PgM of Great Britain 24-26 
September 1928. Klugmann Papers. 
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discussion" (ie. 1929) led to many workers leaving the Party because they 
were simply "not interested" in the peculiarities of the Comintem line. 3 
Events 'at home' also informed the increasingly leftist perspective of the 
CPGB however; although the Party suffered a number of political setbacks 
in its attempt to forge an independent leadership of the working class. The 
textile disputes that raged across the North of England and the General 
Election of May 1929 both facilitated extensive communist campaigns. 
But here too, the import attributed to the 'right danger' impinged upon 
communist activity. Party failures were upheld as evidence of the 
leaderships 'vacillation'. And communists such as Walter Tapsell, John 
Mahon, Maurice Ferguson, and Lily Webb, agitated tirelessly against the 
perceived'right errors'of Rothstein, Campbell., Inkpin and Bell. Even 
Harry Pollitt was accused of 'right deviation' in 1929, as a vocal 'left wing' 
emerged within the Party ranks. 4 
The sixteen month between September 1928 and December 1929 were 
among the most bitter and sectarian in the Party's history. In this chapter 
therefore, the cause and effect of such upheaval will be outlined, with 
particular attention to internal and external factors relevant to the CPGB's 
apparent decline. Furthermore, it will be argued that the extent of the'left 
turn'within the CPGB was facilitated as much by the Party rank and file as 
by the ECCL 
3Report on the London District PaLty 9 July 1930. Klugmann Papers. 
4The more radical conceptions emanating from Ferguson et al would often prove to be 
incompatible with the official Comintem line. The ECCI appeared to tolerate such 
invention however, so long as the tenants of the ECCI's position 
- 
the theoretical bases of 
the Third Period 
- 
were adhered to. 
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The Movement Turns Left 
In accordance with the Leninist principle of democratic centralism, the 
CPGB was committed to the political objectives outlined by the Executive 
Committee of the Communist International. Moreover, as a section of the 
international communist movement, the CPGB endeavoured to pursue a 
policy in accord with the theoretical framework of the Comintem. In the 
immediate aftermath of the Sixth World Congress however, whereat 
existing orthodoxy's had been challenged, 'correct' theory and practice 
became somewhat hard to define. And although the militant agenda 
encapsulated in the speeches of Losovsky, Manuilsky and ThUlmann 
would eventually eclipse the more moderate prognosis of Bukharin, the 
ECCI evidently fell into some disrepair in late 1928. 
In their recent study of the Comintern, Kevin McDermott and Jeremy 
Agnew list a number of contemporary accounts that reveal the disordered 
nature of the International at this time. Andreu Nin for example, described 
the CI in 1928 as'demoralised, where "nothing at all gets done. 
Everybody is awaiting the outcome of the fight between Stalin and the 
right. " Togliatti too, in December 1928, bemoaned how "bad" and 
factional the "internal regime" of the CI had become. And Clara Zetkin 
referred to the ECCI as "dead mechanism" in March 1929.5 As such, the 
directives that had sought to guide international communism since 1920 
became fractured and inconsistent. Thus, when J. R. Campbell bemoaned 
the "poisonous fractionalism" afflicting the CPGB in September 1928, 
Jack Murphy caustically remarked that "the fault is somewhere to be found 
in the International itself'16 
5K. McDermott and J. Agnew, The Comintern op. cit. p86. 6Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pg! y of Great Britain 24-26 
September 1928. Klugmarm Papers. 
115 
The concessions squeezed out of Bukharin at the Sixth World Congress 
were utilised immediately by his adversaries in the Soviet Union and the 
Comintern. 7 The 'right deviation', which Stalin described as the "tendency 
and inclination, albeit unexpected or undeveloped, on the part of some 
communists to depart from the revolutionary line of Marx in the direction 
of social democracy, " was extended. Subsequently, 'right conciliation', or 
"those who criticise the right deviation but do nothing to combat it 
... 
[or] 
who entertain conciliatory sentiments towards the representatives of the 
right deviation", was added to the ECCI list of misdemeanours. 8 Inside the 
Soviet Union, Bukharin's policies and bases of influence were attacked; 
the editorial boards of Pravda and Bol'shevik overhauled, the Moscow 
Party apparatus purged, and the 'softer' domestic line of Bukharin, Rykov 
and Tomsky castigated. By mid 1929 the 'Bukharin group' had been 
publicly as well as politically undermined. 
Within the International, the KPD set the pace. The more militant 
perspective of Thalmann, Ulbricht, and Lenz was immediately propagated 
throughout the German Party, and a distinct 'rightist group' was targeted 
within the KPD. 9 Subsequently, an ECCI Presidium in December 1928 
7Throughout 1928, the duumvirate's relationship had been becoming increasingly 
strained. Differences of opinion over the meaning of the 'offensive against the Kulak!, the 
'extra-ordinary measures' undertaken by Stalin to procure grain from the peasants, the 
need for what Kuibyshev called 'super industrialisation', and the Shakty affair, all 
contributed to a definite split within the Soviet PB. By July, Stalin had accused Bukharin 
of a'break with Leninism', while Rykov and Tomsky, the two other PB members who 
had been critical of recent Soviet policy, were similarly condemned. The latter was 
criticised for what Losovsky called a 'conciliatory' trade union policy. The Sixth World 
Congress therefore, saw the battle for power within the Soviet leadership extend to the 
international stage. 
8j. Stalin, 'Between Left and Right: Speech to the Plenum of the Moscow Committee and 
Moscow Central Commission of the CPSU 19 October 19282 In Labour Monthly 
December 1928. 
9ThAlmarm was himself under attack in late 1928. Charges of corruption had been 
levelled against the German leader, but with the support of an ECCI Presidium held in 
116 
accused communists associated with Thalheimer, Ewert and Meyer, of 
forming an "anti-Leninist Party" intent on undermining the authority of the 
Comintern. 10 The ensuing 'Open Letter' from the ECCI precipitated a 
wholesale purge of the KPD apparatus, and effectively set the precedent 
other Comintern sections were to follow. 
While disagreements within the CI intensified throughout 1928, support 
for a more revolutionary political perspective spread. Several communists, 
particularly the younger generation bolstered and driven by the radical 
rectitude's of the 1917 revolution, had balked consistently at the 'soft' 
policies of the mid twenties, and the initial left turn of late 1926-28 had 
enlivened their campaign for more radical policy. The international events 
of 1927-29 only served to compound this. The war scare of 1927, the 
deteriorating international relations of the USSR and the West, the onset of 
fascist or neo fascist regimes throughout Europe, 'rationalisation' and 
unemployment, the Wall Street Crash, and the repression of working class 
protest in Germany, all gave credence to a theory of 'imminent capitalist 
collapse. ' Indeed, the shooting down of May Day marchers in 1929 on the 
orders of the SPD police chief Z6rgriebel effectively augmented the more 
radical perspective within the KPD. II Subsequently, the argument for a 
revolutionary Comintern perspective became increasingly persuasive 
throughout 1928-29, as the theoretical foundations of the Third Period 
came under debate. 
Moscow on 6 October 1928 
- 
at a time when Bukharin and Humbert Droz could not 
attend 
- 
his dominance at the head of the KPD was pointedly reaffirmed. 
I OCited in K. McDermott and J. Agnew, The Comintern op cit. p84. II This was reported on in some detail in Labour Monthly June 1929. See W. Pieck, 
'Sharpening Class War in Germany. '
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From September 1928 therefore, the nature of the Comintern changed 
dramatically. Although not officially removed from the ECCI until July 
1929, Bukharin rarely appeared at the Comintern following the Sixth 
World Congress. Meanwhile the Executive became preoccupied with 
defining and rooting out the 'right danger' throughout the communist 
movement. For the CPGB, the struggle at the heart of the International 
exacerbated the political uncertainties of the New Line. In order to assess 
the work of the British Party therefore, it is necessary first to outline the 
theoretical paradigm in which the Party attempted to function. 
The more militant agenda of the Comintern was finally revealed at the 
Tenth ECCI Plenum in July 1929. Even so, the Plenum was not the 
revolutionary call to arms so often portrayed, and a mixture of 
revolutionary impetuosity and political caution characterised the 
proceedings. While speeches were often strident and infused with 
revolutionary vigour, and the Plenum resolutions outlined a world poised 
for revolution, the directives of the ECCI were not overtly sectarian. The 
formation of 'red' trade unions was not unconditionally sanctioned, and the 
united front from below did not discount work within reformist 
organisations or co-operation with workers on the non-communist left. 
The misinterpretation of the ECCI's'New Line'by contemporary 
communists (and subsequent historians), stemmed from attention being 
focused on the speeches and agitational propaganda of those such as 
Losovsky in the RILU or young communists mobilised by the ECCI in the 
battle against the right, rather than the actual directives of the Plenum 
itself. This was partly due to the fact that Manuilsky, Kuusinen, Piatnitsky, 
and others associated with the usurpation of Bukharin, had not gained total 
control of the Comintern by mid 1929, and needed to accommodate 
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sections of the communist left in order to secure domination. Even so, the 
resolutions of the Tenth Plenum reveal that the more pragmatic members 
of the ECCI had influence enough to check the extreme policies many in 
the CI wished to enforce. 
At its basis, the policy detailed at the Tenth ECCI Plenum placed the 
world in a period of "general crisis", where "an upward swing of the 
revolutionary movement in the principal capitalist countries" was evident. 
By accentuating and supplementing Bukharin's theory of capitalist 
stabilisation, a period of revolutionary struggle was declared necessary to 
combat the capitalist offensive launched against the working class and the 
USSR. In particular, the more extreme interpretation of social democracy 
was endorsed. 
In the ECCI's analysis, the bourgeoisie in alliance with the representatives 
of social democracy, had embarked on a policy of "unashamed robbery, 
enslavement and barbarous oppression. " Unemployment was increasing, 
wages were being cut, and the "economic strangulation of the working 
class" was accompanied by a "political reaction" that entailed "the fascist 
transformation of the state apparatus of the bourgeoisie, the intensification 
of repression and white terror, fascist coup d'etat aided by world capitalism 
(Yugoslavia), mass arrests of workers (France, Poland, etc), [and] 





Capitalism was perceived to be transforming into fascism, while in 
countries where there were strong social democratic parties, the guise of 
'social fascismwas assumed. Thus, the leaders of social democracy were 
12The World Situation and Economic Struggles. Theses of the Tenth Plenum of the ECCI (London, 1929). pp 1- 12. 
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'social fascists' who served the bourgeoisie by "paralysing the activity of 
the masses. " 13 
The extremity of such a theory contrasted with Bukharin's more gradualist 
notions, and it is noticeable that the concept of social-fascism was only 
belatedly endorsed by the ECCI. The 'Closed Letter' to the CPGB in 
February 1929 for example, made no reference to social-fascism. Nor did 
the Executive's instructions to Josef Lenz, the ECCI representative at the 
Tenth Congress of the CPGB in January. 14 By the Tenth Plenum however, 
and particularly in response to the SPID sponsored repression of workers in 
Germany, the slogan was firmly on the Comintern agenda. 
Consequently, the ECCI resolved that the primary task of the communist 
movement in the Third Period was twofold. First, to intensify the struggle 
against social democracy in order to allow the radicalisation of the 
working class to be expressed. Second, to purge its own ranks of 
'opportunist' elements so as to successfully carry out the New Line. Those 
who did not fight the right deviation or follow "implicitly" the Comintern's 
decisions, were now considered to be "outside the ranks of the 
Intemational. "15 
Such pronouncements appeared to highlight the sectarian nature of the 
united front from below. However, a closer look at the New Line reveals a 
more flexible approach. The resolutions emphasised work inside the 
'reformist unions'. United front campaigns among women and young 
131bid. 
14See Closed Letter of the Political Secretariat ECCI to the Central Committee CPGB 27 
February 1929. Communist Archive. The letter was reproduced in full in L. J. Macfarlane, 
The British Communist Party op. cit. pp308-319. Instructions for the Comintern Deb-CrAtp 
to the Conference of the CPGB. Communist Archive. 
"The World Situation op. cit. p 18. 
120 
workers were encouraged. Communists were to become "revolutionary 
delegates elected by the workers, " and "the survival of sectarianism" was 
explicitly denounced. 16 Moreover, with regard to actual trade union policy, 
a militant theoretical analysis was similarly juxtaposed with a 
differentiated political method. 
General Strikes in Poland and Columbia; 'major disputes' in Germany, 
France and Austria; and 'small strikes' in Great Britain, were all presented 
as evidence of working class radicalisation and intensifying class struggle. 
Unorganised workers were becoming increasingly politicised, the ECCI 
fathomed, as the social fascist nature of the reformist trade unions was 
revealed. And yet, the policy of the ECCI did not match the militant 
aspirations of Losovsky in the RILU or communists on the left of the 
International. The development of "wide committees of action" elected by 
the workers at the point of industrial protest for example, were clearly 
described as 'non-Party' committees. As for 'red' trade unions, the Plenum 
accepted the principle of working class organisation opposed to the 
reformist bureaucracy, but simultaneously imposed a series of conditions 
to restrict their formation, thus acknowledging the potential dangers of 
such a policy. 
Thus, only "at the high tide of strikes, only when the political struggle is 
very acute, when considerable sections of the proletariat have already 
grasped the social-fascist character of the reformist trade union 
bureaucracy, and when these masses are actively supporting the formation 
of a new trade union, " should a 'red' union be established. 17 Indeed, the 
ECCI was explicit in warning communists "not to withdraw from 
161bid. pp20-2 1. 
171bid. p45. 
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[reformist] unions, but to contribute in every way to the acceleration of the 
process of revolutionisation" of the working class'8 
There should be "no relaxation in our efforts for the winning over of the 
trade union rank and file, " the ECCI insisted. "On the contrary, this work 
must be increased 
... 
The struggle for ousting all the bureaucrats and 
capitalist agents from the unions, the fight for each elected position in the 
unions, especially the struggle for the positions of the lower trade union 
delegates, must serve in our hands as a powerftil instrument for exposing 
the role of social-fascist trade union bureaucracy, and for combating it. " 19 
And even where'entire trade union bodies'were expelled, the ECCI 
recommended that they continue to function while campaigning for 
reinstatement. 
Subsequently, although communist strategy inside the 'reformist' unions 
was revised at the Tenth Plenum 
-'Iegalism'was denounced and the task 
of organising the workers against the existing union leadership emphasised 
- 
the New Line did not necessitate the indiscriminate formation of 
communist trade unions. As with other sections of the ECCI programme, 
the practicalities of CP policy remained flexible. Rather, it was the 
adoption of the theoretical bases of the New Line that would determine the 
future of the respective Communist Parties. 
A Question of Emphasis: Interpretations of the New Line 
As Tom Bell informed the British PB in September 1928, no new 




World Congress. 20 However, the basic theoretical questions that 
constituted the divisions within the CI were discussed, and were 
considered in relation to the CPGB's existing political strategy. The role of 
the NLWM was debated, along with the Party's relationship with the non- 
Party left and the 'reformist' trade unions. 21 Consequently, the more 
militant depiction of the 'existing situation' prevalent within the 
Comintern, necessitated that the CPGB once again review its political 
perspective in preparation for the Tenth Party Congress. 
Such a discussion saw a plethora of views and attitudes emerge, both 
within the Party hierarchy and among the rank and file. Generally, the 
more militant attitude adopted by the ECCI received widespread support 
from the membership, albeit in a rather indeterminate form, as the 
predominant issues were discussed within the Party press, local Party cells 
and District Committees. The debate was most colourful in the Workers' 
Life, wherein articles underlining the main themes of discussion, such as 
'Which Way is A. J. Cook Going? '22 were complimented by letters from the 
readership. Views covered the gamut of communist opinion, ranging from 
G. H. Cole of Salford's demand for the liquidation of the NLWM, to E. R. 
Payne's warning that an independent Communist Party would be little 
more than a "political sect. "23 Even so, a complete break from the Labour 
20Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pajjy of Great Britain 17-19 
September 1928. Klugmann Papers. 
21 For evidence of this, see Letter from the British Delegation to the Political Bureau of 
the CPGB 2 August 1928. This called for a revision of the Party's policy towards the 
Cook-Maxton campaign. The letter criticised the Party's response to the campaign, and 
emphasised the need to 'sharpen' the Party's attitude towards the non-Party left. "Our role 
today must be one of ruthless exposure, " it declared. For evidence that 'red' trade unions 
were discussed, see J. R. Campbell 'The Mining Situation in Great Britain. A. J. Cook: A 
Poligy' undated. Klugmann Papers. 
22Workers'Life 26 October 1928. 
23Work rs'Life 2 November 1928. 
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Party was almost unanimously called for, and a sharper line of agitation 
encouraged. 24 
The discussion also gave an opportunity for those within the Party 
leadership, and indeed the International, to propagate more radical 
political perspectives. Palme Dutt's editorials for Labour Monthly outlined 
rigorously (and monotonously' ) the 'critical' nature of the Third Period. 
Revolutionary zeal was applied to events in Britain; the likes of James 
Maxton were subjected to vicious political attacks; the need for 
'independent leadership' was constantly touted (though never clearly 
defined); and as early as September 1928, Dutt was proposing that the 
theory of social fascism be applied to developments in the UK. 25 
Jack Murphy too, issued a series of inflammatory articles in both Workers' 
Life and the Communist RevieW. 26 These were particularly significant in 
that although based around issues of policy, they sought to identify the 
1vacillators' and 'conciliators' who were holding the Party back. 27 
Moreover, younger communists such as John Mahon, began to question 
the Party's existing trade union policy. "The main strength of reformism is 
not the 140 Labour representatives in the House of Commons 
... 
but in its 
domination over the trade union movement" he wrote, going so far as to 
24See for example'H. Ss' letter in Workers'Life 9 November 1928, which insisted that 
"the Party may as well seek affiliation with the Conservative Party. " Also Olive Budden's 
letter in the same issue that declared there was "one choice 
- 
either with the Communist 
Party and the workers, or with the capitalists against the workers. " - 
25Labour Monthly September 1928. "The essential process of fascism is being 
accomplished in the more advanced capitalist countries through legal-democratic forms" 
Dutt wrote, after quoting Rinaldo Rigola's comment that developments in Britain were no 
different to those in Italy. 
26The Communist Review was known as The Communist throughout 1928. 
27For example, 'Is There a'RighV Danger in our Party'. In The Communist November 
1928. See also Workers'Life 26 October 1928. Communist Review January 1929. Tom 
Bell and Johnny Campbell seemed to receive the bulk of Murphy's criticism, mainly for 
their continued support for the NLWM. 
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dismiss previous "concessions" gained by the unions as "granted by 
capitalism during its period of expansion in order to 
... 
avoid unnecessary 
interruptions in the extraction of surplus value. "28 Mahon effectively 
belittled the whole trade union tradition. 
Such opinion was bolstered not only by those British delegates who 
returned from the Sixth World Congress with a "new union compleX, 1129 
but also by the RILU. In October 1928 the imaginatively titled Red 
International of Labour Unions was issued; primarily as a soapbox for 
Losovsky to propound a more radical industrial policy. Losovsky 
condemned the 'reformist' trade unions as "tools in the hands of the 
bourgeois state" and called for communists to lead the workers "without" 
the official union apparatus and if necessary, "against it. " Communists 
were urged to look towards the unorganised workers for support, while 
subjugation to trade union mores was scornfully dismissed as "legalism. " 
And while the need to work inside the trade unions was underlined by 
Losovsky, his polemics also urged communists not to shy away from splits 
occurring within the existing organisations. 30 
While such a viewpoint alienated communists such as Harry Pollitt and 
Arthur Homer, who regarded the trade unions as a fundamental component 
of the class struggle, for other comrades, the scenario outlined by 
Losovsky related closely to events unfolding around them. In Scotland for 
instance, communist influence in Fife had provoked the formation of a 
breakaway union (The Fife Association) under W. C Adamson. 31 The 
28Labour Monthly December 1928. 
29j. R. Campbell, The Mining Situation in Great Britain. A. J. Cook: A Policy undated. 
Klugmarm Papers. 
30Red International of Labour Unions October 1928 and November 1928. 
31Adamson formed the Fife Association on the eve of Philip Hodge's election as General Secretary of the Fife Union. (Hodge was a member of the Minority Movement. ) Once it 
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subsequent support given to Adamson by the Scottish Mineworkers 
Executive, appeared to embody the 'treacherous role of the reformist 
bureaucracy. ' And in the wake of similar events in Lanarkshire, the CPGB 
established the United Mineworkers of Scotland (UMS). 32 
In London too, where the NUT&GW refused to support striking workers 
at Rego Clothiers Ltd., many communists 
- 
including Sam Elsbury, the 
London organiser for the NUT&GW 
- 
became convinced of the need to 
create alternative union organisations. In March 1929, Elsbury got his 
way, and the United Clothing Workers' Union (UCWU) was established 
under the auspices of the CPGB and the Minority Movement. 
Finally, the Swansea TUC verified the more militant ECCI line in the 
minds of many communists. The endorsement of the Mond-Turner talks, 
and the launching of an enquiry into 'disruptive elements' inside the trade 
union movement, gave an enormous amount of credence to the more 
radical arguments of Elsbury, Mahon and Losovsky. 33 In Birmingham and 
Bradford for instance, Party discussions favouring 'red' trade unions were 
reported in September 1928.34 
became clear that the MM would dominate the union apparatus, the Scottish Executive 
sought to postpone the annual conference, and refused to recognise communist union 
representatives. 
321n Lanarkshire, despite the Presidenct and Secretary of the district union being MM 
representatives, the 'old' Executive remained predominantly opposed to Communist/MM 
influence. Subsequently, legislative attempts were made to declare CP or MM delegates 
ineligible for union office. For more detail on these development see, R. Martin, 
Communism and the British Trade Union Movement op. cit. pp90-93. L. J. Macfarlane, 
The British Communist Party op. cit. pp265-270. W. Gallacher, Revolt on the Clyde. (London, 1990, first printed 1936). pp272-276. D. Proudfoot and J. McArthur, Barriers o 
the Bureaucrats. Fife Breaks Through. (MM pamphlet, 1929). 
33See National Minorily Movement Information Bulletin September 1928. Tanner 
Collection. 
34Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pggrty of Great Britain 24-26 
September 1928. Klugmann Papers. Ernest Brown reported the debates, and claimed to be very 'perturbed' by their conclusions. 
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The emergence of such militancy and the support it engendered in sections 
of the CPGB, led to a polarisation of opinion within (and between) the 
central and District leadership. The influential London District Party 
became a key centre of the leftist outlook within the CP. Members of the 
CP Executive who favoured a more militant Party line, such as R. W. 
Robson (the London District Secretary) and Sam Elsbury, held prominent 
positions within the London DPC. The YCL, whose Secretary William 
Rust was elected to the ECCI at the Sixth World Congress, also had a 
sizeable influence across the capital. Encouraged by Palme Dutt, Rust and 
young militants including Walter Tapsell, Stuart Purkis and Rose Cohen, 
led the inter-Party offensive against the 'right danger. '35 And on the 
Tyneside and Scottish District Party Committees, a vociferous and prolific 
opposition developed throughout 1929. 
Initially, debate focused solely on the practical political implications of the 
New Line. 36 However, the uncertainty at the heart of the Comintern and, 
more precisely, the primacy of the ECCI offensive against the 'right', 
effectively compromised the CPGB leadership. As such, the left turn 
undertaken by the CPGB reflected the desire of the Party membership, and 
in many cases went beyond the parameters of the ECCI line. 
On affiliation, the Party was unanimous in dropping its seemingly futile 
campaign. The further safeguards against communist influence endorsed 
35L. J. Macfarlane makes a similar point in The British Communist Pally op. cit. p218. 
The fact that such young radicals corresponded with Palme Dutt is also significant, given 
Dutt's sensitivity to the Comintern line. See R. P. Dutt Letter to the Central Committee 3 
August 1929. BL. Dutt lists Groves, Purkis, Mahon and Shepard from the London Party, 
Stewart and Proudfoot from the Scottish, and Ferguson from Tyneside, as potential new 
leaders. Interestingly, Purkis and Groves were to become Trotskyists in 1931-2. Also, 
R. P. Dutt Letter to Rea Groves 27 November 1929. BL 
361ndeed, it was such a focus that led the ECCI to accuse the CPGB of perceiving the 
New Line as "chiefly an electoral policy. " See Closed Lette op. cit. 
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by the 1928 Labour Party Conference, 37 convinced William Rust that the 
Labour Party had "completed the transformation 
... 
into a social 
democratic party. " A verdict with which the Party agreed unaniMOUSly. 38 
Moreover, in line with the militant spirit of the Sixth World Congress, the 
Executive also resolved to recommend that the trade unions disaffiliate 
from the Labour Party. 39 
Other issues proved more contentious however. At the core of the New 
Line was the belief that the Labour Party could no longer be transformed 
into a revolutionary instrument of class struggle. As such, Harry Pollitt 
(reiterating his argument from January), Jack Murphy, Walter Tapsell and 
Palme Dutt all questioned the existence of the NLWM. Calls for its 
liquidation were made on the grounds that it was "no longer simply an 
opposition movement within the Labour Party, but a national political 
organisation outside the Labour Party with its own political programme 
and national organisation, and candidates standing between the Labour 
Party and the Communist Party. 1140 Even Ralph Bond, the NLWM 
Secretary, supported the movement's liquidation. Following the enforced 
disaffiliation of militant Labour locals, Bond admitted at the closed session 
of the Tenth Party Congress, the majority of workers in the NLWM were 
no longer members the Labour Party. Consequently, after numerous 
37These included the barring of affiliated organisations from promoting, or associating 
with the promotion of, parliamentary and municipal candidates in opposition to Labour. 
Denying eligibility to delegates who opposed Labour candidates or belonged to a political 
party ineligible for affiliation; and prohibiting local Labour Parties from sharing a 
political platform with those ineligible for affiliation. See L. J. Macfarlane, The British 
Communist Parjy op. cit. pp214-216. 
38Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PgM of Great Britain 12 October 
1928. The PB voted unanimously to drop the affiliation campaign on 6 November 1928, 
and the CC concurred on 19 November 1929. Klugmann Papers. 
39Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PaM of Great Britain 18-19 
November 1928. Klugmann Papers. This was to cause problems for the CPGB later. See 
below. 
40Dutt in Communist Review January 1929. 
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speeches had recommended the dissolution of the movement, and with the 
endorsement of the influential London DistriCt, 41 the resolution calling for 
continued support for the NLWM was defeated by 55 votes to 52.42 
The majority of the Party leadership had favoured the retention of the 
NLWM, perceiving it to be an essential element in the struggle against the 
Labour Party bureaucracy. Although the role of the Left Wing Move ment 
needed to be modified the leadership reasoned, the NLWM remained a 
valuable point of contact between militant left wing workers and the CP. 43 
Subsequently, the defeat of the leadership's resolution at the Tenth 
Congress clearly revealed the extent of the leftward momentum within the 
CPGB. Furthermore, the liquidation of the NLWM went beyond the 
recommendations of the ECCI. Even the intervention of William Rust, 
who informed the congress of Comintern support for a Left Wing 
Movement, did not prevent the Party rank and file dragging the CPGB to 
the left. 44 
Differences of opinion also emerged in relation to the Party's approach to 
the Cook-Maxton campaign. The campaign had been instigated by the ILP 
M. P. John Wheatley, with the intention of propagating a socialist agenda 
within the Labour Party. As prominent members of the Parliamentary and 
industrial left wing, James Maxton and Arthur Cook headed the crusade, 
41The London DPC had voted against the Party's resolution on the NLWM at its District 
Party Conference in December 1928. The Tyneside District only supported the Party 
resolution by fourteen votes to thirteen. See Workers' Life 14 December 1928. 
42For articles calling for the liquidation of the NLWM see Jack Murphy in The 
Communist November 1928; Harry Pollitt in Workers'Life II January 1929; Walter 
Tapsell in Workers Life 14 December 1928; and Palme Dutt in Communist Review 
January 1929. For the Congress speeches and vote see Notes on the I Oth and II th 
Congresses. Klugmann Papers. Also, Workers' Life 25 January 1929. 
43For the majority argument in favour of the NLWM, see Tom Bell's article in Workers' 
Life 26 October 1926. Bell described the NLWM as a 'bridge' between the CP and the 
Labour Party. 
44Notes on the I Oth and II th Congresses. Klugmann Papers. 
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and a manifesto of limited demands was publicised through 
demonstrations and the Sundgy Worker. Although the campaign was 
interpreted initially as evidence of a'leftward trend'by the CPGB 
- 
and 
William Gallacher and the NLWM had been instrumental in its 
emergence45 
- 
Cook and Maxton were attempting to reform the Labour 
Party from within; a concept that contrasted with a basic tenet of the New 
Line. 
At the Sixth World Congress therefore, the British delegation discussed 
the issue and recommended that the Party "ruthlessly expose" the 
campaign. 46 To endorse the manifesto was to mislead the masses into 
believing the Labour Party represented the interests of the working class it 
was argued, while Cook and Maxton personified the manoeuvres of the 
'sham left. ' Although the Party Executive resolved to 'sharpen' its critique 
of the manifesto however, it took agitation from Murphy, Dutt, and Rust, 
along with further pressure from the ECCI, before the Party came out 
openly against the campaign. 47 
The question of misleading the workers was similarly raised by Jack 
Murphy in relation to the political levy. Payment of the levy implied that 
the unions could overtly influence the political perspective of the Labour 
Party, Murphy argued. And although such a theory found little support 
among the central Party leadership, Murphy's reasoning was echoed within 
45W. Gallacher, The Rolling of the Thunder (London, 1948). pp97-99. 
46Letter from the British Delegation to the Political Bureau 2 August 1928. Klugmann 
Papers. 
47Sundgy Worker 6 January 1929, and Instructions for the Comintern Delegate to the 
Conference of the CPG13. Communist Archive. In October 1928, the PB voted by seven 
votes to three to attend the next Cook-Maxton meeting despite a memo from Rust 
insisting that the Party change its line. Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist 
PLr! y of Great Britain 12 October 1928. Klugmann Papers. 
130 
the Party Districts. 48 Even so, the majority on the Party Executive resolved 
to continue paying the levy, while simultaneously campaigning for local 
union control. Such a strategy was intended to allow union branches to 
finance locally elected (and therefore potentially communist) candidates 
for political office. 49 
With regard to industrial strategy, attempts were made by both the RILU 
and young militants within the CPGB to radically overhaul existing Party 
policy. Despite Losovsky's belated portrayal of the Fourth Congress of the 
RILU as the birthplace of the New Line, prior to the Sixth World Congress 
the Minority Movement remained committed to "transforming the trade 
unions into effective weapons of the class struggle. 1150 In the midst of the 
offensive against the 'right' and the turn to the left however, the 
perspective of Losovsky gained considerable momentum. As such, any 
question of 'transforming' the union apparatus was dismissed as a rightist 
illusion, and communists were instructed to work in opposition to the 
existing trade unions; to lead and organise the workers independently of 
the bureaucracy; and expose the left wing inside the unions as treacherous 
agents of capitalism. 51 
Although the more militant agenda of the RILU was never completely 
endorsed by the ECCI, many of its concepts were utilised by the Executive 
to develop a theoretical platform distinct from that of the so-called 'right. ' 
481n the Political Bureau, Murphy was in a minority of one. In the CC he received the 
support of ldris Cox and Percy Glading. In both London and Sheffield, the policy of the 
Party Executive was defeated. Tyneside and Dundee also recorded considerable 
opposition. Workers'Life 14 December 1928. 
49Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PgM of Great Britain 6 November 
1928. Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Parjy of Great Britain 18-19 
November 1928. Klugmann Papers. 
5OReport of the Fourth Congress of the RILU op. cit. p 100. 
51For an early statement on the revised strategy of the MM, see Statement on Strike 
Strategy January 1929. Tanner Collection 
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Such irresolution however, induced division and confusion within the 
CPGB. While the Party leadership accepted the "capitulation of the former 
'lefts' to the right wing, " and the 'ever closer alliance' of the trade unions 
and the capitalist state, as a theoretical basis, the practical application of an 
effective industrial policy proved more diffiCUlt. 52For example, the 
formation of 'red'trade unions prompted variant reactions within the 
CPGB, and the issue placed the Party leadership in regular opposition to 
the Profintern. 
Thus, while the establishment of the UMS and UCVYFU reflected the advent 
of the Party's left turn, the CP leadership successfully resisted the 
establishment of'red'trade unions where conditions were deemed 
unfavourable. 53 By way of illustration, the TUC's proposed expulsion of 
the National Union of Seamen (NUS) inspired the British delegation to the 
Sixth World Congress to recommend the formation of a'red'altemative. 54 
The CP leadership (and Harry Pollitt in particular) resisted however, and 
proposed instead the establishment of a seaman's section within the 
52See Campbell's'Thesis on Party Trade Union Policy to be Submitted to the Tenth 
Congress of the CPGB. ' In The Communist November 1928. Campbell presented this to 
the CC of 24-26 September 1928. See also'Thesis on Party Trade Union Policy'. In The 
New Line: Documents of the Tenth Congress of the CPGB. Held at Bermondsv. London 
On JanuM 19-22 1929 (London, 1929). pp87-1 01 
53The formation of the UCWU was not unanimously accepted by the CP. While Elsbury 
had majority support amongst union members in London, he did not have the backing of 
the majority of the union as a whole. Subsequently, although the decision to form the 
union was supported by the CPGB in March 1929, Harry Pollitt would later insist that: 
"on the basis of the conditions presented for the formation of new unions, I would have 
opposed its [the UCWU] formation. " Minutes of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Pg! y of Great Britain 7-11 August 1929. Klugmann Papers. Pollitt 
considered attempts to set up'red'trade unions would make the Party "look ridiculous. " 
Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pagy of Great Britain 24-26 
September, 1928. Klugmann Papers. For more detailed discussion on the UCWU see, 
S. W. Lemer Breakawgy Unions and the Small Union (London, 1961). pp85-143. 
53Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PM of Great Britain 7-11 
August 1929. Klugmann Papers. The "fascist nature" of the NUS was outlined by the 
delegation. 
54Minutes of the Political Bureau of the CommunisLEgly of Great Britain 25 October 
1928. Klugmann Papers. 
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Minority Movement, and the transference of the NUS membership to the 
TGWU. 55 Although such a policy provoked a letter ftom Tom Bell in 
Moscow, who informed the PB of the RILU's insistence on anew union, 156 
the Party held firm. "At this moment (a new union] would not stand a 
chance" maintained Pollitt. 57 And subsequently, the ECCI refrained from 
putting its ftill authority behind RILU poliCy. 58 
Other trade union issues also proved divisive. For Johnny Campbell, 
Arthur Homer and Harry Pollitt, the "possibilities of utilising the trade 
union machine from the inside [were far] from 
... 
exhausted. "59 For their 
comrades on the left however, most vocally John Mahon, Walter Tapsell, 
and Stuart Purkis, the Party line "must be away from" the existing 
unions. 60 An exchange between Pollitt and Mahon was consequently 
published in the pages of Labour MonLhly, with three topics predominant: 
the question of unorganised workers; the definition of the united front 
from below and the formation of factory committees; and work in the 
existing unions. 
The notion of mobilising unorganised workers was accepted by all 
sections of the Party, though to differing degrees. Speaking as a skilled 
boilermaker, Pollitt insisted that a "large proportion of the unorganised" 
were "apathetic" and "backward. "61 Even so, he accepted that falling trade 
551bid. 
56Letter to the Political Bureau of the CPGB 30 October 1928. Klugmann Papers. 
57Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PgM of Great Britain 18 November 
1928. Klugmann Papers. 
58The Party line towards the NIJS was criticised at the Sixth MM Conference. See Now 
for Action! The Policy of the National Minorijy Movement. A Report of the Sixth Annual 
Conference (London, 1929). p22. 
59Harry Pollitt, Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pggy of Great Britain 
22-24 September 1928. Klugmann Papers. 
60Walter Tapsell, Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PLM of Great 
Britain 23-25 March 1929. Klugmann Papers. 
61 Labour Monthly August 1929. 
133 
union membership and victimisation meant a number of militant workers 
existed outside the union organisation. In contrast, John Mahon believed 
the workers were actively leaving trade unions in response to the official 
leaderships' inability to fight. Mahon claimed that 'unorganised struggles' 
at the Rego clothiers in London, and Austins in Birmingham, revealed that 
the "desire of the working class for militant trade unions to organise their 
struggle is as strong as ever. 1162 
The basic criteria for a 'united front from below' 
- 
factory committees, 
bulletins and independent leadership 
- 
were also accepted by Pollitt and 
Mahon. However, the more militant perspective regarded the formation of 
factory and/or workers committees as "the beginning of [a] new union. 1163 
Such initiatives were to be completely free from official union influence 
Mahon argued, with control administered by the workers themselves under 
the guidance of the JýW. 64 This was repudiated by Pollitt, who saw the 
committees as a means to organise the workers in order to "lead them back 
into unions to smash the leadership. "65 
The extent and objectives of work inside the existing trade unions proved 
to the most divisive question however. While Pollitt insisted on the 
intensification of such work, Mahon took a far more extreme view. A 
communist presence in the union should be geared primarily towards 
encouraging action against employers and union leaders with "no 
concessions to union discipline, " he argued. As for leading the 
unorganised workers back into the unions, Mahon rhetorically asked 
62Labour Monthly June 1929. 
63Labour Monthly October 1929. See Homees report of the MM conference, 'The 
Minority Conference and the TUC'. 
"Labour Monthl June 1929. 
65Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PaM of Great Britain 7-11 
August 1929. Klugmann Papers. Labour Monthly August 1929. 
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whether this included a union "committed to Mondism, led by bureaucrats 
exercising a dictatorship over the lower organs of the unions, in fact 
goveming the membership by fascist means? "66 
In the final instance, the Sixth Minority Movement conference of August 
1929 adopted uniformly the principles of the New Line. "We must build 
the Minority Movement so that it becomes the mass opposition in the 
factory and trade union, " Pollitt reported, and endeavour to make it "the 
new national trade union centre. "67 Pressure from the RILU ensured that 
the MM accepted its numerous 'vacillations and mistakes', and a more 
explicit class analysis of Mondism and trade union bureaucracy was 
inserted into the conference resolutions at the bequest of Losovsky. 68 In 
terms of policy however, the conference fell somewhere between the lines 
of Mahon and Pollitt. 
The formation of factory committees and the establishment of councils of 
action to organise union and non-union workers at the point of industrial 
struggle, were both endorsed by the conference. Similarly, 'constitutional 
action' and 'trade union legalism' were denounced. But communist activity 
inside the 'official' trade unions was not substituted for a purely 
independent leadership, nor did it diminish in importance. On the contrary, 
communists and members of the Minority Movement were to wage "a 
66Labour Monthly June 1929. 
67Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PaW of Great Britain 7 September 
1929. 
68Letter from the RILU to the Executive Committee of the National MinorijY Movement 
15 August 1929. Tanner Collection. Eight amendments to the draft conference resolution 
were recommended. The need to outline previous errors; the need to establish contact 
with colonial trade union movements; the sharpening of the conference line towards 
Mondism; the intensification of the line against 'bureaucratic manoeuvres'; the need to 
augment the UMS and UCWU; a more rigorous analysis of the Austins, strike; the need 
for closer contact with the Pan-Pacific and Latin-American secretariats; and the need for 
an increase in work among women 
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more determined struggle to secure the official positions in the union 
branches and districts; to maintain those positions by rallying the masses 
in support of our policy against the bureaucracy; to campaign for more 
affiliations and closer connections with branches affiliated; in all cases to 
bring to union meetings the day to day struggle in the factories, and to turn 
the union apparatus towards the factories. "69 
As for Pollitt's insistence on leading the unorganised workers into the 
unions, the final report stated that "on the basis of our mass support and 
influence in the factories we can then organise the unorganised into the 
trade unions as new forces coming to the support of the revolutionary 
workers already fighting under our leadership in the trade unions against 
the existing treacherous leadership [my emphasis]. 1170 
Thus, the trade union policy of the CPGB had a far broader basis, and was 
far less sectarian than historians have subsequently accounted for. As with 
so many aspects of the New Line, the divisions within the Party related to 
points of emphasiS. 71 The momentum of the left turn inaugurated by the 
onset of the Third Period, and the ECCI's insistence on the 'struggle 
against the right danger, ' set the CPGB at war with itself. The New Line 
could be interpreted in a number of different ways, and while the 
leadership debated its connotations, it was left to the Party rank and file to 
embody a policy that pitted class against class. 
69Now for Action! op. cit. pp 13-15. 
701bid. p 13. Similar statements were made at the Eleventh CPGB Congress in November. 
See Resolutions of the Eleventh Conaress of the Communist P= of Great Britain 
(London, 1929). pp22-23. "The necessity for an independent leadership in no way 
signifies a weakening of our work in the unions. " 
71 By focusing on the conditions needed to form new unions, and on work inside the 
existing unions, Rust suggested that Pollitt "distorts the general line of the [Tenth 
Plenum] Resolution. " Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Partv of Great 
Britain 7-11 August 1929. Klugmann Papers. 
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A Partial Implosion: The Right Danger and the Struggle for Stability 
The disagreements over policy that blighted the CPGB in 1928-29 were 
exacerbated by the intervention of the ECCI in the wake of the Tenth Party 
Congress. Throughout 1929 therefore, the debate on the New Line was 
focused primarily upon theoretical formulations and the character of the 
British leadership. As such, questions of theory, or the reasonsfor 
communist policy, predominated inter-Party life at the end of the 1920s. 
As John Mahon later noted, the ECCI intervened in Party affairs because 
the leadership "did not present any general line for discussion 
... 
but put 
forward only resolutions on separate issues. "72 Consequently, the ECCI 
dispatched Josef Lenz to the Tenth Congress of the CPGB with 
instructions to determine British explanations for the 'new course', and to 
"ascertain wherein the 'right tendencies' are finding their expression. "73 
Thus, the amendments to the congress resolutions suggested by Lenz were 
concerned predominantly with the theoretical basis of the Party line, as 
opposed to its practical expression. Lenz insisted the CPGB more acutely 
outline the disintegration of British capitalism, the radicalisation of the 
working class, and the fusion of the labour movement with the capitalist 
state. "All these things together" the ECCI argued, "constitute the basis for 
the new tactics of the Party. "74 
Such revisions were clearly designed to make explicit the reasons for the 
New Line and to eliminate inconsistencies within the Party programme. 
Passages were added to the text to confirm a more militant definition of 
72j. Mahon, Hg=Pollitt. A Biouqp (London, 1976). pl59. 




the Third Period. Thus, the ECCI recommended that the phrase, "mighty 
upheavals which shatter the temporary and precarious stabilisation and 
sharpen the general crisis of capitalism, " be added to the thesis on the 
'Present Situation and the Tasks of the Party'. Similarly, an additional 
paragraph condemning the 'mistakes' of AJ. Cook was suggested. 75 
The sweeping criticisms of the 'Closed Letter' sent to the Party by the 
ECCI in February 1929, similarly emphasised the theoretical basis of the 
Third Period. "The chief difference between the general line of the central 
committee and the congress is to be found in the attitude towards capitalist 
stabilisation and the prospects of a revolutionary struggle in Great Britain" 
the ECCI insisted. 76 It was a perceived disbelief in the imminent collapse 
of British capitalism, and the refusal to recognise 'right mistakes', that set 
the ECCI against the CPGB leadership. 
The Party's failure to comply with the prevailing theoretical orthodoxy of 
the Comintern were exacerbated by political decisions regarded as 
inconsistent with the New Line. The exclusion of Robin Page Arnot and 
William Rust from a list of Central Committee nominations presented to 
the Tenth Party Congress for example, was interpreted as a slight against 
the Comintern. Rust and Page Arnot were two of the British 
representatives on the ECCI, and keen proponents of the New Line. 77 Even 
75Ibid. Other examples included the need for a greater emphasis on the war danger; an 
analysis of the various elements in the Left Wing Movement; and a clear line 
demonstrating that left wingers such as Maxton and Cook were "against" the Party. 
76CIosed Letter op. cit. 
77The ECCI regarded this as a'demonstration against the Comintern. The CPGB claimed 
Page Arnot and Rusts'commitments to the Cl would not allow them to fully participate 
in the CC. In the final outcome, after Rust and Page Arnot had appeared at the congress 
and demonstrated against their exclusion, their nominations were put to the membership. 
Page Arnot was voted onto the Executive, William Rust was not. Rust's conversion to the 
New Line occurred at the Sixth World Congress. Prior to August 1928, he had sided with 
the'majority' in the Party leadership. 
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more alarming from the ECCI's perspective, was Campbell, Rothstein and 
Inkpin's vote in favour of endorsing Labour candidates in non-Party 
constituencies. 78 That three members of the British Political Bureau 
advocated a policy antithetical to the New Line, presented clear evidence 
of a 'right deviation' at the heart of the CPGB. 
A dwindling membership and a disastrous General Election performance 
also focused the ECCI's attention on the British Party. As noted below, the 
Party leadership was invited to Moscow in June 1929 to discuss changes in 
personnel, while the Tenth ECCI Plenum featured numerous references to 
the deficiencies of the CPGB. Dmitri Manuilsky accused the Party of 
"wavering for a long time" over the New Line, and of supporting the 
policy through "discipline" rather than "conviction. "79 Several 'right 
mistakes'were subsequently listed, 80 and Walter Ulbricht demanded a 
"new active" British leadership that could "be counted upon to carry out 
consistently the line of the Intemational. "81 
Manuilsky's concluding speech focused specifically on the CPGB. The 
British Party was "too polite" he insisted, a "society of fhends" in which a 
"little breach" was necessary. 82 Calling for the "least deviation" to be 
78Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PgrM of Great Britain 23-25 
March 1929. Klugmann Papers. George Aitkin and Frank Bright also voted in favour of 
supporting Labour Party candidates. The British delegation to the Sixth World Congress 
had dismissed both 'abstentionism' and voting Labour. Circular to all Locals and District 
Pgr1y Committees 18 November, 1928. Klugmann Papers. By May however, the Party 
decided that on no occasion should the Party recommend voting Labour, and Bob 
Stewart drafted a report on'Effective Abstentions'. The PB subsequently recommended 
writing'Conununism'on the ballot paper. To all Districts and Locals where no 
Communist P= Candidate is in the Field. PB Statement 27 May 1929. Klugmann 
Papers. 
791npreco 20 August 1929. 
80The Communist International I October 1929. Otherright' mistakes included 
succumbing to a mood of depression following the General Strike, the Partys attitude to 
the Cook-Maxton campaign, and its exposure of'lefV deviations rather than'right. 1 811npreco 20 August 1929. 
821bid. 
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attacked, Manuilsky pointed towards the example of the KPD, and 
demanded that the Party "eradicate from its ranks all remnants of right 
opportunist deviation. "83 In the lead up to the Eleventh Party Congress of 
November 1929, the CPGB attempted to do just that. 
Criticism of the CPGB also came from within, not least from William 
Rust. As a member of the ECCI, Rust harried and reprimanded the British 
Party leadership throughout 1929. At an ECCI Presidium held to discuss 
the CPGB in February for example, Rust condemned unreservedly the 
"passive attitude" of the Party leadership, castigating Johnny Campbell for 
attempting to "minimise the importance" of the New Line, and bemoaning 
a catalogue of 'right errors' supposedly committed by the Party. Although 
Tom Bell and Harry Pollitt had sought to defend their British comrades, 
the 'Closed Letter' to the Party Executive that proceeded the Presidium was 
uncannily similar to the tirade unleashed by Rust. 84 
Meetings of the Party leadership were similarly dominated by 
disagreements and in-fighting. The March Executive held to discuss the 
'Closed Letter' of the ECCI, included heated debates between Campbell, 
Tapsell and Gallacher, with redrafted resolutions and miscellaneous 
amendments clearly revealing the divergent perspectives within the Party. 
While Campbell would only accept the ECCI's criticisms of the CPGB "in 
general 
- 
and complained about "right wing mistakes that were never 
made" 
- 
Tapsell fully endorsed the ECCI letter, and proposed to use it "as 
a platfonn for the correction of the admitted right wing mistakes. " The 
83Theses on the International Situation and the Immediate Tasks of the Communist 
International (London, 1929). 
84Speeches of the British Delegation to the Presidium of the ECCI 13 February 1929. 
Kluginann Papers. 
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nine who voted against Tapsell's amendment would later be 'exposed' by 
Rust as archetypes of the 'right' tendency within the CPGB. 85 
Moreover, the debates within the leadership would often descended into a 
mire of insults and accusation. Just as Tommy Jackson would refer to 
Gallacher as a "bloody liar" for his acceptance of the ECCI's 'Closed 
Letter', so Arthur Homer would charge Rust of "never [seeing] the 
working class except in pictures and from platforms. "86 The result of such 
tension had ramifications throughout the Party. Not only did it hinder 
effective leadership at the centre, but it also fanned dissent in the Party 
Districts. 
The mounting unease within the Party leadership was complimented and 
heightened in the Party branches and DPCs. As the content of the'Closed 
Letter'became known, the focus of debate shifted away from Party policy 
and on to leadership capability (and culpability). London and Tyneside led 
the way in such criticism, two Districts with an influential and vocal left 
wing keen to implement a more radical communist poliCy. 87 
85Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Great Britain 23-25 
March 1929. Klugmann Papers. Report of Voting in the Executive Committee and 
Political Bureau from the Tenth to the Eleventh Congress. Communist Archive. The nine 
were Campbell, Inkpin, Hannington, Allan, Ferguson, Jackson, Turner, Kerrigan and 
Wilson. Finally, an amendment by Rothstein sought to balance the disagreement. It stated 
that the CC endorsed the main line of the letter, but was not committed to 'every one of 
the detailed illustrations' listed therein. Tapsell, Gallacher, Campbell and Joss voted 
against it. 
86Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PýM of Great Britain 23-25 
March 1929. Klugmann Papers. Jackson was often spurre d into invective. At the August 
CC he said to Tapsell, "if the idea is that you are revolutionary if you are a hooligan, and 
... 
offensive, then the sooner it [the Party] is abolished the better. " Minutes of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Pa! U of Great Britain 7-11 August 1929. Klugmarm 
Papers. 
87The London Distr 
, 
ict included Dutt and Rusfs prot6g6s in the YCL, including Purkis, 
Groves and Tapsell. Tyneside was led by Lily Webb (a member of the CC) and Maurice 
Ferguson, both of whom held views on the left of the Party. 
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The Tyneside District had already clashed with the centre in connection 
with Party practice during the Dawdon colliery dispute (see below). 88 And 
this was followed in July by a strongly worded resolution that claimed the 
Party was "drifting to isolation and impotence. " A "national Party 
Congress" was demanded, "to review Party policy and 
... 
elect a new 
leadership which will operate the new line. "89 The London District 
similarly called for an overhaul of the Party leadership in addition to the 
publication of Executive discussions and the 'Closed Letter, and an 
immediate Party Congress. 90 By all accounts, the meeting of the London 
Aggregate in July 1929 was a bitter affair. Reg Groves, a young left wing 
member of the Party, recalled later Rothstein and Wilson's "dishonest 
defence of the Party leadership", and the anger caused by their "abuse of 
the District Committee. "91 Meanwhile, the six-hour meeting was reported 
to the CC by R. W. Robson and Wal Hannington. The London District 
Secretary described the aggregate as "abhorrent, " while the unemployed 
leader reported the "disgraceftil" behaviour of Groves, Young, Purkis and 
Bond. They acted as "a pack" said Hannington, with the apparent objective 
of debasing the existing leadership. 92 
Following the Tenth Plenum however, the leadership was forced to 
"welcome" the mounting tide of criticism, as the Party opened the debate 
in preparation for a November CongresS. 93 The result was an avalanche of 
condemnation and rejection, with the main focus of discussion centred 
88See Fergusorfs article'Lessons of the Dawdon Struggle' Communist Review August 
1929. 
89Resolution of the Tyneside District Pgty Committee 9 July 1929. Klugmann Papers. 
"The Communist International October 1929. See Resolution on the Closed letter of The 
ECCI adopted at the London aggregate meeting 20 July 1929. Klugmann Papers. 
91R. Groves, The Balham Group op. cit. pp2l-22. 
92Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Ppjjy of Great Britain 7-11 
August 1929. Klugmann Papers. 
93Communist Review September 1929. 
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upon the conduct of the Party Executive. Spurred on by the ECCI, and the 
private and public missives of Palme Dutt, who praised the "Bolshevik 
spirit" of the Tyneside Party, the Party membership turned decisively 
against the leadership. 94 
District Party Committees across the country insisted on a CP 'cleansed' 
from'top to bottom'. 95 The Party's declining membership and growing 
isolation from the wider labour movement was attributed to 'right errors' in 
the leadership, and no Executive member was spared in the search for 
vacillators and conciliators. In Scotland, McNally accused the Central 
Committee of. "dying of old age, " and insisted that it "needed burying. " 
Meanwhile, the ebullience of the left in Tyneside was expressed in the 
District Party's condemnation Rust and Tapsell, two advocates of a 
militant New Line. 96 Indeed, so ferocious were the attacks that Gallacher 
claimed to have "never seen anything like it in my life. "97 Similar 
wholesale criticisms were recorded in Liverpool, London, and South 
Wales. And even Palme Dutt, the harbinger of the New Line, was deemed 
to have revealed his 'conciliatory leanings. '98 
Although the criticisms aimed at the CPGB leadership were encouraged by 
the ECCI, it should not be assumed that the New Line was synonymous 
94, Workers'Life 15 November 1929. R. P. Dutt, Letter to the Central Committee 3 August 
1929. Klugmann Papers. R. P. Dutt Message to the Eleventh PpIV Congress November 
1929. BL. 
95. Workers'Life 15 November 1929. 
96Minutes of the Scottish District Congress undated 1929. Report on the Tyneside 
District PaLly Conuess 5-6 October, 1929. In his report of the Tyneside DPC, Gallacher 
claimed only Dutt was excluded from the criticisms. Lily Webb accused William Rust of 
having "capitulated to the right. " Klugmann Papers. 
97Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PaM of Great Britain 26-27 
October 1929. Klugmann Papers. 
98Workers' Life 13,20, and 27 September. Also N. Branson, Histojy of the Communist 
Pgrly of Great Britain op. cit. pp26-47. For criticism of Dutt, see Workers' Life. 29 
November 1929. 
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with the left wing agenda expressed by sections of the Party. While the 
'right danger' was seen to be the primary danger, both the Comintern and 
Party leadership were aware of incipient ultra-leftism. Subsequently, a 
discrepancy between the desires of the Party rank and file (and comrades 
such as Mahon, Purkis, Ferguson and Tapsell) and the objectives of the 
ECCI, was clearly evident. 
In contrast to the Party membership at the Tenth CPGB Congress for 
example, the ECCI recognised the importance of a Left Wing Movement 
inside the Labour Party. Its liquidation, the Comintern insisted in its 
'Closed Letter'to the British CC, would "isolate the Party from elements 
that might have been utilised by it, and 
... 
gives an opportunity to the so- 
called left elements in the Labour Party to organise their left wing 
... 
against us. "99 The ECCI also objected to the Party's call for trade union 
disaffiliation from the Labour Party. 100 Thus, Lenz's instructions warned of 
a CPGB "faced with two dangers"; from the'right'and the "ultra-left. " A 
"hazy desire to abandon the struggle inside the existing organisations and 
create new red unions without taking into consideration the concrete state 
of affairs and the correlation of forces" was recognised and condemned by 
the ECCI. 101 As such, Maurice Ferguson was forced to publicly accept the 
'left errors' committed by the Tyneside District Party during the Dawdon 
colliery strike. 102 
"Instructions for the Comintern Delep-ate to the Conference of the CPGB. Communist 
Archive, op. cit. Closed Letter op. cit. 
10OSuch a policy "gives rise to the harmful illusion that the trade union bureaucracy 
consists of more progressive elements than the Liberal leaders of the Labour Party. 
Closed Letter op. cit. 
101 Instructions for the Comintem Delegate to the CO iference of the CPGB. Communist 
Archive. op. cit. 
102Communist Review August 1929. Ferguson's article was principally a tirade against 
the 'right' errors of the MM, Harry Pollitt and the Party leadership. However he 
'confessed'to "sectarianism" and "rejecting the struggle within the existing unions. " 
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Palme Dutt similarly warned that the 'struggle against the right' could lead 
the Party to "jump to the other extreme. "103 The communist theoretician 
was forced to complain that the blanket criticism enveloping the Party in 
late 1929 impeded the "driving forward of policy. " "[We] must be 
merciless but not disconnected" he advised Reg Groves; "criticism should 
show signs of leadership. " As such, "the united front has almost gone out 
of the picture" Dutt noted in relation the draft theses of the Eleventh Party 
Congress. 104 The Party's analysis of an 'acutely revolutionary situation' in 
Britain was "dangerous and incorrect. " And the Comintern's depiction of 
the intensifying contradictions of capitalism and the radicalisation of the 
working class, was'robbed of all seriousness'by the Party's'left' 
phrases. 105 
Even in the wake of Manuilsky's command to attack the'least deviation', 
the ECCI warned against a'clean sweep' of the Party Executive. 106 
Obversely, the Comintern remained committed to Harry Pollitt, whose 
promotion to the Party secretariat in June 1929 coincided with wide scale 
charges of 'right deviation. ' Pollitfs leadership of the MM had provoked 
criticism from both the Profintern and sections of the British Party, while 
his attitude towards trade union policy contrasted noticeably with the 
more militant mood of his comrades. Similarly, Johnny Campbell, who 
103R. P. Dutt, Letter to the Political Bureau 17 August 1929. BL. 
104R. P. Dutt, Letter to Reg Groves 27 November 1929. BL. 
105R. P. Dutt, Letter to the Political Bureau 25 September 1929. BL. The draft theses "fell 
into 'left' phrases" wrote Dutt. In a letter to Reg Groves, Dutt complained of the "extra- 
ordinary objection to making any fighting demands of the Labour Government (which is 
the very method to expose them and lead the masses against them 
... 
), or the fear to 
develop any wider mass movement around the party's leadership as a'right danger'. " R. P. 
Dutt, Letter to Reg Groves 27 November 1929. BL. 
1060pen Letter from the Communist International to the Eleventh Pam Congress. 
Klugmann Papers. See also Inpreco 29 November 1929. The new CC should be 
Itcomposed of the best elements of the current leadership 
... 
and of new proletarian 
elements. " For an example of the 'clean sweep' see W. Gallacher's reference to Tyneside, 
Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PgM of Great Britain 26-27 
October 1929. Klugmann Papers. 
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personified the 'right danger' for many in the Party Districts, was 
continually included in the Party leadership discussions held with the 
ECCI prior to the Eleventh Congress. 
The ECCI's'hands on'response to the divisions within the CPGB only 
compounded the problem. In July 1928, initial changes to the Party 
hierarchy had seen J. R. Campbell rise above Albert Inkpin in the CP 
secretariat, adopting the role of Political Secretary over Inkpin's position 
as Business Manager. 107 Even so, the continual loss of membership, and 
the Party's wretched General Election campaign, convinced the ECCI that 
further changes were required. June discussions with Comintern 
representatives were thus held in Berlin, under the auspices of the Western 
European Bureau (WEB), whereat Harry Pollitt was elevated to 
Organisational Secretary. 108 A Political Bureau of Bell, Pollitt, Campbell, 
Gallacher, Murphy, Homer and Rothstein was recommended, with 
Campbell's role as Political Secretary countered by Pollitt's promotion. 
The ensuing Party Executive meeting made a mockery of the WEB's 
proposals however. The suggested PB was rejected. And after numerous 
leadership formations and much counter productive voting, the CC 
adopted a reduced PB of Bell, Homer, Pollitt, Rothstein, Campbell and 
Wilson (with Inkpin as a candidate member); and a Secretariat of 
Campbell, Pollitt and Inkpin. 109 For those expecting a radical overhaul, the 
107Report of the Small Commission on Central Organisation 6 July 1928. Klugmann 
Papers. Campbell out-polled Harry Pollitt for the position. Ernest Brown remained in 
charge of Party Organisation, and Jack Murphy oversaw the Party's industrial department. 
108Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PaM of Great Britain 12 June 1929. 
Klugmann Papers. Arthur Homer replaced Pollitt as the Secretary of the National 
Minority Movement, while Inkpin was to be dispatched to work with the Party Districts. 
Pollitt's position checked the predominance of Campbell somewhat; a move that reflected 
the two men's relationship to the New Line. 
109See Pollitt's speech to the Eleventh Congress. In Notes on the Tenth and Eleventh 
CpGB CoqUess. Also Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PgM Of 
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decision of the Executive was somewhat disappointing. The YCL 
Executive complained to the ECCI that those to the left of the existing 
leadership, namely Gallacher and Murphy, had been excluded. I 10 
Subsequently, further discussions were held between British 
representatives and the Russian delegation at Tenth ECCI Plenum. 
This time a Secretariat of Pollitt, Campbell and Gallacher was 
recommended, along with a PB of Bell, Pollitt, Campbell, Gallacher and 
Homer. Those deemed to have most openly resisted the New Line 
- 
Rothstein, Inkpin and Wilson' 12 
- 
were dropped altogether. And in order 
to bolster the 'left bias' of the PB, Idris Cox and three young London 
workers (Moody, Glading; and Herman) were nominated as candidates. ' 13 
Even so, left wing members of the Party Executive such as Lily Webb still 
complained that the leadership remained open to danger from the 'right. " 14 
Great Britain 15-16 June, 1929. Klugmann Papers. Rothstein had objected to the Berlin 
proposals at the PB meeting on 12 June. The various proposals were submitted by Aitkin 
Ferguson, Walter Tapsell and Ernest Brown. Tapsell adopted the most'lefv wing 
position, with a proposed Secretariat of Murphy, Gallacher and Campbell, and a PB of 
Murphy, Gallacher, Campbell, Pollitt, Rothstein, Stewart and Wilson. He was defeated by 
20 votes to one. The WEB recommendations were defeated by seventeen to nine, and 
Ferguson's by eighteen to four. Brown's line up was accepted by fourteen votes to eleven, 
but its small majority led the PB to recommend individual candidates for election to the 
PB. 
II ONote on the YCL Executive Committee 26 June 1929. Klugmann Papers. 
III Inpreco 12 September. 
1121npreco 21 August 1929. Rothstein's earlier resistance to the Berlin proposals 
effectively sealed his fate, following his previous 'conciliation! to the 'right'. He was sent 
to South Wales to gain'contact with the masses. ' Inkpin's removal from the PB was due 
officially to reasons of Party stagnation, caution and finance. Tom Bell, Minutes of the 
Central Committee of the Communist PaLty of Great Britain 7-11 August 1929. His lack 
of enthusiasm for the New Line was the proverbial nail in his coffin, and he was 
tsentenced'temporarily to Party work in Birmingham. Jock Wilson, who had been co- 
opted onto the PB in July, was also dropped for resistance to the New Line (and'political 
inexperience'). 
IDSee Pollitfs speech in Notes on the Tenth and Eleventh Congress. Klugmann Papers. 
114Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pgly of Great Britain 7-11 
August 1929. Klugmann Papers. Webb dismissed the changes as a "reshuffle. " 
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By the Eleventh Party Congress, ' 15 the Party leadership was divided and, 
in the'eyes of many rank and file members, discredited. In line with the 
recommendations of Palme Dutt and the ECCI therefore, the Party sought 
to remove all "social democratic relics" from its practice. A'panel system', 
whereby a list of CC candidates was elected 'en bloc' was implemented, 
and 'new elements' were drafted into the Party Executive. 116 Although 
difficulties again hampered proceedings - Rust disagreed with Dutt's 
recommendation that "all tendencies" 117 be represented on the CC, and the 
ECCI delegate, Walter Ulbricht, was forced to insist that a'panel 
commission' representative of the Party Districts draw up the list of 
nominees' 18 
- 
the system ensured that the 'old' leadership was replaced. Of 
the 35 names on the list, only twelve represented the out-going 
Executive. 119 
As for the Congress itself, the Party endorsed a programme based upon the 
radical interpretation of the Third Period outlined at the Tenth ECCI 
Plenum. Although Harry Pollitt and Wal Hannington attempted to 
emphasise the limits of the left turn, the Congress was characterised by the 
fervour of the Party left. Even Rust was provoked to wam the Congress 
that there was a "danger of a swing from right wing to left wing 
11 5The Eleventh Congress was held in Leeds between 30 November and 3 December. 
116Memorandurn from Rajani Palme Dutt to the Central Committee 20 October 1929. 
Communist Archive. 
1171bid. 
118Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pgrty of Great Britain 29 October 
1929. Klugmann Papers. Rust headed the Panel. 
119N 
. 
Klugmann Papers. The new CC comprised 
of Cox, Dutt, Tapsell, Joss, Robson, Campbell, Rust, Pollitt, Gallacher, Murphy, Page 
Arnot and Allan, from the'old' leadership. The new members were Shields, Moffat, 
Usher, Duncan, Moody, Herman, Scott, Williams, Parcell, Coslett, Collins, McGree, 
Hoyle, Rushton, Phillipson, Wilde, Gee, Short, Ancrum, Webb, Walsh, Allison, Woolley 
and Cree. Individual candidates also put themselves forward. Hannington was voted onto 
the Executive, but Lily Webb and Maurice Ferguson were both rejected. The list was 
accepted by 52 votes to 30. 
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mistakes, " 120 while the 'mood' of the Congress can be gleaned from the 
'stony silence' and subsequent criticism that met Harry Pollitt's maiden 
speech as Party Secretary. Indeed, Pollitt had become noticeably 
withdrawn in the months following his promotion, and the tone of 
"hopelessness" that Gallacher noted in Pollitt's report corresponded with 
the Secretary's recent outpourings to Palme Dutt. 121 
By late 1929 therefore, the internal regime of the CPGB was divided and 
fragmented. The struggle against the right danger had brought the Party 
close to collapse, with a discredited leadership and a membership small in 
number and rebellious in character. But the difficulties facing the British 
Communist Party as it entered the 1930s were more than compositional. 
The Party's standing among the working class was also in disarray, and it 
is to the CPGB 'at worle that this chapter now turns. 
The Party at Work: The Effect of the New Line 
Despite the Comintern's favourable'objective analysis', the political- 
economic climate of 1928-29 was not conducive to revolutionary 
communist activity in Britain. Unemployment continued to rise, the 
relatively few industrial disputes that did occur were defensive in 
character, and the labour movement remained in retreat. 122 The rank and 
file trade union membership may well have been more willing to resist the 
120Notes on the Tenth and Eleventh Congress. Klugmarm Papers. 
121K. Morgan, Hquy Pollitt op. cit. pp69-72. Notes on. Klugmann Papers. Jimmy Shields 
also criticised Pollitt's speech, claiming that it gave no clear lead to the Party. At a CC 
meeting in October, Rust, Gallacher and Stewart all commented on Pollitt's withdrawal 
into administrative work, with Rust going so far as to recommend Pollitt's removal. 
Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PaM of Great Britain 26-27 
October 1929. Klugmann Papers. For the relevant correspondence between Pollitt and 
Dutt, see Hg= Pollitt Pgpers. Communist Archive. 
122The Minisqy of Labour Gazette December 1929. The aggregate number of days lost to 
stoppages in 1929 numbered 8,290,000 in December. Approximately 7,000,000 of these 
can be attributed to the Lancashire textile disputes. For an overview of the period, see 
C. J. Wrigley (Ed. ), A Histoly of British Industrial Relations Vol 111914-1939 op. cit. 
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changes caused by industrial rationalisation than the trade union 
leadership, 123 but such action was generally a1ast ditch' attempt by 
workers in the 'old' industries to maintain their position in a changing 
economy. 
However, the General Election in May 1929 and the onset of industrial 
action in the textile, mining, and motor industries, enabled the CPGB to 
disseminate its New Line to broad sections of the working class. And as 
the Wall Street Crash sent shock waves through the capitalist world, the 
revolutionary perspective emergent in the Comintern since 1926, suddenly 
had a resonance. 
The Dawdon colliery dispute of March-June 1929 appeared to justify the 
Comintern's prognosis of'reformist treachery'and worker militancy. 
Although the Durham Miners' Association (DMA) recommended the 
acceptance of a proposed cut in piece rates, the Dawdon miners rejected 
such advice, and resolved to struggle alone. 124 The Communist Party 
responded quickly to the workers initiative. The Tyneside DPC established 
a local Party branch. Meetings were called, strike bulletins issued, and 
meals organised through the Workers' International Relief. With the 
establishment of a Strike Committee however, inconsistencies in the 
Party's approach became apparent. 
The District Party's insistence that those DMA union representatives who 
had endorsed the proposed cuts be excluded from the Committee, was 
123C. j. Wrigley, 'The Trade Unions Between the Wars'. In A HistoKy of British. Industrial 
Relations op. cit. p104. 
124 Workers'Life 29 March 1929. See also LJ. Macfarlane, The British CoMM]jýý 
op. cit. pp262-264. 
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deemed premature by the Party centre. 125 Consequently, the strategy of 
Harry Pollitt and the Minority Movement contrasted significantly with that 
of the local comrades. A Vigilance Committee was established to oversee 
the existing strike leaders. Slogans such as 'make your leaders fight' were 
issued by the MM, and Pollitt focused his activity primarily within the 
existing union framework, taking his place alongside fellow communist 
George Lumley at the arbitration proceedings. (A. J. Cook was also elected 
to represent the miners but was unable to attend the discussions. )
The Party consequently became embroiled in a tactical dispute, with 
Maurice Ferguson, the Tyneside District organiser, accusing Pollitt of 
"legalism. " The slogans issued by the Minority Movement, and Pollitt's 
failure to adequately condemn the'reformist officials', demonstrated the 
"contradiction between the formal acceptance of the new line and the 
operation of the old" Ferguson argued. 126 And although such inter-Party 
wrangling meant little to the Durham miners themselves, the dispute 
between District and centre undoubtedly hampered the Party's activity. 
Although communists were able to mobilise considerable support among 
the local miners, as Pollitt and Lumley's election to the arbitration 
discussions demonstrated, the in-roads made by the Minority Movement 
were limited. The workers remained loyal to their official union 
representatives, despite the DMA's initial reluctance to support the pit- 
men. Furthermore, the support engendered by the Communist Party proved 
to be transient. The Party branch established during the dispute for 
125Maurice Ferguson analysed the events in Communist Review August 1929. Kevin 
Morgan offers a succinct but excellent overview of the dispute in HAM Pollitt op. cit. 
pp67-68. 
126A proposed 'counter Bulletin' was scrapped because it rejected work in the existing 
unions. Communist Review August 1929. 
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example, numbered just fifteen by November 1930.127 Consequently, 
Dawdon followed the traditional pattern of communist activity in the 
North East. Militant action was endorsed by the workers, and the MM 
evidently retained the prestige it had forged amidst the General Strike. But 
this did not 'inevitably' lead the workers into the CPGB. As the Party 
gradually distanced itself from the traditional channels of working class 
organisation, so its ties with the Durham miners became increasingly 
tenuous. 
Similar shortcomings were evident during the Austins motor dispute in 
Birmingham. The dispute broke out on 25 March 1929 and revolved 
around the employers' introduction of efficiency grades to determine 
payment. The workers' rejection of such a system, and the largely 
unorganised workforce, ostensibly offered a perfect opportunity for the CP 
to establish an independent lead. But the lack of an established CP or MM 
base at the factory, and the Strike Committee's objection to the MM's 
depiction of 'Vehicle Builders officials' as " weak-kneed 
... 
and 
treacherous", led the workers to reject'outside leadership. '128 
The MM's report on the dispute revealed a number of shortcomings. Only 
one member of MM was included on the Strike Committee (Comrade 
Fleetwood); local communists were not aware of the pending dispute until 
two days before its outbreak; and the various revisions of the MM strike 
bulletin resulted in criticism from both the Strike Committee and the Party 
centre. Subsequently, the CP was unable to block the AEU negotiated 
settlement, and the workers re-entered the factory on 4 April. 129 
127Rel2ort on the TyLieside District PaM 30 November 1930. Klugmann Papers. 
128National Minorijy Movement Executive Bureau Preliminajy Statement on Minori! Y 
Movement Work in the Austins DiMute 16 April 1929. Tanner Collection. 
1291bid. 
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For the MM Executive and the CPGB, the strike had revealed clearly the 
"treacherous role of the trade union officials. "130 Similarly however, the 
dispute had exposed the difficulty the Party had in influencing the workers 
struggle from the 'outside. ' And while the Party leadership blamed the lack 
of communist influence on local members' call for workers to join the 
existing union, such a conclusion ignored the more deep-rooted 
inadequacies of the CP (and the MM) in the area. 131 
The difficulty of forging an independent leadership in areas and industries 
lacking a militant (or indeed communist) basis was most evident in the 
Party's approach to the textile disputes that raged throughout the 'Third 
Period. ' The workforce in the Lancashire and Yorkshire mills were 
predominantly female, largely 'unorganised', and traditionally non- 
militant. The effect of Britain's industrial decline however, had led to 
widespread unemployment and rationalisation. In the summer of 1929, the 
on-going struggle against wage cuts in the Lancashire mills once again 
erupted, with a lock out of over half a million workers. 
So intense was the hostility between the workers and the employers, that 
Andrew Rothstein claimed to perceive the "prospect of a revolutionary 
mass struggle. "132 But although the Party was able to establish'rank and 
file committees' in Burnley and Oldham, the often sympathetic response 
received by Party leaders dispatched to the region was countered by 
continued support for the workers' official representatives. As Lily Webb 
1301bid. 
13 1 See R. Martin, Communism and the British Trade Unions op. cit. pp 114-115. 
132Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PaM of Great Britain 7-11 
August 1929. Klugmann Papers. 
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informed the CC in August: "the Party are not regarded by the workers as 
a serious political force. " 133 
Similarly, when the Yorkshire woollen workers were faced with wage 
reductions in October 1929, the Party assisted in the organisation and 
mobilisation of the local workers. Despite the limited success of 
communists such as Isabel Brown, the Party succeeded only in 
establishing one factory committee (in Bradford). 134 With such 
organisations supposedly forming the very "basis of the united front from 
below, " 135 it was evident that the CPGB needed to firmly locate a 
membership among the local workforce in order to wield a significant 
influence. 
The lack of such an influence was illustrated at the Minority Movement 
conference of 1929, where only six delegates from the textile industry 
attended. 136 Other factors contributed to the Party's apparent weakness 
however. The lack of consensus on the Party line again impeded 
communist activity. While the first edition of the Cotton Lock Out Special 
was criticised for failing to articulate clearly the independent line of the 
Party, 137 the MM programme combined the demand for a forty hour week 
and a minimum wage with an intemperate attack on the trade union 
leadership. 138 Such demands were unrealistic in the midst of a defensive 
1331bid. Macfarlane quotes a report from January 1930. "While accepting the Minority 
Movement policy, [the workers] retain all the illusions about the trade unions being 
capable of struggling against the employers. " L. J. Macfarlane, The British Communist 
P= op. cit. pp252-3 
134M. Hill, Red Roses for Isabel (London, 1982). pp3l-32. 
135See Hornees report on the Tenth Plenum. Minutes of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Pany of Great Britain 7-11 August 1929. Klugmann Papers. 
136Now for Action op. cit., p39. 
137Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pgr1y of Great Britain I August 
1929. Klugmarm Papers. The criticism came from Andrew Rothstein. 
138. Labour Monthly September 1929. 
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struggle, and the harsh criticism of the workers' representatives served 
only to alienate those workers who believed themselves to be fighting 
against their employers. Finally, by 'flying in' a strike leadership, 
insufficient knowledge of local conditions, and a political perspective at 
odds with the nature of the various disputes, alienated the Party from the 
local workforce. Thus, although the CP played a 'valuable role' in 
organising resistance and forcing the unions to respond to the workers 
demands, its impact remained marginal. 139 
The formation of two communist led trade unions however, suggests that 
the CPGB was able to exert an influence beyond its relatively small size. 
Established in April 1929, at a time when Scottish communists were 
leaving the Party, the UMS represented 15,000 members at its First 
Annual Conference in September. 140 The majority of the unions' 
membership was centred around traditionally militant localities in Fife and 
Lanarkshire; areas where communists such as Abe Moffat and Jimmie 
Stewart were popular members of the local community. 141 
Even so, the initial formation of the union was fraught with problems of a 
financial and organisational nature. 142 The union represented no more than 
ten per cent of the total workforce, and William Gallacher, writing in 
1936, described the unions' legacy as "a series of unfortunate and ill- 
conducted stoppages [which gave] an impression 
... 
that the only concern 
of the organisers of the new union was to stop the pit regardless of whether 
139L. J. Macfarlane The British Communist Pa! jy op-cit. pp252-3 
140A. Campbelf, 'The Communist Party in the Scots Coal Fields in the Inter War Period. '
In G. Andrews, N. Fishman and K. Morgan (Ed. ), Opening the Books op. cit. pp57-58. 
141 See A. Moffat, My Life with the Miners (London, 1965). 
142See I. MacDougall (Ed. ), Militant Miners: 
-Recollections of john McArthur, Buckhavem. and Letters. 1924-26. of David Prou Ifoot. Methil to G. Allen Hutt 
(Edinburgh, 1981). 
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there was cause for it or not. " 143 Such a summation was borne out at the 
Second Annual Conference of the UMS in 1930. The union Executive 
warned against "mechanically bringing the men [out] on strike"; and in the 
same year David Proudfoot reported on the 'mess' in the Lanarkshire 
branches, where a'strike, strike, and continually strike heritage'had 
severely depleted the union membership. 144 
The UMS survived the Third Period, and in accordance with the Party's 
realignment of policy between 1930 and 1932, was able to effectively lead 
its members in a number of industrial struggles. In 1929-30 however, 
divisions over the New Line within the Scottish Party, and disagreements 
over the formation of the UMS, restricted the unions' efficiency. 145 As 
Stuart MacIntyre has argued, "the regional strikes organised by the UMS 
in 1929 and 1930 demonstrated anew the problems of minority 
unionism. "146 
The formation of the UCWU meanwhile, revealed the extent of communist 
influence within the London clothing industry. Again however, while 
absorbing the majority of the NUT&GW London membership, the UCWU 
remained a minority union nationally. Moreover, the events surrounding 
the Polikoff dispute in May 1929 demonstrated the fragility of the union, 
and very nearly caused its demise. 
The dispute arose following Polikoff s withdrawal of its recognition of the 
UCWU. Pressure from the NUT&GW and the Wholesale Clothiers 
143W. Gallacher, Revolt on the Clyde op. cit. p275. 
144A. Campbell, 'The Communist Party in the Scots Coal Fields in the Inter War Period, '
in G. Andrews, N. Fishman and K. Morgan (Ed. ), Opening the Books op. cit. pp57-58. 
145S. MacIntyre, Little Moscow's op. cit. pp67-69. 
1461bid. p69. 
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Federation had prompted the Polikoff decision, and Sam Elsbury called his 
members out. The result was a debacle. Polikoff presented the strike as a 
communist plot while the NUT&GW (unsurprisingly) refused to support 
the striking workers. With the non-appearance of the promised strike pay 
(offered by the CPGB), and the successful prosecution of a union member 
for failing to give notice of the strike, the workers resolve collapsed. 147 
The dispute served to estrange the Polikoff workers from both the union 
and the CP, while Elsbury's condemnation of Party practice during and 
after the strike eventually led to his expulsion. Elsbury was hounded from 
the union and replaced as secretary by E. R Pountney, another Party 
member. The whole incident irrevocably damaged the UCWU, and as 
membership steadily declined to a mere few hundred, the CP eventually 
advised union members to rejoin the NUT&GW. 
The industrial work of the CPGB in 1928-29 was fraught with difficulties. 
The relative paucity of strike action created an obvious paradox between 
the revolutionary rhetoric of the Party and the generally small scale 
disputes in which its members were concerned. Among the London 
railway workers for example, the Party organised a number of Depot 
Committees in preparation of expected wage cuts. Depot newspapers 
appeared, and an inaugural Railway MM Conference in January 1929 was 
attended by twelve NUR branches. Despite securing minor victories 
however, the movement diminished once the immediate threat to the 
workers pay packet had passed in late 1929. The measures taken against 
communist members by the various trade union bureaucracies, and the 
Party's mounting condemnation of union representatives and union 
147See S. W. Lemer, Breakaway Unions op. cit. pp85-143 for a detailed history of the 
UCWU Lemer suggests the union lost nine-tenths of its membership in the wake of 
Elsbury's dismissal, with a number of workers disaffiliating from the MM and organising 
themselves independent of 'outside interference'. pp 139-140. 
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practice, undoubtedly minimised the potential influence of the CPGB. The 
Party was placed 'outside' the mainstream of the labour movement; and as 
unemployment rose in conjunction with industrial decline, communists 
simultaneously found themselves 'outside' the workplace. 
More indicative of the CPGB's ability to mobilise support was the work of 
the NTJWCM. Given that communist influence was most evident in 
localities based around the old staple industries, the decline of Britain's 
traditional industrial base forced a number of Party members, and the 
communities in which they lived, into the dole queue. Thus, as Communist 
Party influence diminished within the traditional labour organisations, it 
flourished amongst the unemployed. 148 
Such a refocusing of communist activity was helped in part by the lack any 
of significant competition in the realm of unemployed organisation. TUC 
support for initiatives such as the Labour run Bristol Unemployed 
Association for example, was successfully referred back at the 1928 
Annual Congress. 149 It also reflected the necessity of communist 
involvement among the indigenous population. Respected communist 
workers now became respected NUWCM organisers; Edwin Greening of 
Aberman in Wales for instance, or George Watson of Manchester. 
While it remained true that the majority of the unemployed did notjoin the 
N-UWCM (nor embrace its militant politics) the movement was eminently 
1480ne is reminded of Engels dictum that developing tendencies represent a higher reality 
then empirical fact. 
149See R. Croucher, 'Divisions in the Movement': The National Unemployed Workers, 
Movement and its Rivals in Comparative Perspective. ' In G. Andrews, N. Fishman, K. 
Morgan (Ed. ), Opening the Books op. cit. pp23-42. Also R. Croucher, MLe Refus Le to 
Starve in Silence op. cit. pp90-92. As Croucher shows, communists were also able to 
influence such organisations. The Bristol NUWCM expanded in accord with the BUA. It 
was such developments that provoked the reference back at the TUC. 
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successful in organising and mobilising those that did. The Hunger March 
of January-February 1929 was a case in point. Over 1,000 unemployed 
workers marched in opposition to the 'not genuinely seeking work clause', 
with delegations from across the country converging on the capital to force 
notable concessions from the Government. 150 Regional demonstrations 
were also organised. In Scotland, where several NUWCM branches 
emerged in and around the mining areas of Fife and Lanarkshire, 
unemployed miners marched to Edinburgh in late 1928, securing 
NUWCM officials the right to represent claimants at the Court of 
Referees. 151 Although the movement would continue to suffer from a 
transient membership, the number of NUWCM branches across the UK 
grew significantly in 1928-29. 
The Sixth National Conference of the NUWCM, held in September 1929, 
boasted 82 delegates from 46 branches, 152 and while the conference 
symbolised the re-emergence of the movement since its relative decline in 
the mid 1920s, it also brought the NUWCM into line with prevailing 
communist policy. First, the sub-committee based at the movements' 
headquarters (renamed the Headquarters Advisory Committee) was 
significantly strengthened in order to centralise the organisation. Thus, the 
authority of the National Administrative Council (NAC) was fortified; a 
move reflected in the dropping of the word 'committee' from the 
movement's title. Second, in line with the principles of the 'united front 
from below', the NUWM pledged to strengthen its links with the Minority 
Movement and the "rank and file workers in the workshops and factories, 
150See R. Croucher, We Refuse to Starve in Silence op. cit. pp95-96. W. Hannington, 
Unemployed Struggles 1919-1936 op. cit. pp 182-205 and W. Hannington, Never on our 
Knees (London, 1967). pp221-225. 
151R. Croucher, We Reftise to Starve in Silence op. cit. pp92-95. 
152Report of the Sixth National Conference of the NUWCM 14-16 September 1929. 
WCML. 
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mills and mines. " Similarly, a Women's section was established. And third, 
the constitution of the NUWM was revised to embrace the theoretical 
stipulations of the'Third Period. The possibility of mobilising the TUC 
was refuted, the Labour Government condemned, and the objective of a 
Workers Revolutionary Government determined. 153 
Unlike the MM however, the NUWM remained free from the sectarian 
excesses of the New Line. As National Organiser, Wal Hannington 
ensured that the movement's close contact with those it claimed to 
represent was maintained. The Sixth Conference established a legal 
department to advise the unemployed on the ever more complex laws 
surrounding benefit entitlement. 154 And although such a focus proved a 
contentious issue within the CPGB, it was nevertheless an effective 
component of the NUWM; offering practical advice and a clear'grass 
roots' link to the unemployed. 
Within the parliamentary political sphere, the 1929 General Election 
clearly revealed the marginal character of British communism. However, it 
seems rather inequitable to judge the tiny British Communist Party on such 
a basis. The CPGB was influential in certain villages and towns across 
industrial Britain, and its dedicated members could claim a vocal and 
sometimes dominant presence on trades councils and in trade union 
branches. Even the Comintern acknowledged that "no one could have 
expected a quantitative success in the first electoral attack 
... 
against all the 
bourgeois parties, including the Labour Party. "155 As such, the Party were 
attempting the near impossible by pitching its candidates in areas of 
1531bid. 
154The department was headed by Sid Elias. See the pamphlet How to Get 
Unemployment Beneft (London, 1929), for an example of NUWM initiative. 
155The Communist International I October 1929. 
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"special political importance" 156; Labour strongholds and against Labour 
figureheads. Subsequently, the CPGB was more concerned with the 
principle of its stand against the Labour Party 
- 
as laid out in the manifesto 
Class ARainst Class written of Jack Murphy 
- 
than the actual result. As 
Dutt made clear on the eve of the Election: 
a militant working class fight in the present election and the return of a militant working 
class fighter to parliament (or even if none is returned) is more important and a greater 
gain and advance to the working class as a whole than the return of a 
... 
Labour majority 
committed to rationalisation, industrial peace, imperialism and the maintenance of the 
capitalist state. 157 
There were preliminary hopes of limited success. The Aberdeen by- 
election result in August 1928, had seen the communist candidate (Aitkin 
Ferguson) beat the Liberal to second place with a vote of 2,618. In an area 
with a Local Party ofjust ten members, the Party concluded that such a 
result "completely justifie[d]" the new tactics. 158 A poor showing in the 
Municipal Elections of 1928 however, gave the Party a glimpse of the 
difficulties that lay ahead. As William Joss reported to the CC in 
November 1928; "it had [been] explained by most candidates that the 
workers did not understand the new policy of the Party, and that, although 
the workers listened to the policy 
... 
they were more bent on putting the 
Labour Party into power and could not regard the Communist Party as an 
alternative to the Baldwin government. " The workers may agree with the 
CP that the Labour Party "is not just what it ought to be" Joss concluded, 
but "our weakness is not only a numerical weakness. "159 
156Circular to all Locals and District P@, qy Committees 18 November 1928. Drafted by 
the British delegation to the Sixth World Congress. Klugmann Papers. 
157Labour MonthlY May 1929. 
158Report on the Aberdeen By-Election (Duplicate) unsigned document. Klugmann 
Papers. See also Dutt's Notes 
... 
' in Labour Monthly October 1928. Other Party members 
remained more sceptical however. William Gallacher called the Aberdeen result 
"abnormal. " Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pa! jy of Great Britain 
18-19 November 1929. Klugmann Papers. 
159Statement on the Municipal Elections November 1928. Klugmann Papers. 
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The General Election did not go well however, even by the CPGB's 
reckoning. None of the 25 CP candidates were successful, and the Party 
lost its one existing seat in North Battersea, where Shapudi Saklatvala was 
defeated by Labour's W. S. Sanders. Elsewhere, in constituencies where the 
CP had previously gained significant electoral support, the communist 
vote uniformly dropped. 160 Apart for Saklatvala, only Arthur Homer in 
Rhondda East, and Alex Geddes in Greenock, polled more than 2000 
votes. 161 
Harry Pollitt's stand against Ramsay MacDonald was particularly 
indicative. Not only did the wheels fall off Pollitt's election car in full view 
of MacDonald, but his election portrait was jokingly placed in the window 
of a deserted house. Subsequently, Pollitt gained just 1,43 1 votes, in 
comparison to the 'bourgeois lackey's'35,615. Jack Murphy faced a similar 
'up hill battle' in South Hackney, where he stood against Herbert Morrison. 
In his memoirs Murphy recalled: "I had tried hard to get Herbert into 
public debate but he just laughed at my efforts 
... 
windows in every house 
in almost all the streets 
... 
were decorated with his portrait. " 162 
. 
The critical analysis of the 1929 General Election in The Communist 
International placed the blame for the Party's poor showing at the feet of 
the Party leadership. "The electoral campaign showed with astounding 
1601n Dundee for example, Bob Stewart had secured 8,340 votes in October 1924. In 
1929 he polled 6,160. The Dundee voters elected the independent prohibitionist E. 
Scrymgeour into Parliament. Ferguson's vote in Aberdeen meanwhile, was halved 
161Geddes polled 7,005 votes compared to W. Leonard (Labour) 9,697 and G. P. Collins 
(Liberal) 11,190. Homer gained 5,789 compared to Lt. Co. D. Watts-Morgan (Labour) 
19,010. 
162H. Pollitt, Serving My Time op. cit. pp265-283 J. T. Murphy, New Horizons op. cit. 
p293. See also Bob Stewart Breaking the Fetters op. cit. pp 174-179, for an amusing 
account of his election campaign. 
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clearness the main weaknesses of the British Communist Party and at the 
same time revealed those opportunist elements which over a long period 
have been accumulated within its ranks. " 163 Although Dutt attempted to 
salvage a degree of dignity from the result, suggesting it revealed the 
leftward march of the workers and describing the swing to Labour as "an 
act of class war, "164 the Party could gain little encouragement ftom the 
events of May 1929.165 Even so, the result was more indicative of the 
British working class' perception of the CPGB, than a rejection of a 
specific set of communist policies. 
Conclusions 
R. W. Robson's portrayal of 1929 as "the year of great internal discussion" 
was a succinct and perceptive one. 166 The search for communist orthodoxy 
and political independence overwhelmed the CPGB, as theoretical debate 
eclipsed the more practical realities confronting the Party. With a 
deteriorating basis of support and restricted influence within the labour 
movement, a realignment in the CPGB's perspective was a necessary one. 
However, the offensive against the 'right danger' and the divisions that 
effectively paralysed the Party apparatus, only exacerbated communist 
insularity. 
The transformation of the political framework within which the CPGB 
operated, and the loss of Party influence that characterised 1927-29, were 
intrinsically linked. While the sectarianism engendered by the New Line 
facilitated communist ineffectiveness, the New Line in itself did not cause 
163The Communist International I October 1929. 
164Labour Monthly July 1929. Cited in L. J. Macfarlane, The British Communist Pa!! Y op. 
cit. pp23 0-23 1. 
165Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Great Britain 30 May-I 
June 1929. Klugmann Papers. 
166R. W. Robson, Report on the London DistrigLparly 9 July 1930. Klugmann Papers. 
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the Party's decline. The paucity of industrial conflict and the shifting of the 
Party's support base to the ranks of the unemployed was crucial to the 
CPGB's proficiency. Moreover, traditional obstacles to British 
communism 
- 
parliamentary traditions, relative class equanimity, and the 
perceived neutrality of the state 
- 
remained in place. 
Furthermore, the left turn of 1926-29 gained a momentum of its own. 
While the battle over political theory necessitated ideological clarity, the 
basis of the New Line remained relatively broad. As such, the extremes of 
the New Line were engendered by a collapse in ECCI authority, and the 
emergence of widespread leftist opinion within the International. In 
Britain, sections of the Party leadership and the rank and file expressed 
opinion 'to the left' of both the CPGB and the ECCI. Thus, at the Tenth and 
Eleventh Congress', and amidst the various industrial struggles, indigenous 
interpretations of the New Line transposed the 'correct' (or ECCI) 
perspective. 
Even so, the re-emergence of an effective unemployed movement 
countered the Party's industrial dissolution; though this was scant comfort 
to a Party based upon the working class. Communist activity in the 
NUWM was indicative of the changing realm of Party struggle however, 
and the movement's success was a testament to the dedication and 
capability of the CP membership. As the 'space' within which the Party 
operated was transformed, the CP was forced to reassess both its policy 








Although the introduction of the New Line has been discussed extensively 
by historians of the CPGB, little attention has been given to the plight of 
the Party between 1930 and 1932. Yet these years saw the British 
Communist Party significantly realign its approach to the workers' 
struggle. Concern for its falling membership, and the obvious 
shortcomings of Party militancy in 1929-30, led the CP to propose a 
number of initiatives designed to address the Party's 'isolation from the 
masses. " A Workers' Charter, an emphasis on wider political issues (most 
obviously unemployment and the female proletariat), and the curbing of 
sectarianism, all tempered the Party's evident decline. Furthermore, the 
publication of the Daily Worker provided practical activity for Party 
members at a time of little industrial unrest. These were difficult months 
for the CPGB, but ones in which the Party's problems were recognised and 
acted upon. 
The CP's ability to combat sectarianism was undoubtedly abetted by a 
similar move within the Comintern. As we have seen, the Cl warned the 
CPG13 about the "ultra left danger (sectarianism)" in January 1929.2 
However, the 'deviation' received more defined attention towards the end 
of that year, and throughout 1930-3 1. In the autumn for example, the 
German Youth League was forced to deal with the problem of the'left 
I in Histoly of the Communist PaM of Great Britain op. cit., Noreen Branson offers an 
overview of the Party's work in this period, but does not discuss the numerous political 
and theoretical realignments undertaken by the CPGB in 1930-3 1. 
21nstructions to. the Comintern Delegate to the Conference of the CPQB. Communist 
Archive. 
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danger of isolation from the masses. 13 And once Stalin's notorious 
'Dizziness through Success' letter of February 193 04 had recommended a 
'struggle on two fronts' 
- 
that is against the right and left5 
- 
the issue of the 
'left deviation' was firmly on the Comintern agenda. 
Communist Party activity centred upon a number of issues between 
January 1930 and May 193 1. In particular, both the on-going textile 
disputes in the North of England and the intensifying problem of 
unemployment prompted Party campaigns. Moreover, the purge of the 
'right danger' in late 1929 enabled the leadership to re-focus its attention 
on the practical application of Party policy. Although practicalities could 
not be completely separated from theoretical concepts, the shortcomings of 
the militant strategy pursued by the CPGB in 1929 and early 1930, 
necessitated a radical overhaul of the Party's approach to the British 
proletariat. 
193 0 and early 193 1 therefore, saw the Party attempt to 'find its feet' again 
after the uncertainty of the previous two years. With a new leadership in 
place, a daily paper in production, and conditions in Britain becoming 
superficially more advantageous to a revolutionary Party (a world 
economic crisis, rising unemployment), many in the CPG13 saw an 
auspicious future ahead. It remained for the Party, centrally and in the 
districts, to place itself back among the working class, to organise 
struggles as they occurred, and to seize the opportunities prophesied by the 
Third Period. 
3E. H. Carr, Twilight of the Comintern 1930-1935 (London, 1982). p12. 
4Published in Pravda 2 March 1930. 
5See E. H. Carr, Twiligh op. cit. p12. Stalin called for "a struggle on two fronts, both 
against those who lag behind and against those who rush ahead. " 
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The Background 
By the end of 1929, the relative stability of the British economy was 
undoubtedly being unden-nined. 6 Although emerging 'new' industries had 
gone a little way to offset the decline of the old staple industries evident 
since the War, the World economic upheaval at the end of 1929 plunged 
Britain into a series of ever more acute crises. While export orders had 
been falling since 1928, the problems that beset the US economy in the 
following year compounded Britain's degeneration. The decline of the old 
industries intensified, unemployment continued to rise, and the balance of 
trade proceeded to deteriorate. Subsequently, areas of the country reliant 
on such industries as mining and textiles, areas where the Communist 
Party had its main basis of support, slid into ever-deeper depression. In 
Wales for example, unemployment rose from an already high 19.5 per cent 
in 1927 to 34.6 per cent in 1932; while across Britain as a whole 
unemployment rose from 1,534,000 in January 1930 to 2,783,000 in July 
1931.7 
As remarked on in chapter one, the British labour movement suffered in 
such conditions. Trade union membership continued to fall, industrial 
action remained defensive, and the various schemes launched by the 
Labour Government to offset Britain's economic decline systematically 
failed. Indeed the Government's encouragement of 'rational i sation, in 
industry only exacerbated matters; swelling the ranks of the unemployed 
and inducing disagreements between the Government and the unions as 
6For an overview of the 'depression' see: A. Thorpe, The British General Election of 1931 (Oxford, 1991). C. Cook & J. Stevenson, The Slump. Sociely and Politics in the 
Depressio (London, 1989). R. Skidelsky, Politicians and the Slump: The Labour 
Government of 1929-1931 (London, 1967). S. Pollard, The Development of the British 
Economy 1919-1990 4th ed. (London, 1992). 
7Minis! Ky of Labour Gazette December 193 0 and 193 1. 
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well as within the Labour Party itself. 8 Moreover, the changing basis of the 
British workforce 
- 
new industries, unemployment, and the increasing 
number of female workers 
- 
necessitated a revision of long held traditions 
and prejudices that the labour movement seemed loathe to undertake. 
Thus, as Andrew Thorpe has demonstrated, although the depression in 
Britain was 'mild by international standards', its effects were perceived as 
traumatic by 'contemporary observers'. 9 To those millions forced into the 
dole queue and onto Hunger Marches; to Labour supporters who had 
regarded their party as one of full employment; and to trade unionists who 
believed their organisations were designed to resist attacks on working 
conditions and campaign for their improvement, the events of 1930 were 
devastating. 
For the Communist International, it was essential that the various 
Communist Parties respond effectively to the crisis afflicting capitalism; a 
crisis that hit countries such as Germany and the USA far harder than it 
did Great Britain. From the ECCI's perspective, the predictions of the 
Third Period had been verified as economies crashed and class 
antagonisms were heightened by the social effects of unemployment and 
poverty. Yet a number of Parties, including the French as well as the 
British, were in obvious decline, and it was evident to at least a section of 
the ECCI that a consequence of the offensive against the'right danger'had 
been an upsurge in ultra-leftism. 10 Additionally, in parties where the left 
8Cutting costs in industry usually began with the dismissal of 'excess' labour. The return 
to the Gold Standard in 1925 had led to stringency measures at a time when credit was 
required. 
9A. Thorpe, Britain in the 1930s (Oxford, 1992). p85. 
IOAccording to E. H. Carr, the ECCI was divided between the more flexible approach of 
Manuilsky and Kuusinen, and the morehard line' of Bela Kun and Losovsky. See E. H. 
Carr Twiligh op. cit. p5. During the overhaul of the ECCI in late 1928 and early 1929, 
the'hard liners' temporarily secured the upper hand. Beyond the Tenth Plenum however, 
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had come to dominate the leadership in 1929-30, the outcome had been 
neither positive or effective. Thus, in Germany, the "complacent and 
combative" mood of the KPD was soon dampened by an ECCI that 
objected to the optimistic 'revolutionary phrases'of the Party's left wing. ' 
Subsequently, the strategies and emphases of the ECCI were refined 
continually throughout our period, with the stress on the danger of 
sectarianism being perhaps the most obvious example. 
The first of such realignments occurred at the Enlarged Presidium of the 
ECCI, held between February 8 and 18 1930. Manuilsky, the highest 
authority in the ECCI Political Secretariat, called on Comintem sections to 
focus attention on the 'partial demands' of the workers, 12 while the 
Presidium resolution on the KPD pronounced the need to fight 
"opportunism both open (right) and concealed in 'revolutionary phrases' 
(left). " 13 Such opinion was echoed in a number of congress speeches, and 
formed the basis of a series of articles published in the communist press. 
Thus, "swaggering over the smallest advances and successes" and the 
labelling of all non-communists as 'social fascist'was condemned. 
Simultaneously, work within the reformist trade unions, and the 
concentration on the economic struggle, were re-emphasised. 14 
The ECCI now insisted that the revolutionary crisis of the Third Period 
was emerging, and in doing so checked the left's more fanciful illusion that 
those comrades with a more moderate approach regained the initiative. Thus, the 
restrictions placed on Losovsky's trade union policy for example, were increasingly 
emphasised from 1930. 
1 IE. H. Carr, Twiligh op. cit. p8-1 1. 
121nprecorr 28 March 1930 
13E. H. Carr, Twili op. cit. p 11. This was aimed primarily at Paul Merker (President of 
the RGO), a supporter of Losovsky and a keen advocate of 'red' trade unions. 
14For examples, see The Communist International Nos. 13-14 1930, and Inpreco 28 
March 1930. 
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such a crisis was already apparent. 15 Consequently, the Communist Youth 
League condemned "sectarianism and left deviation" in mid 1930, while 
even the Profintern (at its Fifth Congress in August) was forced to warn 
against the "schematic fon-nation of new unions" and the danger of 'left 
sectarianism. '16 
Similarly, the Comintern's estimate of fascism was also redressed. 
Although any conception that social democracy represented a 'lesser evil' 
was denounced, the ECCI condemned those on the left who saw fascism as 
either a 'historical necessity, or a prerequisite to revolution. Different 
stages of Tascisisation' were distinguished, and the tendency evident in the 
KPD to label the BrUning Government of 1930 asTascist', was pointedly 
rebuked. 17 
Within the national sections, steps were taken by all Parties to combat the 
'new type of leftism'. At the Sixteenth Conference of the Soviet Party, a 
struggle against both 'right' and 'left' deviations was initiated. 18 The KPD 
meanwhile, removed Losovsky's prodigy Paul Merker from his position at 
the head of the Revolutionary Trade Union Opposition (RGO), and 
resolved to pursue a 'united front from below' that distinguished between 
the workers and the leaders of the social democratic trade unions. Such a 
realignment also emphasised the importance of work within those unions, 
15SeeManuilsky's speech inInpreco 8Mayl930. 
16E. H. Carr, Twilight op. cit. pp 20-2 1. Harry Pollitt later revealed that the RILU was 
"questioning whether it is worth carrying on with'red'unions", in August 1930. See 
Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pgly of Great Britain 13 September 
1930. Communist Archive. 
17See Theses. Resolutions. Decisions. The Eleventh Plenum of the Executive Committee 
of the Communist International (Moscow, 193 1). Also E. H. Carr, Twiligh op. cit. pp26- 
27 and 29-37. ThRlmann's synopsis of a'ripening fascist dictatorship' was endorsed by the 
ECCI and the KPD. 
18E. H. Carr, Twilig, 
-ht op. cit. pp 
18-19. Molotov's speech to the Soviet Congress devoted 
considerable attention to the danger of the 'lefV. 
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and concentrated on the 'partial demands' of the workers. In France too, the 
PCF denounced the'left danger'and following a Comintern commission in 
May 1930, determined to 'battle for every worker'; to 'struggle on two 
fronts'; and to concentrate on the day to day issues relevant to the French 
working class. 19 
By the Eleventh ECCI Plenum of March 1931 therefore, the fight against 
the 'exaggerations' and 'adventurism' of the left was an integral part of the 
Comintern line. 20'Left opportunism'was accused of 'fostering' the right 
danger, of leading to the "neglect of the exceptionally important work in 
the reformist unions, " and of completely identifying "social fascism with 
fascism and the social fascist upper stratum with the rank and file social 
democratic masses of the workers. "21 As such, the ECCI committed its 
sections to combating 'bourgeois dictatorship in all its forms, ' and the New 
Line appeared to have at last found a balance. 22 
The CPGB: Learning from Experience 
Just as adjustments in the policy of the Comintern influenced the 
perspective of the CPGB, so the experiences of the various national 
19Such measures were undertaken throughout the Comintern. 
20Theses, Resolutions, Decisions. The Eleventh Plenum of the Executive Committee of 
the Communist International op. cit. "The principal task 
... 
is to win the majority of the 
working class... " pp2-20. 
21 E. H. Carr, Twilight op. cit. ppl2-19. 
221t has been argued by both E. H. Carr, and K. McDermott and J. Agnew, that this 
represented a 'softening' of Comintern policy, and that it was instigated in response to 
pressure from the Soviet leadership and Narkomindel (the Peoples Commissariat of 
Foreign Affairs). The economic crisis in the West, along with initiatives such as the 
Young Plan, raised fears of an'Imperialist war'against the USSR, and Moscow is said to 
have forced the ECCI to moderate its revolutionary rhetoric. While the defence of the 
USSR was a major priority for the Cl however, such a concern should not be seen as 
total. Indeed, it could be argued that attempts to broaden the appeal of the Communist 
party were more alarming to the West than the protestations of a militant minority. 
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sections of the Cl influenced the directives of the ECCI. 23 While the 
CPGB had little influence on the ECCI in isolation, the experiences that 
the British Party shared with a number of other Communist Parties 
undoubtedly contributed to the realignment of the New Line. The fact that 
in spite of the supposed "revolutionary upsurge" the Party was "not 
making the progress it should"24 soon led to questions being asked about 
both the leadership and the policy of the CPGB. 
Until the Eleventh Party Congress (and for a short time after), the blame 
for this lack of progress was attributed to 'right' errors committed by the 
'old' leadership. However, a number of developments soon refocused 
attention on to the deficiencies of the existing Party Executive. Party 
membership continued to decline throughout 1930, while the diminishing 
sales of communist periodicaIS25 and the modest circulation of the new 
Daily Worke 
, 
all suggested that the Party's influence was retracting, as 
opposed to increasing, in the wake of the Leeds Congress. The Party's 
failure to play a decisive role in the industrial disputes of 1930 and the 
ECCI's emphasis on 'left errors' also raised doubts about the aptitude of the 
Leeds line. Thus, in order to explain the Party's own response to the 
difficulties of the New Line, it is necessary to examine those experiences 
that inspired the refinement of Party policy and strategy in 1930. 
23At the Sixteenth Congress of the CPSU, Manuilsky linked the struggle against the'left, 
inside the Comintern to the failing membership of the national Parties. E. H. Carr, 
Twiligh op. cit. ppl8-19. 
24ECCI representative 'Butler'. Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PMIY of 
Great Britain 10 July 193 0. Communist Archive. 
25The Party seriously considered merging, or even liquidating either Labour Monthly or 
the Communist Review in 1930. Dutt opposed such action however, and even offered to 
take over the editorship of the Communist Review. See R. P. Dutt. Letter to the Political 
Bureau 9 January and 9 August 1930. Communist Archive. 
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The textile disputes that had erupted across the North of England in 1929 
remained the foremost industrial 'battleground' for the CPGB in the early 
thirties. The publication of the Macmillan Report in February, endorsing 
severe wage cuts for the already impoverished woollen workers, provoked 
a fresh round of lock-outs and worker protest. Indeed, the high number of 
unorganised workers involved in the dispute and their apparent readiness 
to take action, once again offered the CPGB a seemingly perfect 
opportunity to cultivate an 'independent leadership' of the struggle. 
The Party's approach to the new wave of disputes was discussed at a 
meeting of the Political Bureau on 20 March 1930.26 A number of leading 
Party figures, including Harry Pollitt, William Gallacher and Jack Murphy, 
were dispatched to Yorkshire, and a Conference of Action organised by 
the Minority Movement oversaw the establishment of a Central Strike 
Committee in Bradford under the chairmanship of Ernest Brown. 27 Strike 
bulletins and pamphlets were issued, and Party members endeavoured 
tirelessly to develop workers' committees in the various mills across the 
county. In Shipley, a Strike Committee led by Isabel Brown28 was 
established, and Gallacher reported that 'active Party Locals' were at work 
in Leeds and Huddersfield. 29 As such, individual communists did play a 
significant and consequential role in the dispute 
- 
arranging pickets, 
collecting aid, and providing food for the unorganised workers 
- 
and the 
26Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PgM of Great Britain 20 March 
1930. Communist Archive. 
27The conference was attended by 125 delegates, non of whom were representatives of a 
trade union branch, and was addressed by Gallacher, Pollitt and Ernest Brown (the 
District Party Secretary). The elected Committee of Action became the Central Strike 
Committee. Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PaLty of Great Britain 27 
March 1930. Communist Archive. 
28Ernest and Isabel were married. 
29Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PaLty of Great Britain 5-6 April 
1930. Communist Archive. 
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dedication and enthusiasm of the CP was exemplary. 30 By the end of April 
however, it was evident that the rewards for such hard work were 
negligible. 
Despite the "favourable" conditions, Gallacher reported that the Party had 
'not been as successful as anticipated. ' Walter Tapsell for example, had met 
"local hostility" in Huddersfield. With the Party largely isolated from the 
dispute, recruitment of new members had been "neglected. "31 Gallacher's 
findings were echoed in the report of a group of young communists freshly 
returned from the Lenin school in Moscow. Dispatched to the region to 
give political leadership to the dispute, the students sternly noted the 
Party's failure to set up mill committees. 32 
More humorously, the Party's alienation from the mass of the workers was 
recalled by Isabel Brown. After a hard days campaigning, Brown was 
galled to see a young female worker waving a CP leaflet and shouting: 
"Up with the lavatory seat. Down with the lavatory chain, " in imitation of 
the Party's militant rhetoric. "Is it worth it? " thought Brown. 33 
The Central Strike Committee in Bradford also gave cause for concern. 
With only four non-Party members, the committee was indeed of a "non 
30N. Branson, Histoly of the Communist PgIV op. cit. p84. See R. A. Leeson, Strike op. 
cit., ppl2l-124, for Isabel Brown's recollection of the dispute. A Textile Aid Committee 
was established by the Workers' International Relief (British Section) in April, and run by 
the MM. 
31 Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PqM of Great Britain 24 April 193 0. 
Communist Archive. 
32Report of the Lenin School Students. Report of the Activities of the Textile (woollen) 
Group. May-June, 1930 22 July 1930 (WCML). The students were sent to Yorkshire to 
develop Party training and strengthen Party organisation during the dispute. They do not 
seem to have been welcomed by local communists, and the group's efforts to'speed up 
recruitment' and initiate mill committees met with only minor success. The students 
included Hymie Lee from Manchester, Majorie Pollitt (wife of Harry), Lily Webb, Dora 
Roberts, R. Jones, M. Jordan and G. Brown. 
331n R. A. Leeson, Strike op. cit. p122. 
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representative character, "34 and so its call on the workers to maintain the 
strike once the drift back to work had begun, was concertedly ignored. The 
mill committees were similarly described as "talking shops for Party 
members. 1135 Moreover, the interchangeable personnel that constituted the 
various bureaus and committees established during the dispute, blurred the 
supposedly separate roles of the CP and MM. 36 
Although there was little for the CPGB to celebrate in its 'Resolution on 
the Woollen Textile Strike', the events of April-May 1930 undoubtedly 
influenced the future development of the Party. The very real problems the 
Party experienced in translating the revolutionary policy of the New Line 
to the mills of Yorkshire revealed a number of deficiencies in the Party's 
approach to the British working class. 
The attempt to 'fly in' a strike leadership was neither appreciated nor 
accepted by local workers. 37 The Party's lack of an established base within 
either the region or the various weavers' organisations was again clearly 
evident, and the CP was described as "virtually non-existent" in and 
around Bradford prior to the dispute. 38 Of the 200 or so comrades that 
34Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pagy of Great Britain 8 May 1930. 
Communist Archive. Pollitt visited Bradford the following weekend and found Party 
influence to be "minimal. " 
35E. H. Brown, Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PqM of Great Britain 
24 July 1930. Communist Archive. 
36The Party was supposed to 'lead and direct' the strike, whilst the MM 'organised' the 
strike on the ground. See the ECCI's Letter to the Political Bureau of the Communist 
PaEly of Great Britain 6 March 1930. Klugmarm Papers. 
37There were also difficulties with local communists. See Report of the Activities of the 
Textile (woollen) Group. MU=June. 1930 22 July 1930 WCML. The Lenin school 
students reported that the local leaders were "in opposition to the new Party line. " Ernest 
Brown had certainly been a casualty of the leadership overhaul. A member of the 
Secretariat prior to the Sixth World Congress (in charge of organisation), he was removed 
from the PB following the June discussion with the WEB in June 1929. Brown had 
voiced his opposition to aspects of the New Line throughout 1928-29. 
38Report of the Lenin School Students. Report of the Activities of the Textile (woollen) 
Group. MU-June. 1930 22 July 1930 (WCML) 
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made up the Bradford District Party in May 1930, only 59 were from the 
textile industry, and only 50 were members of a trade union. 39 
Subsequently, the Party campaigned on the periphery of the dispute, and 
the Central Strike Committee remained an organisation of Party 
functionaries detached from the workers themselves. 40 
The militant approach of the Party had also alienated the workers. ldris 
Cox recognised that communists had placed too much emphasis on 
politicising the struggle, 41 and the Party belatedly accepted that slogans 
such as'Defend the Soviet Union'or'Hands off India'were of "minor 
relevance" to workers in Shipley or Huddersfield battling to resist wage 
reductions. 42 Similarly, the portrayal of the dispute as a "workers counter 
offensive" belied the defensive nature of the Yorkshire proteSt. 43 William 
Rust (who a year earlier had led the offensive against the 'right' in the 
CPGB) sharply critici sed the 'left phraseology' of those who interpreted the 
dispute as 'a struggle for power. '44 
Rust likewise noted the Party's failure to campaign around the "grass roots 
demands" of the workers in Yorkshire. 45 In particular, the CPGB was slow 
39Report on Pqr1y Organisation November, 1930. Klugmann Papers. Also, Analysis o 
Membership, 30 July 1930. (WCML) The Bradford membership fluctuated enormously 
at this time. In December 1929, the Bradford DPC numbered just 5 8. The DPC then 
reported that some 250 new recruits were made during the dispute, although only 50 per 
cent returned. By November, the District membership stood at 155. 
40Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pagy of Great Britain 8 May 1930. 
Communist Archive. 
41As noted by Harry Pollitt. Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PLr! y o 
Great Britain 27 May 1930. Communist Archive. 
42Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pgiy of Great Britain 31 May-2 
June 1930. Communist Archive. 
43See J. R. Campbell's article, 'The Workers'Counter Offensive in the Woollen Textile 
Industry. 'In Communist International July 1930. 
44Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PLiV of Great Britain 31 May-2 
June 1930. Communist Archive. This was a reference to John Mahon's article in Labour 
MgnLbly June 1930, entitled'The Woollen Strike and the Struggle for Power'. Mahon 
portrayed the strike as a "workers attack on capitalism. " 
451bid. 
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to adapt itself to the predominantly female character of the dispute. Initial 
attention had been focused on the male mule spinners for example, while 
the Women's section of the Shipley Strike Committee 
- 
led by Kitty 
Morris 
- 
made little progress before its disintegration following the return 
to work. 46 As such, the Party committed itself to either general calls for 
wage increases or a shorter working day, or to the revolutionary 
phraseology described above; and it was partly in recognition of such 
deficiencies, that the CPGB launched the Workers' Charter in August. 47 
The CPGB's 'discovery' of such 'sectarian' mistakes concurred with the 
ECCI's re-emphasis on the'left danger'. Although 1930 had begun with a 
British Party leadership committed to 'ridding the CPGB of the last 
fragments of the right danger, '48 the 'struggle on two fronts' effectively 
abated the Party's 'drift to the left. ' Harry Pollitt, who reported on the 
February Presidium to the Party Executive, immediately highlighted 
"sectarianism of the worst order" in the attitude of certain Party members. 
The "ultra left sectarian tendencies which have hitherto dominated the 
British YCU were condemned for example. In addition, Pollitt 
emphasised Manuilsky's insistence on work inside the 'reformist' trade 
unions. 49 Subsequently, the initiative within the CPGB swung back 
46For an excellent overview of the CPGB in the Woollen Strike, and with particular 
reference to the Party's interaction with the Yorkshire women, see S. Bruley, Leninism, 
Stalinism, and the Women's Movement in Britain op. cit. pp 195-198. 
47By 1930, the numerous strikes in Britain, Germany and the US involving female 
workers prompted the Comintern to hold a Conference of European Women's Sections in 
August 1930. An'energetic struggle'in support of women workers was duly proclaimed. 
in Germany for example, the RGO was instructed to take up women's issues as a central 
part of its agitation, and non-sectarian campaigns were to be organised'from below. ' See 
V. Moirova, Communist International October 1930. Also S. Bruley, Leninism op. cit. 
ppl95-198. 
48Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PaM of Great Britain 6-7 
December 1929. Communist Archive. The Political Bureau was comprised of Pollitt, 
Gallacher, Rust, Tapsell and Cox. 
49Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pm! y of Great Britain 15-16 
March 1930. Communist Archive. The PB and CC meetings of early 1930 were tense and 
argumentative. The CC in March for example, was dismissed as a "fiasco" by Harry 
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towards the more moderate members of the Party Executive, and Harry 
Pollitt was frequently able to obtain ECCI support against what he 
perceived to be the excesses of the Party left. 
In January, Pollitt called on the ECCI to intervene against the harsh 
treatment apportioned by the PB to those comrades charged with 'right 
deviation. ' After Palme Dutt had insisted that a purge be "systematically 
conducted throughout the Party, 1150 action was taken against such leading 
communists as Albert Inkpin, Jock Wilson, Beth Turner, Ernie Cant, 
Andrew Rothstein and Arthur Homer. So vicious were the attacks on the 
likes of Inkpin, who after years as the CPGB Secretary was refused even a 
minor job within the Party, that Pollitt was moved to express "strongly and 
with feeling" his opposition to the hard line taken by Tapsell and Rust. 
Despite being called "sentimental" by Rust (who insisted the CP "must 
stand firm all the time and fight against opportunist elements, and not 
leave room for them to creep back in"), Pollitt took his concerns to the 
ECCI and was vindicated. 51 The ECCI registered its disagreement with the 
British PB's methods, and Inkpin was reinstated as secretary of the Friends 
of Soviet Russia. 
ECCI intervention was also necessary to block the formation of a 'red' 
miners'union in South Wales, following the SWMFs expulsion of the CP 
dominated Mardy Lodge. The militant lodge had been decimated in the 
Pollitt. Page Arnot produced an incomplete Report of the ECCI Presidium, Tapsell 
attacked a draft resolution that the PB had already agreed upon, and political differences 
dominated the proceedings. Pollitt subsequently reminded his comrades that "we do not 
attend CC meetings to fight 
... 
but to lead. " Minutes of the Political Bureau of the 
Communist Pg! y of Great Britain 20 May 1930. Communist Archive. 
50RPD Letter to the Central Committee 6 January 1930. Klugmann Papers 
51Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pj! M of Great Britain 11-12 
January 1930. Communist Archive. The ECCI insisted that the PB's actions "were not the 
correct method of fighting the 'right' danger in the Party. " Minutes of the Political Bureau 
of the Communist PaKly of Great Britain 21 February 1930. Communist Archive. 
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wake of the General Strike as the owners rejected a return to pre-strike 
conditions and the majority of lodge members found themselves 
unemployed and blacklisted. As a result of migration, self-preservation 
and unemployment, the lodge numbered just 350 by 1929 (compared to 
1,743 in 1927), of whom only 25 were employed. 52 Mardy had thus 
become a'militant rump, unrepresentative of the local mineworkers and 
increasingly hostile to the policy of the SWMF. In February 1930, the 
miners'union voted in favour of the lodge's expulsion. 
The idea of a new union to compliment the UMS emerged from William 
Gallacher's 'Report on the Mining Situation', presented to the PB in 
March. 53 With the adoption of the New Line and the emergence of the 
UMS, the Party slogan in favour of'One Miners Union'had taken on a 
new significance. For Gallacher, the question was a national one, and the 
proposed policy of withholding union dues was essentially an attempt to 
dislocate the MFGB. 
Although opposed by the majority of the PB, Gallacher was supported by 
J. W. Mills, a Profintern representative dispatched to South Wales in 
February to root out the 'right danger. '54 As such, the resolution was 
presented to the Party Executive in April, where again considerable 
52H. Francis & D. Smith, The Fed op. cit. pp 163-170. 
53Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PgM of Great Britain 27 March, 
193 0. Communist Archive. Prior to this, the Party recommended the formation of 'all in' 
pit Committees of Action, and attempted to mobilise other lodges to withhold union dues. 
See Minutes of the Executive Bureau of the Minorijy Movement 14 March 1930. Tanner 
Collection. 
54Details about Mills remain uncertain. For the PB's acceptance of his appointment see 
Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pg! y of Great Britain 6 February 
1930. Communist Archive. For his scathing report on the South Wales DPC, see Daily 
Worke 5 and 7 April 1930. Mills wanted a'secret document' outlining the need for a 
United Mineworkers'Union to be circulated to the Party. Minutes of the Political Bureau 
of the Communist PLr-t_y of Great Britain 27 March and 3 April 1930. Communist 
Archive. 
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opposition to the proposal was expressed. 55 However, by emphasising that 
Gallacher's resolution endorsed the principle of a new union, Mills 
adroitly applied the debate to the ECCI line. The Party should therefore 
approach the'Mardy question'with a United Mineworkers' Union "in 
mind"56 said Mills, while keeping the possibility of actually forming such 
a union 'in perspective. ' As such, the resolution was to be redrafted and 
adopted by the CC. 57 
The doubts expressed by British leaders such as Pollitt, Murphy and 
McGree however, were endorsed by the ECCL After the resolution had 
been sent to Moscow for ratification, the ECCI condemned the Party's 
strategy as "premature" and a "left deviation. " A Comintern representative 
at a Party Executive meeting in July ('Butler') insisted that the CPGB was 
attempting to "drag the organisation and its leaders and the workers along 
to form a One Miners Union 
... 
in place of organising for the struggle 
against the employers 
... 
[The formation of a 'new union'] cannot be put 
forward at the present time. "58 The whole debacle was indicative of the 
changing mood within the Comintem, and revealed acutely the division 
between the ECCI and the RILU. Moreover, the CPGB's own uncertainty 
over the 'correct' line was revealed publicly through the pronouncements 
and retractions in the Daily Worker. 59 
55 Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pg_r! y of Great Britain 5-6 April 
1930. Communist Archive. 
56Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PgM of Great Britain 3 April 1930. 
Communist Archive. 
57Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pgjy of Great Britain 5-6 April 
1930. Communist Archive. 
58Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pqr! y of Great Britain 17 July 1930. 
And Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pgly of Great Britain 19-20 
July 1930. Communist Archive. The proposal was dismissed later as a "serious mistake. " 
Resolution on the Question of One Miners Union July 1930. Communist Archive. 
59For example, see Daily Worke 12 and 22 March 1930 for contradictory positions. 
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The ultra-leftism (or sectarianism) evident in the Party's response to 
problems in South Wales, was certainly endemic within the CPGB in 
1930; although the extent to which it impeded communist activity varied 
from region to region. As Richard Stevens has shown, "strident 
sectarianism" was "notable by its absence" in the trades councils of the 
East Midlands, where "Communist Party delegates 
... 
held various offices 
in the council, and 
... 
were among the most active delegates of the time. "60 
Elsewhere however, the 'left danger' was more apparent, as the Party's 
'Report on Party Organisation- commissioned in September, completed 
in November and updated in February 1931 
- 
revealed. 
In Tyneside, Idris Cox claimed that "sectarianism 
... 
is stronger than in any 
other [region] of the Party. "61 The gains in membership that Maurice 
Ferguson had boasted of in the wake the Dawdon colliery dispute had all 
but disappeared by November 1930. By February 1931 "political passivity 
and incompetent leadership" was considered to have led to the "isolation" 
of the District CP. The disputes over the New Line had polarised the 
District Party, and the internal bickering that appeared to characterise the 
DPC were symbolised in the local Party auxiliary organisations, which 
were described as "sectarian par excellence. 1162 
The Party found similar problems in Scotland, although the failing District 
membership was attributed ostensibly to the disenchanting effects of 
unemployment and victimisation. Yet, Scotland also boasted the UMS and 
traditional militant heartlands in Fife and Lanarkshire. As such, the 
60R. Stevens, Trades Councils in the East Midlands, 1929-195 1: Politics and Trade 
Unionism in a7raditionally Moderate'Area Ph. D Thesis, Nottingham 1995. 
61 Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PLM of Great Britain 5 November 
1930. Communist Archive. 
62General Report of the PgM Organisation in the Tyneside District 16 February 193 1. 
Klugmann Papers. 
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reasons given for the Party's numerical decline were very real ones and 
support for the Party remained stronger than the statistics revealed. 63 Even 
so, the militant tradition of Scotland did cause difficulties for the CPGB in 
1928-31. 
As Alan Campbell has noted, Bob Selkirk (a Sub-District Party Organiser 
in Fife) vilified the Party leadership for ignoring Lenin's advice to "[train 
our workers] for the mass production of bombs. " While David Proudfoot, 
the UMS General Secretary between December 1930 and September 193 1, 
complained of a Fife pit paper (Red Guard) that featured crossed rifles on 
its front page. 64 
In the wake of the February Presidium therefore, it was those on the left of 
the Party who received the bulk of ECCI and CPGB criticism. Walter 
Tapsell for instance, following his recall from the struggles in Yorkshire, 
was rebuked mercilessly by his fellow comrades. Not only had Tapsell 
failed to offer adequate "political leadership, " he had also been responsible 
for a 'Strike Now' slogan65 that the PB was belatedly forced to reject. Most 
damningly however, he had chosen to go to the cinema following the local 
May Day demonstration! As such, it was decided that Tapsell did not have 
the "prestige to carry out the policy" of the CP, while the simultaneous 
63 See 'The Communist Party in the Scots Coal Fields in the Inter War Period. ' In Openin 
the Books op. cit. pp44-59. 
641bid. p56. In 1930, Selkirk and a handful of similarly militant comrades were expelled 
from the CPGB. After charging the Party with 'opportunism', Selkirk established a new 
CP branch supposedly more loyal to the Cl. See also Minutes of the Political Bureau of 
the Communist Pgjy of Great Britain 12 June 1930. Communist Archive. Regional 
variations are discussed in chapter one. 
65The Party's agit-prop department had originally issued a slogan of'Strike Nowand 
censured the Bradford DPC's slogan of'Prepare for Strike Action. 'Minutes of the 
Political Bureau of the Communist Pgjy of Great Britain 27 March 1930. Communist 
Archive. However, the PB then considered such a slogan to be premature, and Tapsell (its 
author) was charged with leftism. 
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decline of YCL under his stewardship ensured his removal from the PB in 
mid 1930.66 
Tapsell's links with the YCL were significant. The League had been 
encouraged by both Dutt and the ECCI to mobilise the offensive against 
the 'right danger, ' and young communists such as Stuart Purkis, John 
Mahon and Reg Groves had personified the militant temper of New Line. 
When attention turned to the 'left' deviation, it was inevitable that the YCL 
would itself come under fire. In January 1930, the Party noted that 
"'radical' phrase mongering, [and] opposition to mass work" was 
characteristic of the Young Communists. 67 By the summer of 1930 the 
situation was even worse. YCL membership had fallen to just 375, 
branches were closing or in decline, and the "acute political and 
organisational crisis" had transformed the YCL into an "isolated and 
sectarian body with no firm contact" with the working class youth. 69 The 
blame for this deterioration was attributed to the "left sectarian danger, " of 
which Tapsell and William Rust, as YCL representatives on the Party 
Executive, were accused of promoting 69 
66Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pa!! y of Great Britain 27 June 1930. 
Communist Archive. "After the May Day demonstration there was nothing much on and I 
went to the cinema, " Tapsell said. The'Strike Now'slogan was deemed to ignore he 
necessary preparation needed to organise the strike, and thus was 'running ahead' of the 
masses. Robin Page Arnot was the other primary target for charges of leftism. 
67'Report on the YCL' Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pam o 
Great Britain 11-12 January 1930. Communist Archive. 
68 Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Great Britain 31 May-2 
June, 1930. Furthermore, the 'sectarianism of the YCL'was a major point of criticism in 
the Party's analysis of its shortcomings during the woollen dispute. See Rusfs report in 
Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PaE! y of Great Britain 21-22 July 
1930. Communist Archive. 
69Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PgM of Great Britain 31 May-2 
June 1930. Communist Archive. Rust accepted his share of the blame, but also pointed 
towards the directives of the YCI which he claimed were as much, if not more, 
responsible for the sectarian line of the YCL. 
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Similar problems surrounded the Daily Worker, launched by the CPGB on 
I January 1930.70 A communist daily had been on the CPGBs agenda 
since its formation, and it was hoped that the emergence of the Daily 
Worker would bring the Party back into closer contact with the workers. 
However, difficulties, both organisational and political, soon emerged. 
Harry Pollitt had warned consistently that the Party's perilous financial 
situation would plague the fledgling paper, and the editorial offices' initial 
lack of such j ournalistic rudimentaries as lighting or a telephone seemed to 
justify his concerns. 71 Moreover, the Party's attempt to produce a paper 
that was at once revolutionary and of popular appeal to the British 
working class, led to sharp differences of opinion within both the Party 
leadership and amongst the readership. 
On a practical level, the Daily Worker had to overcome extraordinary 
difficulties. Within days of the paper's launch, the Provincial Wholesalers 
Federation moved to boycott the Daily Worker, and by July (after London 
and Scottish wholesalers had followed suit) the CP had no distributive 
network. Meanwhile, circulation fell far short of the Party's initial 
expectations. A figure of at least 25,000 was hoped for provisionally, but 
circulation settled at around 11,000.72 Subsequently, by as early as IS 
January, a loss of E500 a week was being incurred, 73 and the PB regularly 
discussed the need to cut down the number of pages in the Daily Worker. 74 
70The best overview of the Daily Worker is K. Morgan'The Communist Party and the 
Daily Worker 1930-1956. 'In Opening the Books op. cit. pp142-159. See also W. Rust 
The Sto1y of the Daily Worke (London, 1949). 
71N. Branson, Histoly of the Communist Pg! y of Great Britain op. cit. p53. For materials 
detailing the Daily Workers' development see Information on the Daily Worker Dutt 
Suitcase. WCML. 
72Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pqrty of Great Britain 21-22 July 
1930. Communist Archive. 
73Special Report of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Great Britain 15 
January 1930. Communist Archive. 
74The Daily Worke began with twelve pages but was soon down to just four. Minutes of 
the Political Bureau of the Communist PLM of Great Britain 24 July 1930. Communist 
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Such problems inevitably led to discussions over the objectives of the 
communist daily. The paper's editor William Rust, in conjunction with 
Palme Dutt, envisaged the Daily Worker to be a "leader and agitator 
expressing the revolutionary line of the Party. "75 In contrast, Harry Pollitt 
expected a workers' daily paper to rival other daily papers; covering 
topical news events and sport. Both parties were to be disappointed. Dutt 
protested that "there is a tendency to report, not lead, "76 and Pollitt 
complained that the Daily Worker was more like a "a daily edition of 
Inpreco " than a wide-ranging, popular newspaper. "All the topical news 
of interest is omitted" he observed, "[and] only struggle and death" 
remained. 77 
It was Pollitt who received most support within the Executive. Joe Scott, a 
factory worker and member of the Central Committee, complained that he 
had tried to sell the paper at work "but found it impossible 
... 
the paper 
doesn't treat things in which the workers are interested. "78 Other Party 
leaders also felt the paper "dull" and "unattractive to the workers" 
(Murphy), 79 and crucially, after Pollitt had had discussions in Moscow, the 
PB resolved to develop the daily as a'popular mass newspaper. 180 Even so, 
Archive. The Party was forced to desperately chase up unpaid dues, For one of many 
appeals see Walter Tapsell's article on Tyneside in Daily Worke 4 June, 1930. Also 
Circular to all Pgjy Local 22 September, 1930. Klugmann Papers. 
75Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PpM of Great Britain I 1- 12 
January 1930. Communist Archive. 
76RPD Letter to the Political Bureau 12 February 1930. Klugmarm Papers. 
77Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PLr! y of Great Britain 19 June 1930. 
Communist Archive. 
781bid. Idris Cox also observed that the language of the paper 
- 
"'opportunism'... 
tsectarianism'... 'social fascism, "' 
- 
would serve only to alienate the readership. 
79Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PaLiy of Great Britain 2 and 9 
January, and 19 June 1930. Communist Archive. 
80K. Morgan, 'The Communist Party and the Daily Worker' op. cit. p 145. See also, Communist Review October 1930. 
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Pollitt was still expressing the need for the paper to use "more popular 
expressions" in February 193 1.81 
As such, the Daily Worker highlighted the fissure that existed between the 
CPGB and the working class it claimed to represent. In relation to the 
coverage of sport for example, the theoretical clashed sharply with the 
actualities of the workers' lives and interests. For Dutt, the inclusion of 
"capitalist sport" was "incorrect and indefensible. " The racing tips the 
Daily Worke published initially, were dismissed as an "alternative to the 
class struggle, " while events such as the FA Cup should - in Dutt's opinion 
- 
have been reported in the same way "as, say, Armistice Day 
celebrations. "82 He was supported by Bob Stewart, who insisted that the 
paper promote workers sport rather than the 'sport of kings. '83 Despite 
protestations from Harry Pollitt and an "avalanche" of complaints from the 
readers, the racing tips that had particularly incensed Dutt and Stewart 
were removed, 84 and more space was given over to the activities of the 
BWSF. 
Such sectarian squabbles should not lead to a dismissal of the Daily 
Worker however. While the paper did not induce a mass upsurge in the 
CP's popularity, it did contribute towards lifting the Party out of the 
introspective doldrums of the previous two years. First, it gave inactive or 
81 Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pqr1y of Great Britain 15 February 
193 1. Communist Archive. 
82RPD Letter to the Central Committee 6 January 1930. Communist Archive. 'Sj2ort and 
our Dail '21 January 1930. Dutt Papers (BL). To report non-critically on major sporting 
events would be effectively propaganda for capitalism, insisted Dutt. 
8313aily Worker 4 January 1930. 
84For the removal of the racing tips see, Minutes of the Political Bureau of the 
Communist PýM. of Great Britain 16 January 1930. Communist Archive. Rust referred to 
such letters in Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pam of Great Britain 23 
January 1930. Communist Archive. For examples of the sport debate see the Daily 
Worke throughout January-February 193 0. 
186 
dispirited Party members a focal working point. As Noreen Branson has 
recognised, the paper "acted as a tonic, " forcing the Party to develop its 
own distribution network. 85 Party members threw themselves into ensuring 
the Daily Worker reached its destination, loading papers onto trains in 
London, collecting and distributing them across the country, recovering 
returns and payment. In his autobiography No Mean Fighte 
, 
Harry 
McShane describes how, 
Every moming a fleet of about 30 members on bicycles met at a railway station and took 
bundles of papers out to the different localities where others were waiting to distribute 
them to the newsagents. 86 
Second, the Daily Worker did highlight the deficiencies of too sectarian an 
approach to the Party line. The small circulation of the paper, and such 
controversies as that engendered by the paper's sports coverage, raised 
debate within the Party leadership as to the best way to approach the 
workers. As such, the paper was not consumed wholly by the ultra-leftism 
described above. The Party realised that "to leave out all capitalist sport 
would drive workers away, " and football reports and scores were 
maintained throughout 1930-31.87 Moreover, the paper's attempt to muster 
worker correspondents and foster political debate contributed greatly 
towards the distinct culture that developed around the CPGB in the 
thirties. Such features as Madge Brown's women's page, film reviews, and 
articles on the Worker' Theatre Movement, revealed the CPGB's desire to 
appeal to a broad section of the working class, and to mobilise independent 
working class activity. 
85N. Branson, Histoly of the Communist PLM of Great Britain op. cit. p55. 
86H. McShane, No Mean Fighter op. cit. p 167. 
8713aily Worker I September 1930. Football reports appear to have been sacrificed during 
the economic crisis of late 193 1. As more space was required to report the treachery of 
MacDonald and the National Government, the amount of sport covered by the paper 
diminished noticeably. See Daily Worke 10 October 193 1, for the last football reports. 
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Thus, on the eve of the ECCI commission held in August 1930 to discuss 
the CPGB's 'isolation from the masses', the Party was aware of the 
'sectarianism' that blighted the Party's progress. In the Executive meeting 
that preceded the commission, a number of leading Party members 
denounced the shortcomings of the ultra-militant line pursued in the first 
half of 1930. Garfield Williams for example, one of the Lenin school 
students despatched to South Wales to enforce the Party line, reported of 
Daily Worker reader meetings where non-Party members were quizzed as 
to why they attended; and pit meetings in Cardiff where communists sat 
away from the non-communiStS. 88 Kath Duncan meanwhile, demonstrated 
how "we shun our comrades 
... 
we analyse them and make them feel they 
are considered incapable of accomplishing anything correctly at all 
... 
We 
must cut out all this appalling phrase mongering and claptrap which the 
workers cannot understand. "89 In Moscow, similar sentiments would lead 
to a major re-evaluation of the CPGB's approach to the Third Period. 
While the realignment of the CPGB accorded with the realignment of the 
various other Comintern sections, the problems discussed were very real 
ones and the measures outlined very necessary. 
A Workers Party? 
The British Commission of August 1930 enabled the ECCI to appraise the 
problems afflicting the CPGB's development, and to simultaneously 
realign the British Party with the prevailing concerns of the Comintern. As 
such, the commission attempted to instigate measures that would transform 
88Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PpM of Great Britain 19-21 July 
1930. Communist Archive. For the findings of the Lenin school students group see, 
Report of the Students Group, South Wales District June 1930. WCML 
89Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PMýy of Great Britain 19-21 July 
1930. Communist Archive. Idris Cox and R. W. Robson were among the other Party 
leaders to outline the deficiencies of the Party line. 
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the CPGB into a'mass Party'capable of offering a coherent lead to the 
(theoretically) revolutionary workers in the Third Period. Subsequently, 
the commission was correctly described (by Harry Pollitt) as a 
"straightening out" of the New Line; "a turn in the direction of correctly 
applying the line of the Communist International. "90 
As the leading British delegate, Pollitt reported the findings of the 
commission to the CPGB Executive on 13 September. 91 The ECCI had 
noted "a tendency to go to extremes [in the CPGBI" he recounted, and 
through succumbing to both 'left' and 'right' dangers, the Party had become 
increasingly isolated from the British working class. Not only had Party 
members 'lost sight' of the importance of working inside the trade unions 
and the Labour Party Pollitt explained, but the united front from below had 
been consistently misapplied. 92 
We have always been talking about the united front tactic, and yet it has been 
misinterpreted throughout the Party. It is translated as working with one or two workers 
who, if they do not swallow everything we want them to, become social fascists 
... 
who 
must be mercilessly exposed 
... 
[In] organisations under Party control, there is no attempt 
to bring workers to the front 
... 
If there is in any factory 20 or 30 workers who are 
prepared to work with us on the basis of two or three simple issues, but who have no use 
for our belief in armed insurrection or on the question of religion 
... 
we should not reject 
these workers. We should work with them. 93 
Although the commission maintained that the 'right danger' was the 
"biggest fight" within the CPGB, Pollitt now asserted that'left 
901bid. 
91 Pollitt had previously reported on the commission's findings to the PB on 28 August. 
See Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Great Britain 28 August 
1930. Communist Archive. 
92Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pgjy of Great Britain 13-14 
September 1930. Communist Archive. The move away from the more hard line policy 
was also signified by J. R. Campbell's return from Moscow to work on the Daily Worke 
. As Campbell had been held responsible for numerous'right deviations' throughout 1928- 
29, his return emphasised the high regard with which Campbell was held in the 
Comintern. His presence on the Daily Worker was (possibly) intended to check the over- 
militant line of Rust. 
931bid. 
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sectarianism' was the "most dangerous" deviation. Those who had 
"sneered" or raised charges of 'legalism' against Party members working 
inside the trade unions were denounced by Pollitt, and the need "to win 
new forces, [and] to win official positions inside the bureaucracy in order 
to strengthen the independent leadership of the MM" was underlined. 94 
Significantly, Pollitt used the example of Bradford, where the CPGB's 
isolation from the organised workers was explicit, to emphasise this 
point. 95 
In addition to highlighting the CPGB's deviation from the Comintern line, 
the ECCI commission also recommended measures by which the Party 
could redress its decline. First, the ECCI put its full authority behind Harry 
Pollitt in an attempt to stabilise the Party leadership. A Secretariat of 
Pollitt, Rust and Gallacher was recommended, and the commission stated 
that "Comrade Pollitt has to be looked on as the Secretary of the Party and 
given the fullest SUpport. "96 It was from August 1930 therefore, that Pollitt 
became the defacto leader of the CPGB. 
94Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pgr1y of Great Britain 13-14 
September 1930. Communist Archive. Pollitt clearly insisted that such a re-emphasis on 
trade union work was not a return to the 'old line'. The communists were working "not in 
order to capture the apparatus, or to bring pressure upon the bureaucracy, " but to win 
support and develop the MM. 
95The Fifth RILU Congress made similar references. Held in August 1930, the RILU 
criticised the'sectarian tendencies' of the MM. "The line of independent leadership 
... [has] been wrongly interpreted as meaning the abandonment of work within the refon-nist 
trade unions 
... 
neglect of the struggle against the trade union bureaucrats 
... 
the calling of 
strikes without preparation 
... 
slogans not conforming to actual situations 
... 
the 
mechanical enforcement of programmes of action and demands from the top; the general 
indulgence of abstract appeals and phrase mongering as a substitute for day to day 
systematic practical activities; failure to popularise simple, practical economic and 
political demands. " Resolutions of the Fifth World Congress of the RILU Held in 
Moscow. August 30 (London, 193 1). Several 'right errors' were also listed. 
96Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pg! y of Great Britain 28 August 
1930. Communist Archive. 
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Second, the commission developed plans for a Workers' Charter; a "broad 
united front programme of action" based around a "series of demands that 
were immediately practicable, " and therefore applicable to the 'day to day' 
concerns of the workers. 97 Where previous attempts to revitalise Party 
activity 
- 
such as the 'revolutionary competition' to attract membership9s - 
had focused on the CP itself, the Workers' Charter was a concerted attempt 
to integrate the Communist Party among the British working class. In 
place of the broad revolutionary slogans of the woollen dispute, more 
immediate, 'limited' demands were presented. These included an increased 
rate of unemployment benefit and the abolition of all disqualifying 
restrictions; a seven-hour day and a minimum wage; and campaigns 
against dismissals and the Trades Disputes Act. The Charter was also 
intended to focus on specific sectors of industry. So for example, a 
Women's Charter was developed to demand equal pay and benefit rights. 
But how effective was the CPGB's turn'towards the masses'? With regard 
to the Workers' Charter, the Party's initially high expectations soon proved 
deceptive. The Party press extensively promoted the campaign, numerous 
district conferences were organised, a pamphlet - The Workers' Charter - 
quickly sold 120,000 copies, and Charter candidates contested municipal 
elections in late 1930.99 Two National Women's Conferences also took 
place, in April and August 193 1; and a National Charter Convention, held 
in Bermondsey on 12 April, was attended by 788 delegates representing 
97R. Page Amot, Twenly Years 1920-1940. The Policy of the Communist PajjY of Great 
Britain from its Foundation July 31,1920 (London, 1940). p42. 
98Memorandum on Revolutionga Competition undated (March 1930). Tanner 
Collection. The MM's attempt to apply such a concept found little success. 
990n 26 October, a mass demonstration in support of the Workers' Charter met in 
Trafalgar Square. Reportedly 7-8,000 people were present. Information Sheet No. 6 28 
October 1930. Tanner Collection. 
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over 3 00 workers' organisations and 100 local Charter Committees. 100 
Even so, despite such relatively impressive figures, the Minority 
Movement had registered its concern about the "uneven" success of the 
campaign by October 1930.101 
The National Convention acutely revealed the problem. Although the 
attendance was encouraging, the convention actually attracted less union 
and workshop representatives than the 1929 MM conference. Moreover, as 
Jack Murphy complained, despite the number of non-Party representatives 
in attendance, the "Party monopolised the campaign, especially the 
speeches 
... 
[and] it was more like an MM conference than a Charter 
Conference. "102 Pollitt, who disagreed with Murphy at the time, was left to 
rue the Party's insistence on decidingfor the workers instead of working 
with the workers. 103 
At a local level, it soon became clear that the high number of Charter 
meetings and committees did not necessarily translate into broad, wide- 
ranging support. A Bermondsey meeting in October 1930 for example, 
attracted just four people, while in Tyneside the supposedly broad based 
campaign numbered just twelve, with one non-Party member! 104 
10OFor example see, Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PPM of Great 
Britain 21 August, 8 October 1930,16 April 193 1. Communist Archive. T. Bell, British 
Communist PLr! y op. cit. p145. R. Martin, Communism and the British Trade Unions op. 
cit. pp 157-163. S. Bruley, Leninism op. cit. p 198. Bruley corrects Martin's assumption 
that the Women's Conferences did not take place. 
10IMinutes of the Executive Bureau of the Minorijy Movement 9 October 1930. Tanner 
Collection. Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PqiV of Great Britain 
22-23 November 1930. Communist Archive. 
102Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Great Britain 16 April 
193 1. Communist Archive. 
103K. Morgan, H2= Polli op. cit. p76. 
104R. Martin, Communism and the British Trade Unions op. cit. pp 15 8-5 9. General 
Report of the Pqrly Organisation in the Tyneside District 16 February 193 1. Klugmann 
Papers. 
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Subsequently, with only a handful of union branches (mainly in the AEU 
and the SWMF) showing support, the campaign dissolved in late 1931.105 
The problem of organising a mass campaign with limited personnel, 
coupled with what appeared to many in the labour movement to be a U- 
turn in the CPGB's perspective, blighted the Party's attempt to popularise 
the Workers' Charter. The Minority Movement, which the Charter was 
supposed to rejuvenate, was too weak by late 1930 to adequately launch 
such a campaign. 106 Although the Charter Committees were supposed to 
be subordinate to the MM, there were many areas where fledgling 
Committees existed and Minority Movement sections did not. 107 However, 
the concept of the Charter did much to prepare the Party for the struggles 
ahead, and the recognition of Women's issues, unemployment, and 
indigenous working class concerns, confirmed that the Party had at least 
leamt from its experiences in early 1930.108 
The re-emphasis on the united front from below aroused similar confusion. 
It soon became clear that neither the British Commission, nor the Fifth 
105As Roderick Martin has pointed out (Communism op. cit. p160), William Allan later 
reported to the RILU that "after the conclusion of the Campaign, all the names and 
addresses of workers which we had collected during its progress were pushed into a 
drawer in a desk and nothing was done with them... " Red International of Labour Unions 
February 1932. 
106Reports to the MM Executive were uniformly discouraging in 1930. For an example, 
see Report of the Furnishing Trade Minorijy Movement 5 April 1930. Tanner Collection, 
107As such, the campaign revealed the inadequacy of the MM, and underlined the need 
for the CPGB to change the means through which it approached the working class. 
Although the MM hobbled on into 1932, the January Resolutions (as we shall see) 
effectively marked the liquidation of the MM. 
108 More attention was applied to womens industrial issues as 1930 drew on. A Women's 
page appeared in The Worker; the Women's Department 
- 
headed by Rose Smith 
- 
actively campaigned around such issues as equal pay; and a Women's Department was 
organised in the NUWM following its Sixth National Conference in 1929. The 
department was headed by Maud Brown (who was not in the CPGB), while a number of 
local branches established Women's sections. At its 1931 Conference, the NUWM 
resolved to finiher develop a Women's section in every locality, and a Women's 
contingent became a regular feature of the National Hunger Marches in the 1930s. See S. 
Bruley, Leninism op. cit. pp 179-193. 
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Congress of the RILU, had elucidated adequately the 'correct' means by 
which the Party should construct such a 'broad alliance' of the workers. 
The two major disputes of early 1931 consequently revealed markedly 
different interpretations of the united front within the CPGB. Amidst the 
ensuing debates and remonstrations, the Party almost lost one of its most 
popular members, Arthur Homer. As such, despite the ECCI and CPGB's 
emphasis on supporting the workers within the reformist trade unions, the 
Party remained uncertain as to how to apply the Comintern line 
This was clearly evident in the mining dispute of early 193 1. The dispute 
had been brewing for some time prior to its eventual outbreak on I 
January. Disagreements over the Government's Coal Mines Act, which 
reduced the miners'working day from eight to seven and a half hours, had 
eventually led to the coal owners implementing new rosters based around 
lower wages and the spread over of hours. The SWMF thus called its 
members out, while Government and union officials sought, and secured, a 
temporary compromise with the owners. A Conciliation Board then met to 
review the settlement, and although the SWMF narrowly voted not to 
resume strike action in March 
- 
following the Board's reduction of 
percentage rates and the subsistence wage 
- 
the dispute was effectively 
concluded and the miners defeated. 
Once again however, the Party proved unable to substantially influence 
events. The Miners'Minority Movement conference held on 10 January 
(and attended by 55 delegates) attempted to forge an independent 
leadership of the dispute. A Central Strike Committee was elected, chaired 
by Arthur Homer, and a campaign to form pit committees of organised and 
unorganised men was launched in opposition to the 'manoeuvring' of the 
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SWMF. 109 Problems emerged however, with the decision to return to work 
on 17 January. 
While Homer believed the Party had no option but to accede to the 
SWMF's decision, both the South Wales DPC and the PB insisted that the 
Central Strike Committee call for the extension of the strike. 
Subsequently, only one pit responded to the CPGB's appeal, and Homer 
resigned from his position as chairman of the Strike Committee. 
In a letter to the RILU, Homer demonstrated that the Party's approach 
towards the dispute was fundamentally flawed. "There was not the most 
elementary machinery for carrying on the dispute" he insisted, and as such 
"the tactics employed to continue the struggle on Monday morning were 
infantile. " Homer's reasoning was based on the premise that the role of the 
SWMF was "neglected" (the Party had only one delegate attendant at the 
SWMF conference), no relief fund had been set up, and the "artificial 
strike committees" were "without mass content. " Basically, the Party had 
little or no influence, and the Strike Committee of "250 MM members 
... 
[was] isolated from the mass of the workers. " Horner, by contrast, had 
hoped to work within the SWMF; speaking to the workers and organising 
strike committees as a result of acquiring the workers trust. ' 1() Finally, 
Homer complained that the Party had neglected'local issues', which he felt 
could have been utilised to mobilise support for the strike. III 
109Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pgty of Great Britain 15 January 
193 1. Communist Archive. 
II OArthur Homer Letter to the RIL-U 21 January 193 1. Klugmann Papers. Minutes of the 
Political Bureau of the Communist P= of Great Britain 22 January 193 1. Communist 
Archive. 
III Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PqM of Great Britain 30 May-I 
June 193 1. Communist Archive. 
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Homer was opposed by Idris Cox, the PB's representative on the South 
Wales District Party Committee. Cox insisted on the need to maintain the 
strike, and he explained the ineffectiveness of the pit committees and the 
miners' subsequent disregard for sustained action, as being due to the 
"inactivity of local Party members" and a lack of belief in independent 
action. Homer's line was a "gospel of despair, " Cox said, while any overt 
concentration on local grievances would have detracted from the wider 
political issues of the dispute. ' 12 
At the Party centre, Pollitt and Gallacher both sought to strike a balance; 
accepting Homer's point in relation to activity in the SWMF, while 
criticising his 'defeatism'. Indeed, as E. H. Carr has noted, the initial Party 
report on the dispute focused primarily on the 'left' errors of the Welsh 
comrades. ' 13 The PB's constant referral to the Party's isolation from the 
mass of the miners led Cox to complain that the PB was 'capitulating' to 
Homer. 114 Even Palme Dutt however, found Cox's interpretation of 
'independent leadership'too sectarian: 
Our local comrades in South Wales 
... 
still have the obsession that the task of independent 
leadership consists of holding everything tight in our hands and in the hands of the 
present Central Strike Committee, that if the workers make any move on their own or 
through the lodge machinery it is bound to be wrong because it is not in our hands, and 
we must give our alternative lead against it etc., instead of recognising that the one 
important question is that the fight should go forward whatever the initial forms, that the 
workers should act, and our leadership will come out 
... 
in helping to show the way 
forward. 115 
What Particularly rankled the Party centre however, was first; Homer's 
refusal to appreciate that his acceptance of the SWMF's call for a return to 
112Minutes of the Political Bureau of the CommunisLEqM of Great Britain 23 January 
193 1. Communist Archive. 
113E. H. Carr, Twiligh op. cit. pp210-21 1. Daily Worker 28 January 193 1. 
114Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Great Britain 29 January 
193 1. Communist Archive. 
115R. P. Dutt, Letter to the Political Bureau 22 March 193 1. Communist Archive. 
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work could be interpreted as 'legalism', and second; his flagrant criticism 
of the Party leadership itself. Homer thus positioned himself against the 
Party line, or as Rust put it, "opposed to the C1.11116 As such, although 
aspects of Homer's argument were accepted by the CPGB, 117 it was 
Homer's history of opposition to the New Line that precipitated the vicious 
campaign against 'Homerism' in the pages of the Daily Worker., 18 
Circulars were issued to Party branches, and Executive members such as 
Ernest Woolley called for'steps to be taken'against Homer and 
"Homerites everywhere. " 119 With the 'right danger' still the 'main danger', 
Homer became the principal target. 
The final word rested with the ECCI, which upheld the charge of'legalism' 
but crucially, criticised Homer for a tactical error rather than opposition to 
the CI line. Moreover, much of the ECCI resolution focused on the 
conduct of the CPGB, and was far from complimentary. Most pointedly, 
the ECCI criticised the failure to form the "basis for independent 
leadership among the broad masses of the miners, both the unorganised 
and especially the organised, although there were grounds for it. " 120 
Similarly, the ECCI found Cox guilty of sectarianism with regard to the 
issue of local grievances; 'mechanism' over the application of the line; and 
116Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Great Britain 31 May-I 
June 193 1. Communist Archive. 
11 7For example, Rust called on communists to join the SWMF, and highlighted the need 
to put demands to union officials 'in order to expose them. ' This latter point, Rust said, 
had been made to him at both the August Commission and the RILU Congress. Minutes 
of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pgýý of Great Britain 29 January 193 1. 
Communist Archive. 
118Letter from Robin Page Arnot to Ham Pollitt and Political Bureau 8 February 193 1. 
Klugmarm Papers. Arnot felt Homer placed every struggle within the framework of the 
MFGB, and that therefore a'struggle against Hornerism' should be unleashed. For public 
criticism see Daily Worke 10,12,23,28 February 193 1. 
119Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pgr! y of Great Britain 14-15 
March 193 1. Communist Archive. Political Letter Re: Arthur Homer. to all District and 
Local Pqr1y Committees 27 February 193 1. Klugmarm Papers. 
120Resolution on the Question of Comrade Homer 15 September 193 1. Klugmann 
Papers. 
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'rushing ahead' in his calls for strike action. 121 Both 'right' and 'left' errors 
were thus condemned, and the necessary flexibility of the CI line 
emphasised. 
The CPGB's inability to influence the miners' struggle of 193 1 cannot be 
wholly attributed to the dispute within the Central Strike Committee, or to 
the line of Homer, Cox, or the CPGB. Fundamental to the CP's isolation, 
and indeed to the SWMF's apparent impotency, were the over-riding 
socio-economic factors that undermined both the strength of the union and 
the militant influence within the pits. Once strong, united communities had 
been destroyed by unemployment, victimisation and despondency 
following the General Strike, and the CPGB and the SWMF both suffered 
as a consequence. Thus, the CPGB's attempts to mobilise support in the 
weeks between 17 January and the Conciliation Board report of 6 March 
found little expression. Only the Llwynypia colliery responded to the 
Minority Movement's call to maintain the struggle, 122 and the Conference 
of Action established by the Central Strike Committee was attended by 
just four miners' lodges. Overall, the miners' dispute of 1931 revealed 
acutely the contradictions that still prevailed at the heart of the CPGB, and 
the "disarray" that characterised the once mighty SWMF. 123 
The other major dispute of early 1931 was the on-going struggle of the 
textile workers, whose opposition to rationalisation and the introduction of 
the'more looms'system had intensified in late 1930. The failure of the 
121 Activity of Centre in South Wales Dispute undated. Klugmann Papers. The Party's 
approach to the miners strike of 1931 was a later used by the ECCI as an example of how 
not to employ an independent leadership. Kuusinen referred mockingly to the Central 
Strike Committee ("without mass support") as a "game of spillikins. " See E. H. Carr, 
Twiligh op. cit. P220. 
122Eight other pits took action on local issues however. 
123See H. Francis and D. Smith, The Fed op. cit. pp 176-179, for an in-depth overview of 
these events. I have drawn heavily from their work. 
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Manufacturers' Association and the Weavers' Amalgamation to find any 
kind of compromise led individual mill owners to simply go ahead with 
the systems introduction. Indeed, it was just such an attempt in Burnley 
that sparked the lock-out of January 193 1. Workers in nine mills downed 
tools initially, and organised weavers voted against negotiations over 
'more looms' by a majority of two to one The strike remained solid, the 
owners (temporarily) backed down, and the mills reopened on existing 
terms. 124 
The Party's role in the dispute remained modest. Despite two years' 
agitation in the region, the communist presence in the mills and the 
weavers' organisations was described as "very weak, " and the Party 
admitted it had "no prestige" at the outset of the dispute. 125 Moreover, the 
Central Strike Committee numbered just 40, and Ernest Brown's concerted 
attempts to organise a conference of mill committees proved futile. 126 
Even so, a more pragmatic approach to the dispute was clearly evident. 
Harry Pollitt reminded the PB that "one of the great lessons 
... 
of Bradford 
last year was the complete neglect of trade union [activity]" and "good 
work" amongst the organised workers was duly reported. 127 The slogan 
'Unions Call Out Your Men'was defended by William Rust, who referred 
to the RILU's insistence on putting demands to official union 
representatives as "a means of exposing the officials 
... 
"128 Furthermore, 
124R. Martin, Communism and the British Trade Unions op. cit. ppl63-164. See also, S. 
Bruley, 'The Lancashire Weavers in the Depression! In Opening the Books op. cit. pp64- 
82. A. and L. Fowler, A HistoKy of the Nelson Weavers' Association Burnfev 1984. 
125Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pgly of Great Britain 15 January 
193 1. Communist Archive. 
126Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PM of Great Britain 13 February 
193 1. Communist Archive. 
1271bid. 
128Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist. Pagy of Great Britain 29 January 
193 1. Communist Archive. 
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the Party made attempts to adapt to local conditions. Given the fact that 70 
per cent of the strikers were women, Rose Smith and Bessie Dickinson 
worked hard to secure female support for the Party line. Thus, specific 
issues, such as the owners' tendency to sack female workers ahead of male 
workers, were addressed. 129 
Although the weavers (short-lived) victory was due primarily to the efforts 
of the workers themselves, the Party could at least claim an influence in 
the dispute. And while an 'independent leadership' was not forged in 
Lancashire in early 193 1, communists such as Dickinson and her husband 
Harold, James Rushton and Amy Hargreaves, were at the centre of the 
struggle; rallying resistance and organising pickets with significant local 
support. 130 
In the realm of industrial disputes therefore, the Party generally remained 
peripheral to the workers' struggle in 193 0-3 1. Amongst the unemployed 
however, the CPGB's influence continued to grow. The number of dues 
paying members of the NUWM, which in 1929 totalled some 10,000, had 
purportedly doubled by March 1930 with The Worker quoting a (rather 
optimistic) figure of 39,000 in August. 131 The movement's legal 
department was further refined, additional branches were established and 
demonstrations to local Public Assistance Committees increased across the 
country. These local campaigns, often instigated in and around labour 
129Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PaM of Great Britain 13 February 
193 1. Communist Archive. See also Sue Brulcy, Leninism op. cit. p215-220. B. 
Dickinson, Women and the More Looms System Textile Minority Movement. London 
1931. 
130See S. Bruley, 'The Lancashire Weavers'op. cit. pp74-75. For Bessie Dickinson's 
recollections see R. A. Leeson, Strike op. cit. ppl24-25. 
131 Minutes of the Political Bureau of the CommunisLEg! y of Great Britain 21 March 
1930. Communist Archive. The Worker 29 August 1930. For an alternative estimate see 
S. Davies, 'The Membership of the National Unemployed Workers' Movement 1923-38. '
In Labour Histojy Revie Spring 1992. 
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exchanges, were complimented by branch meetings held in the open, thus 
giving the N-UWM the mass exposure the ECCI and RILU craved. 
The main reason for such growth appears obvious, the simultaneous 
increase in the number of unemployed. But by 1930, with the main focus 
of (nation-wide) working class struggle having arguably switched from the 
workplace to the dole queue, the Party's long history of'unemployment 
struggles' stood it in good stead. 132 In addition, Wal Hannington 
successfully fought off attempts by the CP and the RILU to alter 
significantly the foundations of the NUWM. The movement maintained its 
emphasis on 'grass roots' issues and close contact with non-Party members, 
campaigning for such basic demands as an increase in the rate of 
unemployment benefit, and adapting itself to local grievances and 
conditions. Subsequently, while the Party could not claim to be the 
vanguard of the working masses, it had some claim to the title with regard 
to the unemployed. 133 
The two national demonstrations organised by the NUWM comprised of 
an'International Unemployment Day'held on 6 March, and a Hunger 
March to London from 30 March through to I May. The former was 
conceived by the ECCI secretariat of 16 January and revealed to the CI 
sections at a Western European Bureau (WEB) meeting in Berlin on the 
3 1. With barely a month to prepare, the results (perhaps unsurprisingly) 
proved disappointing. Walter Tapsell reported that "plans were only 
carried out in part" and the 'unsatisfactory' turn out was verified by the 
132For two historical overviews of the NUWM, see W. Hannington, UnemRloyed 
Strugglea op. cit. and R. Croucher, We Refuse to Starve in Silence op. cit. 
133For an alternative view see, H. Harmer, 'The Failure of the Communists: The National 
Unemployed Workers' Movement, 1929-1939: A Disappointing Success. 'In A. Thorpe 
(Ed. ) The Failure of Political Extremism in Inter-War Britain (Exeter, 1989). pp29-48. 
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NUWM at its National Conference the following year. Harry McShane, 
the Scottish organiser of the NUWM, recalled later that only "two hundred 
of us" demon strated in Glasgow, although "a number of other 
demonstrators [later] arrived. "134 
More successful was the National Hunger March of 1930. The march was 
particularly significant due to both the inclusion of a Women's contingent 
- 
headed by Maud Brown 
- 
and the hostility the marchers encountered 
from the governing Labour Party. 
The Women's contingent was the first of its kind, and reflected a growing 
awareness of the female workforce by (sections of) the labour movement. 
The Labour Party's opposition to the march meanwhile, caused 
considerable problems for the NUWM. A circular forbidding local 
branches to have any contact with the movement indicated that Labour 
halls would be unavailable as temporary accommodation. And as Labour 
councils generally refused to offer help to the weary marchers, the 
organisers were forced to rely on the goodwill of 'rogue' Labour supporters 
and the local poor law institutions. 135 As such, the march was limited to 
just 1,000 demonstrators, with a further 20,000 greeting the marchers at 
Hyde Park on I st May. 136 Protests and marches continued throughout the 
week, and although Ramsay MacDonald refused to meet a deputation from 
134H. McShane, No Mean Fighter op. cit. pp 167-169. The demonstration ended in a 
scuffle and McShane was arrested. Report of the Seventh Annual Conference (N-UWM, 
1931). 
1351n W. Hannington, Never on our Knees op. cit. p227, Hannington recalled how an 
'advanced guard'would travel ahead of the march to secure accommodation from'Labour 
women' willing to serve on reception committees. However, the women were often 
threatened with expulsion as a consequence of their actions. 
136W. Hannington, Unemployment Struggles op. cit. pp2ll-213. Hannington reported 
newspaper estimates of 50,000. 
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the NUWM, those demonstrators who successfully raided the Ministry of 
Health generated valuable publicity for the unemployed. 
Despite its continued growth however, the N-UWM's dues paying basis and 
its representational work did come in for criticism following the Party's 
Leeds Congress. At a PB meeting in mid January, R. W. Robson 
complained that the NUWM's methods were indicative of "legalism, " and 
that mass work had been subjugated to the individual needs of its 
members. The question of dues 'scared off potential members the PB 
reasoned, and Robin Page Amot suggested that the NUWM had developed 
into a "kind of specialised trade union. "137 
Hannington answered the various criticisms levelled against the NUWM at 
a meeting of the Political Bureau on 21 March 1930. While some branches 
did pay too much attention to individual matters said Hannington, he 
denied that "hostile elements. and renegades [gathered] round the NUWM. " 
Hannington also agreed that mass work was necessary and desirable 
(indeed the N-UWM had a history of it); but the PB's accusation that not 
enough contact was made between the movement and factory committees 
was tellingly rejected by Hannington on the grounds that it was difficult 
given that such committees did not exist! 138 As such, the CPGB continued 
137Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PgjY of Great Britain 16 February 
1930. For R. Page Arnot's comment see Minutes of the Political Bureau of the 
Communist Pgjy of Great Britain 21 March 1930. Communist Archive. Similar concerns 
were raised within the Comintern. At the RILU Congress in August 1930, the NUWM 
was condemned for its "opportunistic tendencies. " At the Eleventh ECCI Plenum in April 
193 1, Piatnitsky said he "shuddered to think what would have happened if all Parties had 
organised the unemployed as the CPGB had. " However, the RILU remained divided over 
whether'closer contact with the unemployed' should be carried out by the CP itself or by 
a distinct organisation. 
138Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PgM of Great Britain 21 March 
1930. Communist Archive. 
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to criticise the NUWM while allowing Hannington to continue in his own 
way. 
Conclusions 
By mid 193 1, the CPGB's attempts to re-establish itself amongst the 
British working class appeared to have made little progress. Although the 
emphasis on trade union work and 'day to day' issues had blocked the 
ascendancy of the ultra-left within the CP, the Party continued to find itself 
"unable to approach things from the point of view of the workers. "139 
Moreover, the continual refinement of the Party line led to both confusion- 
and disagreement within the Party itself 
The inter-Party feud that emerged from the South Wales miners dispute 
demonstrated conflicting interpretations of an'independent leadership', 
while to those on the left, the CP's emphasis on the day to day concerns of 
the workers was tantamount to 'economism'. This was most eloquently 
expressed by Freda Utley, who (in a review of Lenin's recently translated 
What is to be Done? insisted that the Party explain to the workers just 
why their jobs, wages and conditions were in jeopardy. Theory must take 
precedence over "bow[ing] down before spontaneity" she declared. 140 
Significantly, Utley was supported by Stuart Purkis, 141 Reg Groves, Harry 
139See William Rust's report, Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pa! jY 
of Great Britain 14-15 March 193 1. Communist Archive. 
140 Communist Review May 1930. Also F. Utley, Lost Illusion op. cit. pp32-36. The 
Party replied in kind 
- 
also referring to What is to be Done 
- 
and accused Utley of 
neglecting the'concrete demands'of the workers, and substituting theory for action. See 
Communist Review January 1931 for the official PB reply. Also Tapsell and Hutt in 
Communist Revie July and September respectively. 
141 Labour Monthly November 1930. Unless, strikes led to an understanding of the'ills of 
capitalism' Purkis stated, "victories will be worse than defeats experienced in consciously 
planned struggle in which the lessons of defeat are learnt. " He too was accused of left 
sectarianism. 
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Wicks and Henry Sara, left wing communists who became increasingly 
critical of the CPGB following the August Commission. 
Yet the conclusions of the August Commission were valid ones. The battle 
against 'social democracy', or the 'sham left', had incited sectarianism 
within wide sections of the Party. As Harry Pollitt remarked to the 
Eleventh ECCI Plenum, "nine tenths of our members are so disposed that, 
if a new worker, especially a worker from the ILP, is not ready to swallow 
whole the 21 conditions of Comintern, they call him a social fascist. "142 
Similarly, the Party had lost contact with significant sections of the 
working class. This was not wholly due to the line of the CPGB, but the 
Party's preoccupation with internal affairs and the theoretical concepts of 
the Third Period engendered the infamous language, or 'phraseology', that 
came to characterise the CPGB. 
It soon became clear that talk of 'social fascists' and 'opportunism' 
alienated the workers, and the Party was forced to reassess the "Party 
terminology 
... 
[that] scares new members away. "143 Thus, while the 
CPGB remained marginalised throughout 1930 and early 193 1, initiatives 
such as the Workers' Charter and the Daily Worker enabled the Party to 
focus its attention on the concerns of the class it claimed to represent. And 
although problems continued to blight the CPGB throughout the first 
months of the thirties, the growing influence of the NUWM, and the 
recognition of the sectarian trend within the CP, provided the Party with a 
basis to respond to the political-economic crises of late 193 1. 
142Cited in E. H. Carr, Twiligh op. cit. p2l 1. 
143Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pgrtv of Great Britain 21-22 July 
193 0. Communist Archive. The quote is from Robson, but the 'problem' was commented 
on by several members of the Party, particularly in relation to the Bradford textile dispute 
and the Daily Worker.. 
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Chapter Six 
A Communist Culture 
1926-1932 
The cultural development of the CPGB was a significant, though little 
recognised, constituent of the Third Period. ' Between 1926 and 1932, as 
the Party became increasingly detached from the mainstream of the British 
labour movement, a distinctly pervasive culture emerged around the 
CPGB. Subsequently, erstwhile institutions such as the Clarion Cycling 
Club were estranged by communist attempts to develop "new methods of 
working class sociability and entertainment. "2 The Plebs League and the 
labour colleges, through which many communists had come to embrace 
Marxism, severed their links with the ever more intractable CPGB; while 
'old' forms and expressions of working class culture, from the theatre to the 
playing field, were dismissed by the Party as "ideological weapons of the 
bourgeoisie. "3 
An alternative political culture, designed primarily to forge a revolutionary 
class consciousness, was consequently constructed in the Party's image. 
Party schools and theatre groups, sports clubs and socials, all emerged to 
I The cultural side of the CPGB has been written about but has never been incorporated 
into an overall history of the CPGB. The most important works on Communist Party 
culture are included in R. Samuel, E. MacColl, S. Cosgrove Theatres of the Left 1880- 
1935 op. cit. S. G. Jones, Workers at Plqy op. cit. ppl33-194. S. G, Jones, The British 
Labour Movement and Film. 1918-1939 (London, 1987). S. G. Jones, 'Sport, Politics and 
the Labour Movement: The British Workers Sports Federation 1923-35' The British 
Journal of Sports Histm Vol 2, No. 2 1985. pp 154-178. A. Howkins, 'Class Against 
Class: The Political Culture of the Communist Party of Great Britain, 1930-35. ' In F. 
Gloversmith, Class Culture and Social Change op. cit. pp240-257. The Histo! y Workshop 
Journal, has also featured a number of relevant articles, while R. Samuel's'The Lost 
World of British Communism, Vols. 1-Yin the New Left Review Nos. 154,156 and 165, 
offers a meandefingjoumey through Party life. 
2See Programme of the Young Communist International (London, 1929). Communist 
Archive. 
3Communist Revie February 1930. 
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counter the "soothing syrup" of professional (capitalist), voluntary, and 
factory based leisure initiatives. 4 In addition, while such a culture 
remained alien to the majority of the British working class, the educational 
and recreational opportunities instigated by the CPGB were integral to the 
Party's political evolution. 
Such a development was a by-product of several inter-linking factors. 
First, the theoretical basis of the Third Period necessitated a reappraisal of 
all reformist labour organisations, both cultural and political. Although the 
Labour Party, ILP and trade unions all provided space for cultural 
expression, the CPGB perceived such 'reformist' initiatives to be inimical 
to the interests of the working class; particularly in a period of 
'intensifying class struggle, ' wherein the forces of social democracy were 
aligned with capital against the workers. Second, the Party's attempt to 
develop alternative outlets for working class culture was precipitated by 
the hardening ideological differences evident between British labour- 
socialists and communists in the 1920s. As outlined in chapter one, the 
increasingly distinct nature of the Labour Party, and the simultaneous 
Bolshevisation of the CPGB, compounded the fundamental differences 
existent within the British labour movement. Third, the Party's approach 
conformed with the totality of communist experience. As David Goldinger 
recalled, "I considered my work in the 
... 
trade unions and other 
organisations 
... 
as Party work. "s Subsequently, the CPGB regarded culture 
as yet another realm of the class conflict in which a 'relentless struggle' 
had to be fought. 
4Quoted in S. G. Jones 'Sport, Politics and the Labour Movement' op. cit. p 16 1. 5D. Goldinger, Autobiographical inescript undated. Communist Archive. 
This chapter will offer therefore, an examination of the various cultural 
initiatives mobilised by the CPGB in the late 1920s, and charter their 
develoPment hrough the Third Period. 
Party Life and Education 
While the CPGB aspired to become a mass party of the working class, the 
dedication and commitment required of (and given by) its members 
severally negated such a desire. Party life constituted a never ending round 
of meetings, writing and re-writing, distributing pamphlets and papers, 
organising pit groups, picketing labour exchanges and canvassing factory 
gates; and that was just in relation to the CPGB, MM, and NUWM. Added 
to this was trade union, trades council and (if possible) Labour Party 
meetings; 6 auxiliary work in Friends of Soviet Russia (FOSR) or 
International Class War Prisoners'Aid (ICWPA); and fund raising work in 
the form of Party socials, bazaars and campaigns. For the CPGB, the 
personal and the political flowed together. Joining the Party was not 
simply a case of lending support, it was a means of shaping the future, of 
serving 'the cause. ' The Leninist notion of 'direct action' was fundamental 
to the CPGB, and it shaped every facet of a communist's life. 
This was true throughout the communist household. Inter-Party marriages 
were very common within the CP, and communist parents endeavoured to 
rear communist children. As such, the Party organisation included the 
Young Pioneers, a communist alternative to the 'bourgeois, imperialist' 
scout movement, wherein the young comrades learnt revolutionary songs, 
made wall newspapers, and rallied resistance within the'capitalist school 
6Where possible, communists remained in the Labour Party or ILP. Douglas Hyde for 
example was a member of the ILP in North Wales, where he attempted to take 
"communism into the enemy camp. " D. Hyde, I Believed op. cit. pp45-46. 
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system. 17 In 1928 and 1930 for instance, a school strike was called in 
celebration of May Day. In 1932, one group of Young Pioneers in 
Clapham defiantly produced a red flag to counter their school's unfurling a 
union jack on Empire Day. 8 
The various memoirs and biographies of known and unknown Party 
members are a testament to this dedicated band of people. Mick Jenkins, a 
Manchester communist, has recollected the 'constant stream' of meetings, 
leaflet distribution, pavement chalking, "education classes, lectures, YCL 
rambles, dances 
... 
and work amongst children. "9 His comrade Jimmy 
Miller (Ewan MacColl) has similarly described his ceaseless workload; 
writing, producing and distributing various local newspapers (aalford 
Docker, Crossley Motor, and the Ward and Goldstone's Spark); rehearsing 
with the Workers'Theatre Movement; attending district and branch 
meetings; selling the Daily Worker at the weekend. "We must have 
covered anything from fifteen to twenty miles a day, " he noted. "Politics - 
there seemed nothing else in life, nothing else that was worth a damn. "10 
The Welsh communist Edwin Greening, remembered organising meetings 
and demonstrations, selling the Daily Worker, studying in the day, and 
'politicising' in the evenings and at weekends. II And Margaret McCarthy 
recalled being "overwhelmed with activity", as she contributed to The 
7See for example, Be Prepared for War (YCL pamphlet, 1927). "For what do scouts 
stand? They stand for the bosses against the workers. " Also, A Short History of the 
Working Class Children's Movement in Great Britain (YCL, undated). Johnson-Pollard 
Collection. The Young Pioneers demanded free school meals and the abolition of caning, 
amongst other things. 
8M. Waite, Young People-and Formal Political Activi1y M. Phil, 1992. Communist 
Archive. For the Party demand for a school strike in 1930 see the Daily Worke 24 April 
1930. 
9M. Jenkins, Prelude to Better DUs unpublished manuscript. WCML. 
101n E. MacColl, 'Theatre of Action, Manchester. 'In R. Samuel, E. MacColl, S. 
Cosgrove, Theatres of the Left op. cit. pp219-222. 
II In H. Francis and D. Smith, The Fed op. cit. p 104. 
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Young Worker while "holding street meetings, fly posing 
... 
chalking 
streets, canvassing literature from door to door, and recruiting for the 
Young Communist League. "12 
Such a wide variety of activity truly did constitute a 'lost world of 
communism, ' and a glance through the pages of the Daily Worker reveals 
countless adverts for Party fancy dress carnivals, sports events, 
unemployed concerts and - "the place for the internationalist" - the 
Nanking Chinese restaurant in London's Denmark Street. 13 Indeed the 
Daily Worker encapsulated the all-encompassing environment of the 
CPGB. Articles on the Soviet Five-Year Plan sat next to Madge Brown's 
women's page with its recipes and baby rearing tipS. 14 A critical analysis 
of Britain's colonial policy accompanied reports of the Workers' Theatre 
Movement, health hints from the worker's doctor, or Mickey the Mongrel 
cartoons in thechildren's comer. ' While the sports page focused primarily 
on the activities of the British Workers' Sports Federation (BWSF), with 
its swimming galas and London Labour Football League. 
Party events meanwhile, where diverse and celebratory affairs. The 
concert programme organised by the St. Pancras LPC to commemorate 
International Women's Day in 1928, included the singing of revolutionary 
songs, a play by a workers' theatre group, and a speech by local comrade, 
Phyllis Neal. 15 
12M. McCarthy, Generation in Revolt op. cit. pp93- 94.. 
13AII these examples are drawn from the Daily Worke 7 January 1930, but every edition 
provided a similar array of events. See also A. Howkins "Class Against Class'op. cit. 
pp240-257. 
14, Traditional' gender roles were still firmly in place within the CPGB. However, there 
was a growing awareness of the female proletariat's role in'the struggle', and Workers' 
Weekly included a page dedicated purely to women's industrial activity in the 1930s. 
15Concert ProgT-amme 6 March 1928. Johnson-Pollard Collection. The play was called 
'Baldwin's Pipe Dream, 'Cedar Paul led the singing, and Neal spoke of the importance of 
International Women's Day. A previous social meeting held by the St. Pancras LPC 
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It was this commitment to 'the cause', and the totality of Party life, that 
both enticed and repelled workers. Douglas Hyde remembered being 
attracted to the Party through the tireless work of the local ICWPA, while 
Margaret McCarthy found that the "practical activity" of the YCL 
contrasted favourably with the "no action policy" of the ILP Guild of 
Youth she had initially associated with. 16 However, such dedication and 
the intensely involved nature of communist activity, also kept workers out 
of the Party. One Durham miner for example, complained to the Daily 
Worker that he did not have time to join the CPGB. 17 In addition, the 
numerous recollections of Party life in Phil Cohen's Children of the 
Revolution invariably describe how the Party negated a 'normal'family 
upbringing. 18 Indeed, such a total existence could even prove too much for 
committed Party members. On leaving the Party in 195 1, Bob Darke (a 
communist councillor in Hackney) complained that "a communist has no 
private life. "19 
Moreover, the consequences ofjoining the Party were often equivocal. 
While the Party could give a sense of purpose and direction to a potential 
member, it could likewise subject her/him to victimisation, police 
surveillance and social isolation. Arrest and/or prison sentences were an 
accepted consequence of Party activity, particularly in the midst of an 
industrial dispute. Over 1,000 communists were arrested in the course of 
the General Strike for example, while the textile disputes of 1929-32 led 
to communists such as Amy Hargreaves, Ernie Woolley, Vera Crossley 
included a communist orchestra, revolutionary songs led by Rab Stewart, and a play, 'The 
Cat Burglar. ' Programme for St. Pancras LPC Social 4 February 1928. Johnson-Pollard 
Collection. 
16D. Hyde, I Believed op. cit. pp I- 13. M. McCarthy, Generation in Revolt op. cit. pp 71- 
83. 
17Daily Worke 8 April 1930. 
18p. Cohen, Children of the Revolution op. cit. 
19B. Darke, The Communist Technique in Britain (London, 1952). pp 7-17. 
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and Bessie Dickinson all spending time in gaol as a consequence of their 
activities. 20 Communist Party membership could also lead to victimisation 
in the workplace and even the trade union. This was particularly true after 
1926, as employers took advantage of surplus labour to oust known 
militants, and unions expelled communist officials from their ranks. 21 
Similarly, police surveillance was not only the common lot of the Party 
leadership; even district members, such as David Goldinger, were kept 
under careful supervision. 22 Goldinger was regularly followed to work in 
the late 1920s, and according to his unpublished memoirs, his children 
were interrogated with regard to their father's 'letters fTom the USSR!! 23 
The communist world could also be an isolated world. The Third Period's 
dismissal of non-communist organisation, and the Party's growing 
ideological separation from the Labour mainstream, often alienated 
communists from the wider working class community. Margaret McCarthy 
has eloquently described the "hieroglyphic verbal terms and high sounding 
political phraseology" that came to characterise the CPGB at this time. 
This was coupled by an almost wilful pride in separation that Harry Pollitt 
in particular, sought to destroy. 24 The CPGB Executive discussed regularly 
20See also Len Powell's Prison Letters October-November 193 1. Communist Archive. 
Also, H. Francis, Miners Against Fascism op. cit. p5O-5 1. Welsh communists "were 
usually victimised, often imprisoned (which they accepted with equanimity) 
... 
and 
derive[ed] sustenance and strength from each other, " writes Francis. 
21 Ernest Pountney was expelled from the National Union of Shop Assistants, 
Warehousemen and Clerks in 1928 for example. See E. Pountney, Autobiogrgphical 
Manuscript undated. Communist Archive. Stuart Purkis was also dismissed from the 
Railway Clerks Association, mainly in response to his workplace news sheet The Jogger. 
See Verbatim Report of an Interview between Mr. S. Purkis and the Executive 
Committee of the R-C. A 3 March 1929 (London, 1929). 
22D. Goldinger, Autobiographical Typescript undated. Communist Archive. Jack 
Murphy's wife Molly has also described how the police'lived virtually on our doorstep'. 
In Molly Murphy, Nurse Molly unpublished autobiography. Communist Archive. 
Goldinger was a Jewish tailor from the East End, and was active in the NUW(C)M and 
the MM. 
231bid. 
24M. McCarthy, Generation in Revolt op. cit. p96. For one of many examples, see Harry 
Pollitt, 'How can the Communist Party get Closer to the Masses. ' In the Daily Worke I 
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the Party's attitude to new recruits, and the Daily Worker issued countless 
articles urging Party members to welcome workers "in a real spirit of 
comradeship, " rather than the "off-hand manner" many complained of, 25 
Moreover, communists were invariably a small minority within their 
community. Even in towns such as Nelson in Lancashire, where 
communists had some influence amongst the local textile workers, the 
fastidious local Party minutes reveal meetings of only five to eight 
comrades. 26 
However, the almost puritanical streak that could at times be discerned 
within the CP, should not be exaggerated. While the Party included 
vehement prohibitionists (Bob Stewart), and hard-nosed apparatchiks 
(most obviously Palme Dutt and William Rust), the majority of Party 
members, including Ernie Trory, Frank Bright, Leo McGree and of course, 
Harry Pollitt, were as happy discussing politics in the local pub as on the 
political platform. 27 The Party insisted on its members being of the 
'maximum mental and physical fitness, 'but it similarly demanded that 
communists integrate among the workers it claimed to represent. 28 
Communists were products primarily of their environment, and despite the 
difficulties outlined above, membership of the Communist Party offered a 
full and rich life to those who embraced it. 
September 1930. In the cited article, Pollitt complained of members "who can tell the 
names of all Chinese Generals 
... 
but when the average worker wants to know anything 
about getting unemployment benefit, or workmen's organisations 
... 
he goes to the hated 
social fascist. " 
25paily Worker 29 March 1930. For the Party Executive see, Minutes of the Central ýL 
_ Committee of the Communist Pg! y of Great Britain 19-21 July 1930. Communist 
Archive. 
26Nelson Local CPGB, Minute Book 1924-1928. WCML. 
2713or Trory see E. Trory, Between the Wars. Recollections of a Communist Organiser 
(Brighton, 1974). For Frank Bright see R. and E. Frow, Frank Bright. Miner, Marxist and 
Communist. Organiser. 1891-1944 North West History Group (Manchester, undated). 
28See for example, the Daily Worke 4 June 193 1, in which a Nottinghamshire miner 
asked for the Party line on alcohol. 
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Education 
Communists saw themselves as the representatives of their class, and 
throughout the Third Period the need to demonstrate the endeavour and the 
efficacy of the Party was central to CP activity. This was exemplified by 
Phil Abrahams, who recalled; "we had an opinion in those days that the 
Communist Party was the vanguard of the workers. You had to be honest, 
sober, industrious, a good citizen: these were the qualities we were looking 
for. "29 Welsh communists, of whom Abrahams was one, even had their 
own uniform, a khaki shirt and red tie. In order to fulfil such a role, the 
Party emphasised the importance of education, and the scholarly traditions 
of the early British labour movement were maintained by the CPGB. 
From its formation in 1920, the CPGB had close links with both the labour 
college movement and the Plebs League, and the Party participated 
initially in the National Council of Labour Colleges (NCLC) in 1921.30 By 
the mid-1920s however, the Communist Party's mounting criticism of the 
college syllabus, and the reciprocal anti-communism of the college 
Secretary J. P. M. Millar, had severally debased the Party's involvement in 
the NCLC. The Bolshevisation of the CPGB led the Party to develop its 
own educational structure, and from 1924 the Party endeavoured to create 
a'systematic altemative'to the existing forms of working class 
education. 31 Tom Bell prepared a Party training manual, and the Party's 
concentration on Marxist-Leninist tracts, the international working class 
29Quoted in H. Francis, Miners Against Fascism op. cit. p50. 
30For the background to working class education within the labour movement, see S. 
MacIntyre, A Proletarian Science op. cit. 
31 Ibid. pp85-87. The Party still had members on the NCLC however, and within the 
Central London College (CLC), the Party was often to the fore in inter-college disputes. 
In 1925, thirteen of the 31 students registered at the CLC were communists, and cases of 
communist expulsion were recorded up to 1928. 
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movement, and the example of the Soviet Union, contrasted markedly with 
the more British perspective of the NCLC. 32 
Although the CPGBs initial attempts at'Party training'were problematic, 
by the late 1920s a functioning and progressive educational framework 
had been established. 33 In 1926, the central training school instituted by 
the Party in London conducted a six monthcourse for twelve district 
representatives, while 'four day schools' were introduced to instruct local 
and district organisers. 34 Party representatives were also dispatched to the 
districts to stimulate local training groups, and by 1930 the Party had 
established eleven district schools and 72 study groups, tutoring 192 and 
597 workers respectively. 35 
In July 193 1, with the Party committed to offering a 'Leninist education' to 
all its members, the Party added a summer school to its growing 
educational basis. Organised by Jack Murphy, the course was based 
around the'organisation and development of capitalism'and the'tactics of 
the proletariat after the conquest of power', and included lectures on the 
32The 1927 edition of T. Bell, Communist PaM Trainin (London, 1927), can be seen at 
the WCML. The course outline included'Why the Communist Party,, 'The CPGB and the 
other parties, "Party Organisation, ' and 'The Party and the International. ' 
33St. Pancras Local CPGB Annual Report, 1926-1927. Johnson-Pollard Collection. Two 
early training groups were established in May 1926 by the St. Pancras LPC. None of the 
24 students completed the course however. Twenty one dropped out and the remaining 
three failed to turn up for the examination. 
34The Ninth Congress of the Communist P!, Ljjy of Great Britain. Reports, Theses and 
Resolutions op. cit. pp28-29. 
35Communist Review January 193 1. These workers' study circles included 197 non-Party 
members. Scotland, London, Manchester and South Wales were the most enlightened 
districts. Scotland boasted twenty Party trainers for example, while the London DPC 
claimed 47 district school tutees and 150 participants in worker study groups. Liverpool 
however, had no district school, and along with Bradford and Birmingham, included no 
non-Party members in its study circles. By 193 1, the number of study groups had risen to 
74, and included 647 members. PaM Training. Dutt Suitcase. WCML. 
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Soviet Five Year Plan, the Communist International and its sections, and 
Fascism and Social-FasciSM. 36 
As well as an increasingly distinct political syllabus, the Party sought also 
to develop teaching methods distinct from the labour colleges. The 
organisational report to the Ninth Party Congress described how a "lecture 
programme [should be] combined with mutual discussion and the working 
out of problems by the students in the class room. "37 This was endorsed in 
Tom Bell's revised training manual of October 1927. Party trainers should 
not be a "lecturer showing his knowledge, " but a tutor who "asks questions 
... 
provokes discussion" and concludes the debate. 38 By the 1930s, the 
Party sought to replace the lecture format completely. A system of 
"collective reports" was recommended, whereby the subject discussed was 
"a collective responsibility" with "different comrades [paying] attention to 
special points. 1139 
The Party's attempt to raise the theoretical and educational level of its 
membership was further boosted by the formation of the Lenin school in 
Moscow. The school had been established in 1924, with British members 
in attendance from 1926, and offered one year and three-year courses. 
Students undertook an intensive study programme, including field trips to 
various sections of the Soviet Union and a rigorous syllabus of Russian, 
economics, political theory, dialectical materialism and hiStory. 40 
Although the first British delegation had been critical 
- 
so much so that 
36Daily Worker 23 March 193 1. Outlines for Students and Pagy Trainers London 193 1. 
37The Ninth Congress of the Communist PgM of Great Britain. Reports, Theses and 
Resolutions op. cit. p29. 
38Communist Pgly TMining October 1927 edition (London, 1927). 
39COM unist Review January 193 1. 
40j. T. Murphy, New Horizons op. cit. pp248-249. 
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the CI considered sending the British students hoMC41 - those students 
tutored in Moscow were soon feted by their fellow comrades. "You tended 
to take everything they said as gospel" recalled Jimmy Miller (Ewan 
MacColl), and by 1930, fresh Lenin school graduates were dispatched to 
the various districts to advise local comrades and to enforce the Party 
line. 42 
As Stuart MacIntyre has stated, the experience of the Moscow students 
undoubtedly raised the level of Marxist understanding in Britain. 43 
However, the Comintern jargon, the increasingly doctrinaire approach to 
Marxist (-Leninist) theory, and the very apparent veneration of the Soviet 
Union reinforced by the Lenin school, compounded the extraneous quality 
of the CPGB. As such, the increasingly structured outline of the various 
Party courses, and the obligatory deferral to the 'correct' line of the 
Communist International, hindered any truly original theoreticians 
emerging from either local Party study groups, or the Lenin school. 
Nevertheless, the educational opportunities the Party offered to the British 
workers can be included among the finest achievements of the CPGB. The 
Party's commitment to education, discussion and personal research was 
exemplary, and such encouragement of working class initiative allowed 
those neglected by the wider British schooling system the chance to learn 
and express themselves. Indeed, the rich literary heritage of the CPGB was 
but just one consequence of this. 44 
41Letter from J. T. Murphy to the Political Bureau of the Communist Pam of Great 
Britain II April 1927. Klugmann Papers. Murphy also castigated the British Party for 
encouraging criticism. 
42E. MacColl, 'Theatre of Action, Manchester. 'In R. Samuel, E. MacColl, S. Cosgrove, 
Theatres of the Left op. cit. p218. 
43S. Maclntyre, A Proletarian Science op. cit, pp86-87. For more on the Lenin school see 
the five volumes of related material in the Communist Archive. 
44See A. Croft, Red Letter DAys (London, 1990). 
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On Stage and Field 
By the early 1930s, the CPGB was in the midst of a complex cultural 
evolution. And just as the Party's educational perspective became 
increasingly defined by Lenin, the Comintern, and the Soviet Union, 45 So 
other realms of Party activity similarly transformed into unique hybrids of 
indigenous and internationalist forms. This section will focus on two such 
CPGB auxiliaries. First, the Workers'Theatre Movement and second, the 
British Workers' Sports Federation; both of which emerged from the wider 
British labour movement; and both of which became distinct, communist 
cultural entities in the Third Period. 
The first performance of the Workers'Theatre Movement (WTM) was a 
rendition of Upton Sinclair's Singing Jailbirds, and it took place in July 
1926 at the Memorial Hall in Farringdon, London. The WTM had begun 
as a collaborative venture, instigated by the Sundgy Worker and the 
Central Labour College, supported by, amongst others, the Plebs League 
and the Daily Herald, and emanating from the rather obscure Council for 
Proletarian Art formed by members of the CPGB and ILP in 1924. As 
such, the origins of the WTM were firmly rooted in the federal, 
collaborative traditions of the British labour movement, and the CPGB's 
initial involvement centred primarily around the Sunday Worker (whose 
editor William Paul chaired several early performances of the VvITM), and 
keen communist drama enthusiasts. 46 
45Party Li undated, 1927. The paper of the Party's Organisational Bureau was dedicated 
solely to Party training. "The lesson of Lenin that without theory there is no movement" 
the paper read, "must be taken to heart by all comrades. " 
46R. Samuel. E. MacColl, S. Cosgrove, Theatres of the Left op. cit. p33. 
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The theatre encompassed a militant agenda that complimented its 
proximity to the Peneral Strike. Huntley Carter, writing in the Sunday 
Worker, perceived the WTM to be a theatre of 'direct action'; a 
'propaganda machine' grounded in the class struggle and focused on 
topical issues relevant to the working class. 47 Workers were to write and 
perform their own material an early WTM manifesto insisted, and 
performances were to be staged in the shadow of the factory, or on the 
comer of the street. 49 Writers such as Jim Corrie, a Scottish miner from the 
Bowhill Village Players, were adopted by the movement, and Corrie's In 
Time of Strife, a play about the 1926 miners' lock-out, was among the first 
WTM performances. Several regional drama clubs also emerged at this 
time. A WorkersArts Club was established by Larry Finlay in Salford; a 
Manchester WTM emerged out of the NCLC in Levenshulme; and in 
Hackney, Tom Thomas led the Hackney People's Players. 49 
Despite its radical intentions however, the initial WTM remained within 
the traditional paradigm of labour theatre. Performances were held in trade 
union, co-op or local labour clubs where, as Jimmy Miller (Ewan 
MacColl) remembered, "everybody knew each other 
- 
it was an audience 
of maybe twenty, twenty-five people. And there was I wanting to see the 
revolution. "50 Similarly, as Tom Thomas came to realise, plays such as his 
own Ragged Trousered Philanthropis were still reliant on a stage, 
471bid. See also Carter's articles in the Sundgy Worker particularly 6 June, 19 July and 22 
August 1926. 
48Sunday Worker 30 October 1926. Carter was very influenced by the new Soviet drama 
troupes. 
49R. and E. Frow, 'The Workers'Theatre Movement in Manchester and Safford, 193 1- 
19402 In North West Labour History Group Journal No. 17 1992-93. pp66-7 1. Also R. 
Samuel, E. MacColl, S. Cosgrove, Theatres of the Left op. cit. pp37-38 and pp223-225. 
As Tom Thomas and Raphael Samuel have noted, the original protagonists of the WTM 
- 
Huntley Carter, Christina Walshe, Rutland Boughton, Havelock Eliss, Eden and Cedar 
Paul 
- 
were essentially "upper-middle class bohemians" committed as much to aesthetics 
as revolutionary socialism. The regional groups were generally more proletarian. 
50R. Samuel, E. MacColl, S. Cosgrove, Theatres of the Left op. cit. pp224-225. 
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numerous rehearsals, and the audience-performer divide. 51 Moreover, 
between 1926 and 1928, the perspectives of the WTM's original sponsors 
had diverged sufficiently to become untenable. Communist involvement in 
a WTM performance given in support of the Rego textile strike for 
example, prompted the Cent ral Labour College to expel seven of its 
students in 1928. Simultaneously, reference to labour drama became 
increasingly critical in the pages of the communist press. Palme Dutt had 
dismissed ILP drama as'reformist'by August 1926, and even communist 
sympathisers, such as Sean O'Casey and Eugene ONeill, were reproved 
regularly in the Sunday Worker. 52 
The real advance in both the work and profile of the WTM occurred with 
the CPGB's adoption of the New Line in 1929-30. As the Party sought to 
shed itself of all social-democratic influences, so the WTM detached itself 
from the limitations recognised by Thomas and Miller. As the parameters 
of the communist landscape widened beyond the confines of parliamentary 
and industrial politics, the WTM became a focal point of CP agitation. As 
Stephen Jones has suggested, the Party's divergence from the wider labour 
movement "effectively isolated Marxist forms of cultural expression from 
their labour socialist counterparts. Until about 1933, communists were to 
develop the WTM as a revolutionary alternative to the established modes 
of capitalist and social democratic provision. "53 The Party was able to 
clearly define its cultural ideology in line with the politics of class against 
class, and the cultural-political boundaries that divided 'politics' and 
'culture'were torn down. 
51 Ibid. p50. 
52Labour Monthly August 1926. Sundgy Worker 4 July 1926,24 June and 25 November 
1928. 
53S. G. Jones, Workers at Play op. cit. p 156. 
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Such a development expressed itself in a number of ways. Primarily, the 
form of WTM performance changed dramatically. With hindsight, as Tom 
Thomas has noted, the WTM was already "fumbling towards the idea of. an 
agit-prop theatre" between 1926 and 1928. From 1929 however, the notion 
of a theatre "without a stage, which could use dance, song and cabaret 
... 
which could improvise its own material 
... 
[and] in which the audience 
could take part, " was a very real one. 54 The WTM was to become a tool of 
the class struggle, and its methods necessarily complimented its 
revolutionary message. 
Subsequently, the performances of the WTM became increasingly radical 
in both method and content. In Manchester, a piece'entitled Still Talkin 
was based around a public meeting with players planted amongst the 
audience. In London in 1929, Tom Thomas presented Strike Up a 
performance that similarly utilised actors on and off the stage. Strike Up 
was essentially a revue, incorporating satirical versions of contemporary 
y became Money Boy B songs (Sonny Bo or example), dance routines, short 
sketches and monologues. 55 The political message of the WTM was 
brought explicitly to the fore, and the importance of the plays context 
- 
as 
well as its content 
- 
became central to the movement's approach. 
This was compounded by the example of the Workers'Theatre League of 
Germany, whom Thomas encountered on a visit to the Ruhr in the spring 
of 1930.56 On his return, Thomas penned an article for the Daily Worker 
54T. Thomas, 'A Propertyless Theatre for a Propertyless Class. 'In R. Samuel, E. MacColl, 
S. Cosgrove, Theatres of the Left op. cit. p87. Originally printed in Histoly WorksLop 
Journal No. 4 1977. 
551bid. pp87-88. 
56The Workers'Theatre League emerged out of the Red Front Fighters League (the 
paramilitary organisation of the KPD), German unemployed, and Young Communist 
Organisations. From at least 1928, the KPD utilised 'semi spontaneous' agit-prop theatre 
to mobilise workers around Party campaigns. See. E. D. Weitz, Creating German 
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outlining a new slogan 
-'The Theatre of Struggle'- and a new dramatic 
approach. Scenery, sets and stage were no longer necessary he declared, 
and the 'old, naturalistic' settings of labour drama should be abandoned. 
Instead the WTM was encouraged to develop material that was short, 
popular and direct. Performances were to be flexible, so as to be displayed 
in open cars or on the back of lorries, and Thomas called on every CPGB 
district to form its own workers' theatre group. 57 The German influence 
was further extended in 193 1, when a WTM troupe toured the Rhineland, 
and German comrades regularly visited British theatre groups to offer help 
and advice. 58 
Although the political climate in Britain differed greatly from that of 
Germany in 1930, the example of the KPD's drama troupes, and the 
encouragement offered by the Daily Worker, gave new life to the WTM. 
Communist theatre groups appeared across the country. By 193 1, ten 
existed in London alone, including the Red Star Troupe of West London, 
the Red Magnets of Woolwich, the Red Front group of Streatham, the Red 
Blouses of Greenwich, and the Yiddish speaking Proltet in the East End. 59 
Elsewhere, the Dundee Red Front Troupe, the Liverpool Red Anchor 
Troupe, and the Sunderland Red Magnets also affiliated to the WTM. In 
addition, a weekend school for theatre groups based in the North of the 
England and the Midlands was established, attracting 40 delegates from 
Communism op. cit. p262. Weitz refers to, R. Bodek, We are the Red Megaphones: 
Popular Music. Agi1prop Theatre. Everyday Life and Communist Politics during the 
Weimar Republic. Ph. d. University of Michigan 1990. 
57Daily II May 1930. An article on the WTM entitled I Workers Drama 
-A 
Weapon in the Class Struggle'had featured in the Daily Worke on II January 1930. The 
piece, by'Trudnik, 'emphasised the WTM's role in the class struggle and called for 
workers' theatre groups to report their activities to the paper. 
L_ 58pa ly Worker 12 January 193 1. For German visits to Britain see Daily Worke II June 
1930 and 3 January 193 1. 
59See D. Waterman, 'Proltet: The Yiddish Speaking Group of the Workers' Theatre 
Movement! In Histoly Workshop No. 5 1978. 
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eight towns in May 1931.60 The WTM was to become an integral part of 
the Party machine, an "important weapon" able to assist in "agitation on 
particular events. "61 As such, theatre groups appeared in the midst of 
industrial action, at election rallies, on unemployed demonstrations and 
hunger marches. 
In Manchester, the Salford Red Megaphones exemplified the new spirit of 
the WTM. Based around the nucleus of Jimmy Miller (Ewan MacColl), 
Joe Davies, Grace Sodden, Alex Armstrong, Len Heckert, Flo Clayton, 
Nellie Wallace, and Martin Bobker, the Megaphones developed a series of 
collectively written scripts, which they performed across Lancashire. 
Dressed in dungarees 6 la their German comrades, 62 the group appeared 
outside factory gates, at local labour exchanges, and even on the back of 
trucks during the'more looms'dispute of 1931-32. Their scripts included 
The P. A. Q Sketch, The Trial of Private EnteMrise, and numerous songs 
and skits written in relation to the Lancashire workers' struggle. 63 Pieces 
were adapted to fit local conditions, and they intended to "rouse our 
audiences to immediate action [with] words that would bum like fire and 
set our slums ablaze. "64 
60Daily Wo 29 May 1931. 
61 Communist Review June 193 2. 
62The Manchester group's affinity to the German example stemmed from Miller's 
correspondence with Rudi Lehmann of the German YCL. Lehmann sent Miller details of 
German agit-prop groups, along with song scores, scripts and newspaper cuttings. See E. 
MacColl, 'Theatre of Action, Manchester' in Theatres of the Left op. cit. p229. 
Manchester was also visited by a representative of the YCI, who similarly influenced the 
development of Miller and the Red Megaphones. 
63See R. and E. Frow, 'The Workers'Theatre Movement in Manchester and Salford, 
1931-1940. ' In North West Labour Histoly Group Journal No. 17 1992-93. p6g. Also E. 
MacColl, 'Theatre of Action, Manchestee in R. Samuel, E. MacColl, S. Cosgrove, 
Theatres of the Le op. cit. pp233-238. 
64E. MacColl, Journeyman. An Autobioiz[aphy (London, 1990). p207. 
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The theoretical basis of the WTM was also transformed from 1929, and on 
25-26 June1932 the Workers'Theatre Movement held its first National 
Conference in London. 65 Crucially, the theatre was placed firmly within 
the context of the class struggle. Capitalist theatre "served to blind the 
workers to the existence of the class struggle" the conference resolution 
insisted, while the theatres of the non-communist left were lost in 
"ingenious but sterile technicalities. " Even worse however, were the 
theatre groups of the ILP and Labour Party who sought either to impose 
bourgeois art on the workers, or merely to express the misery of the 
workers existence. 66 
By contrast, the WTM portrayed itself as part of the class struggle, a 
weapon of revolution that not only'unmasked the capitalist system, 'but 
also organised'the workers to fight their way oUt. '67 And rather than 
attempt to 'raise the cultural level of the workers through contact with 
great dramatic art, 'the WTM endeavoured to produce "mass propaganda 
and agitation through the particular method of dramatic representation. " 68 
In both the Daily Worker and the movement's own periodical The Red 
Stage, the WTM sought to focus and define its revolutionary perspective 
in accordance with the line of the CPGB. With regard to theatre criticism, 
Charlie Mann69 (thee. ditor of Red Stage) insisted that the WTM "expose 
the artful propaganda of the bourgeois scribes, who are perforce influenced 
65Twenty two groups were represented at the conference, with another ten registered 
absent for financial reasons 
66'The Basis and Development of the Workers'Theatre Movement., Resolution of the 
First Conference of the WTM, reproduced in full in, R. Samuel, E. MacColl, S. 
Cosgrove, Theatres of the Left op. cit. pp99-105. 
671bid. 
68WTM resolution for memorandum from 1930. Quoted in R. Samuel, E. MacColl, S. 
Cosgrove, Theatres of the Left op. cit. pp33-34. 
69Charlie was the son of Tom Marin and a member of the Lewisham Red Players. The 
Red Stage was first produced in 193 1, and was regarded as a major step forward by Tom 
Thomas. 
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in their writings by loyalty to a system on which they live. 1170 The concept 
of 'class against class' also initiated numerous diatribes (and WTM 
sketches) against the Labour Party and the ILP, and although the 
movement warned against the tendency to become 'divorced from the 
masseS, '71 the WTM remained a distinctly communist entity. 
The Workers'Theatre Movement flourished in the New Line years of the 
CPGB. The Party's attempt to establish an independent leadership of the 
working class gave a focus and clear objective to the WTM, and the 
numerous drama troupes formed under its banner became an integral part 
of the Party's propaganda machine. Continually creative, the WTM was 
able to adapt its flexible format to a variety of topics, from the Meerut 
prisoners (Meerut), to industrial disputes (The Rail Revolt), 
unemployment The P. A. C Sketch), and local social issues Murder in the 
Coal Field). These short sketches, plays and songs, allowed the Party to 
make political points quickly and effectively, and despite regular police 
attention, the 'propertyless theatre' was able to move swiftly from the 
factory to the labour exchange to the market place. Thus, the WTM was 
indicative of the Third Period's transferral of communist activity from the 
workplace to the street. The movement encapsulated the total world of the 
CP, as the political and the cultural coalesced to produce a truly working 
class theatre rooted in the class struggle. 
Equally representative of the CPGB's increasingly distinct cultural world 
was the British Workers' Sports Federation (BWSF). Established in 1923 
on the initiative of the Clarion Cycling Club and various representatives 
from the wider labour movement, the BWSF resolved to promote 'peace 
70The Red Stage March 1932. See S. G. Jones, Workers at PlU op. cit. p 156. 
71'The Basis and Development of the WorkersTheatre Movement. 'op. cit. pp99-105. 
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between nations'through workers sport. As such, European tours were 
undertaken, and the Clarion Cyclists represented the BWSF in the 1927 
Workers Olympiad in Prague. Despite TUC recognition and affiliation to 
the Lucerne Sports International (LSI) however, the federation remained a 
relatively small organisation in the mid 1920s, with limited support in just 
London and Scotland. 72 
CPGB involvement in the BWSF intensified following the General Strike 
and a communist influence was soon evident. 73 In 1927 a successful 
football tour of the Soviet Union was undertaken, and representatives of 
the BWSF were invited to the tenth anniversary celebrations of the 
Bolshevik Revolution. Moreover, communists such as George Sinfield and 
Walter Tapsell, who were on the national committee, sought to radically 
transform the constitution of the BWSF. Tapsell moved that the ob ectives 
of the federation should be an "unrelenting struggle against the existing 
capitalist domination of sport. " While Sinfield published a pamphlet 
inciting the BWSF to "expose capitalist sports clubs 
... 
to win away from 
all pro-capitalist influences the thousands of clubs composed of workers 
which run apart from capitalist control 
... 
[and] to broaden and extend the 
workers' sports organisation. 1174 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, these developments caused consternation amongst 
non-communist members on the national committee. The increasingly 
72S. G. Jones, 'Sport, Politics and the Labour Movement: The British Workers Sports 
Federation 1923-35. ' op. cit. pp 154-157. This remains the only historical overview of the 
BWSF. 
73The YCL in particular campaigned for greater attention to be paid to workers' sport. 
During the General Strike and miners' lock-out, the YCL had organised various 
recreational activities. See, Sunday Worker 2 May 1926. Also Report of the Fourth 




-Confe-rence Of Lthe 
BWS_F 28 April 1928. Communist 
Archive. G. Sinfield, The Workers' Sports Movement London 1927 
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prominent role communists played in the federation would 'violate the 
spirit of TUC and Labour Party support for the BWSF' the committee 
feared. 75 Furthermore, the objectives Tapsell and Sinfield applied to the 
BWSF were described as "antagonistic to the federation" and the LS1.76 
After much discussion and a National Conference however, the Party 
succeeded in wresting control of the movement. George Sinfield was 
elected BWSF secretary, affiliation to the LSI was substituted for 
affiliation to the communist Red Sports International (RSI), and the 
Clarion Cycling Club, TUC and the Labour Party all withdrew their 
support. 77 Tapsell's resolution that the BWSF actively engage in the class 
struggle was consequently adopted at the National Conference, and from 
1928 the federation became an integral part of CP life. As such, the 
initiatives of Sinfield and Tapsell predated the CPGBs adoption of the 
New Line, and a disparity in outlook between the communist and labour- 
socialist members of the BWSF was clearly evident prior to 1928. 
Sport was regarded as far more than just 'healthy recreation' by the Party. 
Working class interest in sport was seen to be at once beneficial and 
detrimental to the revolutionary struggle. Professional sport was portrayed 
as a corrupting influence on the workers - "one of the strongest ideological 
weapons of the bourgeoisie"78 - and a "dope to distract the workers from 
the struggle. "79 Voluntary, amateur and factory sports too, were dismissed 
by the communist led BWSF. Such activity merely diverted the workers 
75Minutes of the National Committee of the BWSF 16 October 1927. Communist 
Archive. Although the national committee condemned the action, the communist 
dominated London section of the BWSF did send a delegate. 
76Conference of the National Committee of the BWSF 8 January 1928. Communist 
Archive. 
77See Minutes of the. Sub Committee of the BWSF 10 July, 12 October and 19 October 
1928. Communist Archive. 
78Communist Review February 1930. 
79R. P. Dutt, Sport and our Daily. Letter sent to the Daily Worker 21 January 1930. Dutt 
Papers. BL. 
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attention away from the rationalisation and wage cuts being imposed 
simultaneously the Party argued, and both Harry Pollitt and Michael 
Condon linked the lack of workers'playing fields, leisure time and 
facilities, to the wider capitalist offensive against the working class. 80 
Alternately, workers sport, as designated by the CPGB/BWSF, was 
perceived as a means of facilitating class-consciousness. "The BWSF 
represents a magnificent auxiliary organisation for both League and Party" 
Jack Cohen argued in 1930, and the BWSF subsequently endeavoured to 
"direct the instinct for sport on the part of the workers into channels that 
serve their own interests on the sports field, and in the field of industry. "81 
Similarly, as the BWSF President Harry Pollitt ventured, by appealing to 
"young workers [who were] interested in swimming and football, " the 
Party could generate an interest "in the unemployed workers and so on. 1,82 
With support from the Daily Worker therefore, the Party sought to 
significantly raise the profile and scope of the BWSF, and by 1930 the 
federation had a functioning national organisation with branches 
throughout the country. 
The activities of the BWSF were adapted to correspond with the totality of 
the CPGB's political vision. The federation sought to develop sport 
organised under'worker's control'that would "expose the corrupt nature of 
boss sport. "83 As well as the various sporting initiatives described below, 
this entailed formulating campaigns relevant to sporting issues. For 
80Worker Sportsman May 1932. M. Condon, The Fight for the Workers' Playing Fields 
(London, 1932). 
81 Report of the Sgcond National Congress of the BWSF 6-7 December 193 0. Communist 
Archive. 
82Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PgM of Great Britain 13-14 
August 1930. Communist Archive. 
83Report of the Second National Congress of the BWSF 6-7 December 1930. Communist 
Archive. 
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example, the federation led a successful campaign against the Tottenham 
district council's banning of Sunday sporting activities. A Workers' Sports 
Association was established, and the Party was able to mobilise 
considerable support among local workers, trade union branches, and 
labour organisations. 84 The BWSF also campaigned for better facilities for 
worker sports people, including the opening of all parks and open spaces 
on Sundays, free access for workers teams, adequate maintenance, and free 
changing accommodation. 85 In Manchester, the local BWSF section 
formed a Ramblers Rights Movement, demanding free access to the 
countryside, and a subsequent mass trespass around Kinder Scout in 
Derbyshire became one of the most notorious CPGB initiatives. 86 
In a wider political context too, the Party utilised the BWSF to disseminate 
communist ideals. Sporting activities were organised around, or in support 
of, striking workers such as the London Lightermen and the Yorkshire 
woollen workers. 87 In Leeds, BWSF cyclists were mobilised to raise 
resistance to bailiffs seeking to evict victims of the means test. 88 Socials, 
raffles and galas raised money for CP election candidates, and the Party 
anticipated the use of sporting events to effectively propagate the Workers' 
Charter. Less practical however, were the communist campaigns against 
capitalist sport. When the CPGB/BWSF called for a boycott of Upton 
Park, in response to West Ham's high admission charges for a Sixth Round 
84T. Condon, The Fight for the Workers'Plqying Fields op. cit. See also, Minutes of the 
Sub Committee of the BWSF 19 September 1930, and Daily Worke 20 May 1930. 
85Report of the S2cond National Congress of the BWSF 6-7 December 1930. Communist 
Archive. 
86Ramblers Rights Movement Circular undated. WCML. Daily Sketc 25 April 1932. J. 
Lowerson, 'Battles for the Countryside. ' In F. Gloversmith, Class, Culture and Social 
Change op. cit. pp272-73. B. Rothman, The 1932 Kinder Trespass: A Personal View of 
the Kinder Scout TreMass Timperly, 1982. D. Cook, 'The Battle for Kinder Scout. ' In 
Marxism Tod August 1977. 
87Daily Worke 14 May 1930 and 29 January 1932. Sport and Games January 1932. 
Report of the Third National Conference of the BWSF. 4-5 March 1933. WCML 
"Sport and Games January 1932. 
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FA Cup tie in 1930, the Daily Worker was forced to report that a "huge 
crowd" nevertheless attended. 89 
In terms of actual sporting events, the BWSF participated in numerous 
local and international activities. British footballers, cyclists, boxers and 
athletes took part in the Soviet Spartakiades of 1928 and 1932, cyclists and 
footballers visited Germany and France, boxers fought in Norway, 
Switzerland and Russia. In return, French and German workers visited 
Britain, although a proposed Russian football tour was postponed when the 
Labour foreign secretary, J. R. Clynes, refused to submit visas to the Soviet 
team. 90 
Red Sports Days were organised by the BWSF. On 26 April 1930,1,000 
spectators watched a plethora of sporting events in Hyde Park, at which 
the West Ham ILP Guild of Youth won the Daily Worker football trophy 
and Hackney Girls won the netball cup. 91 Inter-regional football matches, 
mass rambles, boxing tournaments and cycling tours were all successfully 
undertaken between 1929 and 1933. A football match between London 
and South Wales workers for example, was watched by a crowd of over 
3,000; and a London swimming gala, held at Haggerston Baths in 1930, 
was later described "as the best organised and most successful sporting 
event held by the BWSF. "92 The federation also endeavoured to promote 
'women's sport. 'A women's section was set up in 1930, and a London 
89Daily Worker I March and 4 March 1930. 
90Daily Worke 17 April 1930. Minutes of the Special Meeting of thý.! National Sub 
Committee of the BWSF 17 April 1930. 
91Daily Worke 28 April 1930. Minutes of the Sub Committee of the BWSF 2 May 1930. 
Communist Archive. 
92Report of the National Committee undated. Communist Archive. The limitations of the 
BWSF are revealed by the fact that two German contestants complained to the RSI 
following the gala. Minutes of the Sub Committee of the BWSF 24 October 1930. 
Communist Archive. What the complaints were is unclear, but they were repudiated by 
the BWSF. 
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netball league was established along with various gymnastic, swimming, 
hockey and athletic sections. 93 
Although a national organisation, the BWSF maintained a federal 
structure, and the successes of the workers' sports movement were most 
evident at a local level. In Manchester, the Workers' Arts Club in Salford 
included a boxing gym (through which many boxers were recruited to the 
YCL/CPGB), while the local BWSF organised Sunday rambles and 
cycling trips. A camping trip to Clough Head Farm in 1932 was attended 
by 180 'lads and girls' from the Manchester District, and although 
problems blighted the campers 
- 
and'E. F. ' [Eddie Frow? ] insisted on 
taking a typewriter, Lenin's collected works, and volumes one to six of 
Inprecorr 
- 
further camps were organised. 94 
Cycling was particularly popular across the country, with Red Wheelers 
emerging in Rochdale, Eastwood, Leeds, Doncaster and most other Party 
localities. Cycle rides from London to Brighton were organised, while 
local rambling sections regularly arranged Sunday afternoon jaunts into 
the countryside. A Newcastle boxing gym of 60 members was established 
in 1930, football leagues emerged in Fife, South Wales and Derby, and 
cricket games were played in Bradford. There was even a workers' hockey 
team in Shipley, a workers'tennis club on Tyneside, and a baseball team in 
the Rhondda! Glasgow alone had six BWSF sections representing over 
400 members by 1931.95 The London section meanwhile, was involved in 
93Minutes of the National Committee of the BWSF 23 February 1930. Minutes of the 
Sub Committee of the BWSF 14 March 1930. Minutes of the National Committee of the 
BWSF 7 February 1932. Communist Archive. The realms of 'male' and'female sport 
were in no way challenged by the CPGB. 
94BWSF Camp Souvenir undated. Communist Archive. 
95These details are taken from the Minutes of the BWSF. Communist Archive. The 
Welsh football league was forced to close in 193 1, following the Rhondda district 
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several football competitions. The BWSF had already established two 
workers' football leagues by 1927 and numerous cup and league events 
were added between 1928 and 1934. In 1932 for example, the London 
BWSF spearheaded the broad based London Workers' Football Council to 
which 99 clubs were affiliated. 
Ultimately however, the BWSF remained a marginal organisation. 
Financial and practical problems constantly plagued both the national 
committee and the various local sections, and the federation could in no 
way be regarded as a serious rival to the bastions of 'bourgeois sport' that it 
sought to challenge. Money was a constant concern. The hiring of 
facilities, equipment and grounds proved extremely difficult for an 
organisation dependent on raising its own funds. By 193 1, the BWSFs 
affiliation fee to the RSI was still in due, while the Worker Sportsman, the 
federation paper, had long since collapsed. 96 The fact that those running 
the BWSF were either working or unemployed also hampered the 
movement's growth. While tours to the Soviet Union or Germany were an 
exciting prospect for the federation members, many planned trips and 
competitions failed to occur. Those withjobs often found it impossible to 
take time off work, while the sheer cost of transporting a team of 
footballers or cyclists to Europe made participation impossible. 97 
And yet, the BWSF encapsulated the spirit and dedication of Communist 
Party members. The federation organised successful workers' sporting 
events across the country and in so doing provided entertainment, 
council's ruling that teams playing in the BWSF league would not be allowed to play in 
the Rhondda League. 
96Worker Sportsman dissolved in 1929. A similar fate befell Sports and Games and The 
Worker Sportsman in 1932. 
97For example, see Minutes of the Sub Committee of the BWSF 21 October 1928,19 
July 1929 and 28 March 1930. Communist Archive. 
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excursions and activity to thousands of workers in and outside the Party. 
Through its trips abroad, the BWSF offered workers the opportunity to 
visit and perform in places beyond the reach of the average workers wage 
packet98; and the BWSF was able to campaign effectively, on a local level, 
for workers rights. As well as the successes in Tottenham mentioned 
above, the Stepney Workers' Sports Club managed to gain free access to 
gym and netball facilities, and the mass trespasses of the BWSF ramblers 
won the CPGB nation-wide attention (and support). Moreover, while the 
BWSF in 1927-33 was very much a product of the CPGB's divorce from 
the wider labour movement, the federation generally remained free from 
the extreme sectarianism that blighted other CPGB, auxiliaries. Where 
sectarianism was noted it was condemned, 99 and even at the height of 
'class against class' (1929-30) the federation included ILP football teams 
and numerous non-Party members. 100 By 1932, many Clarion Cycling 
Clubs and ILP branches were co-operating with the BWSF. 
Conclusions: A Culture of a New Type 
The numerous cultural and educational activities instigated and extended 
by the Communist Party from the mid 1920s were central to the formation 
of a political culture particular to the CPGB. Communists sought 
successfully to fuse a political and cultural consciousness through such 
initiatives as the WTM and BWSF. Indeed, the CPGB's cultural immersion 
was a total one, and by the early 1930s the Party had a blossoming 
"The BWSF football team that visited the Soviet Union in 1927 played in front of 
35,000 people for example. S. G. Jones, 'Sport, Politics, and the Labour Movement, ' op. 
cit. p159. 
"Minutes of the Full National Committee of the BWSF 7 June 193 1. Communist 
Archive. 
10OCommunist domination did cause some problems however. Teams such as the Bow 
West Ward Labour Party football team withdrew from the London Group Cup in 1928 
for example. And in Newcastle, many workers "feared the club [BWSF] was run by the 
Communist Party. " Minutes of the Sub Committee of the BWSF 30 November 1928 and 
Minutes of the Full National Committee of the BWSF 7 June 193 1. Communist Archive. 
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Workers'Film Society, Workers'Camera League, Workers'Music 
Association, and even a West London Workers' Esperanto Club. 101 As 
such, Sunday rambling trips became a dilation of the Party's political 
activity, workers theatre performances an extension of industrial conflict, 
and Party socials a means of ftinding and facilitating the class struggle. 
The political import the CPGB applied to its cultural initiatives served also 
to reinforce the Party's divorce from the wider labour movement. While 
the origins of the numerous organisations usurped by the Party between 
1926 and 1928 were rooted in the cross party traditions of the pre-war 
labour movement, the Party infused them with a Bolshevik rigour that 
contrasted with the more moderate, liberal approach of those such as the 
Tom Groom, the chairman of the Clarion Cyclists and the original BWSF 
secretary. Additionally, the CPGBs reverence of the Soviet Union 
increasingly underpinned the cultural direction of the Party, and this 
distinguished further communist practice from that of the labour-socialist. 
The singing of Soviet songs became a regular part of the Party's cultural 
experience for example, while plays based upon Soviet development, the 
numerous Daily Worker articles dedicated to Soviet supremacy and 
comrade Stalin, and the increasingly Russian basis of Party education, all 
gave the CPGB a'foreign-ness' that distinguished the communist's cultural 
world. 
10 1 Daily Worker 3 January 193 1. The most important of these, the Workers Film Society 
(WFS), emerged out of the London Film Society established in 1925. As with the WTM 
and the BWSF, the enthusiasm of Communist Party members soon ensured that 
communists dominated the society, and Soviet films were shown regularly (and then 
distributed) throughout the country. In Manchester, the Workers' Arts Club again 
provided the impetus for the district WFS, while in London the Scala theatre provided 
regular film evenings. See R. Bond, 'Cinema in the Thirties: Documentary Film and the 
Labour Movement. ' In J. Clark, M. Heinemarm, D. Margolies, C. Snee, Culture and Crisis 
Ln, 
_the30s 
(London, 1979). pp241-256. S. G. Jones, The British Labour Movement and 
Film op. cit. Also R. Cordwell, Workers'Film Socie! y undated. WCML. 
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And yet, the fastidiousness of the CPGB's approach to education, the 
totality of political expression, and the particular focus of Party culture 
(on, say, football, rambling, cycling) all had British precedents, as Stuart 
MacIntyre and Stephen Jones have shown. The life of a British communist 
differed significantly from that of a German, Swiss or American 
communist. The cultural development of the CPGB was thus a synthesis of 
both national and international forces, wherein indigenous cultural forms 
were politicised and interpreted through a Marxist-Leninist perspective of 
class struggle. This was itself variable, and depended on the class 
relations, cultural traditions and the social composition of a particular 
region. 
Thus, the Third Period consolidated those differences that separated the 
Communist Party from the wider labour movement, while simultaneously 
propitiating the distinct character of British communism. In terms of 
culture, the Party developed a rich and varied environment, the legacy of 
which benefited both communists and non-communists alike. 
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Chapter Seven 




Between June and December 193 1, the membership of the Communist 
Party of Great Britain rose from 2,756 to 7,478.1 The main reason for such 
an advance was undoubtedly the political and economic crisis that 
engulfed Britain in those months, as the Labour Government collapsed, the 
economy floundered, sailors mutinied, and the demonstrations of the 
unemployed became bigger and bloodier. In an intensified political 
climate, when the global tribulations of capitalism meant its whole edifice 
came into question, the predictions of capitalist collapse and encroaching 
war touted by the CPGB since 1927, were suddenly vindicated. 2 
The British Communist Party's simultaneous attempt to 'turn towards 
masses' was substantiated by an overhaul of the Party apparatus and the 
publication of a programme designed to rebuild the CP 'from the bottom 
upwards. '3 For Kevin Morgan, the'January Resolutions'of 1932 marked 
the beginning of "an effective communist presence in this country" and 
although initial progress was slow and problematic, such an assertion is 
essentially correCt. 4 This chapter will focus therefore, on the CPGB's 
interpretation of and response to the crisis of 193 1, and the reorganisation 
of the Party that occurred in 1932. 
I Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PLily of Great Britain 31 December 
193 1. Communist Archive. Report on Paqy Organisation November 193 1. Klugmann 
Papers. 
2Such an advance should obviously not be exaggerated. The Party remained relatively 
small. 
3Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pgly of Great Britain 16-17 
January 1932. Communist Archive. 
4K. Morgan, Hany Pollitt op. cit. p77. 
The Party's numerical growth remained within the framework of the New 
Line, indeed the events of late 1931 can be seen as the summation of the 
Third Period from the CPGB's perspective. While the Party's interpretation 
of the united front from below broadened, its hostility to the Labour Party, 
the ILP and the trade union bureaucracy remained as vehement and as 
vociferous as it had been in 1929. As such, the Twelfth Congress of the 
CPGB, held in November 1932, did not mark the end of the New Line. 
Rather, it encompassed the policy of the class against class in its most 
coherent and applicable form. By supporting various 'rank and file' 
initiatives inside the trade union movement, the CPGB relinquished the 
burden of the MM and moved towards re-establishing a communist 
presence inside the organised labour movement. 
The rise of Hitler in 1933 would necessitate a thorough revision of 
communist policy throughout the International, and the struggle against 
fascism and war provided the CPGB with a cause to rally the support of 
thousands. It was in these years, 1933-45, that the CPGB finally 
established itself as a sizeable political force in Britain. 5 But history is not 
divided into neat segments, and the evolution of the Third Period into the 
Popular Front, like that of the Second Period into the Third, was not a case 
of black turning to white. Thus, some seeds of the Party's further 
development were planted in the Third Period; and it is to the origins of 
the CPGB's growth that this chapter turns. 
5See K. Morgan Against Fascism and War op. cit. for an excellent overview of the 
Popular Front period. 
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Crisis: The Third Period Justified? 
"The fight is here, " wrote Palme Dutt in October 1931.6 For Dutt and the 
CPGB, the financial and political crisis of 1931 was confirmation of the 
theoretical formulations of the Comintern. While the Wall Street Crash, 
rising unemployment, and the onset of fascist (or neo-fascist) regimes 
throughout Europe had already given credence to the determinants of the 
Third Period, the collapse of the Labour Government placed the period 
acutely within a British context. "The correctness of our [position] is 
revealed, " wrote Dutt, the CP must now "seize the tempo" and lead the 
British workers to revolution. 7 
The events of 1931 were indeed dramatiC. 8 Unemployment continued to 
rise, with 2,783,000 people registered out of work by July. 9 Meanwhile, 
the world economic crisis that had intensified in the wake of the Wall 
Street Crash was further bolstered by the collapse of the Austrian and 
German banks in May 193 1. British assets in both countries were frozen, 
and as the Bank of England chose to borrow E50,000,000 from the New 
York Federal Reserve Bank and the Bank of Paris 
- 
and the Government 
simultaneously maintained the high value of the pound with its 
commitment to free trade and the Gold Standard 
- 
foreign investors 
anxiously withdrew their remaining deposits from London. Such a1light 
from the pound, ' which threatened to completely undermine the British 
economy, was then compounded by the publication of the May Committee 
report in July, which predicted huge deficits for 1932-33 and 
recommended substantial cuts in public spending. 
61, abour Monthly October 193 1. 
7Letter to the Political Bureau IS September 193 1. Klugmann Papers. 
8See A. Thorpe, The British General Election of 1931 op. cit. 9Minisigy of Labour Gazette February 1932. By September, unemployment had risen to 2,825,772. 
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For a Government already racked by internal divisions and declining 
popularity therefore, the events of summer 1931 were too much for a 
minority administration to endure. 10 While a section of the Labour cabinet 
sought to resist or limit any cuts in the rate of unemployment benefit, the 
opposition parties, the world banks and the employers all demanded ever 
severer economies. MacDonald was thus sandwiched between his own 
party and the majority of parliament, and on 24 August at the bequest of 
the King, he formed a National Government that pushed the Labour Party 
into opposition. ' I Consequently, pay cuts for Government employees and 
servicemen were announced, brutal restrictions were placed on 
unemployment relief, and the continued 'flight from the pound' forced 
Britain off the Gold Standard on 19 September. 12 
The CPGB's interpretation of such events was revealed by William Rust in 
his reports to the Political Bureau, and in the pages of the Daily Worker. 
"The National Government 
... 
represents a step towards fascism, " Rust 
said on 17 August, 13 while the effective mobilisation of the unemployed 
IOA. Thorpe, The British General Election op. cit. pp2l-26. The Governmenes failure to 
tackle the problem of unemployment or to meet even the most limited of trade union 
demands had already led to discontent within both the Labour Party itself and the wider 
labour movement. Throughout 1930 the unions became increasingly critical of the 
Government, and the numerous disputes over unemployment engendered the wrath of the 
Party left, particularly in the ILP. Moreover, Laboues by-election results had steadily 
worsened from February 1930 onwards. 
I IThe formation of a National Government did little to alleviate Britain's economic plight 
however. The'flight from the pound'continued apace. 
12These included an increase in contributions to unemployment insurance, a reduction in 
the rate of unemployment benefit, the restriction of the period allowed for receipt of 
benefit, the imposition of a means test to evaluate individual claimants, and the 
amendment of various'anomaties'. See W. Hannington, Ten Lean Years (London, 1940) 
for an overview of such measures from the perspective of the NUWM. 
13Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Par! y of Great Britain 27 August 
193 1. Communist Archive. William Gallacher backed Rust's synopsis, adding that the 
National Government represented the unification of the capitalist class against the 
workers. 
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was clear evidence of the working class's "revolutionary spirit. "14 For Dutt 
too, such unrest and mass mobilisation revealed the "fight for life between 
the bourgeoisie and the working class. " 15 Capitalism was bankrupt wrote 
Dutt, the workers were under attack but rallying against the 'capitalist 
offensive', and the National Government was a "capitalist dictatorship 
... 
in 
full action. " 16 Indeed, by as early 27 July, Dutt had completed and 
despatched the first of two articles entitled 'British Capitalism on the Edge 
of a Precipice'to Inpreco, and Pravda in preparation of the impending 
collapse. 17 
The Invergordon mutiny of 15 September was regarded by the CPGB as 
Ly particularly indicative of the mounting political tension. Through the Rail 
Worker, the Party called on other sailors, soldiers and workers to support 
of the mutineers. 18 The mutiny had occurred in response to a proposed 
wage cut of 25 per cent issued by the National Government as part of its 
stringency measures. However, despite the copious amount of space the 
CP gave to the incident, Invergordon remained an isolated protest. 19 Even 
so, it had further stirred the revolutionary imaginations of the CPGB, and 
the Party was rewarded for its insurrectory efforts by a Special Branch raid 
on the Daily Worker, the imprisonment of the managing director of Utopia 
14W. Rust Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pg! U of Great Britain 
19-20 September 193 1. Communist Archive. 
15Letter from R. P. 
-Dutt 
to the Political Bureau 4 September 193 1. Klugmann Papers. 
16R. P. Dutt, The Workers'Answer to the Crisis (London, 193 1). 
1713ritish Capitalism on the Edge of a Precipice, sent 28 July 193 1. Part Il was sent I 
August 193 1. Dutt Papers (BL). 
18Daily Worker 18 September 193 1. See also, Minutes of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Pgiy of Great Britai 19-20 September 193 1. Communist Archive. 
19For a far more detailed account. see D. Divine, Mutiny At Invergordon (London, 1970). 
F. Copernan, Reason in Revolt (London, 1948). pp40-53. Copeman joined the CPGB 
following the mutiny. 
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PresS20 (W. T. Wilkinson), and the arrest of Party members George Allison 
and Frank Shepherd. 21 
Far more favourable for the CPGB were the unemployment 
demonstrations of September-November. Throughout Britain, marches 
were organised, means test forms returned, petitions drawn up, and Public 
Assistance Committees picketed. Huge crowds marched through Dundee 
on 22 September, Glasgow on the 24th and London on the 27 th 
, 
as the 
unemployed in every major industrial town rallied under the banner the 
NUWM. 22 Such demonstrations were often viciously repressed. In Salford 
for example, a peaceful march to the town hall was met by police 
"charging with their batons, " and protesters such as the Manchester 
communist Eddie Frow were subjected to severe beatings by the local 
constabulary. 23 Moreover, as the demonstrations continued to gather 
momentum throughout October-November, the leaders of the NTJWM 
became regular targets for arrest. Wal Hannington and Sid Elias were both 
imprisoned, and the Chief Commissioner, Lord Trenchard, was forced to 
issue a ban on meetings held at labour exchanges. 
With a General Election called for 27 October 193 1, the CPGB had a 
chance to put its analysis to the British people. The principles of class 
20Utopia Press printed the Daily Worker. 
21 See N. Branson, History of the Communist PpM of Great Britain. op. cit. pp70-71. W. 
Rust, The StoEy of the Daily Worker op. cit. pp2l-24. Shepard and Allison had made 
contact with the sailors only to be framed by the security services for distributing 
subversive leaflets. 
22Every NTJWM branch organised demonstrations. The numbers present on each 
demonstration are impossible to gather with the estimates given in a number of sources 
ranging from 10,000 to 150,000. 
23 R. and E. Frow, The Battle of Bexley Square. (Manchester, 1994). See also W. 
Greenwood's novel Love on the Dole. (London, 1948), for another eyewitness account. 
Wal Hannington, in his autobiography Never on our Knees op. cit. pp237-245, gives 
several accounts of these demonstrations and their harsh repression. In Glasgow on I 
October a particularly viscous baton charge met the unemployed as they marched through 
the city. 
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against class were once again laid out in a manifesto drawn up by William 
Rust, Ernest Woolley, Robin Page Arnot, William Joss and Kath 
Duncan. 24 Subsequently, 'Workers'! Sailors'! SoldiersT focused as much 
on the treachery of the Labour Party and the ILP as it did on the 
ramifications of an elected National Government. The Party called for the 
workers to take the fight 'into their own hands', to repudiate the 'enemies of 
socialism' (Henderson and the TUC), and to relaunch the spirit of the 
General Strike. 25 The Election itself was dismissed as a "mockery" in 
Palme Dutt's pre-election pamphlet: an attempt to hide a 'capitalist 
dictatorship' under a 'democratic veil'. 
The National' Government is already formed and carrying out its programme 
... 
the cuts 
are put through. The workers are robbed, starved, batoned. And then, after all this, the 
representatives of the capitalist parties, of the robbers, turn smiling and bowing to the 
workers, to the 'sovereign people', to give them their votes and 'approve' all their 
actions. 26 
The CPGB fought 26 constituencies in the 1931 General Election and 
polled 74,824 votes. As in 1929, the communist candidates all failed to 
win their seats (although Arthur Homer and Bob Stewart both polled over 
10,000 votes), and although the number of votes registered an 
improvement on the Party's previous performance, the result revealed 
clearly the disparity between the CPGB as an agitational, organisational 
presence within the labour movement, and as a viable political alternative 
to the Labour Party in the minds of the working class. Furthermore, 
despite the months of crisis and unrest, the election resulted in an 
overwhelming victory for the National Government. The number of 
24Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PqM of Great Britain 19-20 
September 193 1. Communist Archive. Rust implored his comrades to speak in a language 
"closer" to the workers. 
25Worker'! Sailors'! Soldiers'! General Election Manifesto of the Communist Pam of 
Great Britain (London, 193 1). Also in Communist Review November-December 193 1. 
26R. P. Dutt, The Workers' Answer to the Crisis op. cit. 
242 
Labour M. Ps fell from 287 to just 46,27 and the National candidates polled 
over 14,000,000 votes to secure 554 seats. 
Just what the Election result proved was to be a contentious issue for the 
CPGB. If the masses were radicalising and the class struggle accentuating, 
how was it possible to account for a fall in the Labour vote by some 
2,000,000, and the apparently huge swing to the Conservative Party? 
Typically, Dutt was quick to offer an explanation, producing a dialectical 
piece of wizardry to match his analysis of 1929. Certainly the election was 
a'smashing blow' against the Labour Party Dutt figured, but the workers 
had not voted Conservative. Rather, as the Liberal vote had declined by 
three million and the Conservative vote had risen by three million, there 
had been a "rearrangement" of the bourgeois vote, from Liberal to 
Conservative. The fall in the Labour vote meanwhile, was due to the 
masses turning away from the 'old' labour movement and towards a new 
'workers' movement. '28 
Such an analysis was unable to stand up to close inspection, and it was 
criticised by both Stuart Purkis and Jack Murphy. Both agreed that the 
defeat of the Labour Party was a chief feature of the General Election, but 
this did not lead to the conclusion that the Labour Party was in ruins 
- 
it 
had still polled over six million votes 
- 
or that workers had abstained 
rather than vote for the National candidate. 29 Essentially, the difficulty for 
the CPGB came from the need to fit the result of the Election to the line of 
the Party, rather than vice versa. As Dutt 'admitted' in his reply to Purkis, 
if his analysis was "inadequate 
... 
it would mean that we should have to 
27plUS six unendorsed candidates, three of which were ILP. 
28Daily Worke 5 November 193 1. 
29For Purkis'reply to Dutt see Daily Worke 6 November 193 1. For Murphy, see Letter 
to the Political Bureau 8 November 193 1. Klugmann Papers. 
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revise as incorrect the whole line of radicalisation of the working class as 
the characteristic feature of the present stage of crisis 
... 
1130 With such 
reasoning, the PB adopted Dutt's analysis. 31 
The question did not end there however. At a December Presidium called 
to discuss the 'situation in the British Party', Dutt's analysis came in for 
severe criticism from Comintern luminaries such as Gerhardt, Emmerich, 
Safarov, Heckert and Kuusinen. It was "complacent" to see the Labour 
Party as finished said Emmerich, while Heckert dismissed the idea that the 
workers did not vote Tory as "quite false. " Indeed it was the latter's 
analysis, that the radicalisation of one section of the working class had led 
dialectically to a swing to the right in another, that eventually won the 
approval of the ECCI. 32 The radicalisation of the working class was still 
accepted, but Dutt's 'rose-tinted' view of Britain's revolutionary 
development was far too optimistic for the more pragmatic Executive. 
So, where did the crisis of 1931 leave the CPGB? Certainly the heightened 
political climate, the economic dislocation, and the'crisis mentality'of the 
time gave credence to a communist alternative to capitalism; particularly 
given the success of the Soviet Union's Five Year Plan that ran 
simultaneously with the'depression years'. The increase in unemployment 
and the subsequent activity of the NUWM also did much to 'win over' 
workers to the CPGB. As such, the Party expanded relatively rapidly 
during the 'crisis months'. Membership had begun to increase from the 
beginning of the year, rising from 2,555 in November 1930 to 2,756 by 
30Reply to Criticism of S. Purkis. Sent to the Daily Worke 17 November 1931. (BL) 
31 Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pa! ly of Great Britain 5 and 12 
November 193 1. Communist Archive. 
32The British Commission of the ECCI 2-29 December 193 1. Communist Archive and 
Klugmann Papers. 
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June 193 1. Between then and December 1931 however, the Party more 
than doubled. An official figure of 7,478 was presented to the Party 
Executive in December, while even the number of factory cells 
- 
always 
an embarrassment for the Party 
- 
rose to 49.33 
In every Party District an improvement in the CPGB's standing was 
recorded. For example, the Sheffield DPC reported an "almost daily" 
influx of new members as a result of the "fight against economies and the 
means test. "34 Elsewhere, the Birmingham District Party grew from just 
101 members in June, to 500 in November; the Scottish District from 428 
to 1,396; and the London Party from 998 to 2,000.35 While it is true that 
the Party launched a recruitment campaign in May, it was undoubtedly the 
events unfolding around the Party in the subsequent weeks that made the 
campaign appear such a succesS. 36 
Although many of the new recruits would be transitory members, and the 
vast majority was unemployed, the fact that this influx came after five 
years of apparent stagnation and isolation did much to bolster the Party. 
Young academics such as John Strachey came closer to the CPGB, and 
since October 1931 a number of communist cells had formed in the 
universities. 37 Moreover, as the ILP distanced itself from the Labour Party, 
several local branches made overtures towards the CP. Such a 
33Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pgjy of Great Britain 31 December 
193 1. Communist Archive. 
34Report to the Organisational Department from the Sheffield District P4M Committee 
November-December 193 1. Klugmarm Papers. The District membership rose from 228 
in June 1931 to 450 in November, with the bulk of the new recruits coming in the "last 
two months. " 
35Rel2ort on Pgjy Organisation November 193 1. Klugmarm Papers. 
361bid. The increase in membership in June-July was relatively minor. 
37Letter from 114gy Pollitt to Jimmy Shields 4 March 1932. Klugmann Papers. 
According to Pollitt, there were eighteen in London, ten in Oxford, 25 in Cambridge and 
between two and four in Reading, Durham, Leeds and Manchester. 
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development was tentatively welcomed as an example of radicalisation, 
but the Party also regarded any connection with the ILP as "very 
dangerous" and there remained "clearly no question of a united front from 
the top. "38 Even so, both Cox and Robson, in July 193 1, underlined the 
need to approach the ILP rank and file, 39 and examples of local 
collaboration, particularly in relation to NTJWM, became increasingly 
common. 40 
Finally, the organisational success of the NTJWM did much to heighten the 
Party's profile and appeal. The vast majority of new recruits came to the 
CP through the unemployed struggles of the time, and although the 
NUWM would continue to endure criticism from the Party and the RILU, 
it remained the most auspicious communist auxiliary of the Third Period. 
By the end of 193 1, The Worker estimated that the NUWM had over 300 
branches and represented some 35,000 workers. 41 
Thus, although the CPGB remained on the periphery of British politics in a 
parliamentary context, its work amongst the unemployed suggested that 
the Party was a consequential part of the British labour movement. 
Furthermore, the divisions within the Labour Party and the ILP, and the 
Party's re-emphasis on work within the trade unions, began to open up 
38Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pg! y of Great Britain 19-20 
September 193 1. Communist Archive. Rust recommended that the Party put demands to 
the ILP that the leadership would not accept but which the rank and file would see as 
united front proposals. 
39Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PLr! y of Great Britain 9 July 193 1. 
Communist Archive. 
40See below. Also Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pgm of Great 
Britain 8 October 193 1. Communist Archive. Page Arnot reported on CP-ILP 
collaboration in Glasgow, Liverpool, London and "others. " For an example, see R. 
Groves The Balharn Group op. cit. pp40-42. 
41 The Worker 5 December, 193 1. See also R. Croucher, We Refuse to Starve op. cit. 
p126. This figure has been questioned. S. Davies, 'The Membership of the National 
Unemployed Movement'op. cit. Davies estimates that the membership was closer 23,000 
at the end of 193 1. 
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opportunities for the'united front from below'to be applied in a more 
discernible form. Wherever the Party existed, communists continued to 
make their presence felt; whether it was Ernest Woolley in Manchester, 
carrying on his speech to unemployed demonstrators whilst being 
simultaneously chased over walls by the police; 42 or Red Wheelers from 
the Leeds cycling club, rallying support to prevent the eviction of a 
worker's family in the wake of the means test. 43 It was in an attempt to 
build on such hard work and potential therefore, that the Party once again 
overhauled itself in 1932. 
Reorganisation and Reapplication 
In January 1932, Harry Pollitt unveiled plans to overhaul the existing 
structure and working methods of the CPGB. These became known as the 
'January Resolutions' and they sought to augment the Party's gains of the 
previous six months while simultaneously establishing a more effective 
communist presence within the factories and the trade unions. The 
preliminary details of the reorganisation were developed at a British 
Commission in December 193 1, held by the ECCI in order to offer a 
'thorough examination' of the Party in the wake of the General Election, 
and to reverse the declining Party influence in the trade union movement. 
(The commission was run in conjunction with the Eighth session of the 
RILU CC. ) The result, after several days of discussion with such ECCI 
heavyweights as Manuilsky and Kuusinen, led to what Jack Murphy 
described as the most important document since the ECCI's'open letter'to 
the Leeds Congress in 1929.44 
42M. Jenkins. Prelude to Better Dgys. Autobiographical Manuscript held at the WCML. 
43Sports and Games January 1932. 
44See The British Commission of the ECCI 2-29 December 193 1. Communist Archive 
and Klugmarm Papers. For Murphy's comment, see Minutes of the Political Bureau of the 
Communist PUN of Great Britain 9 January 1932. Communist Archive. 
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In an echo of the 1930 British Commission, the'January Resolutions' 
blamed the Party's isolation on the lack of effective contact with the daily 
life and work of the working class in the factories and the trade unions. 
However, while the objectives and methods of the united front from below 
were restated, the 1931 commission also outlined plans to radically 
restructure the CPGB apparatus. This entailed the refocusing of 
communist activity onto four key districts, London, Scotland, South Wales 
and Lancashire. Leading members of the Executive were dispatched to the 
relevant District Party centres, from where they were to form Working 
Bureaus and "chose the most decisive factories and unions in. which they 
will carry forward the line. The whole agitational resources of the Party 
will be thrown into that particular factory or trade union branch. "45 
Consequently, the Party centre was drastically reduced. Political Bureau 
meetings were held on alternate Saturdays with Pollitt and Rust co- 
ordinating Party affairs from King Street in the interim. Distinct sections 
of the CPGB, such as the Women's Department, were incorporated into the 
general work of the Party. Idris Cox (South Wales), William Gallacher 
(Scotland), Robin Page Amot (Lancashire), Harry Pollitt and William Rust 
(London), were placed in charge of the chosen DistriCtS, 46 and every 
Executive member of the Party was assigned to a factory cell and trade 
union in which they were instructed to utilise 'every institution within the 
factories and mines to rally the workers around specific issues' relevant to 
life in the workplace. 47 For those communists not in work, 'street cells' 
45Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Paqy of Great Britain 9 January 
1932. Communist Archive. The other Districts 
- 
Liverpool, Bradford, Birmingham, 
Tyneside and Sheffield 
- 
were to remain but without additional resources. 
46Minutes of the Political-Bureau of the Communist Pagy of Great Britain 14 January 
1932. Communist Archive. 
47Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Great Britain 9 January 
1932. Communist Archive. 
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were to be developed to agitate around local issues and recruit potential 
Party members. In Hammersmith for example, the street cell produced a 
local news-sheet and organised school meals for the children of the 
unemployed. 48 
Such reorganisation was certainly necessary. In Kuusinen's words, the 
CPGB had become "an apparatus on top, but not a Party 
... 
directly 
connected with the masses. "49 By overhauling the Party apparatus both at 
the centre and locally, it was hoped to establish stronger links with the 
working class while simultaneously alleviating the burden of bureaucracy 
on Party functionaries. This did not imply a lessening of 'revolutionary 
work' however, and the resolutions outlined significant innovations with 
regard to the Party's approach. 
In the trade unions for example, "the sharpest possible turn" was to be 
made in the Party's work and attitude. "The theory that the old unions are 
schools of capitalism and we are in them to destroy them is absolutely 
false, " said Pollitt. As such, the idea that the trade unions were 'played out' 
was to be 'strangled' along with the 'new union psychology' of the Third 
Period. 50 
This was an issue that mattered greatly to Pollitt, who had fought 
consistently against the radical trade union policy propagated by Losovsky 
at the RILU, and the left in the CPGB. The example of the AEU Members 
48Communist Review January 1933. 
49The British Commission of the ECCI 2-29 December 193 1. Communist Archive and 
Klugmann Papers. 
5OMinutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PPM of Great Britain 9 January 
1932. Communist Archive. 
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Rights Movement (MRM) in particular, bolstered Pollitfs belief that a 
fundamental realignment in the CP's policy was needed. 
The MRM had emerged in the wake of the AEU's expulsion of various 
union members opposed to the Executive's acceptance of reduced wage 
rates and revised working conditions. The campaign gained widespread 
support throughout the union, eventually securing the reinstatement of 
those expelled in June 1932. Most significantly for Pollitt however, was 
the leading role played by communist engineers such as Joe Scott and 
Percy Glading, and the supportive role played by the Metalworkers'MM 
under Jack Tanner. 51 
Such a'united front', initiated by the workers and inclusive of communist 
and non-communists alike, would form the basis of the Party's new 
approach. In order to apply his initiative however, Pollitt was forced to 
secure the support of the ECCL Thus, when Losovsky accused Pollitt of 
'negating the policy of independent leadership' at the Eighth RILU Plenum 
in December 193 1, he was rebuked by Kuusinen, the ECCI 
representative. 52 The December Presidium further ratified Pollitt's 
perspective. And although the final resolution did not go so far as to 
suggest that trade unions could be transformed into ... real organs of class 
struggle" (as Gerhardt suggested), Kuusinen made it clear that such a 
51 See R. and E. Frow, Engineering Struggles. Episodes in the Story of the Shop Stewards' 
Movement (Manchester, 1982). pp9l-94. Also N. Fishman, The British Communist P 
op. cit. p42. 
52Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Great Britain 9 January 
1932. Communist Archive. The disagreements within the ECCI and the RILU over the 
question of trade union policy came to a climax in late 193 1. The more moderate line of 
Manuilsky, Kuusinen and Piatnitsky eventually came through, as evidenced by the 
Resolutions of the RILU Plenum and the endorsement of Pollitt's line. See Breaking 
Through RILU pamphlet. 1932. Pollitt believed there to be a "definite campaign against 
me at RILU headquarters. " "Because I dared to criticise the Profintern, I committed the 
unforgivable sin and the lads are now after my blood. " Letter from Han Pollitt to Jimmy 
Shields 18 March 1932. Klugmann Papers. 
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transformation "was possible among some of the lower branches. " In his 
concluding speech on 22nd December, Kuusinen was even more explicit: 
We must say to the workers that they must fight for turning the trade unions into real 
class fighting organisations 
... 
and the workers through their own experience, through 
their struggle for changing the trade unions into class struggle organisations, should learn 
through their own experience that the communists are the best leaders of the class 
struggle. 53 
Pollitt also raised the question of the MM in his opening speech to the 
commission. The name of the movement was notTundamentally 
important'he said, and although the MM was not officially liquidated at 
the Plenum, its objectives were noticeably revised. The movement would 
now form the basis of a Revolutionary Trade Union Opposition; 
supporting workers rank and file initiatives with the intention of 
organising them on a national basis "at a later stage. "54 This was 
essentially the 'death knoll' for the MM as Pollitt lambasted the 
movement's recent record. The establishment of Strike Committees 
"without any vestiges of support or mass influence" was condemned, as 
was the tendency to issue programmes emanating from the "Party or MM 
office" rather than "the life of the workers themselves. " "The composition 
of the Minority Movement as we know it today will disappear" Pollitt 
predicted, "and we will have a mass organisation growing up in its 
place. "55 
The question of work among the unemployed was less revelatory, with the 
usual charges of 'legalism' again levelled at the NUWM. Hannington once 
again defended the dues-paying basis of the movement to the commission, 
531bid. 
54 Report of the British Commission 2-29 December 193 1. Communist Archive and 
Klugmann Papers. 
55Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pa! V of Great Britain 16-17 
January 193 1. Communist Archive. 
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although he did admit responsibility for the NUWM's failure to set up the 
non-membership based Unemployed Councils outlined at the Prague 
Conference on unemployment held in July-August 1931.56 As Richard 
Croucher has explained in some detail however, these 'all-in' councils were 
difficult to apply to Britain. The NUWM was already well established, and 
the vast majority of local branches regarded such councils as an 
unnecessary rival organisation. 57 Although the NAC, under pressure from 
the RILU, continued to call for their establishment throughout 1932, 
nothing came from the initiative. 
With regard to other political parties, the CP maintained its commitment to 
the notions of class against class. Indeed, the Party had become 
increasingly hostile to the ILP in response to Maxton and company's 
widening breach with the Parliamentary Labour Party. "The ILP is the 
most dangerous enemy of the working class movement. It constitutes a 
terrific barrier between the radicalised masses and the Party" declared 
Pollitt in January; and subsequently, instances where the Party had 
formally collaborated with the ILP were condemned unreservedly. For 
example, the CI and the British PB both criticised the Scottish District 
Party for allowing an unemployment demonstration to be headed by John 
McGovern of the ILP. 58 Similarly, the N-UWM's involvement with a 
56For the Prague Resolutions see Inpreco 8 September 193 1. Hannington was very 
critical of the Prague Conference at the British Commission in December. The first three 
days of the conference were taken up with reports on the severity of unemployment in 
various countries he said. Subsequently, he and Johnny Campbell met Walter Ulbricht for 
just one hour to discuss the new approach to the unemployed in Britain. No resolution 
appeared before the congress, no definite agreements were made, and Hannington 
claimed to have only seen the Prague resolutions when they were reported by Robin Page 
Amot in mid September. 
57R. Croucher, We Refuse to Starve op. cit. pp126-130. 
58Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pagy of Great Britain 8 and II 
October 193 1. Communist Archive. Both Gallacher and Peter Kerrigan argued in favour 
of the Glasgow DPC. Furthermore, the Scottish Party were charged with'Iegalism, for 
first; seeking permission for the demonstration from the local magistrate, and second; for 
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deputation to meet Ramsay MacDonald (organised by James Maxton and 
David Kirkwood) was censured, along with the NUWM-ILP meeting at 
the Friends Meeting House in London on 23 September. 59 
As both Kuusinen and Pollitt correctly explained, the policy outlined at the 
British Commission was not a repudiation of the New Line. The 
resolutions remained within the paradigm of the Third Period and 
essentially supplemented the line established at the 1930 commission. 
However, the measures taken to restructure the CPGB were indeed radical. 
The overhaul of the Party apparatus and the realignment of the MM 
signified the final preclusion of the leftist interpretation of the New Line. 
Whilst the fundamental constructs of class against class remained, the 
working methods of the CPGB were revised significantly. 
Problems of Application 
Although the January Resolutions were endorsed unanimously by the 
CPGB Executive, the initial results of the Party's reorganisation were 
variable. The PB was at once concerned that there had been little 
appreciation of the "real ftindamental change" to Party work outlined in 
the resolutionS, 60 and this was bome out in the reports issued by the 
various District representatives. The resolutions were "not grasped [South 
Wales]" by local Party members, or had been accepted "without proper 
not allowing the workers to 'armý themselves in a march protesting against the police 
brutality of the I October demonstration. 
59For the Friends House Meeting see The Workers United Front and the ILP (London, 
193 1). For the criticism of NUWM contact with Maxton see Minutes of the Political 
Bureau of the Communist Pg! y of Great Britain 8 October 193 1. Communist Archive. 
60Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pa! jy of Great Britain 22 January 
1932. Communist Archive. Gallacher, Cox and Pollitt felt the CC had gone badly, and the 
ECCI representative, 'Jack!, said the resolutions were endorsed with'suspicious 
unanimity. ' 
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study [Manchester]. '161 In addition, despite the appearance of the Party 
Organiser, with articles entitled'How Party Work can be Improved'and 
'Knowing What Goes on in the Factory' penned by Harry Pollitt, it soon 
became apparent that the 'turn to mass work' would not occur without 
diff, CUlty. 62 Subsequently, although the Working Bureaus established in 
the districts quickly designated various factories, pits and unions to focus 
upon, Pollitt was forced to complain to the CC meeting of June 1932 about 
the 'mechanical acceptance' of the resolutions. Two months later, at the 
Twelfth ECCI Plenum, Pollitt estimated that only 25 per cent of Party 
members actively applied the resolutions, while the rest 'clung' to the 'old 
sectarian routine. ' 63 
Idris Cox provided the details of the Party's development to the Central 
Committee in June and the Twelfth Party Congress in November 1932. 
Despite recruiting 2,500 members since January, Cox explained, the Party 
membership had actually fallen from over 7,000 to just 5,400 by 
November. Despite an increase in the number of factory cells throughout 
1932, from 40 to 82, only 39 per cent of Party members were in work, and 
the vast majority of new recruits continued to come through the NUWM. 64 
The effect of the Party's trade union work was similarly varied. Only 35 
61 For Cox's Report on South Wales, see Minutes of the Political Bureau of the 
Communist Pgly of Great Britain 6 February 1932. Communist Archive. For the 
comments on the London District see London District ReRort 22 April 1932. Klugmarm 
Papers. 
62PaEly Organiser No. I March 1932 and No. 8 December 1932. 
63Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PLaly of Great Britain 4-5 June 
1932. Communist Archive. See also Pollitt's Letter to Jimmy Shields 10 March 1932. 
Klugmarm Papers. For an overview of the ECCI Plenum see R. W. Robsolvs report in the 
paily Worker 6 October 1932, and E. H. Carr, Twilight of the Comintern op. cit., pp64-74 
and 220-222. 
64Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PaM of Great Britain. 4-5 June 
1932. Communist Archive. Report of the Twelfth Congress of the Communist Pam of 
Great Britain 12-15 November 1932. Klugmann Papers. 70 of the cells were in the four 
key districts, and all 82 had a total of 550 members. For the total membership figure, see 
Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PLrjy of Great Britain 9 November 
1932. Communist Archive. 
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per cent of Party card holders were registered union members in June 
1932, although Cox reported that the re-emphasis on Party work in the 
trade unions and the factories had indeed brought the CPGB 'closer to the 
workers. '65 
The numerous reports on the four key Districts emphasised these mixed 
results. In London the Party membership fell ftom 2,120 in December 
1931 to 1,800 in June 1932. However, the percentage of Party members 
who were also in a trade union rose slightly, and the Party's supportive role 
in various disputes (see below) led to the recruitment of 180 'industrial 
workers'and an increase in communist factory cells; from 25 to 33. The 
Scottish membership also fell (from 1,453 to 1,200) between January and 
November. The number of factory cells in Scotland rose ftom five to 
twenty, but only 226 Scottish communists were registered trade union 
members. Even so, the Scottish Party had more than doubled since the 
summer of 193 1, and through the NUWM and UMS, the CPGB was able 
to mobilise significant sections of the Scottish working class beyond the 
Party membership. 66 The UMS for instance, led a successftil strike of 
5,000 miners against proposed wage cuts in May. 67 
In South Wales, although the District membership fell from 700 to 594 
between January and July, the Party managed to go some way towards re- 
establishing itself The number of trade union members in the Welsh Party 
65Report of the Twelfth Congress of the Communist PgISy of Great Britain 12-15 
November 1932. Klugmarm Papers. Approximately 2,500 people joined the Party 
between November 1931 and November 1932; and the same number left. In Birmingham, 
the number of people who left the District Party in 1932, was double the number who 
remained in it. 
66 See the various reports to the PB in Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist 
Party of Great Britain 1932. Communist Archive and Klugmarm Papers. The number of 
factory cells was given as 18-20 in May 1932. 
67Report of the Fourth Congress of the United Mineworkers of Scotland 4-5 December 
1932. Klugmann Papers. See also the Daily Worke throughout May 1932. 
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increased, and ldris Cox reported that communists occupied several 
official union positions. The number of CP and MM delegates attending 
the 1932 SWMF conference rose to eight (compared to just two in 193 1), 
and communists were evident on four district union committees, sixteen 
branch committees and two district councils. 68 
The Lancashire District meanwhile, saw an increase in Communist Party 
membership (from 515 to 834) between January and October, primarily as 
a consequence of the ongoing textile dispute. Even so, the CP was not 
happy with the rate of development in Manchester, and the PB became 
increasingly critical of Robin Page Arnot, as the Executive's 
representative, and Trevor Robinson, the District Organiser. Despite the 
intensifying unrest in the textile towns, the Party remained unable to make 
a significant impact on the dispute. Opposition to the Party line within the 
District Party (of which Page Arnot was himself guilty) undoubtedly 
hampered development, with trade union work considered to be extremely 
'inadequate'. 69 
All four'key Districts' recounted difficulties in mobilising the majority of 
local communists to the new approach. Many 'local comrades' were 
reported to have found 'nothing neNV in the January Resolutions, or had 
accepted the resolutions whilst continuing to work as they had done 
68At Ferndale, the lodge secretary was a communist, as was the vice chairman. 
Additionally, five of the fifteen members of the lodge committee were CP members. In 
contrast, the Tylorstown lodge had 40 Party members, only one of whom bothered to 
attend its meetings. Report on the South Wales District 6 February 1932. Communist 
Archive. 
691bid. For criticism of Page Amot see, Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist 
Pqrty of Great Britain 20 August 1932. Pollitt later called for Page Arnot to be relegated 
to a candidate member of Party Executive, but he was opposed by Gallacher, Cox and 
Rust among others. For Robinson, see Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist 
Party of Great Britain 25 June 1932. Both Communist Archive. 
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before. 70 At the Twelfth Party Congress, ldris Cox complained of older 
comrades' ("the grandfathers of the Party") hostility to new members who 
they thought threatened their position. 71 Elsewhere, most notoriously in 
London, those on the left of the Party registered openly their disagreement 
with the leadership's re-emphasis on trade union work (see below). 
Although the January Resolutions were intended to transform the CPGB 
from a 'sect' to a mass party, initial progress had proven slow and 
problematic. The main increase in Party membership had come during the 
political upheavals of 193 1, and although the Party was able to maintain a 
steady level of membership throughout 1932, it was unable to add to it. 
(The degree of fluctuation in Party membership was described as 
'unprecedented'. 72) However, the resolutions' more supportive, pragmatic 
line enabled the Party to register some notable successes in its trade union 
work in 1932, and through the NUWM, the CP continued to dominate the 
unemployed movement. 
Difference of opinion between the CP and NT-JWM Executives over the 
issue of Unemployed Councils did not noticeably diminish communist 
agitation amongst the unemployed. At a local and national level, the 
NUWM remained at the forefront of the'class struggle' throughout 1932, 
70Trevor Robinson said this was particularly evident in Manchester. See Report of the 
Twelfth Congress of the Communist PaM of Great Britain 12-15 November 1932. 
Klugmann Papers. 
71 Report of the Twelfth Congress of the Communist Pý! M of Great Britain 12-15 
November 1932. Klugmann Papers. The Party was very aware of this tendency. William 
Allan had informed the British Commission of a "local where five new members had 
recently been brought into the Party and these five new members were talking about what 
was taking place inside the place where they work. Quite a useful thing to talk about I 
should think. And because they were talking without knowing any of the usual jargon, 
the local comrades there snubbed them and told them they should talk like Bolsheviks 
... 
and that they should bring forward questions relating to Bolshevism. " Report of the 
British Commission. 2-29 December 1931. Communist Archive and Klugmann Papers. 
72ThiS was the view of Idris Cox. Report of the Twelfth Congress of the Communist 
PaM of Great Britain 12-15 November 1932. Klugmann Papers. 
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and it was through the work of the N-UWM that the CPGB could most 
precisely claim to have a'mass influence! In most localities, the NTJWM 
maintained a continuous agitational presence; mobilising the unemployed 
at the labour exchanges, organising regular demonstrations to the Public 
Assistance Committee (PAC), rallying opposition to evictions, and 
offering legal and other advice to individual unemployed workers. The fact 
that County or Borough councils appointed the PAC meant local 
discontent could have a significant influence on the relevant council's 
policy. The N-LJWM consequently registered a number of successes in 
either forcing up the rate of benefit set by the committee, or lessening the 
strictures of the means teSt. 73 Even so, such success often came at a price, 
as local demonstrations met with a violent response from the authorities. 
Demonstrations were regularly baton charged by police, and in Castleford 
one demonstrator, Arthur Speight, was beaten to death. 74 In September the 
clashes intensified further. The protest at Birkenhead was attacked 
violently by the police for example, and the whole NTJWM branch 
committee was arrested before concessions were granted by the PAC. 75 
Nationally, the NTJWM organised a'Day of Struggle' on 23 February. 
Large demonstrations took place across Britain, particularly in Bristol, 
Manchester, London, Edinburgh and Glasgow, and although often ending 
in scenes of violence, the extent of the campaign and the size of support 
73Report of the National Advisojy Committee 23-24 January 1932. Klugmann Papers. 
Early successes included Wigan, the Vale of Levan, Stoke, Keighly, Newcastle and 
Sheffield. Here the NAC reported that the local PAC or council had been unable to 
implement the means test or had been forced to modify it. 
74See R. Croucher, We Refuse to Starve. op. cit. pp 132-133. In Northern Ireland, in 
somewhat different circumstances, two demonstrators were shot, and British police were 
called into action. Increases in the rates of relief were granted subsequently. 
751bid. pp 133-136. See also W. Hannington, Never on our Knees op. cit. pp252-54, for 
an account of events during and after the'riots'. 
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mobilised, led the NUWM to regard the day as a triumph. 76 The movement 
was also able to produce a national newspaper, the Unemployed Special 
(and then the Unemployed Leader). And on 28-29 May, a'Conference 
against the Means Test'attracted 679 delegates from various NUWM and 
trade union bodies. A Hunger March was organised for September- 
October, and while winning few concessions from the Government, the 
march was a major propaganda success for the NUWM. Some 1,500 
marchers, including the now customary Women's contingent led by Lily 
Webb and Maud Brown, converged on London with a petition of 
1,000,000 signatures. 77 They were greeted by thousands of supporters (as 
well as the obligatory police batons) in Hyde Park on 27 October, and so 
ominous did the NUWM appear to the British authorities in late 1932, that 
its leaders (Hannington, Elias, Llewellyn and 78 year old Tom Mann) were 
all arrested prior to, or within days of, the Hyde Park rally. The police 
even seized the petition, and the planned march to the House of Commons 
was duly repressed. 78 
Although actual NUWM membership continued to fluctuate, the 
movement maintained a relatively high number of cadres throughout 
1932.79 Moreover, despite ILP and trade union efforts to instigate rival 
76Report on Demonstrations on the National DU of Struggle undated (1932). Klugmann 
Papers. 
77The petition called for the abolition of the means test and the anomalies act, and the 
restoration of the 10 per cent benefit cut. 'Unofficial' Report of NUWM as at 19 August 
1932 Klugmarm Papers. 
78Hannington was arrested following a NUWM meeting at which he had been 
surreptitiously handed an incriminating document alluding to terrorist activities. 
Hannington exposed the'plot'but was arrested the following day. See Unemploye 
Struggles. 1919-1936 op. cit. p253-255. Sid Elias was arrested on charges relating to 
letters written to Hannington from the USSR. Llewellyn and Mann were both charged 
with sedition. At a local level too, leading NUWM members were regular targets for 
arrest. For Mann see, C. Tsuzuki, Tom Mann 1856-1941: The Challenges of Labour 
(Oxford, 199 1). pp243-45. 
79S. Davies has estimated that the NUWM membership peaked in late 1931 with a total 
of 23,643 (rf'he Membership of op. cit. ). At the same time The Worker 5 December 
193 1, claimed the NUWM represented 35,000, and Hannington informed the ECCI of 
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unemployed organisations, 80 the NUWM continued to lead the 
unemployed in the vast majority of cases. By June 1932, the South Wales 
DPC reported that the NUWM represented 12,000 workers in 28 branches, 
while a month earlier Peter Kerrigan claimed the N-LJWM was a'main line' 
of Party activity in Scotland, with 13,000 members. 81 Although 
Hannington was removed from the Party Executive at the Twelfth Party 
Congress (due to political differences), the success of the NUWM 
remained a source of pride for the CPGB. 
More directly linked to the initiatives of the January Resolutions however, 
was the progress made by the Party in its industrial work. This was due, in 
part, to the fact that the Party now measured its achievement against its 
ability to offer support to various working class grievances and initiatives, 
rather than against its ability to actually lead the workers in a specific 
dispute. Although the need for a more systematic approach to work within 
the trade unions had been stressed by the CPGB since 1930, the 
resolution's emphasis on rank and file committees, its condemnation of the 
MM's 'hard line' tactics, and its re-assertion that lower sections of the 
union apparatus could be'won'by the CP, gave the Party even wider scope 
for trade union agitation. Indeed the impotency of the MM by 1931 made 
3 7,000. Report of the British Commission 2-29 December 193 1. Communist Archive and 
Klugmann Papers. Davies suggests that the average membership throughout 1932 was 
around 20,000, while Harry Pollitt claimed 50,000 in The Communist International 
October 1932. 
8OFor example, a District Committee of the AEU in Scotland set up an unemployed 
organisation. See Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PLM of Great 
hLin 9-10 April 193 2. Communist Archive an 
. 
The TUC General Council also set about 
forming unemployed associations under trades council control from January 1932, a 
decision that was endorsed at the September Conference. 
81 Report of the South Wales District 5 July 193 2. Scottish District P4M Committee 
Report May 1932. Communist Archive. 
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such a change of policy particularly necessary. 82 As such, the CP offered 
its support to a number of disputes throughout 1932, and often to effect. 
In January 1932, London dockworkers formed a number of rank and file 
committees in opposition to TGWU endorsed wage cuts, and according to 
Joe Leigh (a London communist), Harry Pollitt threw himself into the 
dispute. After instructing the local Party branch to establish contact with 
the dock workers, "[Pollitt] went out himself, found a lighterman bom in 
Manchester, " and from his discussions ("they were like old pals united") 
drew up an account of the lightermen's demands and working conditions 
for the Daily Worker. 83 Although the strike was defeated, the support the 
Party gave to both the strike and the Vigilance Committee established in 
its wake, won the CP the appreciation of the striking men, and also gained 
the Party a number of new recruits. 84 
The Party was even more successful in its work amongst London transport 
workers. Although the MM had previously been hostile to the numerous 
rank and file movements of the London busmen, the Party eventually lent 
its support to militant workers such as Albert Papworth in mid 1932. 
Again, TGWU endorsed wage reductions provoked the dispute. 85 Thus, in 
August 1932, the CPGB and the Daily Worker championed the Rank and 
82The fact that the South Wales District had more branches of the Friends of Soviet 
Russia than the MM by mid 1932 was indicative of the movement's decline. There were 
ten FOSR branches with 256 members, compared to three MM branches with 65. Roort 
of the South Wales District 5 July 1932. Communist Archive. In December 1931 
meanwhile, the MM secretary William Allan admitted that the movement only functioned 
in London and Scotland. Report of the British Commission 2-29 December 193 1. 
Communist Archive. 
831n J. Mahon, liagy Pollit op. cit. p170. 
84As well as covcrage in the Daily Worke the Party and the MM also organised dock 
gate meetings, issued leaflets, strike bulletins and special editions of the London Docker 
news-sheet. See Renort on the London Dock Strike February 1932. Klugmann Papers. 
For the appreciation of the dock workers, see Report of the South Side Strike Committee 
10 January 1932. Klugmann Papers. 
851-1. A Clegg, Labour Relations in London Transport (London, 1950). ppl4-17. 
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File Delegate Committee established by Papworth and his fellow militants. 
The committee was heralded as a'united fighting front', 86 and the 
Busmen's Punch (originally a communist run news-sheet) was relaunched 
as the Busman's Punch, and quickly became the official organ of the 
committee. The CPGB's link to the committee was evident in Emile Bums' 
position as technical editor of the news-sheet, the inclusion of Party 
members such as Bill Ware and Bernard Sharkey, and the significant 
support offered by the London District Party. 87 Thus, rather than 
remaining in opposition to the militant busmen, as exemplified by the MM 
as late as February 1932,88 the CPGB was able to claim a significant 
degree of responsibility for the workers eventual success. 89 Party 
membership in the London garages increased accordingly, and the CP 
could boast an influence among an important and militant section of the 
working class. 
Among the railway workers too, the CPGB refocused its attention away 
from the MM and onto the Railwaymen's Vigilance Movement (RVM) and 
The Railway Vigilant, a news-sheet that claimed 12,000 readers. 90 The 
MM had initially seen the Vigilance Movement as a link between itself 
and the rail workers, but by January 1933 the RVM was recognised as the 
"actual alternative leadership of the railwaymen in the process of 
development. "91 The Party was relatively well represented in the railway 
industry, particularly in London where a number of communist cells were 
86N. Fishman, The British Communist Pgr1y op. cit. pp50-54. 
87London District Report 22 April 1932. Report on London Bus Work 15 November 
1932. Communist Archive. 
"For example, see Daily Worke 23 February 1932. 
89The wage reductions were withdrawn in return for minor concessions. See N. Fishman, 
The British Communist Pgjy op. cit. pp50-54. 
90N. Branson, HistojX of the Communist Pg! Y of Great Britain op. cit. p93. 
91 Rail 
_Statement 
II January 1933. In R. Martin, Communism and the British Trade 
Unions op. cit. p 173. MM members fitrictioned as "supporters and members. " 
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in existence, but the sectarianism of young militants in the Railway MM 
(such as Stuart Purkis), had often stifled Party influence. The formation of 
the RVM, in which the communist head of the Railway MM, W. C Loeber, 
played a prominent role, undoubtedly widened the scope for communist 
involvement. 92 Indeed, one historian of the NUR has suggested the RVM 
"revive[d] a militant spirit within the union. "93 
However, difficulties were apparent, particularly on occasions where local 
Party leaders remained committed to the more 'hard line' interpretation of 
the'independent leadership. ' This was very evident during the Lucas 
dispute in Birmingham, where Pollitt once again clashed with Maurice 
Ferguson, the District Secretary. The dispute emerged when the (mainly) 
unorganised women workers at the factory objected to the introduction of 
the American Bedaux bonus system. Local Party activists rallied to 
support the women and immediately began recruiting them into the MM. 
However, this contrasted with the strategy of the Party centre, which 
instructed the DPC to organise the workers into a rank and file committee 
within the official trade union. 
The DPC met to discuss the dispute on 20 March, with Harry Pollitt in 
attendance. After a report by T. Roberts (the Party Organiser), several 
local comrades, including Ferguson, Millins, Kingston and Lily Webb, 
maintained that it was "fatal to advise workers to join the trade unions. " 
Such a tactic made the workers "prey to the trade union officials" said 
9217or the Party's attitude to the Railwaymen see Harry Pollitfs article in Communist 
Review January 1933. 
93p. S. Bagwell, The RailwayLnen. The Histo! 3! of the National Union of RailwgYmen 
(London, 1963). p522. 
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Millins, and Pollitt 
- 
who was forced to intervene in order to affirm the 
ECCI endorsed policy 
- 
was accused of reversing the line of the Party. 94 
The strike itself was successful. Moreover, the Communist Party's 
agitation in and around the factory enabled the Party to gain a degree of 
support93 despite the "confusion" and hostility to trade union work Pollitt 
noted on his visit to Birmingham. 96 The main obstacle to Party activity, a 
young worker at the factory informed the DPC, was the workers' fear of 
victimisation. 17hus, the support engendered by the local comrades was lost 
following the return to work. 97 
Events in Lancashire also stirred mixed feelings within the Party 
leadership. Local disputes against individual employers occurred 
throughout the year, but by July the situation had intensified significantly. 
Burnley weavers voted for an 'all-out' strike following the Trades 
Federations' failure to respond to the employer's suspension of all previous 
wage and work agreements; and at the end of August mass demonstrations 
took place across Lancashire. 98 
However, the District Party boasted only fitleen cotton workers amongst 
its membership in June 1932. " Individuals such as Lily Webb, James 
Rushton and Bessie Dickinson had been continually involved at the heart 
94Rcp(wri 
, 
in Meeting in Binningharn 20 March 1932. Dutt Suitcase, WCML. 
95Scc T. Robert's speech. The Twelfth Con=ss of the Communist PaLly of Great Britain 
12-15 November 1932. Klugmann Papers. Roberts was carried to the factory by 1,000 
workers in the name of the MM. There is also a dreadfully written piece by Roberts in 
Party Oryaniscr December 1932. 
961, riter froni-I lagy Ptýllijt to Jimmy Shields 10 March 1932. Klugmann Papers. 
97RCMrl on_Mgoing in Birmingham 20 March 1932. Dutt Suitcase, WCML. 
"For the details of the dispute see S. Bruley, inQpgning-the Books ov. cit. and A. 
Bullcn, Thc Calling of the 1932 Cotton Strike', in hLorth West Labour History Group 
Bolictin No. 3 undated. 
991)rafl Rcsolution on the Cotton Strike'. See Minutes of the Political Bureau of the 
Communim Paily Qf Grcat-Hritain 4-5 October 1932. Communist Archive. 
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of the battle, and a number of communists were included among those 
arrested during the countless battles between strikers and police. 100 
However, the Party essentially remained inconsequential to the workers 
concerns. 101 
For Pollitt, who visited Lancashire during the strike, the Party's inability to 
make a decisive impact stemmed from the left excesses of the New Line. 
Robin Page Amot's initial attempts to develop and organise the Party's 
'independent leadership'were roundly condemned by the PB, along with 
his report claiming that the Party was actually 'leading the strike. "02 Thus, 
Pollitt became convinced of the need to further emphasise the importance 
of a communist presence within the existing workers organisations. 
The adoption of the January Resolutions did not immediately transform 
the CPGB into aParty of the masses'. While the overhaul of the CP's 
organisation and working methods had enabled the Party to involve itself 
more effectively among the working class, the resolution of the Twelfth 
Party Congress summed up succinctly the CPGB's record in 1932: 
10OForjust one example, see Bessie and Harold Dickinson in R. A. Leeson, Strike op. cit. 
ppl24-125. 
10 I'Draft Resolution on the Cotton Strike. ' Minutes of the Political Bureau of the 
Communist PaEty of Great Britain 4-5 October 1932. Communist Archive. Certain minor 
successes were achieved during the 1932 dispute. The Solidarity Movement that took 
over from the MM established broader contacts with the local workers; a number of new 
Party Locals emerged during the dispute; the Communist news-sheet, Cotton Strike 
Leade achieved a circulation ofjust under 1,000; and the CP led Strike Relief 
Committee succeeded in getting resolutions adopted by the County Conference of 
striking workers held in Burnley on 7 September. 
102Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PaM of Great Britain 20 August 
1932. Communist Archive. For Pollitt, Lancashire was "a typical example of the Party 
lagging behind" the workers. 
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The Communist Party, although it has won increased influence in the factories and the 
trade unions, has not yet found the way to develop the militancy of the workers into an 
organised revolutionary trade union opposition, firmly based on the factories, and able to 
develop the independent leadership and organisation of the economic struggles. 103 
Problems of Definition 
As well as producing variable results, the January Resolutions caused a 
number of internal difficulties for the CPGB. The muted response of a 
number of Party members has been referred to above, but such passivity 
infiltrated as far as the Party Executive. Of the 81 leading communists who 
had attended the January meetings, only thirteen were trade union 
members, and only six bothered to reply to the Secretariats' circular in 
March requesting details of Party work. 104 
Meanwhile, the overhaul of the Party apparatus had left Pollitt and Rust 
with the burden of co-ordinating the central leadership. The apparent 
lethargy of his comrades, became a constant source of irritation for the 
General Secretary. In March, Pollitt described to Jimmy Shields the 
"steady daily grind" from "early morning to midnight" that made up his 
political life. 105 In addition to such organisational problems however, the 
CPGB leadership also encountered difficulties relating to the interpretation 
of the January line. 
The actual meaning of the united front from below, and the extent to which 
the slogan should be applied, was one such example. The London District 
Party complained in June about "confusion [over] the question of the ILP, " 
as local ILP branches approached the CP to discuss the possibility ofjoint 
103The Road to VictoKy. The Twelfth Congress of the Communist PgM of Great Britain 
(London, 1932). 
104Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pqr! y of Great Britain 10-11 
October 1932. Communist Archive. 
105Letter from Hara Pollitt to Jimmy Shields 10 March 1932. Klugmann Papers 
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campaigns against'hunger and war. '106 In addition, this 'confusion'was 
compounded by the possibility of the ILP's disaffiliation from the Labour 
Party. 107 
In June, the Party Executive described the 'united front' as, 
[an] alliance (not organisational). It is the working of Communist Party members with all 
other workers irrespective of political or organisational association, for the realisation of 
an immediate programme of action. It is not something that can achieve unity of the 
divisions that exist in the working class movement, but it is something that can strengthen 
the workers daily struggle in the present situation. It does not mean an organisational 
bloc; it does not mean coming together in a specific bloc of organisations such as the ILP 
or the Labour Party; but it does mean that in the factories and the localities, ILP, Labour 
Party etc. workers can come together to fight against the means test, wage cuts, for a7 
hour day. 108 
As for the ILP itself, the CP resolved to expose its disaffiliation from the 
Labour Party as a manoeuvre provoked by the increasingly militant rank 
and file, but designed to prevent the workers crossing over to the 
Communist Party. The CPGB insisted that while the ILP leadership uttered 
'left phrases', its policy essentially remained the same as that of the Labour 
Party. 109 Indeed, so bitter were the denunciations of the ILP in the Daily 
Worker, that at the Twelfth ECCI Plenum, Gusev (of the KPD) warned the 
CPGB that such attacks were more likely to ward off potential recruits 
than attract them. I 10 Even so, the 'treacherous nature' of the ILP remained a 
fundamental facet of the CPGB line 
- 
as demonstrated at the open debate 
106Six Months Work in the London District Cagying out the CC Resolution undated 
1932. Klugmann Papers. 
107The ILP finally voted to disaffiliate from the Labour Party in August 1932. 
108Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Paqy of Great Britain 4-5 June 
1932. Communist Archive. 
109See The Road to Victo! y. The Twelfth Congress of the Communist Pgr1y of Great 
Britain op. cit. 
I IOSee Robson's report on the Plenum to the PB. Minutes of the Political Bureau of the 
Communist PaE! y of Great Britain 4-5 October 1932. Communist Archive. See ! )ALIY 
Worker 20 July 1932 for an example of the Party's attacks on the ILP leadership. 
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between HarryPollitt and Fenner Brockway in April I H-while joint 
action with ILP members was encouraged only so long as'no compromise' 
over reformism was exacted from the CPGB in the process. The united 
fTont had to be on communist terms. 112 
It was the question of trade union work that most occupied the CPGB 
leadership in 1932. In London, the'Balharn Group' of left communists 
launched a number of attacks on the Party line following the adoption of 
the January Resolutions. The main focus of criticism was the resolutions' 
assertion that the lower trade union organs could be utilised by the 
Party; ' 13 and the group quoted both Dutt and Losovsky to support their 
view that trade unions were "unsuited to be effective organs of class 
struggle. " 114 In line with the January Resolutions, the secretariat and the 
London District Working Bureau dismissed the group's criticisms as 
'sectarian. ' However, once it became clear that certain members of the 
group had links with American Trotskyists, any influence that Groves, 
Sara, Wicks and Purkis wished to have on CPG13 policy was curtailed. The 
Party decreed in June that no ftirther articles by the group would be 
published through the Party press, and as the group's criticism began to 
target the Party leadership and the policy of the ECCI, three of its leading 
III See, Which Way for the Workers? HLM Pollitt versus Fenner Brockwgy (London, 
1932). Pollitt remained fiercely opposed to the ILP, and he belittled Brockway's 'feeble 
performance' in a letter to Jimmy Shields on 21 April 1932 (Klugmann Papers). While 
keen to re-address the excesses of the Party's trade union policy, Pollitt remained totally 
committed to class against class vis a vis rival political parties (and indeed the trade union 
bureaucracy). 
112Road to Victo1y. The Twelfth Congress of the Communist PaM of Great Britain op. 
cit. The Congress called for ILP members to join the CPGB and even answered criticisms 
of the CPGB made by the ILP rank and file. However, a united front from above was 
categorically ruled out and the policy of the ILP condemned. 
IDDaily Worke 14 April 1932. See also, R. Groves, The Balham Group op. cit. pp45- 
52, for a discussion of the group and its links with Trotsky. 
114Lefter to the Secretariat 12 May 1932. Communist Archive. Printed in Daily Worke 
27 May 1932. The Losovsky quote was edited out of the article, but Losovsky himself 








Jack Murphy was also expelled from the Party in 1932. Murphy, who had 
always been something of a maverick character in the CPGB, fell foul of 
the Party leadership following his suggestion that the Party campaign for 
credits to be issued to the USSR, and for Soviet ships to be built in British 
ship yards. ' 16 Such a line, the rest of the Party leadership reasoned, 
suggested that the capitalist and socialist systems could be 'integrated' and 
that capitalism could actually help Soviet development. After a series of 
debates, at which Murphy rarely appeared, he was expelled and 
systematically denounced in the Party press. ' 17 
One interesting sideline of the dispute however, was the contrast between 
Harry Pollitt's attitude to Murphy and his attitude to the 'right deviationists' 
of 1929. Where Pollitt had defended the likes of Inkpin and Rothstein, he 
wasted no such effort on Murphy. The two men had never been close, 
despite their being'founding fathers' of the CPGB, and in late 1923 Pollitt 
had only just refrained himself from hitting Murphy at an EC meeting. ' 18 
With Murphy's fall into disfavour in 1932, Pollitt described him as a 
"coward" and a "renegade of the first rank. "' 19 
11 5R. Groves, The Balharn Group op. cit. pp69-7 1. The Balham Group was thus 
'liquidated'with individual members being invited to re-apply for membership. Hugo 
Dewar, a Tooting communist who had links with the Balharn Group, was also expelled. 
For Henry Sara see A. J. P. Taylor, A Personal History (Great Britain, 1983). pp54-55 and 
72-77. 
116For Murphy's argument, see Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PLM 
of Great Britain 5 March 1932. Communist Archive. Communist Review April 1932. 
Also, Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PgjY of Great Britain 7 May 
1932. Communist Archive. 
11717or example, Daily Worke 10 May, 1932. Communist Review June 1932. 
118K. Morgan, HagyPolli op. cit. p42. 
119Letter from Pollitt to Jimmy Shields II May 1932. Klugmann Papers. "Every time 
detectives were outside his office" Pollitt revealed, "he [Murphy] would always come and 
ask if we should not go underground, and before he went to Sheffield it go so bad that we 
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More damaging to the Party leadership was the disagreement that emerged 
in the wake of Harry Pollitt's attempt to instigate a "slight turn" in the 
Party's trade union work. 120 As noted above, the example of the Members' 
Rights Movement in the AEU, and the CPs evident ineffectiveness, had 
convinced Pollitt of the need to emphasise the necessity of communist 
agitation in the trade unions. Moreover, in an article for the Daily Worker 
on 29 July, Pollitt'insisted that a 'drive into the union branches' could 
effect the policy of the TUC; a position that contrasted clearly with the 
idea that the trade unions were an entrenched part of the capitalist state 
and thus no longer an effective instrument in the class struggle. 121 
PollitVs main intention was to refute any suggestion that the Party pursued 
an anti trade union poliCy. 122 In an editorial written for the Cotton Strike 
Leade 
, 
he insisted that "we carry forward the fight inside the unions so 
that we can take them out of the hands of the present leaders, and by 
electing militant, reliable and sincere workers to all positions in the local 
union, transform them into strong instruments and weapons in our daily 
struggles. " 123 In suggesting that a revolutionary trade union opposition 
could not be achieved without "strengthening the branches, District 
Committees and everything which has to be had with the workers struggle 
had to tell him to work away from his office 
... 
[and he] never took a jump that meant no 
money at the end of it. " Pollitt recalled also, how Murphy refused to go without wages in 
1928 despite the fact that the rest of the Party leadership were obliged to. Minutes of the 
Political Bureau of the Communist Pgrty of Great Britain 8 May 1932. Communist 
Archive. 
120Pollitt described his policy as a'sligbt turn! at the PB in October. Minutes of the 
Political Bureau of the Communist PaM of Great Britain 10-11 October 1932. 
Communist Archive. 
121Daily Worke 19 July 1932. "We must clear our minds of the belief that nothing can 
be done inside the trade unions, that the leaders are taking no notice of rank and file 
demands. "
122Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist P4rly of Great Britain 17 September 
1932. Communist Archive. 
123Cotton Strike Leader September 1932. Klugmann Papers. 
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in the trade unions, "124 Pollitt raised further issues that potentially diverged 
from the Comintern line. Could the unions become organs of class struggle 
and could the rank and file effect the policy of the union leadership? How 
much of the apparatus was under the control of the capitalist state and how 
much could the communists actually'win'? Were local officials social- 
fascists or potential allies? 125 
To Pollitt's surprise, his remarks in July initially went unchallenged, but 
his subsequent articles in the Daily Worker, Communist Review, and the 
Cotton Strike Leader, provoked a reply from Palme Dutt. Pollitt's articles 
warned Dutt, gave the impression that the existing trade unions could be 
developed into organs of class struggle, and that statements alluding to 
'powerful united trade unionism' negated the Party's opposition to the 
existing union apparatus. 126 Dutt was also appalled by an 'interview' with 
the MM secretary William Allan, in which Allan called the 1932 TUC 
resolution in support of the cotton workers a 'magnificent display of 
solidarity. 'In fact, the 'interview' had been composed by William Rust, 
Johnny Campbell and William Gallacher, 127 but such statements 
complained Dutt 
- 
along with 'uneven and general' talk of 'strengthening 
unions'- suggested a reversal of "our whole trade union line. "128 
124Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PajU of Great Britain 10-11 
October 1932. Communist Archive. 
125For the last question see Daily Worke 30 August 1932 where Tom Wintringham 
discussed the class position of the 'petty bourgeois' union official, and the need to 'win' 
these branch secretaries etc. For an opposing view see G. Graham in Daily Worke 7 
September 1932. 
12617or Harry PollitVs views, see Daily Worke 20 August 1932 and Communist Review 
September 1932. For Dutt, see Daily Worke 19 September 1932. 
127Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Great Britain 17 September 
1932. Communist Archive. 
128For the Allan interview see Daily Worke 8 September 1932. For Dutt's criticism see 
Daily Worke 14 September 1932. 
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While the debate raged in the Daily Worker, it positively exploded in 
meetings of the PB. One meeting even had to be adjourned as Willie 
Gallacher and Johnny Campbell disagreed angrily over the extent to which 
a union branch could be'won'! 129 William Rust, following Dutt's lead, 
contended that Pollitt was 'falsifying' the Party line, and he was supported 
by Tapsell and Campbell in insisting that the Party pursue a policy distinct 
from the trade union apparatus. 130 Pollitt's emphasis on trade union work 
and the belief that the communists could strengthen the unions 'encouraged 
opportunism, '131 said Rust. 
The most vocal supporter of Pollitt was William Gallacher. Gallacher, who 
accused Rust and Dutt of plotting against Pollitt, described Dutt's 
arguments as "a very definite anti trade union poliCy, "132 and mobilised 
support for Pollitt through the Scottish District Party. 133 Pollitt was also 
backed by the MM secretary William Allan, who felt Dutt's approach 
129Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Great Britain 17 September 
1932. Communist Archive. 
DOThe main arguments took place at the P13 meetings on 17 September, 4-5 October and 
10-11 October. Tapsell insisted that the "trade union branch is a necessary part of the 
trade union apparatus 
... 
[and] is always gripped 
... 
[by] the control the apparatus 
exercises through it. " (Minutes, 4-5 October, 1932) Johnny Campbell maintained that 
"you have to have a struggle independent of the union apparatus" (Minutes 10-11 
October, 1932), and agreed that the branch was intrinsically linked to the apparatus 
(Minutes 17 September, 1932). In the Daily Worke 15 September 1932, Campbell also 
denied the possibility of forcing the trade union bureaucracy'into actiotf, and he 
supported Rust's sununation that the TUC passed the resolution in support of the cotton 
workers as a manoeuvre to gain control of the strike (Minutes 10-11 October, 1932). 
This casts doubt on Nina Fishmatfs theory that Pollitt and Campbell worked closely 
together to change the Party's trade union policy (see N. Fishman The British Communist 
Larty op. cit. pp5-6). While the two men were both members of the secretariat and were 
close, they did not present a coherent line either in the P13 or the Party press. See also, 
Campbell in Daily Worke 8 November 1932. 
13 IMinutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pq! jy of Great Britain 10 October 
1932. Communist Archive. Rust believed that the TUC's support of the cotton workers 
was a 'manoeuvre' to win the leadership of the strike from the workers in order to betray 
it. 
132Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Parjy of Great Britain 17 September 
1932. Communist Archive. 
133The Scottish Party passed a resolution condemning Rust and Dutt's estimation of the 
trade union bureaucracy in October. See Resolution of the Scottish District Pally 
Committee 6 October 1932. Klugmann Papers. 
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"hampered" the workers struggle. To claim that the unions were "devoted 
to capitalism" Allan reasoned, would only discourage the workers. 134 
The eventual resolution presented to the Twelfth Party Congress 
effectively endorsed the line of the January Resolution in terms of the 
Party's'aims and objectives. The Party was to "participate in every phase of 
trade union activity, and aim at the winning of all elective posts and 
representative positions in factory and trade union activity. " As such, trade 
union work was a "logical, vital and integral part of our mass work 
... 
and 
the object is the winning of trade unionists and lower organs for the line of 
independent leadership and struggle. "135 Certain more 'thorny' issues were 
dropped, such as the ability of the rank and file to influence the TUC, and 
the possibility of 'strengthening' the trade unions; while the emphasis was 
placed on winning trade unionists, rather than the trade unions per se. 
Moreover, the line was linked back to the Leeds Congress 
- 
despite 
Pollitt's assertion that the Eleventh Congress resolution now made him 
want to "Vomit" 136 
- 
thus appeasing Rust and Dutt's desire for continuity. 
However, Pollitt and Gallacher had succeeded in emphasising both the 
central importance of trade union work and the significance of the workers' 
rank and file movements. Indeed, this "modus vivendi, " as Kevin Morgan 
134Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pagy of Great Britain 17 September 
1932. Communist Archive. Daily Worke 19 September 1932. Pollitt was also supported 
by R. W. Robson, Jimmy Shields and Idris Cox, and several local communists wrote in 
support of the more optimistic trade union line. The Tyneside District Party however, 
supported Dutt. 
135See Daily Worker 18 October 1932, and The Road to Victojy. The Twelfth Congress 
of the Communist Party of Great Britain op. cit. At the June CC, the Party had resolved to 
"win every position we possibly can in the union branches, every contact we can, and to 
take into the trade union branches not merely ourselves, but masses of workers who we 
have influenced, in order that these union branches can become powerful allies in the 
independent struggle of the working class. " Minutes of the Central Committee of the 
Communist PLrjy of Great Britain 4-5 June 1932. Communist Archive. Also see Party 
Organiser June 1932. 
136Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pg! y of Great Britain 10-11 
October 1932. Communist Archive. 
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describes the congress resolution, 137 was evident in both Dutt and Pollitt's 
pre congress articles for the Daily Worker. 138 
The Twelfth Congress was the last to be held before the significant 
overhaul of Comintern policy in 1933-35 towards the Popular Front. In 
many ways the congress saw the New Line expressed in its most workable 
form. The Party finally jettisoned the sectarian vestiges of the policy, and 
simultaneously set about constructing a viable united front of the working 
class 'from below. ' This entailed an emphasis on work within the trade 
union movement as well as outside it, and the call for joint action with the 
rank and file of the ILP (and even the Labour Party) on issues relevant to 
the struggle of the workers. 
Although such policies had been possible (potentially) since the adoption 
of the New Line in 1928, the numerous difficulties of interpretation, and 
the various realignments of the ECCI vis a vis the'right danger, had 
constantly hampered its application. And while the problems of the Third 
Period should neither be exaggerated nor underestimated, the 
reorganisation of the Party in 1932, and the more politically charged 
climate of 1931-32, enabled the Party to re-establish itself amongst a 
wider section of the working class. 
137K. Morgan, HqMLPollitt op. cit. p80. 
13817or Pollitt, see Daily Worke 7 November 1932. Pollitt admitted making'unclear 
formulations', the main criticism of Dutt. For Dutt see, Daily Worker 12 November 1932. 
Dutt emphasised clearly the necessity and possibilities of trade union work. The outcome 
of the ECCI Plenum, held in August-September, had given credence to Pollitts more pro- 
union agenda. Pollitt quoted liberally from the Plenum speeches of Kuusinen and 
Piatnitsky at the Party Congress. The Plenum had underlined the need for a communist 
presence in the unions, including the utilisation of trade union branches and councils, 
while Losovsky withdrew his description of unions as 'schools of capitalism. ' 
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Crucially, the CPGB was advancing at the end of the Third Period. 
Membership figures had returned to their pre General Strike level, the 
shackles of the MM had finally been abandoned in favour of rank and file 
movements developing inside the established trade unions, and the 
NUWM was the undisputed leader of the unemployed. Moreover, in the 
fledgling anti-war campaigns instigated by the Party, the beginnings of the 
anti-fascist front were clearly evident. As such, the development of the 
CPGB throughout 1931-32 ebbed and flowed in conjunction with the 
wider political developments in Britain and its labour movement. And 
although the Third Period had brought the Party to the brink of collapse, 
the CPGB had stubbornly refused to disappear. 
Conclusions 
The political-economic of crisis of 1931 gave new life to the CPGB. The 
heightened political climate and the successful mobilisation of the 
unemployed by the NUWM, placed the CPGB at the heart of events. 
Furthermore, the sustained campaigns of the unemployed movement 
acutely revealed the Party's dominant influence among the jobless 
workers. As such, the shift of communist practice referred to throughout 
this thesis was clearly apparent. While the Party remained on the periphery 
of the 'industrial struggle' and irrelevant to Britain's parliamentary politics, 
in local communities and around the dole queues, communists were 
regularly to the fore. 
Within the Party itself, the organisational overhaul of January 1932, and 
the adoption of a broader interpretation of the united from below, the 
CPGB successfully steadied its precarious existence. Although difficulties 
and disagreements remained, the emergence of Harry Pollitt as the 
undisputed leader of the CPGB allowed a more focused political strategy 
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to develop. Additionally, the CPs concentration on both the 'grass roots' of 
the Party and the workers struggle placed communist agitation more firmly 
within the reality of 1930s Britain. Communists once again allied 
themselves with militant workers in the factories and the unions. In 
addition, the exposure of 'left sectarianism' restricted but did not remove 
its negative influence. 
Crucially however, the policy detailed in the January resolutions remained 
firmly rooted to the concepts of class against class. Both the ECCI and 
British leaders such as Pollitt, Gallacher and Allan, varied the emphasis of 
the New Line. The focus on independent leadership was substituted for 
support in favour of the 'day to day' demands of the workers. The offensive 
against the 'right' was replaced by exposure and condemnation of 'left 
sectarianism. ' All these factors were included in the resolutions of the 
Tenth ECCI Plenum, it was their expression and their primacy that was 
transformed throughout the Third Period. 
From 1933, the focus of the ECCI became centred increasing upon the rise 
of fascism and encroaching war. Although not officially abandoned until 
the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern in 1935, the New Line was 
effectively adapted to the temper and political-economic paradigm of the 
mid 1930s. Similarly, the arrest of the economic depression presented new 
structural transformations. Such developments once again altered the 
'spaces' in which the CPGB were able and endeavoured to act, and a new 
chapter of the Party's history was opened. 
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Conclusion 
The Third Period Reassessed 
The six years between 1927 and 1932 were difficult and traumatic ones for 
I 
the CPGB. The Party's slow but steady growth from 1920 to 1926 came to 
an abrupt end following the collapse of the miners' lock-out, and as links 
between the CPGB and the wider labour movement were severed. 
- 
Unemployment ravaged the Party membership. In addition, the militant 
line pursued by the communist movement, particularly in 1928-30 induced 
divisions within the CPGB that exacerbated problems already afflicting the 
Party. 
As a consequence of such turmoil, methods of Party work were necessarily 
revised. Moreover, the focus of communist activity shifted to correspond 
with the social-structural environment of the time, and the location of the 
CP rank and file. Thus, militant miners became militant unemployed 
workers, communist activists who had worked inside the trade unions 
became concerned predominantly with the CPGB (and NUWM) and 
'critical support' of a Labour opposition became condemnation of a Labour 
Government. 
Most importantly, the fortunes of the CPGB must be considered within the 
general social, political and economic framework of 1926-32. Four inter- 
relating factors were central to the Party's experience; first, the structural 
changes and deepening economic crisis afflicting Great Britain throughout 
the 1920s-30s; second, the defensive and subsequently moderate position 
of the British labour movement; third, the increasing disparity between the 
communist and labour-socialist perspective; fourth, those conditions 
inherent within Britain's political composition antithetical to the 
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advancement of militant policy. Within such a context, the CPGB was 
forced to realign both its policy and its perspective, a transition that proved 
painful and temporarily incapacitating. 
The CPGB's membership of the Communist International was also 
fundamental to the Party's political perspective. The infamous 21 
conditions of the CI bound the CPGB to the decisions of the Comintern, 
and the objectives of the CI were subsequently expressed through the 
British Party. This was particularly evident between 1928-29, as the 
Comintern conducted an offensive against the'right danger' throughout the 
movement, and imposed the theoretical orthodoxy of the New Line. 
However, as Kevin McDermott has recently suggested in relation to the 
CI's programme of Bolshevisation, the stated aims of the Comintern were 
often diverse and open to interpretation. 1 With regard to the New Line this 
was equally so. The numerous 'tasks of the Party' detailed at the various 
plenums and congresses remained relatively varied. Disparities between 
ECCI, RILU and CPGB policies were evident, and once the'right danger' 
had been defeated in 1929, a political pragmatism characterised the 
directives of the International Executive. 
The pressure placed upon the British Party by the ECCI between 1927 and 
1929 should not suggest however, that the formulations and objectives of 
the New Line contrasted with those of the CPGB. The CP's approach to 
the Labour Party and trade union bureaucracy had hardened noticeably in 
the wake of the General Strike. Restrictions placed on communist 
influence within the 'official' labour movement preoccupied the Party 
I K. McDermott, 'Boishevisation'From Above'or'From Below'. The Comintern and 
European Communism in the 1920s. 'In T. Saarela and K. Rentola, Communism National 
and International (Finland, 1998). p 112. 
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Executive's discussions of 1927-8. In addition, the notions of class against 
class were welcomed by a significant minority of the Party leadership, and 
large sections of the rank and file. The divisions that ravaged the British 
Party must therefore be seen as a culmination of indigenous and external 
forces. 
And yet, the Third Period also included an increase in Party membership, 
the extension of the communist led NUWM, and the onset of a distinct 
political culture centred around the CPGB. The ability to organise the 
unemployed was undoubtedly the CPGB's principal success of the late 
1920s, early 30s. The movement had begun as the embodiment of a united 
front from below in 192 1, and although many of the methods employed by 
Hannington, McShane and Elias were criticised by the CPGB and the 
Comintern, the NLJWM exemplified the 'independent leadership' endorsed 
in the New Line. Ironically however, the CPGB placed more emphasis on 
the working class, and the NUWM never received the acclaim it deserved. 
The cultural initiatives of the CPGB demonstrated communist zeal and 
enthusiasm, albeit at a local level. Workers' sport and theatre groups 
exposed the CP to broad sections of the working class, and the formation 
of campaigns such as the Tottenham Workers' Sports Association and the 
Ramblers'Rights Movement benefited many outside the parameters of the 
CPGB. Similarly, the Party's commitment to education perpetuated the 
noble scholarly traditions of the nineteenth century labour movement. 
Altogether, the years of class against class were ones of transition for the 
CPGB. The foundations of the British labour movement were shifting and 
the Party was forced to adapt itself accordingly. Subsequently, although 
the Third Period has come to represent a'low' in the Party's development, 
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the events and traumas of 1926-32 were integral to the CPGB's future 
development. That the Party survived at all was testament to the 
committed men and women who gave themselves so selflessly to 'the 
cause. ' It is to them that this thesis is dedicated. 
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